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On the Origins and Strategic Dynamics of pre-Legal Jihad 610 - 680 C.E.

Kader, Mehdi Kurgan

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On the Origins and Strategic Dynamics of pre-Legal Jihad
610 - 680 C.E.

Candidate:
Mehdi Kurgan Kader

The Department of War Studies,
King's College London

For the degree of Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) in War Studies

2016

ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the *strategic dynamics* of Jihad across the first 70 years of Islam, surveying how the military instrument dynamically served policy in a means-end relationship; and was the product of both the systemic strategic environment, and the *bargaining dynamics* of domestic politics. Two distinct concepts of Jihad are distinguished; the first is the theological and perpetual contest or *absolute Jihad*, that seeks to impose the jurisdiction of God's sovereignty without challenge; and secondly, Jihad in reality, that is, war in reality subject to the vicissitudes of the strategic setting and environment.

Mapping the evolution of Jihad reveals that the initial warfighting practices of the Prophet Muhammad served revolutionary policies that would be transformed by the policies of successive Caliphates (*al-Khulafa al-Rashidun*) yet remain the *idiom of military action* in Islam. Specifically, Jihad served the functions of homeland security, defensive expansionism, and most prominently, an emancipatory interventionist Da'wa Policy. In its final evolution, during the first caliphate of the Umayyad Dynasty, Jihad served an imperial agenda designed to regain strategic and regional hegemony. The *strategic dynamics* of Jihad across the first seventy-years of Islam was infused by the *cult of the offensive* as early Muslim political leadership competed with regional actors for superior offense-dominance and the strategic initiative, under conditions of anarchy and self-help.

The research concludes that the proposition of 'Jihad as a continuation of *politik* by other means' accurately reflects the politico-strategic behaviour of Muslim political administrations during the first century of Islam. *Absolute Jihad* consistently provided the permissive essence for policies of limited warfare that sought to implement Jihad as the *idiom of military action*, although objectives were set according to the geo-political and strategic realities of the operational and strategic environment and setting and not upon theological imperatives or absolute war.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank the Department of War Studies, King's College London, for a decade of education in War Studies. In particular, I would like to express my appreciation and thanks to my supervisor Professor Michael Rainsborough whose mentorship has been invaluable; Dr. Barrie Paskins (retired) for encouraging my academic path, and Professor Philip Sabin who believed in my potential. Additionally, I would like to thank Professors Guglielmo Verdirame and Isabelle Duyvesteyn, Dr. John Stone, and Dr. James Worrall, for their insightful comments and criticisms, without which this work would never have been.

Finally, a special thanks to my wife, son, and daughter, whose enduring patience, love and support, has sustained me during my research.

This work was supported by the Economic and Social Research Council [ES/I018050/1].

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GLOSSARY

<i>Absolute Jihad</i>	Theological battle between ‘Truth’ and ‘Falsity’; the absolute Sovereignty of God versus the laws of mankind over others.
<i>Ahl al-Dhimma</i>	Non-Muslim citizens of the <i>dar al-Islam</i>
<i>Al-sahaba</i>	Companions of the Prophet
<i>Al-shura</i>	Consultative political decision-making
<i>Al-wala wa al-bara</i>	Loyalty and disavowal
<i>Amir al-Mu’meneen</i>	Commander of the Believers
<i>Asabiyya</i>	Tribal partisanship
<i>Ayyam al-‘Arab</i>	Glorified traditions of Arab warfare
<i>Bay‘a</i>	Oaths of allegiance
<i>Bughat</i>	Rebels, insurgents, or political revolutionaries
<i>Dar al-Ahd</i>	Territories with diplomatic alliances
<i>Dar al-harb</i>	Hostile territories
<i>Dar al-Islam</i>	Muslim territories
<i>da’wa</i>	Lit. to call or invite – Missionary proselytisation
<i>Diwan</i>	Military roster of personnel
<i>Ermattungsstrategie</i>	Strategy of exhaustion
<i>Fatawa</i>	Legal Verdicts (sing. <i>Fatwa</i>)
<i>Fiqh</i>	Legal codes in Islam
<i>Fitna</i>	Lit. trial or sedition/ temptation – The First Civil War of Islam
<i>Fi sabil l’Allah</i>	<i>Nisus</i> specifically expended according to or in service of, the commands of God – the Shari‘a.
<i>Futuh</i> (pl. <i>Futuhāt</i>)	Lit. ‘to open’ - <i>The</i> historical events of Islamic expansion during the <i>Rashidun</i> era.
<i>Ghazwa</i> (pl. <i>Ghazawat</i>)	Military operations led by the Prophet
<i>Hadith</i>	Recorded narrations attributed to the Prophet
<i>Haras</i>	Close-protection units
<i>Hijaz</i>	A fertile region of Western Arabia

<i>Hijra</i>	Migration
<i>Jahiliya</i>	Pre-Islamic value system that prided itself upon virtues of excess
<i>Jihad</i>	<i>Nisus</i>
<i>Jihad al-Nafs</i>	Self-disciplined restraint and a commitment
<i>Khilafa tul Rasulullah</i>	The Deputy of the Prophet
<i>Kriegskunst</i>	Art of War
<i>Kriegführung</i>	Conduct of War
<i>Kuffar</i>	Non-Muslims
<i>Kufr</i>	The rejection of God's authority and jurisdiction
<i>Lex talonis</i>	Tribal retaliation
<i>Maghazi</i>	The biography of the Prophet, often with specific reference to his politico-military career
<i>Mulk</i>	Royal government
<i>Nisus</i>	To struggle for perfection in a particular endeavour
<i>Politik</i>	The <i>interplay</i> of policy and politics
<i>Qital</i>	Warfighting
<i>Rashidun</i>	The period of Al-Khulafa' <i>al-Rashidun</i> - the Rightly-Guided Caliphs - who reigned 632-661 CE
<i>Ribat</i>	Border outposts
<i>Ridda</i>	Apostasy
<i>Saraya</i> (sing. <i>Sariya</i>)	Military operations ordered but unaccompanied by the Prophet
<i>Seera</i>	The biography of the Prophet
<i>Siyar</i>	An early corpus of legal work on international relations
<i>Shari'a</i>	Divine ordinances to regulate human conduct
<i>Shi'at ul- 'Ali</i>	The political supporters of 'Ali ibn Abu Talib
<i>Shurta</i>	Police
<i>Sunna</i>	The 'Precedent' or practice of the Prophet
<i>Strategie</i>	Strategy
<i>Tabaqat</i>	Historical biographies of the Prophet's companions
<i>Ta'lif al-qulub</i>	Soft-power technique of creating friendly relations (Lit. to reconcile hearts)
<i>Zakat</i>	The mandatory poor-alms tax levied upon all Muslims

ABBREVIATIONS

- BLD** al-Baladhuri (2002), *Kitab Futuh al-Buldan*
- I.H.** Ibn Hisham (2013), *Sirah of Ibn Hisham*
- I.I.** Ibn Ishaq (1998), *Sirat Rasul Allah*
- I.K.** Ibn Kathir (2010), *The Lives of the Noble Caliphs*
- I.K.a** Ibn Kathir (2012), *The Caliphate of Banu Umayyah*
- OW** *On War* - Clausewitz (1984)
- Q** The Qur'an
- WQ** al-Waqidi (2010), *Kitab al-Maghazi*
- WQS** al-Waqidi (2005), *Kitab Futuh ash-Sham*

CHAPTER ONE

On the Origins and Strategic Dynamics of pre-Legal Jihad

610 - 680 C.E.

Jihad as the Continuation of *Politik* by other Means

1.0. Introduction

This study examines the *strategic dynamics* of Jihad as a continuation of *politik* by other means from 610 to 680 C.E. The *strategic dynamics* of Jihad refers to the broad identification of critical stages and events that formed a consistent process in the evolution of Jihad that is congruent with *strategic theoretics* or the generally acknowledged ‘strategic approach’. Modern strategic studies broadly speaking, is a relatively young field that can expand and develop critical, responsible, and purposive conclusions, but has yet to be applied to the Islamic discourse in any meaningful manner. The research presented in this study is a working example of the scope and breadth that *strategic theoretics* can achieve when creatively applied.

In this study, *strategic theoretics* are used to explore the relationship between ends and means; providing an analysis or framework to translate how the expected utility of armed force was used to serve political objectives through the medium of policy and decision-making processes during the first century of Islam. The research establishes the instrumentalisation of warfighting in Islam as a function of *politik* that is both external policy and internal politics; and how ideas of Jihad became institutionalised and consequently affected strategic thought.

A method of diagnostic assessment is employed to test the tenability of offensive realist assumptions through the prime predictions of variables expected to induce war based upon shifts in the offense-defense balance between strategic actors, known as Offense-Defense Theory.¹ The method of investigation and research design has been encouraged by the continuing strategic lacunae and failure to address major theoretical issues concerning the original concept of Jihad that is an essential element constituting the conceptual core of early Islamic history. The overall approach distinguishes the originality of the research methodology and intention as the first strategically *committed* investigation of Jihad.

¹ Following the American-English convention of the theory the spelling of defense shall remain as used by its practitioners, and all references to the theory and its applications shall retain the spelling *defense* to maintain congruity with theory. In instances unrelated to offense-defense theory, the conventional British spelling *defence* shall be used.

1.1. The Problem Statement

Since September 11th 2001, Islam and warfare has stimulated an increasingly large academic and non-academic interest. ‘Jihad’ has become a well-established word not only in common parlance, but also in the vernacular of academia. Current studies in social sciences, such as war studies, political science, and public policy refer to - and deal with - the topic in various interdisciplinary guises and yet, over the past decade these studies have failed to trigger any substantial analytical interest in the *strategic dynamics* of the original politico-military policies and doctrine of the early Muslims.

Instead, Jihad has remained so ambiguous that some academic scholars have commented: ‘between Western and Islamic culture there is possibly no other single issue at the same time as divisive or as poorly understood as that of jihad.’² Reuven Firestone claims ‘Islam is perhaps the most misunderstood religion to the West, and many stereotypes still hinder clarity about its tenets and practices. Western prejudice toward Islam is as old as Islam itself.’³ Fred Donner describes this problem of deficiency in scholarship as less an issue of prejudice but rather as ‘a practical one’ due to the lack of ‘preliminary work on a vast subject.’⁴ As a result, academics and lay readers, whether Muslims or non-Muslims, are liable to ignore or misunderstand the earliest forms of politico-strategic thought concerning Jihad, focusing instead upon purely religious and legal interpretations and explanations that rarely reach beyond the surface of the strategic dynamics involved.

Accordingly, this study will induce a level of strategic appreciation through recognition of politico-strategic patterns and military phenomena which Muslim and non-Muslim actors share, domestically and internationally. A key aim of this study is to demonstrate alignment with existing *strategic theoretics* in order to elucidate how the dynamics at play or common misperceptions pertaining to Jihad are in fact strategically comprehensible by applying *strategic theoretics* over traditional legal-based and historical analysis.

² Johnson (1997), p.19

³ Firestone (1999), p.13

⁴ Donner (1991), p.57

1.2. Introductory Definitions

This thesis explores the relationship between Jihad and politics, and how the *strategic dynamics* of Jihad as a matter of policy are affected by this interplay. It may be useful to state from the start that *politics* is far broader than the concerns of rational calculation (policy) and is the totality of Clausewitz's trinity reflecting the *strategic interactions* between its parts and the interplay of policy – which is meant by *politik*. Broadly understood, *politik*, or simply 'politics' (meaning both *the political* and policy):

... is a struggle for power between opposing forces - political events and outcomes are rarely if ever the product of any single actor's conscious intentions. Politics, [...], is a chaotic process involving competing personalities (...), chance and friction, and popular emotion.⁵

The basic distinction between the term politics and policy (= *politik*) in this study, is that policy refers to the rational calculation of policy by which military force may be instrumentally used to serve a political end; and politics which is broadly employed to refer to domestic strategic interaction between opposing forces *bargaining* for power and influence. Both terms are contained within the term *politik*, and are features of the Clausewitzian trinity.

More specifically however, this study highlights those elements of *bargaining* that are quintessential to politico-strategic interactions. This mode of political interaction is especially valued in game theory but also for qualitative investigations of conflict dynamics between adversaries. Thomas Schelling is perhaps the most well-known author of this form of politico-strategic analysis and explains that 'War is always a bargaining process, one in which threats and proposals, counterproposals and counterthreats, offers and assurances, concessions and demonstrations, take the form of actions rather than words.'⁶ Naturally, those unfamiliar with the nature of war and the anarchical society, might object to such a statement, just as Thomas Schelling notes

⁵ Villacres & Bassford (1995), p.14

⁶ Schelling (2008), p.142

To think of war as a bargaining process is uncongenial to some of us. Bargaining with violence smacks of extortion, vicious politics, callous diplomacy, and everything indecent, illegal, or uncivilized. It is bad enough to kill and to maim, but to do it for gain and not for some transcendent purpose seems even worse.⁷

It is this very distinction between the mundane and the transcendent vying for controlling influence over policy that shall be a constant theme of investigation in this study. Religion, and the role of belief is distinguished in this study between a ‘meta-narrative’ and the value-systems of strategic actors. In regards to the former, Amr Sabet makes an important distinction with regards to conceptually gauging how the term ‘politics’ is used, explaining; ‘Tenuous differences between terms such as Islamic politics and politics of Islam frequently lead to conceptual confusion.’⁸ Part of the confusion is a lack of understanding the subtlety and distinction between both phrases ‘Islamic politics’ and ‘politics of Islam’. Sabet argues that the former, by necessity if not by definition, incorporates the latter,⁹ but the opposite is not true. The politics of Islam varies across time and space, and is the result of socio-political changes, whereas ‘Islamic politics’ are rooted in the fundamental tenets and ideas of the religion, hence the meta-narrative of Islam. Thus, the ‘politics of Islam’ are in the context of this study, no different to the ‘politics’ of domestic strategic interaction between opposing forces bargaining and competing for power and influence.

The research aims to formulate and explore the interplay of *politik* during formative Islam via *strategic dynamics*, that is, the motion of forces that stimulated growth, development, and institutional evolution within the concept and practice of Jihad as an instrument of *politik*. By ‘formative period’ we refer to the pre-legal period, circa 610-750¹⁰ – or the time before legal codification and construction of Islamic legal regulations on the conduct of war. In specifically targeting the first 70 years of this period, the research advances strategic explanations and interpretations of events as they *dynamically* unfolded.

⁷ Schelling (2008), p.215

⁸ Sabet (2008), p.1

⁹ *ibid.*

¹⁰ On chronology and the development of chronological schemes in the Islamic historiographical tradition see Donner (1998), pp.230-248

Hitherto, we have made reference to *strategic theoretics* as an umbrella term to denote the cross application of a few methods usually encompassed under the rubric of the ‘strategic approach’. *Strategic theoretics* specifically refers to the use of cross-investigative strategic approaches, such as strategic theory, realism, and a Clausewitzian framework of concepts.

Strategic theory specifically, is rooted in earlier works principally in the fields of game theory, rational choice theory, security dilemma analysis and strategic deterrence by authors such as Kenneth Waltz, Morton Kaplan, John Herz, Robert Jervis, and Thomas Schelling.¹¹ The parsimonious approach of strategic theory seeks to reduce complexity by condensing all possible options to the perceived optimal response based upon expected utility or value-maximisation. Strategic theory offers plausible explanations for outcomes or preferences and strategies. In essence, strategic theory links strategic assumptions to logically valid conclusions. Despite the analytical strengths of strategic theory to offer a framework of analysis, it is: ‘Too formalised to be an art: Too loose to be scientific.’¹² This is because the practice of applying strategic theory is based more upon explaining claims than establishing facts, resultantly, it is more appropriate that such claims are expressed in forms of inferential logical propositions such as a *strategic dynamics*, or as strategic paradigms.

Paradigms guide avenues of enquiry and dictate a way of thinking.¹³ A strategic paradigm is an exploratory framework as opposed to being dogmatic, and qualitative rather than quantitative.¹⁴ The core characteristic of an exploratory paradigm consists in a successful synthesis (achievement) of theory and explanation, which results in the continuation of the paradigm with the next generation of practitioners.¹⁵ Dogmatic paradigms hold to rigid patterns and hypotheses, often institutionally imposed, of theory and explanation that formally promote or defend long-standing assumptions and answers to problems. In literature, which is to be explored next, these dogmatic paradigms often become genres of research and collected writings.

¹¹ Lake & Powell (1999), pp.4-5

¹² Smith (1991), p.11

¹³ Kuhn (2012), p.29

¹⁴ A deeper discussion of paradigm theory follows this chapter, see 2.8.

¹⁵ Kuhn (2012), p.19

1.3. A Critical Overview of the Existing Literature

This literature review provides general background about the subject area and the problems, issues and research questions to be investigated. Because there exists a notable lack of familiarity in this subject area particularly for non-Arabic readers and research specialists, the literature review precedes the research design framework in order to demonstrate the gaps in the literature and to provide an overview of the terrain of study. It is not without importance to note that the dominant language of the discourse on Jihad is in Arabic and not in English. This is particularly significant because any academic treatment of the subject requires familiarity with the Arabic language and access to primary Arabic sources. This problem is distinctly identified in the first genre of exploration, historiography.

1.3.1. Historical Revisionism & Historiography in English

James Turner Johnson states that contemporary scholarship on the 'Islamic normative tradition on war is considerably less well developed' in relation to the 'Western tradition', and that 'there exist no general histories treating the understanding of normative tradition on religion, statecraft, and war in Islamic societies or in Islamic religious thought.' Johnson cites this problem as a consequence of a 'lack of researchers with the necessary training and language skills.'¹⁶ Indeed, a researcher without any training in the Arabic language is often limited to available secondary translations and interpretations.

Proficiency with the Arabic language does not suffice for a clear understanding of the subject alone. For example, Jihad polemics are a common feature of writers whose concerns are largely with historical revisionism and negationism of the traditional Islamic sources - the Qur'an, the *hadith* literature, and later the historical biographies of the Prophet and his companions (known as *seera* and *tabaqat* respectively).¹⁷ Attempts at critical reconstruction of early Islamic historiography, afford better contributions¹⁸ to the exploration of the strategic environment in which Jihad evolved.

¹⁶ Johnson (1997), pp. 22-23

¹⁷ See Lewis (1988) and Watt (1998)

¹⁸ See Robinson (2003)

Humphrey's edition of Islamic history¹⁹ set out to propose a framework for inquiry, which was premised upon a similarly recognised need that non-Arabic reading researchers have inadequate resource materials in most cases to effectively study many subject areas of Islam. Since this study is concerned with *strategic dynamics* and not critical history *per se*, the deficiencies in the area of the existing historiographical literature have a marginal impact for this study.

Whilst the contributions to the field by of Fred M. Donner²⁰ are largely historiographical, they provide some of the most significant insights to the existing literature for the purposes of this study. Donner makes the theoretical and historical discourse of the formative stages of Islamic history subject to politico-strategic analysis and investigation in a manner distinct from other works on the subject. For example, in *The Early Islamic Conquests*²¹ Donner's alternative interpretation of the Islamic conquests and establishment of a definitive record of them as the sources allow, is the result of his innovative methodology that does not require the usual textual skepticism prevalent in historical revisionism. Donner's *Muhammad's Political Consolidation in Arabia up to the Conquest of Mecca*²² which details a concise and engaging 'reassessment' of the Prophet's politico-strategic calculus in his political consolidation of Arabia also provides one of the few, more rigorous attempts by modern scholarship to examine Jihad based upon the warfighting practice of the Prophet.

With respect to bibliographical surveys, there are two studies worthy of mention available in English:²³ the first is a work compiled by Muhammad Naeem – *Muslim Military History: A preliminary Bibliography*²⁴ - a bibliographical study of all academic military research contributions, the compilation comprises of 525 entries, 145 books in English and 183 articles mainly in English, the rest in European languages such as French, German and Spanish; 68 books and 3 articles in Arabic; 105 books and 16 articles in Urdu; and 3 books in Persian and Pushto.

¹⁹ See Humphrey (1991)

²⁰ See Donner (1979, 1981, 1998, 2008, & 2010)

²¹ Ibid., (1981)

²² Ibid., (1979)

²³ For Arabic sources, see 'Awad (1981-1982), an Arabic bibliographical study of Arab military sources, which includes over 850 English language sources on the subject area.

²⁴ Naeem (1985)

The second work of mention is the historiographical and bibliographical sourcebook compiled by John W. Jandora²⁵ *Militarism in Arab Society*; although limited by its focus upon Arab military history alone, the method of survey and its theoretical framework is of great importance alone. The usefulness of this work cannot be understated for researchers in English given that the research is limited to sources available in European languages, mainly those in English.

Notable preliminary attempts at examining the subject of warfare in Islam with military science has been provided by in articles by Jandora in ‘Developments in Islamic Warfare: The early Conquests’;²⁶ Paul Heck in ‘Jihad Revisited’;²⁷ and Margret Pettygrove ‘Conceptions of War in Islamic Legal Theory and Practice’;²⁸ although these articles do not address the specific concerns of the subject area of Jihad, as this study investigates it. Worthy of mention are Michael Bonner’s²⁹ attempt to chart the evolution of Jihad through Muslim history (an honest but non-strategic approach to Jihad); and David Cook’s³⁰ *Understanding Jihad*, which, although he does not approach the subject from a politico-strategic agenda, the research is, systematically organised in episodic and thematic chapters, raising important questions for congruity and religious consideration.

1.3.2. Traditional Arabic Historiography

The traditional Arabic texts are the key sources upon which any historical reference whether biographical (*seera*) or military history (*maghazi*),³¹ to the early formative stages of Islam, is dependent. The most senior of these are the biographies of Ibn-Ishaq (d. 761-770) and Ibn Hisham (d. 833), and the military biography of al-Waqidi (d. 822-3). Other notable works in this genre are al-Waqidi’s *Kitab Futuhat al-Sham* (The Liberation of the Levant); and al-Baladhuri’s (d. 892) *Kitab al-Futuh al-Buldan* (The Liberation of the [non-Muslim] Lands); Ibn Kathir’s (d. 1373) *Ghazawat al-Rasul* (The Military Campaigns of the Messenger); and undoubtedly the most comprehensive of all the collected histories is Muhammad ibn Jarir al-Tabari’s (d.

²⁵ Jandora (1997)

²⁶ Ibid., (1986)

²⁷ Heck (2004)

²⁸ Pettygrove (2007)

²⁹ Bonner (2006)

³⁰ Cook (2005)

³¹ By *maghazi* what is meant is ‘The memorable deeds of... those who engage in warring, or warring and plundering, expeditions’ - see Lane (1968), p. 2257

923), *magnus opus* - *Kitab Tarikh al-Rasul wa al-Muluk* (The Complete History of The Messenger and Kings). These texts in particular were compiled during an era of sparse strategic analysis; hence, whilst the historical importance of these works cannot be denied, this must be balanced by an appreciation that very little else exists to compete with them.

Indeed, these writings all share a common approach, namely, the historical retelling of the military engagements of the Prophet and the *Rashidun*; to commemorate great victories; and inspire courage and martial virtues for succeeding generations. Their aims are historical and devotional, and not to develop an ontological understanding or general theory of war. The use of such texts has traditionally been restricted to providing historical and legislative precedent for how war should be conducted as a matter of ideal practice.³² The aforementioned texts have all been translated into English and are widely accessed for research. However, despite large bodies of classical sources being translated since 2001, their employment within these fields have contributed little overall to an understanding of Jihad. The English literature on *seera* and *maghazi* has continued to rely on the foundational Arabic texts, consequently remaining historically descriptive with little or no politico-strategic analysis in relation to Jihad as a military instrument. Nonetheless, in order to better detail the fields of research and their limitations, historiographical sources may be further sub-divided and explored as genres concerning: the *Seera*, the *Maghazi*, and the *Khilafah*.

1.3.2a. Biographical Literature in English (*Seera*)

This specific genre considers those studies concerned with the biography of the Prophet Muhammad's life. The most popular of these are often translated biographies from the traditional texts. Karen Armstrong and Tariq Ramadan³³ have both written mainstream examples of popular biography whose wider readership often reflects the general intention of such authors and their audiences - to concern themselves less with socio-political puzzles and more with the spreading of spiritual enlightenment.

³² See al-Tabari's *Kitab al-Jihad* – tr. Iqbal (2007); and Ibn Rushd's chapter concerning Jihad from *Bidayat Al-Mujtahid* (tr. Peters, 1977, and Nyazee, 2002)

³³ Armstrong (2001), Ramadan (2008)

Broadly speaking, writers of this distinction unanimously hold negative assumptions regarding the utility and efficacy of violence and seem to project this bias upon their works without any form of reasoned explanation. William Montgomery Watt, an older source, is more rigorous in his approach to the genre. Watt's socio-political approach and research has afforded many subsequent authors with a basis for academic research related to the *seera*, in particular *Muhammad at Mecca* and *Muhammad at Medina*,³⁴ which are perhaps the best academic overviews of the *Seera* in the English language to date.

1.3.2b. Military History in English (*Maghazi*)

Greater ambition is usually found in this area of academic study, with some authors attempting to introduce deeper levels of analysis to uncover an operational or tactical methodology of Jihad from the biography of the Prophet. Russ Rodgers³⁵ for example, considers a strategic-asymmetric framework of a 'Muslim way of warfare' from the early Islamic sources approaching the Prophet's use of force as correlative to a guerrilla campaign against the Arab tribes. Interestingly, though not intended as a strategic analysis, is the subject area of early Muslim warfighting examined in Malik al-Mubarak's PhD thesis³⁶, which required attention to strategic matters, and as such, contains some very valuable contextual analysis.

Similarly, Muhammad Hamidullah's *The Battlefields of the Prophet Muhammad*³⁷ and Bashier's *War and Peace in the Life of the Prophet Muhammad*³⁸ both present more serious attempts by contemporary Muslim authors to contextualise and approach the Prophetic biography from a politico-strategic perspective, whilst also attempting to understand the warfighting of the *seera* through the means of historical narrative and analysis, with some attempts at strategic interpretation. Generally, these authors primarily redux the traditional narratives found in the traditional texts, but with more substantive ideas of military practice.

³⁴ Watt (1953) & (1956) respectively; see also (1964), (1974), and (1998)

³⁵ Rodgers (2008)

³⁶ al-Mubarak (1997)

³⁷ Hamidullah (2003)

³⁸ Bashier (2006)

Unfortunately, many of these works, such as S.K. Malik's *The Quranic Concept of War*,³⁹ despite the occasional references to strategists such as Clausewitz and Liddell-Hart, ultimately fails to deliver an examination of Jihad similar to the writings of Hamidullah and Bashier, because they are marred by customary apologetics garbed in devotional bias. Indeed, this is a recurrent issue in otherwise promising subject areas of research, such as Iqbal's *The Prophet's Diplomacy*,⁴⁰ and Muhammad Siddique Qureshi's *Foreign Policy of [...] Muhammad*,⁴¹ both of which fail to deliver anything according to what their titles seems to promise.

The most informative analysis of this genre and early Muslim warfighting is a more recent work by Russ Rodgers⁴² entitled *The Generalship of Muhammad*. Despite Rodgers concern (primarily at the operational level of analysis), there are few alternatives in the existing literature to match his military treatment of the *maghazi* genre, especially as it concerns Jihad as a military instrument. Another stand out contribution in this genre that provides politico-military analysis working through the lens of military history is Gabriel's *Muhammad: Islam's First Great General*.⁴³ Gabriel's occasional reference to politico-strategic considerations (specifically, the highlighting of a means-end approach adopted by the Prophet) in his work does offer insight into what is otherwise a distinctly historical revisionist biography. Nonetheless, Gabriel is one of a few authors who have engaged with strategic thought, specifically Clausewitzian thought, applying it to the warfighting practice of the Prophet and the first Muslims. The other branch of research, which specifically concerns the subject matter of this study, are those works which consider Jihad alongside the development of the Islamic polity.

1.3.3. The Formation of the early Islamic Polity (*al-Khilafah*)

This genre is effectively concerned with the *Rashidun* period (632-661) and the Umayyad Caliphate (661-750). The *Rashidun* and Umayyad periods are the most important demonstrations of Muslim political behaviour both systemically and domestically in the face of pre-paradigm legal influence, where the power and weight

³⁹ Malik (1986)

⁴⁰ Iqbal (1975)

⁴¹ Qureshi (2011)

⁴² Rodgers (2012)

⁴³ Gabriel (2007)

of legal opinion was inferior to politico-strategic decision-making and military power. Historical detail on systemic military events are scarce however, with descriptions of events usually a matter of bare record. Although such information facilitates a sketch of the strategic setting, there is little information that actually details the politico-strategic decision-making and methods behind the application of force. Strategic interpretation is therefore academic, but not fanciful. The literature has three subdivisions: the *Ridda*, the *Futuh*, and the *Fitna*.

1.3.3a. The *Ridda* Literature

The *Ridda* literature concerns the events of succession following the death of the Prophet and the apostasy wars that ensued thereafter as new central authority was challenged. The traditional texts generally extend their coverage of events to include the *Ridda* campaigns and those circumstances surrounding them. The *Annals* of al-Tabari, al-Baladhuri, and the many works by Ibn Kathir, are the most well-known. Although there exists coverage of the events of the *Ridda* in English, these are usually tied to the broader events of the *Futuh* and are not specific to the political circumstances of succession. Madelung's⁴⁴ study of the political succession to the Prophet is one of the most well-known studies of the early Caliphate, though primarily a Shi'ite inclined historical narrative, it is nonetheless comprehensive for its intended purposes of detailing the early Muslim political community and the causes of division.

1.3.3b. The *Futuh* Literature

The *futuhat* literature represents the post-*maghazi* era most vividly, detailing the historical events of Islamic expansion during the *Rashidun* era. *Futuh* literally meaning 'to open' (*futuhat* pl. 'openings'), and refers to the opening of non-Muslim territories to Islam, or more precisely, to the jurisdiction of the Shari'a. Muslim historians wrote abundantly on this period, writing within the period itself and for an increasingly popular audience. Ibn 'Abd al-Hakam's (d. 871) *Futuh al-Misr* (The Liberation of Egypt), Abu Isma'il al-Azdi's (d. 810) *Futuh al-Sham* (The Liberation of the Levant), al-Baladhuri's *Futuh al-Buldan* and al-Tabari's *Kitab al-Rasul wa al-Muluk* constitute the most famous works of this genre.⁴⁵

⁴⁴ Madelung (1997)

⁴⁵ Donner (1998), p.175

Developments in style and historical record keeping broadened the scope of these works,⁴⁶ and affording this genre greater precision of events than the *maghazi* literature given that they were events written and compiled during their author's lifetimes.⁴⁷ In the English language, historiographical research represents the most compelling sources for analysis, alongside translated works of the Arabic classics.

In particular, Hugh Kennedy has written a few works in this genre⁴⁸ though Kennedy's most appropriate contributions to this study are firstly, *The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphate*⁴⁹ – a synthesis of the original Arabic sources with some modern studies, by which the author seeks as he writes in the preface, to strike a balance between the presentation of factual material and speculative interpretation. Secondly, *The Great Arab Conquests*, which is concerned with Islamic expansion between 632-750.⁵⁰ Kennedy insightfully notes how the classical accounts of the *Futuh*, have been edited and revised over the centuries and what has remained in the recounting of the *Futuh* is actually a matter of memory and the creation of memories.⁵¹ This awareness is especially pertinent given the second genre of literature connected to the post-*maghazi* era, the *Fitna* sources.

1.3.3c. The *Fitna* Literature

The theme of *Fitna*, or the sedition leading to the First Civil War of Islam (656 -661), took place as a consequence of the end of the Caliphate of 'Uthman. Vast amounts of literature have covered the events of the *Fitna*, since the second century of Islam and continue today with particular reference to Shi'ite literature.⁵² The subject area itself is however, inextricably connected to the events of the succession (and therefore the *Ridda*) and the *Futuh*, and thus is generally covered by the same source materials and literature.

⁴⁶ Khalidi (1994), pp.62-5

⁴⁷ Robinson (2003), p.50

⁴⁸ Kennedy (1981) & (2001)

⁴⁹ Ibid., (1986)

⁵⁰ Ibid., (2007)

⁵¹ Ibid., p.2; also Hawting (2002), pp.15-6

⁵² Donner (1998), p.187

1.3.3d. Umayyad Historiography

The final area of literature in this field concerns the longest serving Caliphate that was administered by the Umayyad Dynasty. Broadly speaking, Hugh Kennedy writes: ‘Clearly so swift and massive a change needs historical investigation, yet the approachable literature on the subject is very restricted. This is partly because of the territorial boundaries of the historical profession.’⁵³ Although it stands as a reasonable expectation that an important era, given the vast expansions and military conflicts that took place, would be well researched and published;⁵⁴ the reality is that there are few detailed accounts of the Umayyad historical period, and even fewer accounts that deal directly with foreign policy.

Khalid Blankinship’s *The End of the Jihad State*⁵⁵ is the most salient and appropriate account of Umayyad foreign policy, and consequently of their military affairs currently available. Although not written as a work of politics or war studies, given the dearth of resources available it is difficult not to write to some degree dependently upon Blankinship’s work. Blankinship devotes an appendix to the critical problem of sources, methodology, and limitation of scholarship on the period.⁵⁶ Gerald Hawting’s *The Umayyad Caliphate: The First Dynasty of Islam* is another one of the few sources available, as he explains in his preface, ‘there is little that can be recommended confidently as an introduction to the importance, main events and personalities, and problems of the Umayyad period.’⁵⁷ Where Blankinship provides the best treatment of Umayyad foreign policy, Hawting’s contribution is far more concerned with domestic developments and the political evolution of the Umayyad dynasty. Complementing the works of both Hawting and Blankinship⁵⁸ are; Julius Wellhausen’s *The Arab Kingdom and its Fall*,⁵⁹ M.A. Shaban’s *Islamic History*,⁶⁰ Patricia Crone’s *Slaves on Horses*.⁶¹

⁵³ Kennedy (2007), p.3

⁵⁴ Mulalic (2012), p.109

⁵⁵ Blankinship (1994)

⁵⁶ Ibid., pp.247-272

⁵⁷ Hawting (2002), p.xxi; Robinson (2003), p.52

⁵⁸ Hawting (2002), pp.xxi-xxii; Blankinship (1994), pp.270-2

⁵⁹ Wellhausen (1927)

⁶⁰ Shaban (1971) & (1976)

⁶¹ Crone (1980)

Additionally, concerning domestic politics, ‘Abd al-Ameer ‘Abd Dixon’s *The Umayyad Caliphate 65-86/684-705 (A Political Study)*⁶² is a comprehensive summary of the major Arabic sources with objective analysis regarding Umayyad domestic political aims and practices.⁶³ The Arabic literature on the Umayyad period is relatively larger with sizeable entries of written historical material, but unfortunately the majority of those encountered are not suited to the research agenda of this study.⁶⁴

Predominately, incompatibility is a consequence of substance where the Arabic literature has maintained the traditional approach rooted in an oral culture.⁶⁵ The early Islamic historical literature did not attempt significant analysis preferring instead to record and transmit reports and events for posterity,⁶⁶ emphasising rigour with respect to the accuracy of reports to examination of its content.⁶⁷

Secondarily, the earliest sources on the Umayyads were written during the ‘Abbasid period, where anti-Umayyad historians were the majority of writers.⁶⁸ As sworn enemies of the Umayyad House, ‘Abd Dixon writes ‘it is extremely difficult to do justice to the Umayyad cause: it gets scarce sympathy from an historical tradition which was the product of the period following their fall from power.’⁶⁹ Following the Umayyad political collapse, and the slaughter of the Umayyad House⁷⁰ by the ‘Abbasid revolution, a new era of scholastic celebration began whereby the new political elite patronised scholarship and the development of learning institutions.⁷¹ The ‘Abbasid revolution ushered in the ‘Golden Age’ of Islamic civilization,⁷² cultural-religious sciences, and a ‘lively flourishing of Muslim historiography.’⁷³

⁶² ‘Abd Dixon (1971)

⁶³ See also Robinson (2005)

⁶⁴ See Kennedy (2007), pp.3-5, 12-23 for a more comprehensive set of historical problems that the Arabic and traditional sources present.

⁶⁵ Blankinship (1991), p.448; Robinson (2003), p.26; Donner (1998), pp.203-9

⁶⁶ Martensson (2005), p.287; Mulalic (2012), p.133

⁶⁷ Khalidi (1994), p.67; Robinson (2003), pp.53-4

⁶⁸ ‘Abd Dixon (1971), p.1, Donner (1998), pp.187-192; Hawting (2002), pp.11-12

⁶⁹ ‘Abd Dixon (1971), p.1; Hawting (2002), p.2; Luttwak (2011), p.211

⁷⁰ ul-Hasan (2005), p.109; Robinson (2003), p.41

⁷¹ Robinson (2003), pp.26, 118-122

⁷² Bewley (2002), p.iii; Robinson (2005), p.33

⁷³ Mulalic (2012), p.117

Unsurprisingly, ‘Abbasid patronage almost certainly ensured that the Umayyad legacy would be one of revulsion and selected memory.’⁷⁴ Consequently, anti-Umayyad literature was rife: ‘Literary works came to be produced devoted to cataloguing the crimes of the Umayyads, singing the praises of their opponents, and explaining why God allowed the community to fall under the sway of these godless tyrants.’⁷⁵ This literature continued into the fifteenth century, and coupled with the *Fitna* genre, virtually guaranteed that historical analysis or revision was almost always a matter of religio-ethical judgments and not politico-strategic conclusions. The result is a corpus of religiously sensitive ‘political’ versions of history. In a candid lamentation of the earliest historical records that researchers have to work with, with particular reference to Muslim-Byzantine warfighting during the Umayyad Caliphate, Bashear writes:

Anyone who is familiar with the traditional accounts of the early Muslim conquests in Syria knows the extent of the discrepancies caused basically by the fact that such accounts were actually the product of continuous attempts at reconstruction, often motivated by the later need to produce a scheme of sacred history, mixed with sectarian and local tendencies and hindered by the lack of precise, first hand and written documentation. Such is the case concerning the issues of dates, locations, how the conquest of Damascus, Jerusalem, Caesarea, Hims occurred: in fact almost every event of the first century.⁷⁶

Finally, much of the historical literature collected in the Arabic works was used as moral or pious legitimation for the respective caliph at the time, or the opposite.⁷⁷ The ahistorical nature of much of Islamic historiography concerning the political administrations of the Caliphates renders much of the information and records ill-

⁷⁴ A notable example is al-Tabari’s selective omission of the ‘Abbasid massacre of the Umayyad House as a final act of revolution before declaring their new Caliphate, see ul-Hasan (2005), pp.109-10; and Donner (1998), pp.138-141, 194-5. Hawting (2002) makes the salient comment that the hostility of the Muslim tradition as a whole to the Umayyads is ‘reflected in both what the tradition reports and the way in which it reports it.’ – p.11; also Humphreys (2006), pp.3-6

⁷⁵ Hawting (2002), pp.11-2, 16-7

⁷⁶ Bashear (1991), p.199

⁷⁷ Donner (1998), pp.190-3

suiting for the strategic approach broadly speaking, with only passing use for understanding the differences between strategic actors in the broader context of political decision-making and military action.⁷⁸

1.3.4. The Religious Genre

Having surveyed the historiographical literature, the second major genre or paradigm of writings is distinctly religious. Broadly understood, this field represents the religious approaches to Jihad structured by Muslim legal specialisation, ethico-religious beliefs, and hermeneutical investigation. Undoubtedly, it is the richest category in not only contribution but also accessibility.

1.3.4a. The Legal Approach

The legal approach and sources are known in Arabic as *Fiqh*, which Muhammad Kamali explains, ‘consists largely of juristic interpretation whereas *‘Shari‘ah’* bears a closer affinity with divine revelation.’⁷⁹ The majority of academic writings consistently orientate their approach to Jihad by reference to the legal rulings of *Fiqh*. Authors such as Al-Dawoody⁸⁰ whose work is based upon his PhD thesis entitled ‘War in Islamic Law: Justifications and Regulations’ tend to follow this trend and serve as model examples of this persuasion in research. Al-Sumaih’s PhD thesis *The Sunni Concept of Jihad in classical Fiqh and Modern Islamic Thought*⁸¹ is similar form of work but focuses upon the *seera* as a foundation for the *fiqh*. The overwhelming majority of works in this area are concerned with legal theory or legislation offering little original analysis of Jihad as a subject matter in its own right.⁸²

Two exceptions to this trend are Khaled Abou El Fadl and Sherman Jackson. Abou El Fadl’s⁸³ article ‘The Rules of Killing at War: an inquiry into classical sources’ and his pioneering book *Rebellion and Violence in Islamic Law*; focuses his analyses with a direct examination of early sources and thought regarding the utility and efficacy of

⁷⁸ Kennedy (2007), pp.20-2

⁷⁹ Kamali (1997), p.107, fn.1

⁸⁰ Al-Dawoody (2009) & (2011)

⁸¹ al-Sumaih (1998)

⁸² See Khadduri (1966) & (1969), Hamidullah (2003), Aboul-Enein, *et al* (2004); Ali & Rehman (2005); and Thomas (1997) – as typical examples.

⁸³ Abou El Fadl (1999) & (2001)

violence. Sherman Jackson's⁸⁴ 'Domestic Terrorism in the Islamic Legal Tradition' and 'Jihad and the Modern World'; examines the normative state of war and anarchy of the pre-modern world, leads through to the experience of early Islam and later developments, which would concern *jus ad bellum* and international relations.

The literature on Jihad by Islamic scholarship writing in Arabic is as impoverished as that in English. There are a handful of authors who have attempted to engage with the traditional discourse in a more contemporary manner. Muhammad Abu Zahrah (d.1974) is among the few and earliest modern Muslim authors who advocated a new approach to Jihad and international relations, predicated upon principles of justice, cooperation and human dignity. His writings⁸⁵ have left an impression on mainstream modernist Muslim thought on the subject. Comparably, is Yusuf al-Qaradawi's more recent contribution to the subject area; a two-volume work entitled *Fiqh al-Jihad: Dirasah Muqaranah li-Ahkamih wa Falsafatih fi Daw'al-Qur'an wa al-Sunnah* (Understanding Jihad: A Comparative Study of its Rules and Philosophy in the Light of the Qur'an and Sunnah).⁸⁶ In this work al-Qaradawi considers Jihad as a legal condition, resonating with writers on war such as Quincy Wright.⁸⁷ Thus, although there are occasional hints of politico-strategic analysis scattered throughout both volumes, nothing original is presented by al-Qaradawi that merits additional mention.

Similarly, the works of Muhammad Saeed Ramadan al-Buti (d. 2013)⁸⁸ provide another attempt by a prominent member of contemporary Islamic scholarship on Jihad to locate early Islamic violence within the legal discourse, using historical and biographical narrative respectively. Another leading authority on Islamic Jurisprudence, Wahbah al-Zuhayli, whose PhD thesis was published under the title *Athar al-Harb fi al-Islam: Dirasah Muqaranah* (The Effects of War in Islam: A Comparative Study)⁸⁹ is similarly lacking content in relation to politico-strategic or military analysis. Al-Zuhayli readily acknowledges that the classical view of Jihad was expansionist, but advocates that in the modern era it can only be defensive, a

⁸⁴ Jackson (2001) & (2002)

⁸⁵ Abu Zahra (1961) & (1964)

⁸⁶ al-Qaradawi (2009)

⁸⁷ Wright (1965)

⁸⁸ al-Buti (1997) & (2000)

⁸⁹ al-Zuhayli (1963)

common tendency exhibited by contemporary scholars writing in Arabic, for the broader Islamic scholastic community.⁹⁰

The outstanding work in the Arabic language has been written by Muhammad Khayr Haykal's *al-Jihad wa al-Qital fi Siyasati al-Shari'a*, (Jihad and Warfighting according to Shari'a Policy)⁹¹ – an extensive three-volume work. Haykal comprehensively covers the subject of Jihad from the perspective of the legal tradition and is perhaps the definitive work on the subject area to date in the Arabic language. Whilst the treatment of Jihad as concept is thorough with regard to traditional and legal analysis, the overall approach of the work remains politically descriptive and idealistic. Strategic considerations at the systemic level of analysis are either rare or shallow where mentioned. On the subject areas of internally directed Jihad, operational and tactical considerations are given a comprehensive treatment according to legal opinions and juristic analysis and are extremely informative in this regard. However, strategic explanations for early Muslim politico-strategic behaviour are almost always lacking.

1.3.4b. International Law and Relations (*Siyar*)

This body of work represents those themes classified under what would be considered today as a 'Systemic' approach to politics and war at the level of the international, where state structures are the most important units of analysis. Technically, this is an extension of traditional Islamic *fiqh*. Originally, as separate body of law, the '*siyar*' was predominately concerned with systemic interaction,⁹² and the conduct of an Islamic polity in the anarchical society. Majid Khadduri's translation of al-Shaybani's *Siyar* entitled *The Islamic Law of Nations*⁹³ is perhaps the most famous work in this area in (both the original version in Arabic) and English.⁹⁴ It is particularly valuable with respect to early juristic opinions on such issues as the conduct of war and normative interactions with non-Muslim territories.

⁹⁰ See al-Atiki (2005), Bayyah (2009), and al-Qadri (2010)

⁹¹ Haykal (1999)

⁹² Hamidullah (1977), p.9

⁹³ Khadduri (1966)

⁹⁴ Other works include Kassim (1994), Elbakry (1987), AbuSulayman (1993), Sabet (2008), and Masri (1998)

Principally, al-Shaybani's *Siyar* considers the normal state of affairs between Muslim territories and the world at large, as a hostile tension of a 'state of war'. Khadduri also emphasizes that the early Muslim jurists did not consider the non-Muslim nations as a zero-sum enemy to be decisively beaten by military means. Furthermore, the enactments of military engagements were not deemed authorised on account of being non-Muslims (*kuffar*). Al-Shaybani's elaboration of questions and answers related to the subject demonstrates a framework of juristic concern along the theoretical lines of contemporary realist theories of systemic behaviour.

Unfortunately, little explanation is ever given as to *why* particular rules are the case, and the overall analysis of legislation is so deeply rooted within the legal discourse that political explanations are rarely given any consideration. More broadly speaking, particularly in such an area, one might expect some politico-strategic analysis within the context of early Muslim inter-state behaviour, but the *siyar* literature does not incline toward this. The genre as a whole offers disappointingly little for the analysis of the formative period of Islam, that is, the pre-legal development of Jihad.

1.3.4c. Just War Theory – The Ethical Approach

The ethical approach is rooted in similar, though distinct, literature to the legal approach. The distinction resides in the more pluralistic path taken by scholarship in this area, that has sought to discuss Jihad in relation to notions of *justum bellum*⁹⁵ where the focus of such works are concerned with the similarities and dissimilarities between the Western Judeo-Christian and Eastern Islamic traditions on the subject of sanctioned warfighting, causes and conduct. This approach is not shared amongst Islamic scholarship written in Arabic but is common in the English language, with John Kelsay and James T. Johnson as established forerunners of this approach.⁹⁶ Unfortunately, there are a number of studies⁹⁷ that only serve to reinforce the notion that little strategic value can be accrued from such research, which is predominantly historical in nature.

⁹⁵ Khadduri, being a popular source for researchers working through English based sources, arguably has popularised the claim that Jihad is the 'just war' version of Judaeo-Christian tradition, see (1984), p.165

⁹⁶ See Kelsay & Johnson, (eds.), (1990) and (1991), and Kelsay (2007). Also, Abdel Haleem *et al* (eds.), (1998); and Zawati, (2001).

⁹⁷ See Mahallati (2006), Firestone (1999), Armstrong (2001), Watt (1974), and Hillenbrand (2006)

1.3.4d. The Qur'an & Hadith – The Hermeneutical Approach

The final approach of the traditional literature concerns those studies, which are hermeneutic in focus. These studies situate the foundations, conceptual origins, and explanations of Jihad, primarily within the Qur'an and hadith literature. Traditionally the preserve of Arabic reading researchers, the vast corpus of Qur'anic exegeses is also becoming increasingly accessible and available online and through printed media. In particular, the New Edition of the *Encyclopedia of the Qur'an*,⁹⁸ *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*, and *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Islamic World*⁹⁹ - all provide a number of focused studies on the vocabulary of violence in the Qur'an. Consequently, many researchers, as well as journalists and lay writers, have taken to re-examining the Qur'an and hadith literature in light of Jihad.

For example, Tim Schwartz-Barcott's *War, Terror & Peace in the Qur'an and in Islam: Insights for Military & Government Leaders*¹⁰⁰ is an attempt to deduce a distinctly 'Muslim' approach to warfighting derived from historical narrative and Qur'anic hermeneutical analysis. However, as with most works which attempt to do the same, the historical narrative and secondary sources become much more relevant and informative for the study of Jihad than hermeneutical analysis.¹⁰¹

The problem of this approach for the purposes of this study is not academic but rather with respect to their inherent assumptions about the role and importance of the Qur'an to the subject of Jihad. Whilst undoubtedly the Qur'an and the Hadith literature are important, they are not necessarily the foundation for interpretation and analysis when it comes to the subject of Jihad proper. Unlike Biblical exegesis and hermeneutics, the earliest Islamic methods of interpretation, was not dependent upon the Qur'an and the Hadith literature as it was to the *maghazi* literature. Rather, it was the legal literature in general that placed a greater premium upon the Qur'an and the Hadith literature as sources of explanation for Jihad than its actual practitioners.

⁹⁸ McAuliffe (2005)

⁹⁹ Esposito (1995) & (2009) respectively.

¹⁰⁰ Schwartz-Barcott (2004)

¹⁰¹ See Bassiouni (2008) and Firestone (1997)

The literature-promoting Jihad as a form of providentialism appears very early in the Muslim world, many of which were authored by those who undertook its practice. Perhaps the best known (and also the earliest) is written by Abdallah ibn al-Mubarak, *Kitab al-Jihad* (d. 797) that heavily influenced the writing of *Kitab al-Siyar* of Abu Ishaq al-Farazi (d. 802), an early author of *siyar*.¹⁰² These books extol the virtues of Jihad and those who partake of it, referencing Qur'anic verses and hadith throughout. These works are quintessential expressions of early conceptions of Jihad with the emphasis solely directed toward encouraging the individual warrior to take up arms.

1.4. Conclusions

The literature review has demonstrated that academic attention to Jihad in the context of strategic analysis and interpretation is virtually non-existent. With no real literature available to inform academic strategic research there has been a continued and repetitive iteration of pervasive assumptions, or fixations with specific genres of writings on Islam. The Arabic literature has been dominated by the religious genre and legal approach, whilst the range of literature available in English is generally focused on historiographical or textual criticism. Where present in principle, current studies focusing on warfare and international law and relations, are more generally linked with the traditional *siyar* literature.

Relative to the existing literature, the research orientation of this study is clearly distinguished from the traditional discourse of Jihad. In particular, the literature review has alluded to the gap specifically concerning the pre-legal period. In the pre-Islamic era, information concerning battles and Arab warfighting practices were enshrined in poetry, but it was not until the second century of Islam that the oral tradition of the Arabs found its way into ink. Roughly corresponding to this period was the burgeoning Islamic legal schools and over the following century, the legislation of Jihad as a matter of doctrine alongside the formal institution of Islamic legal structures. Thus, between the advent of Islam in 610, and the early stage of the Umayyad Dynasty circa 661-680, there exists no research that has examined the development of Jihad during this formative period.

¹⁰² Bonner (1992)

More specifically, this study seeks to address the gap by proposing an investigation into the evolution of the *strategic dynamics* of Jihad, illustrating the relationship of violence to politics, and how policy affected the manner in which warfighting was instrumentally applied during the first 70 years of Islam. As a prelude to elucidating the research questions, basic assumptions, and the limitations for this study, an overview of the parameters, scope, and limitations of the research method and the limitations of strategic theory is discussed next.

1.5. Research Parameters

The literature review has already described the problems associated with the language barrier that many researchers face. Additionally, the review has highlighted the weaknesses of the Arabic literature alone. Given these parameters, ranges of bilingual sources (English and Arabic) are assessed in tandem to cover a broad variety of perspectives and alternative approaches to the historical information available. Whenever possible, existing English translations have been adopted for use and reference as a means to make the research presented more accessible. However, in instances where no English translations were available, I have endeavoured to provide my own translations. The literature employed extends from the earliest Arabic sources available to the present-day, including the scholarship of both Muslim and non-Muslim authors. Comprehensive studies or histories in English have been explicitly preferred over original works by authors in matters pertaining to historical survey. This is because the episodic approach to history used in this research is concerned with the broadly identified variables that afford or relate to the analysis or interpretation of evolving strategic dynamics in relation to the research agenda.

The literature review has revealed a second parameter, namely the *siyar* as the only established body writing that considered Jihad in the form of systemic interactions. The *siyar* is however, exclusively legal in nature and not strategic, written in Arabic bar a few translations, and developed near two centuries after the advent of Islam. There has never been an attempt to explain systematically or examine the nature of early violence in Islam as it relates to *politik*, in the Islamic literature or later non-Islamic writings on Jihad. This deficiency has resulted in a gap that necessarily limits modern research due to the lack of materials with which to discuss issues pertaining

to Jihad and early political institutions. Instead, legal interpretation has come to dominate the discourse on Jihad, designating the language of law, ethics, and theology over that of politics and strategy.

This means that the role of Islamic legal literature and juristic opinion has little to no relation to Jihad, policy, and doctrine during the period under investigation, because it is pre-legal, that is, before the establishment of the traditional legal institutions of Islam. All forms of Islamic legal doctrine written on the conduct of war were written well after the events examined. In large part, the later legal literature is an attempt to understand the very same questions this research has set out to do, albeit for different purposes and to a different end. Therefore, Islamic legal literature has negligible interest except in instances of revisionist explanations for events that lack any other form of historical or recorded documentation.

A third parameter concerns the body of Islamic historiography which was less concerned with military affairs such as tactics and logistics as they were with biographical details and issues that extolled the genealogies of battlefield participants and their war-time exploits. Hence, this investigation cannot be premised upon an examination of Islamic legislation or a historical study of the Muslim conduct of war since neither of these fields is suited to the concerns of strategy *per se*. Accordingly, this study does not examine the conduct of Muslim warfare, warfighting, or operational dynamics directly, that is, operational and tactical levels of analysis and the reasons for military success or failure; including the historical aspects of warfighting such as formations, numerical values attached to warring parties, theatre tactics, and the like, which are similarly excluded as extemporaneous to the remit of the investigation.

More broadly speaking, a fourth parameter to the research design concerns the various legal rulings that Muslim jurists developed over the centuries regarding warfare which were often moral judgments based upon religious ideals. As a *strategically committed* approach to the subject matter, ethico-religious and hermeneutical approaches are generally negligible to the scope of interest for this study. Since these subjects do not relate to strategic analysis they are not relevant or necessary for the strategic exploration of Jihad as it relates to the evolution of *strategic dynamics* except as they

might relate to the intentions and motivations of the strategic actors involved. This qualification is however limited, since the intentions and motivations of strategic actors are only one facet of the strategic approach.

1.5.1. Limitations of Analytical Procedures

Existing weaknesses present in the literature are a significant limitation. Consequently, the research method demands a very specific analytical approach where *a priori* reasoning is engaged to establish coherent and rational explanations for events in instances where strategic interpretations can be made but not proven. It suggests an artificial coherence of theory and facts, unsubstantiated by any coherent body of traditional Islamic texts. This is the consequence of scarce strategic thought having been applied, or more specifically, un-developed by traditional Muslim thinkers and historians, and a combination of academic indifference or neglect by writers on Jihad since.

Therefore, the methodological approach of *strategic theoretics* offers a useful, though limited means to interpret and verify (according to its own standards) a strategic reconstruction of events in the past. Verification is provided through a simple self-referential application of consistent strategic understanding with the theoretical approach explicated in Chapter Two. The outcome of the research will be based upon a logically congruent demonstration of strategic logic, by which we shall arrive at our conclusions. More precisely, the research outcome seeks to demonstrate a set of strategically coherent and logically deduced inferences from the examination of the relationship between applications of force in the name of Jihad and the politico-military circumstances that the use of force served for the ends of policy.

Secondly, the evolution of Jihad is limited only so far as it is relevant to the demonstration of the *strategic dynamics* involved, and not as a matter of detailed chronological development. An historical case-study approach is employed restrictively as a means of episodic analysis, surveying events and the resulting influences upon the strategic relationship between *politik* and military means to map the practice of Jihad against the backdrop of different historical incidents.

Because this study is not an historical analysis *per se* but rather a study of strategic theory and dynamics, questions of historical authenticity of texts and sources are limited by their practical value. Debates in the fields of textual analysis, Oriental and Near-Eastern studies, Islamic studies, and so on, are also not useful for the investigation and controversial or widely disputed historical events have been excluded from the research. Accordingly, we have kept to those commonly accepted historical works that have been used to relay accepted history.

Finally, the research questions have been developed in accordance with the strengths and limitations of the research methodology, which is strategically *committed*. Thus, whilst strategic analysis certainly incorporates additional areas of analysis such as socio-economic factors for example, this study is restricted to the specific concerns of strategic theory and the utility of force in relation to *politik*. The primary reason for this restriction is order to maintain analytical consistency.

Thomas Schelling notes the importance of aspiring towards analytical consistency for the development of strategic theory when he writes: ‘The advantage of cultivating the area of “strategy” for theoretical development is not that, all possible approaches, it is the one that evidently stays closest to the truth, but that the assumption of rational behavior is a productive one.’¹⁰³ Since qualitative research is rooted in human behaviour and decision-making, this method fits well with the strategic approach, which ‘is based on a set of assumptions and principles that govern the way a political actor will, or should, use the military instrument.’¹⁰⁴ Hence, episodic surveys highlighting key politico-strategic decisions and events can demonstrate strategic continuity without *doing history* itself or the need to further hypothesise based upon alternative dimensions of analysis. The limitation of analysis to a strictly strategic lens is a greater strength than weakness concerning analytical procedures, and shall be further elaborated upon in the following section concerning verification.

¹⁰³ Schelling (1980), p.4

¹⁰⁴ Harris (2006), p.541

1.6. The Research Objectives: Basic assumptions to be investigated

The research questions are explored in the context and operational limitations of the literature and are pre-legal, which means no formal legislation for the conduct of war, strategy, or policy existed for the strategic actors involved. The foundational assumptions of strategic behaviour and decision-making of the actors involved is that firstly, they were situated and operating under conditions of anarchy and self-help, acting in accordance with rational calculations of means or expected utility. Secondly, without a set precedent for action, strategic behaviour was driven by objectives that were ideologically crafted by a grand meta-narrative used to communicate theological imperatives; or by policies set by Prophet. Clarifying the *strategic dynamics* of Jihad begins with these assumptions that suggest politics and violence are causally interlinked as an instrument of bargaining. These assumptions can and will be verified by applying the research methodology to highlight where this causal relationship clearly existed as a matter of historical record in various established practices in Muslim history.

The method of designing the research questions began as the product of highlighting the lacunae of strategic analysis found in the literature review. In particular, the period between 610-680, in which strategic consideration is virtually absent. A rigid application of *strategic theoretics* to the existing literature revealed the necessary research questions that would elucidate the relationship between Jihad and the strategic actors, their interests, and the environment. A diligent reading of the literature also suggested that no single administration of government during the 70-year time period could comprehensively explain the strategic congruence of Jihad as a continuation of *politik*, without reference to that which preceded it or would come after. Taken as a whole however, the net result of the evolving *strategic dynamics* examined against the prime predictions of offense-defence theory could reveal the consistent and deliberate subordination of Jihad to the *politik* of formative Islam.

1.6.1. The Research Questions

The central research questions are designed to fundamentally explore three problems: the *bargaining dynamics* between politics and policy; the politico-strategic mechanisms that instrumentalise and drive military force; and lastly, the degree to

which behaviour may be understood as a creation rooted in a set of strategic settings generated by the pressures and nature of the strategic environment. The strategic theoretic so far, culminating in the paradigm presented, offers investigative propositions to substantiate these broadly proposed questions:

1. The prime agenda is to ascertain *whether Jihad is a continuation of politik by other means*; that is to ask the question therefore, what is the link between *politik* (policy and politics) and the application of force in the name of Jihad?
2. Logically proceeding from the aforementioned, can a consistent link be demonstrated to have existed so as to establish that the evolving *strategic dynamics* affected Jihad as a mechanism for policy?
3. To what extent is Jihad and its development a consequence of religio-political circumstance? In other words, was strategic behaviour rooted in a set of strategic preferences and assumptions as the product of a religious worldview or, was Jihad largely determined as a result and consequence of the pressures and nature of the anarchic environment?
4. Can the *strategic dynamics* of Jihad explain the offensive military conquests of Islamic history within the remit of policy to facilitate a coherent explanation for the origin and evolution of warfighting?

1.6.2. Sub-Investigative Questions

The primary research questions may be divided into a sub-set of investigative avenues that more accurately explicates the research direction by establishing the basic assumptions of Jihad from its earliest manifestations, and cross-referencing the manner in which it was applied as a matter of policy and influenced by wider politics.

- a. What is Jihad? Specifically, can a general definition be proposed, with respect to distinguishing word from concept; and how will this distinction advance strategic interpretation?
- b. Is Jihad a teleological consequence of Islam? To what extent does providentialism influence the application of Jihad as the means that justifies the ends?

- c. What is the relationship between Jihad and politics? Were there distinctive policies that directed the application of Jihad, and if so, under what circumstances did these policies come to bear and how did they evolve?
- d. Is Jihad an instrument of aggression or offensive imperial ambitions? Can the early period of Islamic expansion be explained in a manner that demonstrates strategic coherence for the application of warfighting as a means of policy?

The sub-set of investigative questions demonstrates if there exists enough congruity to suppose that Jihad was a continuation of *politic* by other means, that is, a consistently established instrument of rational calculation. However, research question 4, and sub-investigative questions (b, c, & d) in particular, requires an additional analytical procedure, which seeks to validate strategic interpretation with systemic actions operating in a different strategic environment. To accomplish this task, a diagnostic method is adopted. The diagnostic method of verification examines historically accepted episodes of military practice with hypothetical problem sets of action, to strategically interpolate the decision-making process that created strategic behaviour. The congruity between interpretations of events to predictions of hypotheses generates a diagnostic evaluation that serves explain strategic interactions consistent with a proposed strategic paradigm.

1.7. Verification

Clearly the details of real-time decision-making by actors in the past are a matter of historical interpretation. The motivations for many acts in history can only be plausible and rarely substantiated as completely true. On the other hand, if this ambiguity is taken to be paramount, no analysis can ever be afforded any academic value. For this reason, it is reasonable to consider all analysis of historical events, which cannot be verified according to a methodological theory as conjectural. The strategic approach is rooted in a paradigm that is rigidly self-verified, that is, based upon its own logical predictions and not explanatory by endogenous factors. In other words, a given problem is resolved through the identification of events conforming to the expectations of strategic logic, *paradoxical* as they may be. Using a strategic paradigm maintains a consistent set of expectations that can distinguish a given set of events as a strategic condition based upon interaction.

Additionally, the qualitative nature of the strategic approach restricts the degree of falsification permitted since events cannot be quantifiably tested or demonstrated. Given these limitations, the strategic approach must be augmented by a method by which to test the interpretations of the strategic paradigm. In this study, Offense-Defense Theory (ODT) is employed to breach the problems of verification. Offense-Defense Theory is a sub-branch of the neo-realist school which posits that the calculi of the advantage dynamic in the context of security threats is the most important concern between adversaries as a prelude to violent engagement.

Offense-Defense Theory employed as a diagnostic tool demonstrates that ‘shifts in the offense-defense balance- real or perceived- have a large effect on the risk of war’; that is, limited wars as generators of risk are subject to a strategic calculus between offense-defense dynamics to the degree that ‘actual offense-defense balance has marked effects; [but] the effects of the perceived offense-defense balance are even larger.’¹⁰⁵ Hence, using offense-defense theory as a diagnostic approach treats empirical historical events as differential *signs* and *symptoms* that can be subject to qualitative evaluation when clustered to identify a course of action based upon events as they present themselves.

Whilst this method is limited such that variables are examined only in the context of realist assumptions, it is necessary in order for two primary reasons. Firstly, as previously stipulated subjecting the analysis to multiple alternative explanations cannot realistically be resolved in this study alone. Furthermore, many explanations require a degree of expertise and knowledge beyond the author’s capacity. Hence, those fields of economics, anthropology and archaeology may well contribute or offer additional explanation, but would require separate studies to this one.

The second reason to restrict the analysis to strategic theoretics tested against ODT predictions is to remain consistent to the research framework that is strategically *committed* in interpretation. By *committed*, what is meant is that the outlook of the study is exclusively concerned with strategic analysis rooted in a Clausewitzian

¹⁰⁵ Van Evera (2004), p.228

Trinitarian interpretation. This is to analyse a case in *purely* strategic terms, just as a medical diagnostic is undertaken strictly in accordance with medical need and not endogenous considerations, which do not directly pertain to the case evaluation. According to Lyndsey Harris, few authors engage with strategic explanations exclusively, because authors invariably seek ‘to assign a particular slant or interpretation of strategic interaction according to their own discipline.’¹⁰⁶ Consequently, liberal or social constructivist theories are distractions to answers that can be abductively derived from pure strategic logic and predicted expectations of offense-defense theory.

In a sense, the nature of this study is especially abstracted in relation to analysis that other fields of social sciences provide. But strategic theory is itself an exercise in abduction by its very nature, which leads to the final limitation of the research methodology, which is the abductive reasoning of the research methodology. Strategic theory is pragmatically applied as abductive reasoning, being neither inductive nor deductive, and congruent with Occam’s razor. Abduction is a logical process of observed inference that applies the *lex parsimoniae* (law of parsimony), as a problem-solving method that seeks to derive a theory to account for observed phenomena.

By reducing a multiplicity of plausible explanations to those with the least amount of assumptions, the result should be a ‘simpler’ process for analysis and explanation. In the context of this study, the abductive process is to reduce the complexity of the historical events and their backgrounds, as case studies for example, which are recounted as descriptions of historical events highlighted by the strategic interactions that occurred, before being examined against hypotheses of offense-defense theory. The foundational assumptions contained in the strategic paradigm and realist assumptions of offense-defense theory are pragmatic premises that guide abductive reasoning as opposed to deductive reasoning.

¹⁰⁶ Harris (2006), p.542

This approach does create a problem of verification within the research methodology whereby the logical fallacy of *converse error* by *affirming the consequent* is an inherent result of inductive qualitative reasoning and analysis alongside the rigid application of *strategic theoretics* to the exclusion of alternative explanations. Acknowledgment of this shortcoming reaffirms the positive results that abductive reasoning affords theoretical explanation and predictions since the hypotheses of offense-defence theory serve as hypothetico-deductive problem sets that affirm the abductive process that precedes testing. A hypothetico-deductive methodology is an algorithmic process of the scientific method.¹⁰⁷ The differential diagnostic procedure employed as part of the investigation serves to counter balance the problems of *converse error* by substantiating the process that results in positive examination.

Hence, a differential diagnostic provides three immediate forms of analysis; firstly, a diagnosis considers strategic interactions of the events in a case to reveal the strategic condition; secondly, the condition is then subjected to differentials, that is, plausible strategic explanations, which either elucidate the strategic condition or at the very least eliminate what the strategic interactions do not or cannot explain. Lastly, the process of diagnostic evaluation results in the clustering or lack of, differentials that has the net value of demonstrating a sound diagnostic opinion with respect to the case examined. A deeper explanation of this procedure is undertaken in the following chapter.

1.8. The Structure of the Study

Each chapter begins with a preliminary section introducing the strategic actor. The analysis proceeds by chronological development of the most salient events that reveal those elements of the strategic paradigm simultaneously emphasising the evolving *strategic dynamics* of the period. The analysis then proceeds to test the strategic theoretics established by this process against the most prominently featured predictions of the offense-defence balance. Whilst each period contains a cluster of predictions, analysis will focus upon those predictions that directly relate to the evolution of the *strategic dynamics* of Jihad. Each chapter concludes with an overview of the findings in the context of a trinitarian assessment of events.

¹⁰⁷ Sober (2008), pp.24-34

Chapter Two details the *strategic theoretics* of this study, covering the preliminary groundwork beginning with strategic terminology, theory, and a strategic framework of analysis. This chapter also outlines the thematic concepts and elements of strategy that, alongside the method of strategic diagnostics, is the link between hypothetical postulates and strategic theory. A triangulation of strategic methods results in a proposed strategic theoretic or paradigm to engage the research throughout this study in order generate discursive strategic analysis.

Chapter Three proposes a ‘baseline zero’ which is an overall strategic assessment of how and why force was applied by the Prophet Muhammad as part of his mission to spread Islam. This chapter is also concerned with the original understanding of Jihad - the meaning of the word in its ideation, concept and thematic use. From this chapter, a series of key concepts and themes will be identified and used as a baseline to outline and share across subsequent chapters.

Chapter Four examines the aftermath of the Prophet’s death and the institution of the Caliphate under the leadership of Abu Bakr between 632-634. This chapter presents a broad strategic overview of the geopolitical and geostrategic events that confronted the nascent Muslim community and how, given the strategic setting and environment, Jihad was employed to serve the interests of policy and the politics of the Muslim community. Specifically, this chapter examines the *Ridda* Wars, and the preliminary incursions into Byzantine and Sassanid territories alongside strategic diagnostics to assess the offensive elements of Jihad employed both externally and within Arabia.

Chapter Five continues with the legacy of Abu Bakr and the developments that took place in both policy, politics, and the strategic dynamics of Jihad under the new administration of the second Caliph ‘Umar. This chapter explores the new strategic setting and environment, correlating domestic political events with systemic policies as a basis to explore politico-strategic alignment against military actions during the period of 634-644 - the famous period of ‘conquests’ in Islam, known as the *Futuh*.

Chapter Six explores the continuing practice of Jihad against the backdrop of the third Caliph ‘Uthman during the period of 644-656. Having already identified and tracked the politico-strategic developments that served the design and influence of both foreign

and domestic policy, in this chapter we subject the forgoing analysis to hypo-deductive sets of offensive strategic behaviour to identify causal strategic behaviour both externally but also internally in relation to political uprisings (*bughat*). The chapter concludes with a brief overview of the Caliphate of ‘Ali 656-661, identifying the strategic setting and environment, in the midst of Civil War known as the *Fitna* and how the dynamics of Jihad fared under such conditions.

Chapter Seven explores how, in the aftermath of the Civil War, the systemic strategic environment began to rebalance itself in the absence of Jihad. The end of the *Rashidun* Caliphates witnessed the rise of the first King of Islam, Mu‘awiya who’s near two-decades of rule (661-680) redefined the causal assumptions of Jihad in relation to policy in the face of a new imperial agenda. In this chapter in particular, grand strategic outcomes are considered as designed functions of policy crafted by the political elite to instrumentalise Jihad as a means to serve political ambitions.

Chapter Eight illustrates the conclusions gathered from the preceding chapters mapping common denominators and causal assumptions to the examined phenomena and the historical legacy of the formative period of Islam. Our conclusions shall identify preferences for strategic options, simultaneously pinpointing the extent to which religious justification for action was imposed upon the operational politico-strategic decision-making procedures, and general strategic choices for the application of violence as a tool of political bargaining.

1.9. On Arabic Conventions and Translations

Throughout this study historical dates are given according to the Common Era calendar. As for translational conventions, Arabic words have been loosely transliterated and *italicised* with the exception of the words Qur’an, Jihad, Shari‘a, and Arabic personal names. The *ta marbuta* which is present at the end of feminine words in Arabic and is usually transliterated with either a ‘t’ or a ‘h’ at the end has been dropped in most instances where pronunciation may be confused. For simplicity, the use of macrons for any Arabic word has not been included, except where quoted by another author.

CHAPTER TWO

2.0. Strategic Theoretics

This chapter elucidates the *strategic theoretics*¹ that form the main analytical framework, which is best understood as a matrix of propositions derived from the general ‘strategic approach’ originating from a Clausewitzian paradigm. The employment of strategic theoretics is, as all methodological approaches are, a process of privileging particular forms of explanation over others.² The essence of the research framework is to apply strategic theoretics in order to identify, chart, and logically explain the politico-strategic events between 610-680 as they involve Jihad. Strategic theory is ideally suited to ‘trace the line of thinking of a particular political entity in order to comprehend how it proposes to achieve its objectives;’ as M.L.R. Smith explains, in particular ‘to look at the ideological assumptions and values that underlie that entity’s thinking and how this informs the way it formulates its strategy.’³ Strategic theory applied to the research questions delineated in the previous chapter reveals the core problems to be explored. Firstly, the *bargaining* dynamic between politics and policy; secondly, the politico-strategic mechanisms that instrumentalise and drive military force; and finally, the degree to which political behaviour may be understood as a set of bargaining options generated by the pressures and nature of the strategic environment.

This research methodology - the theoretical framework as a whole - is heavily indebted and influenced by one individual in particular, Carl Philipp von Clausewitz (d. 1831) the intellectual and philosophical godfather of Euro-American strategic thought. A brief foray into some fundamental concepts raised by Clausewitz is therefore necessary in order to explicate the foundations of the strategic theoretic presented in this chapter.

¹ *Strategic theoretics* have been italicised until now so as to distinguish the word as an umbrella term for the research approach. Since this chapter elucidates the research approach fully, the italics shall be removed henceforth.

² Lake & Powell (1999), p.16

³ Smith (1997), p.4

2.1. On War

Clausewitz begins his opus *On War (Vom Kriege)* with a definition of war, which contains a subject and a predicate: ‘War is an act of force intended to compel the enemy to fulfil our will’ (the subject being war, and the predicate an act of force). The resolve to compel is driven by the motives for war, Clausewitz explains, the more powerful and inspiring these motives are the closer war will escalate to the abstract ideal and the more important it will be to crush the enemy; meaning ‘the more closely will the military aims and the political objects of war coincide, and the more military and less political will war appear to be.’⁴ The basic point is that the tension between war’s essence and its attributes is constant and must always be managed. In the following sections we shall clarify and explain the major propositions of Clausewitz’s theory but also the language used, and their implications for this study.

2.2. The Trinitarian System

2.2.1. Proposition 1 – Rational Calculation (Policy)

P¹: In order to maintain the primacy of those political interests for which war is fought, control of the instrument must ultimately reside with the political and not the military authorities.

Basic Theory: Any war effort is never restricted to the military instrument alone. A clash of wills and a trial of strength include politico-economic, diplomatic, and legal pressure, directed at the enemy. Such means seek to destabilise the opponent and increase or induce those elements, which will unbalance his rational pursuits through war. The political motives for war when unchecked are threatened by the variables of hostile intentions and feelings that will escalate the military influence over the political ability to control the direction of the will of war to its natural extreme. On the other hand, the inverse relationship holds true, such that the military element’s natural tendency toward violent escalation is reduced when political control is exerted over primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, thus facilitating political control and a means-ends outcome.

⁴ *OW*, pp.87-88

Explanation: Clausewitz refines his philosophical inquiry into war by focusing upon its reality than its ideal. The initial definition Clausewitz derived is from the example of a duel; essentially a contest between two opposing wills battle for dominance. The key concepts of this contest are violence, objective and end.⁵ The reciprocal logic posits that if disarmament or destruction of the enemy is not aimed for, it is only to invite the enemy to do the same to us. The strategic objective thus becomes a race between two adversaries to disarm each other.⁶ Clausewitz sought to refine his initial definition by rooting war in reality via a framework of analysis he calls the *paradoxical trinity*, a means of triangulation between the subject-predicate. Clausewitz delineates that this trinity is constituted by:

primordial violence, hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.⁷

From Clausewitz's initial subject-predicate starting point; triangulation between the paradoxical trinity delivered Clausewitz to his final statement regarding the nature of war: 'Policy [*politik*], then will permeate all military operations, and in so far as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them';⁸ and 'As a result, war will be driven further from its natural course, the political object will be more and more at variance with the aim of ideal war, and the conflict will seem increasingly *political* in character.'⁹ The term used by Clausewitz is *politik*, that more accurately includes both the meaning of policy and politics, and contains a far broader implication of socio-political influence upon the application of the military instrument. Thus, adding to our previous introductory definition of politics, politics is about the power to influence either directly or indirectly. Politics is about power and those avenues by which an actor seeks to attain their objectives.

⁵ Aron (1986), p.62

⁶ *OW*, pp.77, 90-123

⁷ *Ibid.*, p.89

⁸ *Ibid.*, p.87

⁹ *Ibid.*, p.88 [*italics* in the original]

The creation of advantage through *bargaining dynamics* in relation to counter-political agendas is the means of policy. Policy may or may not incorporate the use of force or specifically the military instrument. Political interests served below the level of policy, that is, unofficially or informally; contain a breadth of interactions that can include bargaining between institutional structures, businesses, domestic households, or social relations. The quintessential link between policy and politics therefore, is the idea of *bargaining* to an end. This *bargaining dynamic* is what makes interactions *political*, and sometimes involves the threat or use of force, other times through mutual consent and agreement.

Hence, according to Clausewitzian logic, the strategic employment of violence is never waged in isolation from political influences, constraints, and moral ideals;¹⁰ rather ‘the primacy of politics meant that there could never be a purely military solution to any strategic problem.’ Daniel Moran explains, ‘Military objectives derived from political purposes, and strategic plans should in turn be defined by, and proportionate to, the objective.’¹¹ The ‘strategic approach’ can be broadly understood to be largely a consequence of the Clausewitzian impact on strategy and military theory, Waldman writes:

Ostensibly, the concept of war as an instrument of policy is straight-forward. The use of military force is a means to a higher end—the political object. War is a tool that policy uses to achieve its objectives and, as such, has a measure of rational utility. So, the purpose for which the use of force is intended will be the major determinant of the course and character of a war.¹²

The first element of the Trinitarian system is thus concerned with rational calculation as a *strategic act* of bargaining. The words ‘strategy’ and its derivative ‘strategic’ should therefore be clarified by some simple qualifications that are of methodological consequence.

¹⁰ Ibid., p.78

¹¹ Moran (2002), p.29

¹² Waldman (2010), p.2

2.2.2. Sub-Proposition A – Vertical Design (Strategy)

P^{1A}: *The quintessential characteristic of ‘strategy’ is that it is an instrumental link between means and ends; and ‘strategic’ action or interaction, implies instrumental design advanced to reach a particular end or objective(s) given the assumptions of adversarial or competitive behaviour.*

Basic Theory & Explanation: Whilst strategy is not an ‘essentially contested concept’ - there is no strictly agreed upon definition within the field of strategic theory and studies. Early definitions of strategy in the European tradition deemed strategy as ‘all military movements out of the enemy’s cannon range or range of vision’, the Swiss General and strategist Antoine Henry de Jomini (d.1869) wrote of it as ‘the art of making war upon the map’¹³; but following Clausewitz’s introduction of war’s relation to policy, a broader meaning came to be enjoyed amongst strategic thinkers and military theorists.

Clausewitz himself used the terms ‘art of war’ (*Kriegskunst*), ‘strategy’ (*Strategie*) and ‘conduct of war’ (*Kriegführung*) almost interchangeably¹⁴ but defined strategy as ‘the use of the engagement for the purpose of the war.’¹⁵ According to Clausewitz, the strategist must ‘define an aim for the entire operational side of the war that will be in accordance with its purpose.’ In other words, ‘he will draft the plan of the war, and the aim will determine the series of actions intended to achieve it.’¹⁶ Clausewitz qualifies this explanation further by writing:

Strategy, in connecting these factors with the outcome of an engagement, confers a special significance on that outcome and thereby on the engagement: *it assigns a particular aim to it.* Yet insofar as that aim is not the one that will lead directly to peace, it remains subsidiary and is also to be thought of as a means.¹⁷

¹³ Cited in Platias & Koliopoulos (2010), pp.2-3

¹⁴ See Echevarria (1995)

¹⁵ *OW*, p.177

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.143 (emphasis in the original)

Various strategic thinkers have put forth differing definitions or descriptions of strategy, for example, Harry Yarger writes: ‘Strategy is fundamentally about choices; it reflects a preference for a future state or condition and determines how best to get there.’ In doing so, Yarger asserts the comprehensive nature of strategy in that ‘strategy confronts adversaries, allies, and other actors; and it addresses resource and organizational issues; even then some factors simply will remain beyond control or maybe unforeseen.’¹⁸ Michael Howard defines strategy as ‘the use of available resources to gain any objective.’¹⁹ These rather broad and abstract definitions can be contrasted with more specific military proposals.

The military definition of ‘strategy’ proposed by Basil Liddell-Hart is ‘the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfil the ends of policy.’²⁰ Beaufre defines it otherwise as ‘the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills, using force to resolve their dispute’.²¹ According to Daniel Moran, ‘The goal of strategy is to optimize military effectiveness while limiting the social costs of war, relative to the interests at stake.’²² Colin S. Gray offers the definition of strategy as ‘the use that is made of force and the threat of force for the ends of policy’;²³ and David Lonsdale amalgamates the definitions of Clausewitz, Gray and Beaufre to posit ‘the art of using military force against an intelligent foe(s) toward the attainment of policy objectives.’²⁴

Whilst further definitions and interpretations could be presented,²⁵ the objective would not be qualified further in doing so because strategic theory does not advocate a particular definition of strategy itself, as we shall explain later in this chapter. Therefore it is sufficient for now to acknowledge all of the aforementioned definitions and propose for this study, our own definition: strategy is simply an *abstract design* conceived as an instrumental process between means and ends.

¹⁸ Yarger (2006), p.6

¹⁹ Howard (1983), p.86

²⁰ Liddell Hart (1967), p.335

²¹ Cited in Sabin (2012), p.61

²² Moran (2002), p.25

²³ Gray (1999), p.7

²⁴ Lonsdale (2007), p.6

²⁵ See Gray (2010), Jermy (2011), Lonsdale (2007), Platias & Koliopoulos (2010), and Stone (2011).

2.2.3. Sub-Proposition B - Horizontal Design (Strategic)

P^{1B}: *The result in war is never final. The instrument of war cannot confer victory or legitimacy without political credibility. Military victory is distinct from political victory. Peace cannot be imposed unless terms are made acceptable to the vanquished.*

Basic Theory & Explanation: The choices or decisions of actors (whether states, political parties, ethnic groups, military organisations, or individuals) can be understood as strategic; ‘which means dependent upon the choices and behaviour of other relevant actors regardless of whether those choices concern war or peace.’²⁶ The interdependency of action is often adversarial, or competitive, creating dialectical responses between actors each attempting to further their interests. The strategic design of each side is called the ‘horizontal dimension’ according to Edward Luttwak,²⁷ like two wrestlers attempting to defeat one another. Raymond Aron writes, ‘If strategy has one end, it could be summarized in a single word: peace.’ Aron continues to make the pertinent distinction that peace is ‘not military victory, even though each of the belligerents clearly wants a different peace or conceives of peace in different terms.’²⁸ The exemplary purpose of strategy in Clausewitzian thought is to serve the ends of political victory, to impose an acceptable peace upon the adversary.

Platias & Koliopoulos argue that since the days of Thucydides it was understood that strategy maintained a constantly adversarial logic, ‘never conducted in a vacuum; it is always directed against one or more opponents who in turn formulate their own strategy.’²⁹ Strategic choice and action is, therefore, the product of strategic calculus dependent upon the existence and interaction on an opponent within an environment, a strategic bargaining dialectic where action and reaction are driven by previous behaviour and expectations for the future.³⁰

In other words, ‘A situation is strategic if an actor’s ability to further its ends depends on the actions others take. If so, then each actor must try to anticipate what the other

²⁶ Lake & Powell (1999), p.3

²⁷ Luttwak (1987), p.70

²⁸ Aron (1986), p.97

²⁹ Platias & Koliopoulos (2010), p.61

³⁰ Ibid., p.66

actors will do.’³¹ But what one actor chooses is dependent to some degree upon their assumptions regarding what the other will attempt. John Stone summarises this point by explaining that ‘our choice of strategic objective flows not from the most dangerous response our adversary can possibly make, but from his most probable response in light of the value he places on victory.’³² Strategic choices are not reified responses, rather they are calculated responses to emerging conditions and ‘[i]t is exactly this conditioning of strategic choices by political considerations that Clausewitz had in mind when he characterized war as a continuation of politics by other means.’³³ Strategy is the bridge between means and ends, and thus directs decision-making and problem-solving towards a common objective - the political aim. Strategic actions are like moves on a chessboard, each move ultimately designed and calculated to an end, the checkmate of the opponent, but dependent upon the responses of the opponent simultaneously. Strategy cannot be wholly conceived independent of a setting however, as it is the setting itself which structures and gives meaning to strategic interactions.

2.3. The Strategic Setting

2.3.1. Proposition 2 – Rational Actors seek to control Blind Forces

P²: *If war is an instrument of rational calculation, it is never the first or the last resort, but rather it should be the most effective means at one’s disposal.*

Basic Theory: The rational instrumentalisation of war demands the establishment of clear and attainable objectives through a cost-benefit calculus of the utility of employing force as part of strategic interactions between actors and the environment. This calculus specifically seeks to employ violence in such a manner as to achieve the political objectives as fast and efficiently as possible, at the lowest political costs. Hostile feelings and intentions can, and often will, contradict rational calculation thus making war less political and escalating its tendencies to the extreme.

Explanation: The strategic setting is the foundational structure of strategic bargaining analysis, incorporating the basic constituent variables of strategic

³¹ Lake & Powell (1999), p.8

³² Stone (2011), pp. 6-7

³³ Ibid.

interaction analysis. The strategic setting is a conceptual reconfiguration of the units of analysis (two or more actors) as strategic problems and interactions seeking to explain how this interaction unfolds.³⁴ In order to do this effectively, strategic interaction is structured and distinguished between the actors, their environment, and the preferences and beliefs held or demonstrated - all according to the known information available to the actors – which, according to Lake & Powell, forms analytical categories that ‘serve as the basis for conceptual experiments that recur at all levels of strategic interaction.’ According to Lake, using this structural approach, the resulting analytical scheme ‘gives theories within the strategic-choice approach their explanatory power.’³⁵ The constituent key forms of interactions within the strategic setting are: strategic actions, strategic preferences, and the strategic environment. Each form of interaction presents a strategic problem to be solved by other units involved. These problems set in motion the other interaction but are also created on account of them.

2.3.2. Sub-Proposition C - Interaction Analysis (Local Politics)

P^{2C}: *War is a political instrument employed to serve the political interests of a social unit, whether an organised political polity or a tribe. Therefore, its instrumental purpose reflects its rational purpose.*

Basic Theory: Strategic interactions generate expectations and projections of the opponent and create preferred methods of engagement or influence bargaining behaviour along lines of expected practice and utility of actions, which end in ranked assumptions and preferences for action and outcomes sought through the interactive process. If political interests are strategically unchecked, or at the mercy of non-political stewardship, the instrument of war may just as easily be employed to serve irrational or unattainable objectives as interests become blinded by passions.

Explanation: Strategic interaction is analysis according to actor and environments with no specification or determination of the traditional levels-of-analysis problem; meaning systemic, domestic or individual actors are not judged by hierarchy but

³⁴ Lake & Powell (1999), p.4

³⁵ Ibid. (both quotes)

observed and tackled according to strategic interaction. If there is no strategic interaction at a particular level, there is no need to assume or investigate further. Strategic interactions are dissected between local actors, interests, and the strategic environment.

The actions available to actors (which can be analysed through sets of decision-making inferences, plausible reactions, and sequential deduction), inform whether competitive or cooperative bargaining behaviour is to be expected or predicted.³⁶ The strategic environment also informs the analysis as to the information available to the actors thereby making clear what is uncertain or must be inferred during the decision-making process. The uncertainty and fog of the strategic environment greatly affects the corresponding decision-making, in large part subsequently determining the course of actions undertaken. A deeper discussion of actors, interests, and the strategic environment, reveals the foundational structure upon which the strategic setting is built.

2.3.2a. The Strategic Actor

The means-end relationship of strategy assumes that actors will make advance decisions with an expectation to maximize *subjective expected utility* whenever possible as part of a broad cost-benefit calculus. At the heart of strategic interaction between actors is this form of *bargaining calculus*. The *bargaining calculus* of actors reflect decisions, or strategic preferences, that unlike the legal preferences and assumptions of rational choice theories,³⁷ are not completely identifiable or static, nor can be ranked according to a preference hierarchy intended to result in particular outcomes. This is because the strategic environment is dynamic such that preferences cannot be transitive or hierarchical in a linear manner indefinitely; i.e. if A is preferred to B and B to C, then A is preferred to C. Instead, strategic preferences are aligned with broad policy outcomes that facilitate adaptive and flexible responses to maximize *subjective expected utility* prior to any diplomatic or military engagements. Between actors and their environments lie interests for action. Strategic interests link interactions between actors.

³⁶ Such predictions are commonly made through the use of the Prisoner's Dilemma matrices, and 'two-by-two games', in game theory and modelling.

³⁷ Walt (2000), pp.5-7

2.3.2b. The Strategic Interest

The identification of ‘preferences’ is broadly used as an indicator of where the strategic interest resides within the *bargaining calculus* of a strategic interaction. Jeffery Frieden writes ‘[T]he essential point is that in any given setting, an actor *prefers* some outcomes to others and pursues a *strategy* to achieve its most preferred possible outcome.’³⁸ The ‘preference and pursuit’ reflect the deeper implications of the strategic relation between the interaction of the actor, the environment and other actors within the environment. Political preferences, expressed through policy may explicate what and where the strategic interest of an actor resides, but the identification of strategic interests themselves remain problematic. Strategic interests are rarely ever purely ‘strategic’ but more often the result of political considerations. The problem of political demands is that they are not always the most judicious confusing political interests with strategic interests.³⁹

Confusion of political interests with strategic interests is not surprising however, since the complexity of the strategic environment is exceptionally dynamic given systemic flux and the variables of instability. Constant streams of information and intelligence are locked into a strategic loop of variable calculus toward threats and behaviours. ‘This is the feedback process in principle,’⁴⁰ Thomas Schelling explains, wherein the activities of politicians and the military generate multiple variables and sources of internal friction that reduces the efficacy of strategic decision-making. Bureaucracy, inter-departmental, and cross-party politics provides substantial friction in domestic areas such as acquisition and budget allocations that have a direct knock-on effect for military decisions, where political motivations of individuals and parties or interest groups and increasingly the media, influence the political-decision process.

As the publicity of policy is increasingly affected by internal friction, policy is also a spectacle for the audience of systemic actors affecting the internal, as well as the external, development and application of military decision-making. Bernard Brodie also argues that very often, political judgment does not direct military options in order to advance strategic interests. ‘To save wear and tear on their always overburdened and

³⁸ Frieden (1999), p.41

³⁹ Cited in Jermy (2011), p.80

⁴⁰ Schelling (2008), p.274

frequently limited analytical powers,' politicians according to Brodie, 'cling obsessively to common accepted axioms, some of which may be old enough to have the aura of "traditional" policy.'⁴¹ If political preferences are not reflective or indicative of the actual strategic interest, and demonstrate a distinct contradiction of the expected strategic logic in favour of more politically manageable options, the result is an expected disaster.

The identification of the strategic interests advanced by policy must be distinguished from the politics involved in its formulation, otherwise Jermy concludes, 'the strategy will be built on weak foundations.'⁴² Accordingly, the motives for war should correspond to the vital interests of the actors such that they check the escalatory nature of adversarial violence applied. The final unit of the strategic setting is the strategic environment itself, however, to engage this variable correctly we must address its Trinitarian roots first.

2.4. The Variables of Chaos

2.4.1. Proposition 3 – The Non-Linear forces of Chaos, Escalation, and Friction

P³: *The balance afforded by rational calculation is always threatened by the variables of chaos and escalation.*

Basic Theory: Friction refers to the interplay of probabilities against chance and uncertainty. This includes the general elements of friction, incompetence, negligence, technical or mechanical failure, and others. Escalation always threatens to destabilise the directing control of rational purposes. The more war is fought for less politically motivated goals, the greater the propensity for escalation and the increase the likelihood of violent and destructive means being employed.

Escalation may however be deliberately introduced by one side against another as a means of shifting the bargaining advantage or the strategic initiative through disproportionate force. Policy should dictate the series of actions that aim to translate the desired political outcome into a reality whilst overcoming the variables of chaos, escalation, and friction. In this sense, strategy seeks to translate vertical or abstract

⁴¹ Brodie cited in Jermy (2011), p.92

⁴² Jermy (2011), p.92

will onto the horizontal plane of tangible outcomes. Warfighting is a means of translation.

Explanation: The design of policy seeks to align military actions with a consistent strategic vision of events, yet as ‘Clausewitz tells us that the conscious conduct of war (strategy, etc.) *should* be a continuation of rational calculation and policy, but also that war *inevitably* originates and exists within the chaotic, unpredictable realm of politics.’⁴³ Ideal war is that where ‘war is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force.’⁴⁴ When two opposing wills clash both, attempting to apply force to each other, the reciprocal consequence between two adversaries creates an escalatory logic whereby violence is used at accelerated rates to achieve dominance over the other, it become *absolute*. The ‘unlimited’ logic represents the abstract apex of ‘*absolute war*’ - to apply violent means to achieve an end - which should be used with the greatest sense of urgency, that is, at its utmost speed and power, without warning or hesitation – supremely a single instantaneous explosion of unrestricted force⁴⁵ against the opponent to decisively crush any possibility of resistance.

Despite war’s propensity to escalation, Clausewitz noted the absence of absolute war in human history and that the actual face of war was quite a different affair. Bound by human reasoning and error, and unforeseen variables, both colluding to create friction against escalation, war could never progress from the political decision to the military decision is one instantaneous strike. Clausewitz noted the epistemological nature of war in reality, absorbed in ‘a kind of friction that is inconceivable’⁴⁶ between political aims and military action which, in its ideal form would be instantaneous, non-local or linear, and without friction.

Harry Yarger⁴⁷ explains the inconceivable role of friction coupled with the ideas of nonlinearity (both continuities and unpredicted threats and opportunities), as an interactive process whereby strategic choices generate effects that in turn engender reactions, the results of which may or may not create significant changes. Yarger’s

⁴³ Villacres & Bassford (1995), p.14 [*italics* in the original]

⁴⁴ *OW*, p.77

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p.79

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, p.119

⁴⁷ Yarger (2006), pp.24-25

argument is that friction is generated as consequence of interaction between actors irrespective of their relationship to the principal actor – be they friendly, adversarial, or indifferent, and their choice of actions – whether purposeful and deliberate, reactive, or pre-emptive – all result in shifts at some degree from their previous condition.

Hence, the smallest amount of friction is inherently volatile by its nature, and escalates internally, inversely affecting the external capacity for military escalation to reach its optimum, ‘whether by lack of foresight, slow execution, or factors beyond the actor’s control, [it] can amplify itself into a cascade of things going wrong to create potential chaos.’⁴⁸ Epistemologically Clausewitz concludes that the logically ideal form of war is impossible to attain in reality on account of not only political behaviour⁴⁹ but even in the theoretical instance of war driven solely by passionate motivations for complete destruction of the enemy; the inescapable influence of friction will always limit the realistically attainable level of escalation which is required. This is what is meant by war in reality (see Figure 1. below).




Figure 1. The Fundamentals of War in Reality

2.4.2. The Strategic Environment

Basic Theory & Explanation: The strategic environment is the most dynamic unit of analysis, and can be best understood as a self-regulating system wherein, much like an eco-system, an internal complex system of organisation exists which establishes

⁴⁸ Ibid., p.24

⁴⁹ *OW*, pp.605-610

equilibrium for life to be maintained, and flourish. Externally this is manifested by conditions suitable for life or habitats to survive according to the needs of the species present. Likewise, the strategic environment is composed of actors with formed relationships between them. Such relationships may be co-operative or hostile. Accordingly, interactions between actors demonstrate strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats. Survival between hostile actors are, nonetheless, still balanced by the needs of the system and regulated as such. In cases of extreme threat or even eradication to one actor, the environment may adapt in order to reconfigure the needs of the environment as a whole in the absence of a former relationship no longer present or to remove an actor who threatens to destabilise the system completely.⁵⁰ In other words, the strategic environment will seek to manage threats and the use of violence to an acceptable level.

The advancement of politico-strategic interests of actors themselves generates friction. To this end, it can be argued that counter-productive effects to one's strategy are often self-inflicted by the strategy adopted because of the manner in which interests advanced within the strategic environment are never achieved unilaterally. In order to reduce friction, a cumulative strategy is often preferred by strategists in order to incrementally advance towards one's objectives whilst simultaneously protecting the platform upon which the strategist is operating, that is to say, building upon one's successes by not compromising the accrued goals already met. The fog and friction of war is where the interplay of chance and probability – those innate or non-rational forces – are brought to bear. This side of the trinity is a broad and complicated area that can be simplified by recourse to a modern variant of explanation: VUCA.

The U.S. Army War College offers the acronym VUCA – volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity - to describe the strategic environment.⁵¹ The understanding of these characteristics is to reinforce the dynamic instability of the strategic environment. Whilst the system may self-regulate, it remains nonetheless volatile due to the complexities of actor's choices within the 'fog of war' – meaning uncertain or incomplete information – and the ambiguities of logical cause-and-effect

⁵⁰ More commonly understood in international relations theory as *balance of power*, obvious examples of such shifts are the French Revolution and the balancing of European nations against Germany twice in the twentieth-century.

⁵¹ Yarger (2006), p.18

on account of friction. The constant flux generated within the strategic environment renders many assumptions speculative and uncertain. More so, the introduction of violence escalates the characteristics of VUCA in any given theatre.⁵²

2.5. Philosophical Conclusions

The Clausewitzian Trinity (*wunderliche Dreifaltigkeit*) is a ‘fascinating trinity’ by which to *observe* the events of early Islam and the formative Jihad. We have explained Trinitarian theory alongside its constituents noted in contemporary strategic theoretics, (that is, theories that can be included as part of the ‘strategic approach’) according to three propositions: *rational calculation*, the *strategic setting*, and the *variables of chaos*. Let us remind ourselves of how Clausewitz defines the trinity:

primordial violence, hatred, and enmity; which are to be regarded as a blind force; of the play of chance and probability within which the creative spirit is free to roam; and it’s element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which makes it subject to reason alone.⁵³

Often summarised as the social trinity of ‘people, army, and government’⁵⁴ whereby ‘the directing policy of the government, the professional qualities of the army, and the attitude of the population all played an equally significant part’;⁵⁵ Clausewitz’s triune lens of strategic interpretation is exceedingly insightful and illuminates how ‘War is more than a true chameleon that slightly adapts its characteristics to the given case. As a total phenomenon its dominant tendencies always make war a remarkable trinity’.⁵⁶ This is because in all instances of war, the particulars of the trinity remain constant though the specifics will differ. Over a period of time therefore, changes inevitably occur because of changes within the strategic setting or environment, which can never be stagnant. Accordingly shifts in rational calculation must follow, if they are not driving the changes. The trinity itself is all about *dynamism*.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ *OW*, p.89

⁵⁴ Villacres & Bassford (1995), p.9; and Bassford (2015)

⁵⁵ Howard (1983), p.20

⁵⁶ *OW*, p.89

Hence, trinitarian analysis or ‘interpretation’ is a valuable means of identifying *strategic dynamics*. This method has been described by Villacres & Bassford who write: ‘Interpreting the meandering course of any real-world war as the product of a trinity of forces (emotion, chance, and rationality) is altogether different from discussing a trinity of actors (people, army, and government).’⁵⁷ Indeed, as *strategic dynamics* evolve, actors will change though the forces of the trinity remain as we have mentioned.

For this reason it is important to see that any trinitarian interpretation of events is located within the trinity of actors but is concerned with the later repercussions or trajectory of their decisions and actions rather than to become bogged down in the contingent behavioural dynamics of the event. Social interpretations that are considered as events within themselves often lead to trinitarian failure when analysed in such manner. This is because such analysis generally assumes that were one set of structures to be removed from the analysis, the trinity ceases to exist as a framework of interpretation.⁵⁸

This study indirectly counters such claims by firmly situating trinitarian interpretation to an extremely volatile pre-state society over a period of 70 years. Beginning with no civil-military institutions or official political establishments, seventh-century Arabia, it shall be argued, is *especially* amenable to trinitarian interpretation. As institutions began to form, their development is inextricably bound to the dynamic interplay of strategic interactions at the levels of the strategic setting and environment that created systemic policies and subsequent institutions for interaction.

Hence, to recognise strategic developments during a particular Caliphate is to understand the events of the previous Caliphate that led to it. Furthermore, the forthcoming chapters shall demonstrate how the positive use of Clausewitzian theory yields significant analytical benefit when applying trinitarian interpretation to understanding the evolving *strategic dynamics* of warfighting in Islam and those policies that directed it, because the primary features of Clausewitzian theory are rooted in a similar tension between Jihad as both an absolute ideal and a real

⁵⁷ Villacres & Bassford (1995), p.15

⁵⁸ Ibid.; See Kaldor (2006) and Smith (2006)

phenomenon. But first, let us observe how Clausewitz adopted a similar approach in *On War*.

2.6. Clausewitz and the ‘Case Study Approach’

It is perhaps useful at this point to reassert the line of continuity between the strategic theoretics proposed so far and the reasons as to why a diagnostic procedure is needed to complete the research method. Let us begin by stating that the strategic approach in general is not uniform and some strategists advocate an eternal unity to strategic thought that can be transmitted through generations as strategic wisdom.⁵⁹ According to Clausewitz, if theory should reflect reality then a logical hierarchy of laws, principles, rules, prescriptions and methods must govern it.⁶⁰ However, Clausewitz was quick to dismiss the possibility that laws should be given a place in a theory of war, because laws were understood as ‘universal’ and therefore drove cause-and-effect determining actions and outcomes,⁶¹ and ‘since the phenomenon of war consisted of “too much change and diversity” to allow action to be traced to a single cause’⁶² Clausewitz rejected the notion out-right. Principles are deductions on the other hand, and reflect the ‘spirit and sense’ of a law,⁶³ but are not universal and absolute like laws. A universal principle guides general expectation and hence, for Clausewitz, principles, and rules, were acceptable in the theorisation of war because they were intrinsically broad and non-absolute. They were general truths subject to exceptions and not factual realities.

Drawing from Clausewitz’s original ideas an orientation developed premising strategy with political aims that blossomed into the strategic approach that exists today. This orientation, is premised upon the emphatic correlation Clausewitz advocated, the balance between policy and the instrumental use of force: ‘If we keep in mind that war springs from some political purpose, it is natural that the prime cause of its existence will remain the supreme consideration in conducting it.’⁶⁴ Debate within the

⁵⁹ See Gray (1999), p.1

⁶⁰ *OW*, pp.151-155

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, p.151

⁶² Echevarria (1995)

⁶³ *OW*, p.151

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p.87

orientation as to the strategic relevance and validity of historical experiences and records is a matter of contention however.

Some modern writers, such as David J. Lonsdale,⁶⁵ Platias & Koliopoulos,⁶⁶ and Colin Gray, advocate the value of history as a repository for strategic wisdom. Colin Gray for example, argues that ‘there is an essential unity to all strategic experience in all periods of history because nothing vital to the nature and function of war and strategy changes.’⁶⁷ Furthermore, Gray adds, ‘Because war and strategy are unchanged and unchanging in their natures, it has to follow that we should allow ourselves to seek education from historical experience.’⁶⁸ In opposition to such ideas are authors, such as Philip Sabin, who argues that the ‘understandable tendency of modern observers to focus almost exclusively on potential parallels and areas of similarity between ancient and modern experience is in fact misleading and even pernicious.’⁶⁹

Clausewitz, upon whom this research is philosophically premised, is most blunt in this regard: ‘The further back one goes, the less useful military history becomes, growing poorer and barer at the same time. The history of antiquity is without doubt the most useless and the barest of all.’⁷⁰ Clausewitz’s dismissiveness is a product of this theoretical approach, as he explains: ‘the further one progresses from broad generalities to details,’ by which he means universals to particulars, ‘the less one is able to select examples and experiences from remote times. We are in no position to evaluate the relevant events correctly, nor to apply them to the wholly different means we use today.’⁷¹ Clausewitz devotes an entire section to this issue⁷² in *On War* (Book Two, Chapter Six) and his judgment in this regard is most salient for this study. Therefore, we have proposed to examine the period of 610-680, in a style, as we have explained according to trinitarian interpretation, but not explained why until now. The why is simply in accordance with Clausewitzian recommendation. Furthermore, the

⁶⁵ Lonsdale (2007), p.1

⁶⁶ Platias & Koliopoulos (2010)

⁶⁷ Gray (1999), p.1,

⁶⁸ Ibid., (2006), p.6

⁶⁹ See Sabin (2007)

⁷⁰ *OW*, p.173

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 174

⁷² Ibid., p.516

implementation of diagnostic procedure for evaluation similarly conforms to Clausewitz's own approach to validate the theoretics he proposed himself.

2.6.1. The Curious Case of Napoleon

For Clausewitz, the Napoleonic era bore witness to warfare reaching its closest point to absolute war.⁷³ However, because Clausewitz was deeply troubled by the tension between historical changes over time, the influence of circumstances, and the dubious applicability of general laws to the conduct of war;⁷⁴ he did not conduct a historical appraisal of the Napoleonic wars but rather a *strategic* one. Clausewitz subjected information available on the campaigns of Napoleon to the theoretical framework of *On War*, redefining the historical events in broader terms to signify a 'framework for study' or a 'basis for conceptualization.'⁷⁵ The campaigns of Napoleon provided Clausewitz with a rich canvas of events (not historical details) by which to demonstrate the aim of theory and to draw means-ends relationships in order to validate theoretical consistency.⁷⁶

The process adopted by Clausewitz according to Antulio Echevarria involved placing 'the principal elements of war, such as military genius and friction, under the microscope,' examining them in detail before contrasting them against military history, in particular campaigns of Napoleon 'as a sort of crucible to test how each element functioned and influenced the others, if indeed it did so.'⁷⁷ For Clausewitz's method, this was the diagnostic element that revealed the character of Napoleonic warfare was at its extreme inclination towards the absolute conception of warfighting.

Clausewitz's arrival at this position was a result of avoiding the artificiality of historical categorisation and interpretation,⁷⁸ insisting instead upon strategic analysis according to broad generalisations demonstrably observed and recorded. For Clausewitz, battle and the use of battle for the purposes of the political aim was the primary form of historical information.⁷⁹ Hence, strategic and operational (or tactical)

⁷³ Ibid., pp. 592-3

⁷⁴ Echevarria (1995)

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ Ibid., (2007), p.3

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ See Morillo with Pavkovic (2006); and Keegan (1984), p.25

⁷⁹ Echevarria (2007), p.6

reports were the most important forms of records to subject strategic to analysis to in order to arrive at an understanding of the political objective.

Just as Clausewitz was able to subject the Napoleonic wars to strategic examination, this study advances the *strategic dynamics* that drove and developed the warfighting practices of Jihad in Islam and subjects those events to the proposition of Jihad as the continuation of *politik* by other means. In his own investigation, Clausewitz was theoretically flexible, using the philosophy, physics and strategic thought of his day. Similarly, in the following sections we shall propose firstly; a strategic theoretic that is inclusive of trinitarian analysis discussed so far, strategic theory and the broader strategic approach; and secondly, investigative avenues found in contemporary offensive realism to support theoretical flexibility and evaluation.

Having elucidated the basic philosophical elements of the trinity and the requirements for diagnostic evaluation by case study method; an explanation of strategic theory follows as a prelude to presenting an overall strategic paradigm or theoretic. Where Clausewitzian theory provides the philosophical origins and format of the research method, strategic theory - being premised upon all of the aforementioned propositions either directly or indirectly - serves as the guiding structure of strategic investigation. Furthermore, strategic theory synchronises additional qualities integral to the research methodology and approach.

2.7. Strategic Theory

2.7.1. Proposition 4 – Pragmatic Judgement not Truth

Strategic theory is philosophically pragmatic, technically parsimonious, and premised upon rational calculation and judgement.

Basic Theory: Strategic theory demands the use of judgement, and makes use of existing theoretics in accordance with its own principles and logic, based upon the utility of the theory to the investigation. While strategic theory does prefer some principles and theories to others on account of methodological connexion, the

pragmatic character of strategic theory applies a depth of knowledge to a given problem through strategic integration of objectives, to result in a clear strategic formulation of the subject that is as much a strategic judgment as it is a calculated outcome.

Explanation: Despite the fact that strategic theory is not a falsifiable scientific theory, according to M.L.R. Smith ‘it does constitute a theory in the broader sense that it advances a set of propositions that if true can be held to explain certain facts or phenomena.’⁸⁰ In the words of strategic theorists themselves, the field is a branch of social theory, ‘[E]merging as an offshoot from public choice economics, it shares assumptions found in game, drama and rational choice theory.’⁸¹ Strategic theory, shares with the broader strategic approach, the assumptions that:⁸²

- Actors are purposive,
- Strategic interactions are the units of analysis,
- The approach provides a common framework for organising interactions,
- The approach takes an essentially pragmatic view of theory,
- and finally, makes a series of methodological bets about what will prove to be fruitful ways of analysing and thinking about international politics.

In a politico-military context, it is ‘concerned with the use of force to achieve the goals of one community in conflict with others. It explores how to employ armed forces to advance political, social, economic, cultural, or ideological interests.’⁸³ This approach is fundamentally concerned with the reciprocal interaction between thought and action, action and reaction: ‘tracing the line of thinking of political actors to comprehend how they propose to achieve their objectives’;⁸⁴ and is characterised by ‘means and ends’ logic alongside a formalised series of explicit assumptions. For strategists, ‘[W]ar’s instrumental nature - its logical and practical subordination to objectives outside itself-is in theoretical terms its most important characteristic.’⁸⁵ The

⁸⁰ Smith (2011)

⁸¹ Harris (2006), p.539

⁸² The following assumptions are listed by Lake & Powell (1999), p.6

⁸³ Moran (2001), p.1

⁸⁴ Harris (2006), p.539

⁸⁵ Moran (2001), p.1

basic theoretic of strategic theory or its specific assumptions, are summarised by M.L.R. Smith as seven,⁸⁶ and comprise the core of strategic theory (Figure 3.):

1. The study of ends and means;
2. The study of the political actor as the central unit of analysis;
3. Understanding the political actor's value system and preferences;
4. An actor's interest will be influenced by the wider strategic environment;
5. The actor is behaving rationally in pursuit of its aims;
6. The acceptance of clashing interests;
7. and finally, the observance of moral neutrality.

2.7.2. Advantages of Strategic Theory

Employing strategic theory as the theoretical framework for this research confers three salient advantages. The first is theoretical flexibility; the second is parsimony; and the third is moral equivocality. An explication of these three features of theory will reveal why strategic theory is better suited to an investigation of Jihad as a politico-strategic application of the military instrument rather than a general strategic approach, an exclusively Clausewitzian study, or common strategic-history approach.

2.7.3. The Theoretical Flexibility of Strategic Theory

M.L.R. Smith stipulates that strategic theory is distinct and should not be confused with vague subject areas such as 'strategic culture', 'security and strategic studies'; confused as being game theory by another name, or a method of studying military power alone.⁸⁷ Nonetheless, research premised upon strategic theory can, and often will, include research methodologies from 'strategic' disciplines or at least share some very similar concerns and assumptions as they do, after all, strategic approaches are theoretically inclusive.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ Smith (2011); elsewhere, in an earlier work, Smith (1997), p.2; mentions another pertinent assumption, that '... one of the principal assumptions of strategic theory is that military force is a functional aspect of power, deliberately employed to achieve political objectives.' According to Smith, the basic theoretic is premised upon the essential application of Occam's Razor to the correlation of means and ends. Strategic theory applied therefore, serves as an inquiry by presenting 'purposive assumptions that guide analysis' – (2011)

⁸⁷ Smith (2011)

⁸⁸ Lake & Powell (1999), p.6

Two fields in particular offer assistance for complex problems tackled by strategic theory, both acknowledged by M.L.R. Smith as having early disciplinary influence on the growth and development of strategic theory in general - International Relations theories, and Game Theory. Whilst strategic theory is predominately a qualitative field of research, it does admit occasions where quantitative methods are employed, and given the essentially pragmatic nature of strategic theory this is hardly surprising. It would be hasty to consider strategic theory a mixed method approach however, as it remains qualitatively bound by the nature of its 'theoretic' character.

Strategic theory can advance abductive strategic assumptions but cannot assume the reasons for behaviour, especially cross-cultural behaviour, without an alternative set of assumptions to premise investigation upon. This is where theoretical flexibility facilitates the merging of strategic theory with questions of international politics. Strategic theory is more closely aligned to the Realist school of thought, but strategic theory is neither a Realist theory nor in agreement with all assumptions of Realism. Core fundamentals of Realism are however, generally acceptable as initial foundations for assumptions regarding the systemic level and behaviour of international actors. Subsequent theories derived from Realism which do not contravene the basic fundamentals are therefore also amenable to the purposes of strategic theorists if and when relevant to an investigation.

2.7.4. The Parsimonious Nature of Strategic Theory

The second advantageous feature of strategic theory builds upon theoretical flexibility but with the streamlining effect of parsimony. The application of strategic theory is methodologically premised upon the principle parsimony, which sharpens the abductive logic of investigation by reducing complexity according to the units of consideration. Strategic theory, does not advocate as constructivists do, 'an intellectual position where everything is "endogenous," or dependent on everything else';⁸⁹ despite the truth of interdependence, it is not helpful and contrary to the pragmatic philosophy of strategic theory and abductive logical inferences.

⁸⁹ Lake & Powell (1999), p.32

The constructivist trap is to introduce too many variable unknowns, such that in mathematical terms, the numerical frequency exceeds the available equations to solve the problems. With so many unknown variables, constructivists can only ever speculate about plausible alternatives but not explain why any particular solution emerges without violating any of their own assumptions that actors and environments are mutually constitutive.⁹⁰ On the other hand, it is short-sighted to infer that the application of parsimonious reasoning is always reductionist especially in cases where too many necessary variables exist. Often, a multitude of units can be accommodated for and reduced to serve theory, because the success of strategic theory is measured by the research to provide a strategically consistent and logically evident outcome to a question, problem, or subject matter, rather than an all-embracing explanation.

For example, according to offensive realism, the decision to employ war as a means to achieve one's ends is prejudiced by the ease of an offensive military capability in the existing strategic setting, such that when launching offensive operations has a greater expected utility over static defensive operations, war will become more likely.⁹¹ This application of the offense-defense theory is an example of both theoretical flexibility and parsimonious explanation, both of which conform to abductive logic and the assumptions of strategic theory.⁹²

2.7.5. Moral Equivocation

The final advantage of strategic theory over other strategic approaches is moral equivocation, which may be considered as simply an approach that is analytically disinterested in ethical norms. The purpose is to enforce objectivity by denying subjectivity of research with the researcher.⁹³ Hence, value judgements are never in point of fact, but counterfactual. A strategic investigation which involves violence emphasises the problems of 'situating violence, of describing and analyzing its structure or structures, of clarifying the ways in which it is structured, of articulating its modes and themes, and showing how various kinds of violence may be related';⁹⁴

⁹⁰ Ibid., pp.32-3

⁹¹ Brown, Cote Jr., Lynn-Jones & Miller (2004), p.xi

⁹² See Smith (1997), p. 2

⁹³ Lonsdale (2007), p.3

⁹⁴ Stanage (1974), pp. 208-209

over debates of what ought to be, or what is morally right or wrong. In situating violence, strategic theorists effectively instrumentalise ethical issues. When military force is used in the service of policy, David Lonsdale explains

ethically driven political responses to certain military actions are significant. Thus, the strategist must consider whether such responses will have detrimental or positive results for the attainment of his policy objective. However, it is not the role of the strategist to judge the moral worth of an action in an abstract manner.⁹⁵

Strategic theory agrees and continues Clausewitz's assertion that:

Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat the enemy without too much bloodshed, and might imagine this is the true goal of the art of war. Pleasant as it sounds, it is a fallacy that must be exposed: War is a dangerous business where mistakes that come from kindness are the very worst.⁹⁶

Strategic theory presumes that war and warfighting are concomitant of human social relations, on the basis of historical and empirical observation and evidence. Such behaviour is embedded beyond eradication. Particular wars may be prevented, but war in general will always coexist with human beings. Consequently, strategic theory offers no labels for violence as either 'good' or 'bad' except with respect to the 'good' or 'bad' judgment behind its employment. If it has been employed strategically, we therefore assume the rational calculation of means and ends, costs and benefits, the seeking of advantage, and the adversarial logic of engagement. Consequent analysis of strategic behaviour is informed by the underlying conception of the nature of war – whether a preference for diplomacy or violent strategies is employed; and under the conditions from which violence holds its utility and strategic preference.

⁹⁵ Lonsdale (2007), p.159, fn.7

⁹⁶ *OW*, p.75

In view of the principle of equivocation, the broader issues of Jihad more commonly engaged such as ideology, religion, law and ethics, are restrictively addressed within the confines of strategic theory. For this reason, only those aspects, which are of direct concern to policy and warfare, and assist the strategic analysis, shall be addressed and considered. This study does not seek to justify nor condemn war as implemented by Muslims in the past or by reference to the present. The interplay of policy and politics (*politik*) are investigated as ethically indifferent bargaining calculations intended to achieve political ends, that may have been specifically religious at times or otherwise wholly not. This study shall not restrict itself to an apologetic tone of interpretation or dependence upon apologetic literature, and thus shall subject the author's views so as to invite criticism, in order to reconstruct and reformulate what has become a dead letter in Muslim thinking and Islamic academia.

2.8. Strategic Theoretics as a Disciplinary Matrix

Strategic theory, given its strengths and weaknesses, is still a relatively young field much less established than its earlier incarnations and predecessors. Given this lack of establishment, the method and practice of strategic theoretics are not fixed. Thomas Kuhn in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*⁹⁷ delineates the importance in having a standardised jargon or vocabulary to guide research and discussion within a particular field of endeavour. A *disciplinary matrix* of theoretical inquiry Kuhn argues, 'refers to the common possession of the practitioners of a particular discipline;' forming a 'matrix' because it is 'composed of ordered elements of various sorts, each requiring further specification...' ⁹⁸ which according to Kuhn, is necessary for the accumulation of knowledge and to avoid stagnation within the field. Collectively, the aforementioned propositions, strategic terminology, and structures, are constituents of a proposed disciplinary matrix, and as such they form paradigmatic functions.

Clausewitz, before Kuhn, expressed a similar conclusion: 'Theory exists so that one need not start afresh each time sorting out the material and plowing through it, but will find it ready to hand and in good order. It is meant to educate the mind of the

⁹⁷ Kuhn (2012)

⁹⁸ Ibid., pp.181-2

future commander. . . .'⁹⁹ Exchange the word 'theory' for 'paradigm', and we have essentially the same premise. Hence, rather than propose another interpretation of strategy, the research methodology is premised upon a strategic paradigm. Advancing a strategic paradigm is important because it will anchor the forthcoming interpretations,¹⁰⁰ but it will also serve to inform the research of 'the pre-interpretive material on which an interpreter goes to work. That is, they are part of what a successful interpretation ... must fit.'¹⁰¹ Hence, the congruity of interpretation to the paradigm reflects validation rather than previous opinions or references.

2.8.1. The Strategic Paradigm

Considering the aforementioned strategic propositions, principles and assumptions of strategic theory, in tandem with Clausewitzian theory and the traditional strategic paradigm of classical theorists the following core assumptions are proposed as the foundational strategic paradigm advanced in this study:¹⁰²

1. War and warfighting are considered concomitants of human social relations, on the basis of historical and empirical observation and evidence. Such behaviour is embedded beyond eradication. Particular wars may be prevented, or cooperation may be preferred to war, but war in general will always coexist with human beings.
2. War is a political instrument employed to serve the political interests of a social unit, whether an organised political polity or a tribe. The instrumental purpose of war reflects its rational resolve.
3. This rational instrumentalisation of war demands the establishment of clear and attainable objectives through a cost-benefit calculus of the utility of force. This calculus seeks to employ violence in such a manner as to achieve the political objectives as fast and efficiently as possible at the lowest politico-economic costs.
4. War is an instrument of rational calculation; therefore it is never the first or the last resort, but rather the result of expected utility. The decision to employ war as a means to achieve one's ends is prejudiced by the calculated

⁹⁹ *OW*, p.141

¹⁰⁰ Endicott (2005), p.48

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰² This paradigm is developed upon the paradigm presented by Handel (2006), pp.xviii-xix

expectation of success, such that when offensive operations have the perceived or expected advantage war will become more likely.

5. The same calculus also prejudices the prospects for cooperation and peace, such that when diplomatic avenues have the perceived or expected advantage, the propensity to warfighting is reduced.
6. In order to maintain the primacy of those political interests for which war is fought, control of the instrument must ultimately reside with the political establishment and not the military authorities.
7. If unchecked, or at the mercy of non-political stewardship, the instrument of war may just as easily be employed to serve irrational or unattainable objectives.
8. The balance afforded by rational calculation is always threatened by variables of VUCA.
 - Anarchy refers to the interplay of probabilities against chance and uncertainty. This includes the general elements of friction, unrestrained passions, incompetence, negligence, technical or mechanical failure, and others.
 - Escalation always threatens to destabilise the directing control of rational purposes. The more war is fought for less politically motivated goals, the greater the propensity for escalation and the increase of violent and destructive means are employed.
 - Escalation may however be deliberately introduced by one side against another as a means of shifting advantage or the strategic initiative.
9. Any war effort is never restricted to the military instrument alone. A clash of wills and a trial of strength include politico-economic, diplomatic, and legal pressure directed at the enemy. Such means seek to destabilise the opponent and increase or induce those elements, which will unbalance his rational pursuits through war.
10. The result in war is never final. The instrument of war cannot confer victory or legitimacy without political credibility. Military victory is distinct from political victory. Peace cannot be imposed unless terms are made acceptable to the vanquished. The ultimate purpose of strategy is to realise the political objectives set.

The strategic paradigm is not a scientific theory of investigating war, although it does serve as a sound foundation upon which a strategic theoretic may be proposed. In order to substantiate abductive observation and generalisations drawn from historical practice; further dimensions of analysis may be required to reconcile the abstract and the reality, to facilitate the strategic paradigm as a bridge, and to act as a theoretical guide to test strategic thought. Modelling is the normative quantitative method, however a qualitative approach, differential diagnostics, which suits the parsimonious ethos of strategic theory, will be applied and entails the following clarifications.

2.9. Strategic Diagnostics

Strategic theory is philosophically pragmatic and abductively flexible. A hypothesis that can explain something is equivalent to what can be actionable for theory. Strategy begins with the possible, and has little time for the implausible or the extraordinary. This study proposes a version of 'Differential Diagnosis' (D/Dx) grounded upon the evidence presented that is abductively observed and interpreted, without the labouring of validating sources. If something is evidently present and can be applied to a pre-existing hypothesis, it is considered. This is especially important when there are large pieces of information missing in an investigation.

In regard to this study, there simply is not enough information regarding certain episodes and events because they have been lost in the passage of time. Walter Kaegi, writing on the Muslim conquests between 630-650 and their interactions with Byzantium explains that:

The histories of the conquests, irrespective of the language in which they are written, do not provide a very good understanding of the nature of warfare and the realities of warfare in that period. The resulting condition of the sources permits many inferences to be drawn, and the information provided is better than having nothing, but many questions are left inadequately understood and explained.¹⁰³

¹⁰³ Kaegi (2000), p.273

A diagnostic approach can help bridge this gap however. Conceived as a hypothetico-deductive method, a technique used across many fields (medicine in particular), to ‘reverse engineer’ an answer on account of unknown or missing variables of information. The basic approach when taking a case history is to cluster signs and symptoms under a specific classification. This serves as a hypothetical problem set that requires interactive differentiation found in explanations of actions based upon geostrategic conditions of the strategic environment, the strategic setting of the actors, and the flexibility of explanations to predict changes in preferences based upon changes in politico-strategic conditions.

Hypothetical sets represent strategic preferences (and interests) that can be established on the basis of preexisting theory, inferring from the known features of the actor across various contexts, to explain how theory may predict or anticipate under certain determined contexts a particular set of preferences that can be expected.¹⁰⁴ Furthermore, it is possible to overstep the usual trappings of focusing excessively on the preferences themselves which is the path of historians, including their meanings and applications, instead applying strategic assessment to the actual casual outcomes they generate.

2.9.1. Diagnostic Procedure

Precedent for such innovative analytical procedures already exist within international relations. An existing approach that is similar in some respects to ours is Stephen Walt’s revision of balance-of-power analysis which he terms ‘balance of threat’ – an analysis that incorporates aggressive intentions, geographical proximity, and ideology as considerations of state preferences, and the degree to which there are inherent ‘conflicts of interest.’¹⁰⁵ Balance of threat is a combined approach that blends national preferences, strategies, and the environment into a single factor – ‘not only how powerful the actor is, but what it wants, how it proposes to get it, and the setting in which this takes place.’¹⁰⁶ Balance of threat is a form of diagnostics that differentiates ‘truth’ as what can be useful for analysis and what cannot be known,

¹⁰⁴ Frieden (1999), p.61

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., p.50

¹⁰⁶ Ibid.

meaning the implausible. It is not designed to generate a fact of what is, as much as what it cannot be.

The diagnostic procedure is the attempt to classify a problem according to one of plausible identification constituted by a cluster of differentials or prime differentials that unmistakably identify a class. The application of this method identifies differentials to hypothetical problem sets, essentially as classification tests; to evaluate the strategic theoretic conclusions arrived through abductive inference as a prelude to contextualisation for trinitarian analysis. The result is a (strategic) diagnostic opinion.

This diagnostic approach fundamentally demonstrates why something is *strategically* diagnosed rather than what *is* the proven case. It effectively rules out certain options or possibilities in favour of facilitating a more accurate diagnostic opinion. Hence, rather than advancing multiple explanations, or the attempt to force facts against multiple theories, the strategic assumptions of events are presented as logically coherent and demonstrable conclusions; or unambiguous explanations of strategic action that provide useful explanation for further study or investigation. The differentials and hypothetical problem sets to be employed and subjected to diagnostic procedure are derived from Offense-Defense Theory.

2.9.2. Offense-Defense Theory (ODT) and *Strategic Dynamics*

The simplest explanation of this theory is the premise of the offense-defence balance:

When we say that the offense has the advantage, we simply mean that it is easier to destroy the other's army and take its territory than it is to defend one's own. When the defense has the advantage, it is easier to protect and to hold than it is to move forward, destroy, and take.¹⁰⁷

It is the perception of the offense-defense balance that creates the fear of exploitation and the associated costs that reinforces the presence of the security dilemma according to Robert Jervis, regardless of whether the actual or perceived vulnerability

¹⁰⁷ Jervis (1978), p.187

(or lack of) is true or not.¹⁰⁸ An actor who believes conquest is easy requires only excuses to engage offensively thus presupposing suspicions in the recipient actor that an attack is looming. Hence, under conditions of actual defense dominance, an actor is more likely to cooperate given the confidence or lack of suspicion on account of diminished vulnerability to offensive action. For Van Evera, the prime predictions of offense-defense theory are:

1. War will be more common in periods when conquest is easy or is believed easy, less common when conquest is difficult or is believed difficult;
2. States that have or believe they have large offensive opportunities or defensive vulnerabilities will initiate and fight more wars than other states;
3. A state will initiate and fight more wars in periods when it has, or thinks that it has, larger offensive opportunities and defensive capabilities.¹⁰⁹

Fused with a trinitarian interpretation, ‘the security dilemma occurs because of uncertainty confounded with a problem of credibility. Each side worries about whether the other will attack because it is uncertain about the other's motivations;’¹¹⁰ which is a reference to the lack of knowledge or certainty regarding the details of the strategic setting of the adversary and their policies. Van Evera proposes ten war-inducing effects that arise when the offense dominates either directly or indirectly, which we will use to serve as our hypothetical problem sets. Van Evera explains these hypothetical problem sets as follows:

Offense-defense theory’s explanatory predictions derive from the hypotheses that comprise its ten explanations. Tests of these predictions shed light on both *whether* and *how* offense dominance (or perceptions of offense dominance) causes war. ... Offense-defense theory posits that offense dominance leads to war through the war-causing action of its ten intervening phenomena A-J.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁸ *ibid.*, p.170

¹⁰⁹ Van Evera (2004), p.244

¹¹⁰ Morrow (1999), p.83

¹¹¹ Van Evera (2004), pp.244-5; In the vernacular of his article, Van Evera employs the term “offense dominant” to suggest that conquest is fairly easy – meaning easier than it usually would be; and

Each of these hypothetical problem sets shall be introduced and explained through the study at their relevant points of analysis, suffice for now to merely list them and note that these hypotheses provide the classification sets for differential diagnosis of Muslim strategic interaction at the systemic level.¹¹²

1. **Hypothesis A:** Opportunistic Expansion on account of Offense Dominance will lead to war.
2. **Hypothesis B:** Defensive Expansion on account of Offense Dominance will lead to war.
3. **Hypothesis C:** Fierce Resistance to Expansion by other States on account of Offense Dominance will lead to war.
4. **Hypothesis D:** Moving First when Offense Dominant will lead to war.
5. **Hypothesis E:** Windows and larger and more Dangerous on account of Offense Dominance and therefore will lead to war.
6. **Hypothesis F:** *Faits Accomplis* are more Common and Dangerous on account of Offense Dominance leading to war.
7. **Hypothesis G:** States Negotiate Less and reach fewer Agreements on account of Offense Dominance leading to war.
8. **Hypothesis H:** Secrecy is more Common and Dangerous on account of Offense Dominance leading to war.
9. **Hypothesis I:** Arms Racing becomes more Intense on account of Offense Dominance leading to war.
10. **Hypothesis J:** Offense grows even stronger on account of Offense Dominance leading to war.

2.9.3. Diagnostic Stages of Assessment

The process of diagnostic assessment is a three-stage process; stage one is to outline the case history, this is to establish a strategic condition, which is the sum of converging strategic interactions resulting in an established pattern of means-end behaviours. This is primarily initiated through abductive inference from the literature

“defense dominant” that conquest is very difficult meaning that the inherent advantage of defence remains intact. Hence, “offense-defense balance” denotes the relative ease of aggression and defense against aggression. - *ibid.*, p.227 fn.1

¹¹² Cited from Van Evera (2004), p.234

and earliest sources. Abduction is logical ‘inference to the best explanation.’¹¹³ Abductive logic differs from deduction in that premises are taken as pragmatic starting propositions to guide the investigative process rather than established truths to be validated. Abductive reasoning suggests the probability of pragmatically useful conclusions based upon observations of a case or situation.

Abduction proposes either the most likely case, or the most pragmatic manner in which to understand a series of events in order to situate a problem within a hypothesis that can be actionable for prediction or explanation as a result. Abductive reasoning does not independently validate or suggest that conclusions are definitive, only more likely than not. Abductive reasoning is used at this stage to pragmatically propose theory based upon observations that are strategically interpreted and then tested against hypothetico-deductive problem sets with accompanying predictions found in offense-defense theory on the tenability of realist assumptions and expectations of the utility of force to serve political ends in the following stage. This process infers strategic interactions as *symptomatic* of an overall condition, and stage two of the process uses a method of differential diagnostics to distinguish a particular set of strategic *signs* that correlate to predicted expectations of offense-defense theory.

A *symptom* is the abductive evidence of differentials or offense-defense variables, whilst *signs* are objectively demonstrated evidence of the offense-defense theory at work. *Symptoms*, accordingly, are less verifiable than *signs*, since they are less likely to be subjected to falsification. *Signs* are identified as being those hypotheses of offense-defense theory whose differential variables are most prominently featured within a given case that they are readily identifiable within the context of the strategic paradigm. *Signs* are therefore scrutinised in order to demonstrate the objective correlation of rational behaviour in the context of politico-military actions that took place.

Thus, whilst the strategic *symptoms* may well lend themselves to alternative interpretations of an emerging condition, even within the remit of strategic theory, the focus of this study is to restrict the evaluation to those *signs* that can be tested in

¹¹³ Sober p.24

accordance with offense-defense theory. Hence, whilst many alternative explanations may be derived from the strategic *symptoms*, the diagnosis of behaviours in relation offense-defense behaviour facilitates the diagnostic opinion that politico-strategic decision-making intended similar ends along the lines of rational actor expectations.

Period	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
Unknown	✕		✕	✕	✕	✕	✕	✕		✕
6xx-6yy		●							●	

Figure 3. Offense-Defence Variables of Intervening Factors that lead to War

Between stages one and two, a table is presented that displays the identifiable *symptoms* and *signs* of the given case prior to diagnostic evaluation (Figure 3.). The ten hypotheses of intervening phenomena of war-causing action (A to J) are listed across the table with the classification sets for differential diagnosis highlighted by the following key:

- ✕ = Primary Offense-Defense Variable of analysis = *Signs*
- ✕ = Secondary Offense-Defense Variable of analysis = *Symptoms*
- = non-applicable Offense-Defense Variable of analysis = *Undiagnosed*

By transplanting the hypothetical intervening phenomena that leads to warfighting against identified Muslim strategic action between 610-680, those policies employing the military instrument may be considered as reflective of actions undertaken in response to the offense-defense balance resulting in stage three; a final diagnostic conclusion proposed for each individual caliphate or administrative period that served as a case study. A trinitarian exploration and assessment of the period and the consequent effects on policy and Jihad will be juxtaposed against the hypothetical problem sets and predictions of offense-defense theory in order to assess the *strategic dynamics* of the case.

In other words, *politik*, that is, the *bargaining dynamics* of policy and politics, shall be assessed by trinitarian analysis to reveal sound politico-strategic decision-making within the strategic setting and environment, based upon the assessments of the

hypothetical problem sets of intervening phenomena that led to Jihad. The final result is either a validation of the prediction that Jihad was a continuation of *politik* by other means during the period examined, or that the *strategic dynamics* demonstrated a deductive failure of a strategic condition to account for the use of force according to offense-defense theory and trinitarian explanation.

2.9.4. Conclusions

The research methodology presented in this chapter is essentially interested in how strategic problems (conceived of as strategic interactions) can change the way we think about Jihad, policy, and the interplay between domestic and international politics. The research method advances a set of propositions based upon Clausewitzian theory to explain the *strategic dynamics* of Jihad within the context of the broader strategic approach, which is pragmatic in utilising means that will support investigation and thought concerning the proposed research questions. Strategic theory encapsulates this approach, and structures analysis in order to parsimoniously trace ‘the line of thinking of political actors to comprehend how they propose to achieve their objectives.’¹¹⁴ The result is, as most theories are, ‘not necessarily statements about or accurate descriptions of the “real world.” Rather, they are tools analysts use to render a complex reality somewhat more tractable intellectually.’¹¹⁵ Applying strategic theory has reduced the research framework to two distinct avenues of analysis, the first is trinitarian interpretation, that is, to consider how the interplay between the rational calculation of policy is the product or continuation of the effects of the strategic setting and the influence of the strategic environment.

Secondly, how policy that had been created or sustained from trinitarian interpretation was applied systemically by examining assumptions via hypothetical problems sets provided by offense-defense theory. Both avenues demonstrate not only alignment with the core assumptions of the strategic approach, but also more specifically, congruity with the essence of strategic theory and both demonstrate the advantages it incurs in the form of theoretical flexibility and parsimonious explanation with moral equivocation. Accordingly, the strategic theoretic employed in this research is a

¹¹⁴ Harris (2006), p.539

¹¹⁵ Lake & Powell (1999), p.14

methodological framework that attempts to simplify the complexity of the subject matter; rendering further academic investigation possible by distinguishing significant fact from historical observation, promoting strategic relevance as a means of correlating such strategic facts with theory within the framework of a strategic theoretic.

CHAPTER THREE

3.0. The Archetypal Jihad (610 – 632)

Muslim strategic interaction proper, understood at the systemic level, did not take place during the lifetime of the Prophet. Strategic interaction that did occur, was either diplomatic, or in the form of military posturing with no direct engagements. Consequently, the primary significance for beginning with the life of the Prophet resides in the trinitarian interpretation of two particular areas: the first concerns the vertical design of strategy, that which concerns nomenclature, or more specifically the development of nomenclature to support evolving ideas and the foundational thought of the Islamic meta-narrative. The second concerns the horizontal design of strategy, that is, those elements of the strategic setting (interaction analysis: tribal politics, actors, interests) that would lend themselves to the development and formulation of policy that would survive the Prophet himself, and the actors who would remain as key variables in the continuation of *poltik* as Islam grew.

An analysis of the politico-military career of the Prophet is therefore not the objective of this chapter, which would be a separate study in itself. Nor is the objective to focus narrowly upon certain events that occurred within his lifetime. As previously discussed, there simply is no comprehensive biography or study to date that provides sufficient information for such,¹ nor is it relevant to the research methodology to do so. Instead, we shall track those key developments, which occurred alongside - or as the result of - particular episodes during the lifetime of the Prophet, with a focus upon the specifically politico-military aspects of his biography, referred to specifically as *maghazi* in the Arabic literature. The design of this chapter therefore serves the need of establishing a 'baseline zero', by which is meant - an original starting point for the idea, concept, and practice of Jihad, and to locate this 'zero' within the framework of trinitarian interpretation and the confines of the strategic paradigm.

¹ Donner (1979) has provided the most detailed attempt to chart the political rise and victory of the Prophet over the Quraysh. There is little that can be added to his article based upon the historiographical foundations from which he wrote.

3.1. Nomenclature

Strategic nomenclature has been addressed in the previous chapter; the purpose of this section is to align strategic thought and nomenclature with baseline Islamic references, terms, and ideas established from its inception. This is an essential step in clarifying direction and creating a parsimonious platform for the remainder of the study. Just as the previous chapter outlined the research method designed to answer the central research questions, this chapter builds upon the research design by describing the foundations and background necessary to advance answers to the subset of investigative questions that are driven by the central questions. Specifically, the first two sub-investigative questions must be examined from the outset since they quintessentially inform the nature of the archetypal Jihad that future version of practice either conforms to or differs from:

- a. What is Jihad? Specifically, can a general definition be proposed, with respect to distinguishing word from concept; and how will this distinction advance strategic interpretation?
- b. Is Jihad a teleological consequence of Islam?

As these questions suggest, nomenclature is important because it is used to operationalise abstract terms in order to maximise analytical precision for clarification where misunderstanding of language or its use may lead to error.² Thus we proceed to provide an overview of the *maghazi*, drawing those salient features and events that contribute toward answering the research questions above, as an initial starting point to plot the course of trajectory that Jihad would take over the next century. The purpose is to arrive at a sound trinitarian interpretation of events that also clarifies the dualities, dichotomies, and dialectics that surround the subject matter of Jihad from its inception in seventh century Arabia.

² Raz (2005), p.6

3.1.1. The Pre-Islamic Jihad

The basic meaning of the word Jihad as used and understood in pre-Islamic Arabia, and within the value-system of the *jahiliya*,³ was an independent meaning of *nisus* – an effort or struggle - physical, mental or otherwise - towards an end or objective, and usually a perfective endeavour. *Nisus*, is a Latin word, preferred in this study over the more commonly used verb ‘to struggle’. This is because the perfective implication of the word *nisus* is also present within the conventional implication of Jihad thus rendering both words closer and more synonymous than the English word *struggle*, which is equivocal in its moral application.

According to Edward W. Lane’s Lexicon, the morphology of the Arabic word Jihad from the stem root of J-H-D[ج ه د] (ج • ه • د), denotes: ‘He strove, laboured, or toiled; exerted himself or his power or efforts or endeavours or ability; employed himself vigorously, strenuously, laboriously, diligently, studiously, sedulously, earnestly, or with energy, ...’.⁴ In its third verbal form conjugation (*jaa-ha-da* [جاهد]) one intends to mean an interaction between two sides (such as adversaries) or to strive or fight against something or someone.⁵ Hence, linguistically from its stem meaning to its third form, Jihad is an exercise of *nisus* in relation to another. The subsequent verbal conjugations are all derivatives of this basic idea. The involvement of ‘another’ is requisite to this form being employed. The other may be within oneself, but predominately it is used in relation to an external ‘second’. Correspondingly, Jihad may comfortably be employed to denote socio-political activity between two hostile wills in contest either internally or externally, as well as the intended *nisus* to be a form of violent engagement.

It is salient to note that the moral character or the motivation behind the Jihad was not restricted in pre-Islamic usage. Used solely as a linguistic expression, one may equally speak of the Jihad of a thief, or a gangster since the perfective implication resided with the element of effort to achieve one’s objective rather than contain a value judgment. In this sense, Jihad was morally equivocal. Examples shall follow in the ensuing discussion below.

³ See the following section

⁴ Lane (1968), p.473 (Vol. 2)

⁵ Wehr (1974), p.142

3.2. The Strategic Setting Prior to Islam

The *maghazi* period saliently sets the stage for the crucial value of tribal politics in understanding the early strategic dynamics of Jihad. In seventh-century Arabia, a tribe was an autonomous sovereign unit that combined all three elements of the trinity in a total manner. All members of the tribe served as the population and audience of political decision-making, and recipients of tribal policies. Decision-making and policies were conducted by the elders, chieftains or appointed leaders of the tribe who acted on behalf of the interests of their own tribe as their de facto governing body.⁶ And finally, all men of physical capability were warriors or soldiers for the tribe to call upon, thus constituting the military element of the tribe.

3.2.1. The Concept of *Jahiliya*

Arab customs and cultural norms and values during the seventh-century were particularly resonate with Clausewitz's explanation of irrational *blind forces* that are inherent in the population or members of the tribe. The *jahiliya* was an Islamic description of a time when 'Hobbesian' Arab virtues were dominant. These virtues were of course the products of the environment and realities of life that had over time developed as they would in any society to establish norms and exhibit certain expected behaviour and conduct.⁷

Most of all, the passions of hostile feelings and intent are abundant in the notion of *jahiliya*; the proud man of the *jahiliya* was notably violent.⁸ This was a quality of strength in the Arab conception of virtues. To react with disproportional violence to an offence or an attack was quite acceptable and demonstrated the greater virtue of resolve.⁹ After all, the Arab man was a desert man that had to be filled with talents to survive, and the propensity to resort to violence was one of them. Weakness was the worst of attributes that an Arab man could accrue.¹⁰ 'Primordial violence, hatred, and enmity' are a precise set of words to describe tribal competition and intra-tribal norms and politics.

⁶ Hodgson (1977), p.149

⁷ Wehr (1974), p.144

⁸ Donner (1981), p.40

⁹ Izutsu (2002), p.223

¹⁰ Schwartz-Barcott (2004), pp.103-4

In this context, tribal politics are significant. Tribal chiefs and elders, usually advanced in age, better understood the ramifications of the *jahiliya* and its virtues amongst the people, especially the youth. Thus, tribal politics were a means to not only protect and advance the interests of a tribe but also to protect a tribe from bringing danger and destruction upon itself. The tribal elite therefore not only conducted diplomacy externally, but also internally. The conduct of war was marshaled by the elite and not left to the young, or inexperienced. In short, tribal politics was the attempt to subordinate the passions of the Arabs in an anarchic society to some form of regulation that did not result in self-extinction.¹¹ The consequent raiding practice is an example of a practice that best typifies the accepted norms between tribes that harnessed primordial violence, hatred, and enmity and subordinated it to the play of chance and probability within which *the creative spirit is free to roam* by regulating and promoting a policy-norm that encouraged raiding between tribes that became more game-like than actual warring.¹² Quigley offers the following description of Arab warfighting in the time of *Jahiliya* when Arabs:

... fought simply to establish superiority, not to annihilate the opposition and had the primitive belief that a battle should be fought only to the point where superiority was indicated for that day. They saw no point in fighting to the death, and had no desire to destroy their opponents totally, and had little desire to kill them. To fight them was an opportunity for booty or ransoms, or simply to obtain a recognition of superiority. It had many elements of a game, offered an opportunity to demonstrate one's masculinity, and was carried on with chivalric overtones.¹³

The most salient feature of the trinity's application in pre-Islamic Arabia is the total nature of its application within each autonomous tribe. In modern terms, the tribe was an institutional whole unto itself not compartmentalised institutions serving a central authority.¹⁴

¹¹ Donner (1981), p. 40

¹² Gabriel (2007), pp. 23-9

¹³ Quigley (2013), p.711

¹⁴ Donner (1981), p. 41; Hodgson (1977), p.149

Thus, the soldiers of the tribe were also its population, who were not paid to fight and protect but did so for the benefit of the tribe either for existential purposes or within the tribal norms of raiding or in service to virtues of *jahiliya*. The leadership of the tribe was often the same whether in relation to the military activity or political.¹⁵ Whilst command of battle might not be in the hands of an elder (due to age), the appointed leader on the battlefield would be from the same decision-making group.¹⁶ The point to be drawn here is simply the idea of civil-military relations did not exist. Thus, political aims were not the preserve of the tribal chiefs, who would act self-interestedly. Rather, tribal chiefs were representatives of the tribal will and acted in true service of their tribes who were, after all, not only their blood and kin, but also literally all they had. Hence, the essence of tribal considerations is eloquently described when Clausewitz speaks of ‘an object suspended between three magnets’,¹⁷ since tribal interest was perhaps the single most valuable shared commodity that bound tribal members together.

3.2.2. Warfighting of the Arabs

The Arabs hailed from a long history of warfighting, mainly amongst themselves, known in the Arabic literary tradition as the *Days of the Arabs - Ayyam al-‘Arab*. Additionally, the concept of *jahiliyya* had long been connected to violence as part of those virtues associated to the *Ayyam al-‘Arab* traditions and how they developed. In Haykal’s study of warfare in the Arabian Peninsula he identifies thirty pre-Islamic applications of warfighting, from the *Ayyam al-‘Arab* traditions which were either recorded in poetry or existed as a matter of sustained practice by the Arabs.¹⁸ Haykal’s survey of recorded Arab warfighting practices reveals a long history of interaction and practice of limited warfare amongst the Arabs. The list can be reduced to four broad and limited political objectives that the *Ayyam al-‘Arab* traditions relate about pre-Islamic warfighting: political power, strategic necessity, economic or materiel benefits; and finally sovereignty for a divine jurisdiction.

¹⁵ Schwartz-Barcott (2004), pp. 103-4

¹⁶ Hodgson (1977), p.149

¹⁷ *OW*, p.89

¹⁸ Haykal (1996), pp.14-29 (translated from the original Arabic)

It is clear therefore, that the first proposition of the strategic paradigm has been well established by historical evidence - that tribal tensions and warfighting were considered concomitants of human social relations in Arabia before, during, and as we shall see in subsequent chapters, well after the advent of Islam. Violent behaviour as a means to accrue political ends was a deeply embedded socio-political practice in pre-Islamic Arab society and culture. Additionally, the model of offense-defense theory and the prime predications that we shall test are not incongruent with pre-Islamic warfighting practices or alien at their conceptual root according to the *Ayyam al-'Arab* traditions.

3.3. The Baseline Zero (Jihad v.0)

The evolution of Jihad during the lifetime of the Prophet can be mapped across three distinct phases; firstly the Meccan phase during which Jihad was practiced as a means to encourage and promote the revolutionary message of Islam – a pacifistic *nisus*. Phase two, the Medinan period, where the evolution of Jihad became a form of military *nisus*. This first incarnation of Jihad as an armed enterprise took the form of a violent expression of will for political purposes with the distinct character and methods of what would be identified today as guerrilla warfare.

The third and final phase follows the capture of Mecca, where Jihad evolves further according to the new political powers that had been accrued through the defeat of the Prophet's main political enemies. This end point marks the official creation of Jihad version 1.0. The remainder of this chapter draws salient strategic observations from the strategic setting of all three phases to arrive at investigative conclusions that will contextualise subsequent chapters. For this period in particular, 610-622, the research is heavily dependent upon one source, Ibn Ishaq's *Seerah Rasul Allah* primarily because almost every other early work on the Prophet's biography is either a revised and regurgitated version of Ibn Ishaq's work, or a footnote to it.¹⁹ A secondary reason is that of all English translations of Arabic works currently available, Guillaume's translation of Ibn Ishaq's remains the most comprehensive, non-abridged work that has set the standard until today.

¹⁹ See Horovitz (2002)

3.4. Phase One Mecca – The Strategic Setting

(610-622)

The Prophet was born in approximately 570, and claimed revelation from God in the fortieth year of his life (610).²⁰ His mission thereafter lasted for approximately twenty-three years, thirteen of which were spent in Mecca, and the remaining ten in the later political capital he founded called Medina (formerly Yathrib).²¹ During his mission, he challenged and ultimately overthrew the established socio-political status quo of Arabia, and imposed the jurisdiction of the Shari‘a in Arabia. The Prophet’s rise to power, like that of many revolutionaries, was however unforeseeable.

Born and raised in Mecca – the economic hub of Arabia and the unofficial political capital;²² he was orphaned as a young child, and became a shepherd in his earlier days, and later a merchant trader as he grew older.²³ The Prophet was a well-known personality in Mecca where his reputation and character in Mecca was celebrated,²⁴ was considered as an outstanding representative of his clan.²⁵ However, there seems to be no indication in any historical texts, or by academic research, that suggests the Prophet had any political ambitions prior to his claims of prophecy. Prior to his mission the Prophet appears to have been politically conscious of the various tribal politics and the policies of his own tribe, the Quraysh.²⁶

The Quraysh, who were the most significant political tribe in Arabia,²⁷ was composed of ten clans two of which, were especially prominent: the Banu Umayya, or the Umayyad House, and the clan to which the Prophet belonged - the House of Hashim (Banu Hashim).²⁸ Prior to the onset of the Prophet’s mission, the House of Makhzum (Banu Makhzum), wealthy merchants known to have provided military protection to the Quraysh, were presiding as the unofficial leaders of the tribe.²⁹

²⁰ Rahman (2003), p.35

²¹ Ibid., p.41

²² Hodgson (1977), p.156

²³ *I.I.*, pp.69-81; Buti (2007), pp.99-100

²⁴ Ibid., p.81

²⁵ Ibid., p.73; Quigley (2013), p.702

²⁶ See *I.I.*, pp.84-6; *I.H.*, pp.95-7; Buti (2007), pp.116-7

²⁷ Hodgson (1977), p.154

²⁸ See Quigley (2013), p.702

²⁹ *I.I.*, p.121, 164

The political significance of the Quraysh was owing to the fact that they were the custodians of the Ka'ba in Mecca,³⁰ which the Arab tribes across Arabia venerated, conducted pagan rituals and to which annual pilgrimages were made; but also due to the fact that they were the geo-strategic junction between the two most important trade routes between north and south and east and west.³¹ Mecca, the most cosmopolitan zone in all of Arabia, was a religiously pluralistic society and the Quraysh noted for their political neutrality, were a tribe fond of diplomacy and maintaining the status quo.³² The policies of the Quraysh were largely determined upon maintaining their trade interests by upholding their regional prestige and reputation amongst the Arab tribes, with whom constant contact and commerce took place.³³ Donner provides an especially vivid description of the Quraysh, writing;

[The Quraysh] had come to dominate the lucrative West Arabian transit trade in luxuries such as slaves and spices. They maintained a far-flung network of commercial contacts stretching from the Syrian entrepôts of Bostra, Gaza, and al-'Arish to the Yemen; they concluded economic, and sometimes political, alliances with numerous nomadic groups in the deserts of northern and central Arabia, whose consent and assistance were needed to facilitate the passage of Meccan caravans; and they controlled large amounts of capital, invested in their trading ventures not only by themselves, but also, it seems, by virtually every resident of Mecca.³⁴

Consequently, the Quraysh were extremely adept at tribal politics and brokering deals amongst the tribes,³⁵ as well as being highly adept financiers and merchants managing and profiting from the junction of trade routes they controlled. Maintaining stability was therefore a primary concern of the Quraysh, which meant preserving the status quo and the regional balance of power, by which they profited.³⁶

³⁰ Ibid., p.55

³¹ Hodgson (1977), pp.154-6; Quigley (2013), p.702; Hamid (2004), p.101

³² Hodgson (1977), p.156

³³ Hamid (2004), pp.102-3

³⁴ Donner (1981), p. 51

³⁵ *I.I.*, pp.56-8

³⁶ Ibid., pp.58-9, 65

3.4.3. The Mission of Islam – The Overarching Political Objective

In 610, at the age of forty, the Prophet received his mission from God to bring Islam to all of humanity.³⁷ The call to Islam was based on the recognition of God, loyalty to Him and obedience to His commands, and not to be subservient to human beings. The mission of the Prophet was therefore primarily to align vertically between Heaven and Earth, but had distinct strategic interests horizontally between human beings themselves. At the horizontal level, revolutionary ideas of social unity based upon creed rather than blood ties were brought to bear by the clashing of Islamic emancipation from tribal domination.

The mission of the Prophet became a direct threat to the interests of the Quraysh. To submit to Islam was a socio-political act as much as a theological stance. To declare oneself a Muslim was to simultaneously denounce (or emancipate) one's allegiance to the gods and deities worshipped by the Arabs, and then to any tribe, master, race, or culture, before God Himself. The expression of the Prophet's mission was in modern terms, a social revolutionary movement that also sought to protect and defend the weak, poor, and oppressed of Arabian society from the more privileged Arabs and upper classes. The absolute message of Islam (the vertical axis) resulted in the inevitable clashing of interests that ensued, thus firmly placing the Prophet at odds with his own people.³⁸

3.4.4. The Clash of Value Systems and Strategic Preferences

The horizontal strategic interest of Islam was to emancipate human beings from the rule of men to the rule of God alone (that is, realigning the horizontal axis to the vertical). This summons was so revolutionary in relation to Arab tribal culture that it had to be an absolute.³⁹ The jurisdiction of God could not be shared or negotiated, and the only political option presented by the Prophet was to 'surrender' or 'submit' (Islam) to the authority of God. Unlimited in its political ambition, the Prophet pursued a policy of proselytisation - *da'wa* or 'open calling'⁴⁰ - to his message, for thirteen years in his home city of Mecca.

³⁷ *Q*, 34:27; see *I.I.*, pp.104-7

³⁸ See *I.I.*, pp.117-9

³⁹ Bashier (2006), pp.21-4

⁴⁰ Berjak (2006), p.164

Upsetting the social status quo and jeopardising commercial business in Mecca, the Prophet's *da'wa* brought animosity and violent reactions against him and his small, but growing community of followers,⁴¹ as Islam proposed an alternative socio-political community. Social ties were threatened as young men turned from the religious practices of their forefathers to join the Prophet's message. In a tribal structure, where social ties were fundamental to not only the identity of a tribe, but also to its security, the Prophet became a threat to the established order of socio-political and economic life in Mecca.⁴² Islam also brought ideas and a vision of a different society that threatened the class based tribal structure and power of the tribal elders and political elites such as the Quraysh. That Arabs could be unified outside of their tribal families for reasons other than those that served the interests of the tribe was anathema.⁴³

3.4.5. The Escalation of Blind Forces

Realising the potential threat that Islam posed to unbalance the tribal structure, in a strategic environment inherently volatile; the Quraysh resorted to what they did best – inter-tribal bargaining and attempted to ‘buy’ the Prophet out of his cause. After a failed series of offers where money, women, and positions of political leadership were offered to the Prophet in exchange for him ceasing and desisting in his mission,⁴⁴ the Quraysh employed a strategy of coercion by punishment⁴⁵ beginning an official policy of sanctions against the House of Hashim.⁴⁶ As the Quraysh's attempts to resolve the situation through political bargaining faltered, a progressively less political course of action ensued as escalation became unchecked and the strategy of coercion by punishment, increasingly violent.⁴⁷ An unofficial policy of character assassination and defamation began⁴⁸ alongside the encouragement of blind forces of violence, hatred and enmity from the lower classes of Mecca directed against Muslims - resulting in violent mob attacks against the Prophet and his followers.⁴⁹

⁴¹ Rahman (2003), p.35; *I.I.*, pp.118-20; Buti (2007), pp.146-52; *I.H.*, p.133

⁴² Lings (1991), pp. 60-6

⁴³ *I.I.*, p.367

⁴⁴ *I.I.*, pp.119-120; 132-4; *I.H.*, pp.13-40

⁴⁵ Pape (1996), p. 13

⁴⁶ *I.I.*, pp.159-61; Buti (2007), pp.161-8

⁴⁷ *I.H.*, p.141

⁴⁸ *I.I.*, pp.121-2; Quigley (2013), pp.706-8

⁴⁹ *I.I.*, p.130, 143-5, &161-67; *I.H.*, pp.173-81, 193-5; Rahman (2003), pp.36-7; *I.I.*, pp.146-55; Buti (2007), pp.169-71

3.4.6. The Re-Calculation of Policy

In the year 619, the Prophet's uncle and political protector - the chief elder of the Banu Hashim - Abu Talib died, leaving the Prophet extremely vulnerable.⁵⁰ The new head of the House of Hashim, Abu Lahab, had been an open enemy to the Prophet and immediately withdrew the protection of the clan from the Prophet. In effect, this meant that anyone could kill him without invoking *lex talonis*.⁵¹ Following a series of unproductive policies to erode the internal growth of the Muslims, in particular following the failure to maintain a sequence of socio-economic tribal sanctions placed on the House of Hashim as a form of punitive coercion;⁵² the tribal elders of Quraysh escalated their attempts to suppress the Prophet's movement by taking advantage of Abu Lahab's retraction of protection, and began orchestrating an attempt on his life.⁵³ The Prophet, aware that the moment Abu Talib had passed his life was in danger, re-evaluated his options and extended his message through a new strategy to build political strength through alliances.⁵⁴ Over the next two years, the Prophet and his close circle worked to find new tribal allies.⁵⁵

3.4.7a. Analysis of Phase One - *Da'wa*

Phase one reveals a paradoxical origin to the concept of Jihad. The horizontal design of strategic interaction between the Prophet (and Muslims in general by extension) and the Quraysh was evidently premised upon a policy of pacifism and social dissent with only two events are mentioned by Ibn Ishaq of violence by Muslims.⁵⁶ Jihad during this stage at the level of practice was distinctly related to a commitment of socio-political dissent and proselytisation (*da'wa*). *Nisus* was effort exerted to the ends of *da'wa* and the promotion of a new liberation movement, holding to its ideals and promoting the radical values the message of Islam espoused.

⁵⁰ *I.I.*, p.191

⁵¹ *I.H.*, pp.212-3

⁵² *I.I.*, pp.172-3

⁵³ Quigley (2013), p.708-9; Bashumail (1977), pp.41-4

⁵⁴ The Prophet's new strategy was prompted by the revelation of *Q*, 17:80, according to al-Tabari and the majority of the Qur'anic exegetes. - Hamid (2004), p.114

⁵⁵ *I.I.*, pp.194-6; Buti (2007), pp.205-7; Sallaabee (2007), pp.77-81

⁵⁶ *I.I.*, pp.118, 131-2

The Qur'an at this stage maintained the pre-Islamic usage and conventions of Jihad, demonstrating the application of the word, for example, when referring to the Jihad of men to turn their children from the Truth.⁵⁷ On the other hand, it was also used to acknowledge the efforts being made by the Muslims who were struggling in the midst of oppression.⁵⁸ The quintessential feature of the linguistic definition and application of the term Jihad remained the employment of the word in relation to the effort exerted to achieve the objective. Although later Muslim scholarship would claim this was the period of *Jihad al-Nafs*,⁵⁹ that is, self-disciplined restraint and a commitment to persevere in the face of violent threat; there was nothing identifiably 'Islamic' about Jihad at the horizontal stage. Vertically, however it was a different matter.

3.4.7b. *Absolute Jihad*

The first form of *nisus* in Islam was *da'wa* as a means of socio-political dissent against Falsehood in all its forms especially the practice of paganism, *jahiliya*, and the tribal class systems whilst avoiding violence.⁶⁰ The meta-narrative of Islam lays out the story of humanity according to God's Providence, culminating in the End of Days, all found in the Qur'an, supported by the hadith literature.⁶¹ The foundation of the metanarrative however, is a tension rooted in faith. Specifically in Allah as the sole God with no partners or equals,⁶² the Prophet as God's final emissary, and the Qur'an as the final revelation from God Himself to humanity as an eternal form of guidance. These tenets are considered as fundamental Truth, and anything that clashes or contradicts these are considered as Falsehood.⁶³ Submission to God's will (lit. Islam) was fused between Muslims as instruments of God's Will on Earth and an apocalyptic inevitability, whereby history is a constant reminder of the inescapable future and end of human experience.⁶⁴ Accordingly, Truth and Falsehood are locked in a theological imperative of an attritional battle that results in a perpetual state of hostility.⁶⁵

⁵⁷ Q, 31:15; also 29:8; Bonner (2006) p.13

⁵⁸ Q, 16:125, 25:52, 29:6, 69

⁵⁹ Leaman (2006), pp.437-8

⁶⁰ Q, 7:55

⁶¹ Bonner (2006), p.15; Cook (2005), pp.22-6; Kamali (2003), p.207

⁶² Q, 2:22, 165, 16:74, 42:11, 112:4

⁶³ Hamid (2004), p.15

⁶⁴ Robinson (2003), p.131 & (2005), p.61

⁶⁵ Khadduri (1955), p.64

The theological imperative threatened those who opposed the Truth, or ‘light’⁶⁶ with the promise of Hell and violent retribution.⁶⁷ Whilst not referred to as Jihad in any way, war and violence was threatened against those who opposed the Prophet and the message of Islam in both life, and death.⁶⁸ The Prophet, throughout phase one, was constant in his cautions to the Quraysh to take him seriously.⁶⁹ The Qur’an itself is replete with supporting claims of the Prophet.⁷⁰ Consistently during a state of abject weakness, the Qur’an promised the faithful God’s victory would come,⁷¹ simultaneously threatening the opponents of the Prophet.⁷² The meta-narrative was clearly expounding to the Muslims was that they were part of the perpetual battle as instruments of God fighting the abstract *absolute Jihad*, that is, God’s war against the rebels of humanity. This often overlooked element of phase one is vital to understanding the dynamics of Jihad. The vertical design of Jihad at this stage was theoretically absolute, threatening the most violent form of ‘war’ – eternal damnation. Though restricted to speech only, it was nonetheless extremely confrontational and provocative.

3.5. Phase Two (622-630)

The ‘Medinan’ period has traditionally received greater attention especially from the early biographers and chroniclers, mostly on account of being the *maghazi* proper. To this end, alongside Ibn Ishaq, the most useful source on the subject is al-Waqidi’s *Kitab al-Maghazi*,⁷³ which most comprehensively details the four most important politico-military landmarks of stage two: The Battle of Badr (624), The Battle of Uhud (625), The Battle of al-Khandaq (627), and the Treaty of Hudaibiya (628). Each one of these milestones reiterates the consistent failure of the Meccans (that is, the Quraysh and their confederates,) to impose a strategic decision against the Muslims, thereby generating greater friction in the strategic environment and exacerbating the variables of VUCA against themselves.⁷⁴ The events of each milestone will be addressed briefly.

⁶⁶ *Q*, 61:8, 47:7,

⁶⁷ *Q*, 3:10; 6:128, 25:17-9, 34:40-1, 36:59-62

⁶⁸ *Q*, 67:2

⁶⁹ *I.I.*, pp.118, 131

⁷⁰ *Q*, 15:9

⁷¹ *Q*, 3:139, 24:55, 37:173, 58:21, 61:14

⁷² *Q*, 2:98-99, 257; 3:68, 5:56, 9:61, 22:38, 40:51, 48:29, 63:8

⁷³ *WQ* (2013)

⁷⁴ See **Proposition 8**; Quigley (2013), p.712

Phase two begins in 622 after managing to avoid an assassination plot by the Quraysh,⁷⁵ the Prophet and his remaining seventy followers⁷⁶ vacated Mecca by stealth to Yathrib, an oasis city 210 miles northeast of Mecca. This shift became known as *al-hijra*, or the ‘migration’, and was later marked the start of the Islamic calendar during the Caliphate of ‘Umar. It is easy to overlook the *hijra* as simply a ‘migration’ or self-imposed exile; however the strategic importance of the dislocation from Mecca is immense. The *hijra* of the Prophet from Mecca to Medina accompanied a significant shift in policy concerning the utility of force to further the Prophetic mission.⁷⁷

3.5.1. Medina - The Rational Pursuit of Aims

In the two years following the death of Abu Talib, in the midst of increasing oppression from the Quraysh, the Prophet had, alongside his political advisors Abu Bakr and ‘Umar, and his uncle ‘Abbas, negotiated a political arrangement whereby the Prophet would be appointed as a peace broker between the warring tribes of Yathrib (al-Aws and al-Khazraj) acting as a *podestà* or chief magistrate.⁷⁸ The terms the Prophet laid down to the tribal elders were most salient, that they acknowledged him as God’s Emissary, submitted to the jurisdiction of the Shari‘ah, and would protect him from external threats.⁷⁹ This political alliance was the foundation of the Prophet’s political support whilst in exile from Mecca.

The prevailing narrative argues that the Prophet lacked the ability to use violence because he was deprived of any political authority in Mecca. After ‘migrating’ to Medina he acquired the political power and military capability to resist the machinations of his enemies and thus launched a series of ‘defensive’ campaigns. This narrative, it is argued here, is as romantic as it is speculative and reflects a profound dependence upon the much later narratives of the *Seera* literature that were selectively constructed with no serious analysis of events.

⁷⁵ *I.I.*, p.221-3; Lings (2001), pp.116-7

⁷⁶ Rahman (2003), p.41

⁷⁷ See **Proposition 5**

⁷⁸ *I.I.*, pp.197-207

⁷⁹ Bashumail (1977), p.28; Rahman (2003), pp.40-1; *I.I.*, p.208

The shift to Medina is more accurately acknowledged here as a ‘strategic relocation’ to establish a new base of operations⁸⁰ and not an emergency evacuation as often claimed.⁸¹ Even more saliently, the *hijra* or strategic relocation, took place after the Prophet had received permission to use violence against his enemies⁸² strongly suggesting that the strategic relocation was preceded by a new estimation concerning the efficacy of violence.

3.5.2. The New Strategic Environment

Although having been effectively denied any real political gains in Mecca, the Prophet now enjoyed a degree of credible authority and legitimate jurisdiction, at least within Medina. The recognition of political authority in Medina was notably not an exclusive consequence of his claims to prophecy but rather on account of his political empowerment.⁸³ Although politically vested as the chief magistrate of Medina, the Prophet was still lacking in reputation and prestige, the most influential factors for creating confederacy, and hence found political alliance-building a difficult task since no tribe would risk allying with an unproven, weak, and regionally disliked community of fragmented ‘tribal defectors.’⁸⁴ Indeed, the message of Islam threatened the tribal loyalties and structures across Arabia making all tribes potential threats and enemies by default.

Nonetheless, in his religious capacity at least, the Prophet alongside his Muslim aides⁸⁵ identified Mecca as the primary centre of gravity, and the Quraysh as the most important strategic actor and adversary.⁸⁶ The secondary centre of gravity, were the allies of the Quraysh, the Banu Khaybar who were a northern buffer of the Quraysh to Medina effectively sandwiching the Prophet’s movements.⁸⁷ The strategic environment was balancing itself against Medina and the surrounding tribes were

⁸⁰ Most contemporary Muslim scholarship advocates that the Qur’anic verses legislating permission to war were revealed only after the prophet had reached Medina despite the fact that the two eldest sources, Ibn Ishaq and Ibn Hisham both explicitly state otherwise. See *I.I.*, pp.223-33; *I.H.*, pp.228-9, Buti (2007), pp.220-1; Bashumail (1977), is one of the few writers who acknowledges the shift to Medina as the establishment of a military base of operations. - p.56

⁸¹ Lings (2001), p.118

⁸² *Q*, 2:198

⁸³ See the *sahifa* document or ‘the constitution of Medina’ – Rahman (2003), p.42; *I.I.*, pp.231-3, 239; on Jewish tensions see *I.I.*, pp.239-70; *I.H.*, pp.275-315

⁸⁴ *I.H.*, p.160

⁸⁵ *I.K.*, p.219

⁸⁶ Bashier (2006), pp.3-5

⁸⁷ Donner (1979), p. 242

either allied with the Quraysh or had no reason not to directly help or assist the Quraysh in crushing the rising Muslim power.

3.5.3. Guerrilla Warfare

The new strategic environment essentially demanded two forms of strategic action:⁸⁸ firstly, the Prophet had to ensure the primacy of the defence⁸⁹ by establishing a security protocol; secondly, to maintain pressure upon the centre of gravity of the Quraysh.⁹⁰ The combination of these two strategic concerns resulted in the first policy of armed force in Islamic history – guerilla warfare. These missions were known as *saraya* (sing. *sariya*) and were tactical offensive action, ‘which involves the attack but not the seizure and holding of territory.’⁹¹ The Prophet dispatched small strike teams with specific objectives that did not demand a specific strategic decision.⁹² Missions that the Prophet led himself were referred to as *ghazawa* (pl. *ghazwat*).⁹³

It is evident that the Prophet understood the limited time at his disposal before an inevitable attack by one of the surrounding tribes against him, and initiated a policy of guerrilla-style assaults in the surrounding area. These assaults were designed to not only target economic assets⁹⁴ of the Quraysh⁹⁵ but also to deter allied tribes of the Quraysh from raiding Medina in the hope of extending possible diplomatic relations.⁹⁶ Medina was an oasis town off the trade routes and thus fairly innocuous,⁹⁷ the Prophet had a strong geostrategic advantage, as he was able to plot raids from his new base of operations and have his strike teams retreat back to Medina with considerable ease.⁹⁸ More importantly, he could make a show of force without inviting an opponent near his own territory.⁹⁹

⁸⁸ Bashier (2006), p.5

⁸⁹ See *OW*, pp.484-500

⁹⁰ See Rodgers (2008), p.38; Donner (1979)

⁹¹ Van Evera (2004), p.227, fn.1

⁹² *OW*, pp.548-50

⁹³ The *ghazwat* which the Prophet led personally against assets of the Quraysh were: Buwat (623) and Safwan (623); *ghazawat* against beduoin tribes: al-‘Ashira (623); - Bashier (2006), pp.11-3

⁹⁴ Bashumail (1977), pp.77-8; Gabriel (2007), pp.74-7

⁹⁵ See *WQ*, pp.6-11; the *sariya* of Al-‘Is (623), Rabigh (623), al-Kharrar (623), Nakhla (624); (Bashier (2006), p.5; Bashumail (1977), pp.74-6

⁹⁶ See the *sariya* of Waddan (or al-abwa) (623) - *I.I.*, p.281; *I.H.*, p.328

⁹⁷ Rahman (2003), p.40

⁹⁸ Gabriel (2007), p.74

⁹⁹ *OW*, pp.469-78

The ability to transfer warfighting or raids away from his own base of operations only enhanced the guerrilla nature of Jihad. According to Clausewitz, ‘people in arms’, that is, guerrilla warfare as part of a larger conventional effort, requires the following conditions, all of which we see present in Medina,¹⁰⁰

1. The war must be fought in the interior of the country.
2. It must not be decided by a single stroke.
3. The theatre of operations must be fairly large.
4. The national character must be suited to that type of war
5. The country must be rough and inaccessible, because of mountains, or forests, marshes, or the local methods of cultivation.

Additionally, by attacking the Quraysh the Prophet bought significant time against surrounding tribes and confederates of the Quraysh, who would by default withhold from under-taking any form of full-scale action until observing the response of their ally.¹⁰¹ During these years (622-625), the social construction of Jihad began, transforming from - and in distinction to - the *nisus* of Mecca.¹⁰²

3.5.4. The Results of Guerrilla Jihad

The guerrilla tactics of the Muslims resonated with existing tribal raiding tactics and practices. The long history of raiding since the *Ayyam al-Arab* had been exploited by the Prophet to serve the political aims of his mission, as proposition four of the strategic paradigm states, *warfare is an instrument of rational calculation and the result of expected utility*.¹⁰³ Aware that he could disrupt the Quraysh by striking at their centre of gravity, the guerrilla-style tactics employed by the Prophet were based upon circumstances and relative strengths. Guerrilla warfare was adopted because of the need to match political objectives with military realities, that is, to align means and ends. Because the immediate goal of submission by the Quraysh and thus control of Mecca was not within the Prophet’s politico-military means, he had to re-align his strategy.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., p.480

¹⁰¹ Bashier (2006), p.13-7

¹⁰² Ibid., p.15; Quigley (2013), p.710

¹⁰³ See **Proposition 4**

¹⁰⁴ *OW*, p.81

The disparity of politico-military power between the Muslims and the Quraysh did not afford the Prophet any rational belief in the expected utility of force to achieve a permanent strategic decision.¹⁰⁵ The strategy to raid returning economic convoys of the Quraysh was not however an easy task at all,¹⁰⁶ and the relatively low success rate of the Muslims demonstrated this.¹⁰⁷ Furthermore, as Clausewitz warns, ‘the danger that the enemy army, or part of it, may take revenge on the attacker by inflicting a defeat on him later, as punishment for the operation’¹⁰⁸ came to pass in 624 after several guerrilla raids against convoys of the Quraysh was sufficient to provoke an organised military response known as the Battle of Badr.¹⁰⁹

3.5.5a. Milestone # 1: The Battle of Badr (624)

Targeting a convoy of the Quraysh on its return journey along the northern trade route south to Mecca, the Prophet with a guerrilla force of approximately 300 men set out on a raiding mission.¹¹⁰ Word reached Mecca of the impending threat and the Quraysh mobilised an armed force of approximately 1,000 men to intercept the suspected strike by the Muslims.¹¹¹ The Quraysh made a show of force and dispatched their army not only to protect the cargo, but also to make sure the watching Arab tribes would know of the spectacle taking place.¹¹²

As news reached the Prophet of the dispatched army sent to meet him, the Prophet took counsel and made the strategic decision to confront the armed force of the Quraysh.¹¹³ Knowingly outnumbered and respectively inferior in military arms and capabilities,¹¹⁴ the Prophet’s unexpected choice to engage the Quraysh resulted in a sudden, and shocking, tactical victory against the superior military side.¹¹⁵ According to Gabriel, the casualty ratio for the Quraysh was around 20% of the total force with

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., pp.545-7

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., pp.555-6

¹⁰⁷ Gabriel (2007), pp.80-1

¹⁰⁸ *OW*, p.556

¹⁰⁹ Bashier (2006), pp.9-11; Gabriel (2007), p.73

¹¹⁰ Bashumail (1977), pp.78-84

¹¹¹ Ibid., pp.87-90, 98

¹¹² See *WQ*, pp.11-56 for the earliest comprehensive background recorded; also *II*, pp.291-327; Bashumail (1977), p.91; Gabriel (2007), p.125

¹¹³ Sallaabee (2007), p.111

¹¹⁴ Bashumail (1977), p. 88

¹¹⁵ Being perhaps the most famous event in Islamic military history all works of *seera* and *maghazi* afford space to cover the battle, however most sources are premised off the records of *II*, pp.327-60; and *WQ*, pp.56-85. From contemporary sources Bashumail (1977) is most notable.

approximately the same percentage taken prisoner, as compared to the 10% casualty rate of the Muslims; these percentages by traditional Arab standards were exceptionally high.¹¹⁶

The tactical victory at Badr,¹¹⁷ would later bring inverse strategic results to Medina, but nonetheless, remained a significant political and moral gain.¹¹⁸ In particular, the victory at Badr consolidated the transformation of Jihad from its vertical theological character down to the horizontal expression of warfighting¹¹⁹ through the various guerrilla raids that had become a hallmark of the new independent Muslim movement in Medina.¹²⁰

3.5.5b. Milestone # 2: The Battle of Uhud (625)

Reeling from their humiliating loss the previous year, the Quraysh reassembled the largest armed force in living memory and decided to march on Medina. The Quraysh who called in the support of all their allies to destroy the Muslim movement led the confederate army.¹²¹ The Muslims still high from the victory at Badr, saw the engagement as a providential contest that they were sure to win.¹²²

The result was a battle outside of Medina by a mountain named Uhud, where the Muslims suffered a tactical defeat¹²³ and the Prophet himself was injured in battle.¹²⁴ The Quraysh, according to characteristic *jahiliya* customs, withdrew after having established military superiority on the battlefield against the Muslims.¹²⁵ The tactical defeat of the Muslims was made worse by the fact that they had clearly failed to balance their means and ends. The morale boosting victory the year prior had clouded the Muslim rational calculus, delivering a false sense of military capability.¹²⁶

¹¹⁶ Gabriel (2007), pp.100-1

¹¹⁷ Bashier (2006), p.37; like many others, mistakenly refer to the tactical decision at Badr as being a decisive victory when it was clearly not, see *OW*, pp.248-70.

¹¹⁸ Gabriel (2007), p.101

¹¹⁹ See *Q*, 8:1-75; *I.H.*, pp.373-82

¹²⁰ Between the victory at Badr and the next Milestone at Uhud the following year, the raids (*ghazawat*) against Banu Sulaym in al-Kudr; Banu Qaynuqa, Dhu Amarr, and al-Furu' of Bahran, and the *sariya* of al-Sawiq, and al-Qarada, took place. - *I.I.*, pp.360 -64; *I.H.*, pp.382-87; *WQ*, pp.87-99

¹²¹ *WQ*, p.100

¹²² *Ibid.*, pp.104-6

¹²³ *I.H.*, pp.403-4; Bashier (2006), pp.93-8

¹²⁴ *I.I.*, p.380; Bashier (2006), p.83

¹²⁵ *WQ*, p.144; *I.I.*, pp.386-7; Gabriel (2007), pp.122-3

¹²⁶ See Gabriel (2007), pp.107-130; *WQ*, p.105

It had been the preference of the Prophet to remain within the city and invite urban warfare, which would have been the more strategically balanced option given the incapacity of the Muslims to prevent the assault on Medina.¹²⁷ Instead, by transferring warfighting into the open against a vastly superior side (that had been prepared over a period of a year for war), the defeat was to be expected. Additionally, whilst morale was high on the side of the Muslims, the Quraysh, who had suffered heavy casualties at Badr were further driven and fuelled by the blind force of *jahiliya* that demanded violent reprisal.¹²⁸ Although a tactical loss was inflicted, the failure of the Quraysh to impose a strategic decision resulted in a political stalemate.¹²⁹ Even though the Quraysh had won, the Prophet, and the Muslims, still survived to fight another day.¹³⁰ The Quraysh at full strength with their allies did not seize the opportunity to inflict a decisive victory.¹³¹

3.5.5c. Milestone # 3: The Battle of al-Khandaq (627)

Once again, the audience of Arabia had taken note, the Prophet had managed to survive Uhud and defy the Quraysh again.¹³² In the years following the Battle of Uhud, the Prophet began the process of consolidating his political power far exceeding the initial terms of agreement between himself and those who appointed him as their chief magistrate.¹³³ Eventually, he was able to transform his status from an arbiter to the uncontested political authority in Medina. The process of consolidation resulted in the marginalisation and exclusion of the Jewish tribes of Medina, in particular the Banu Nadir who had been covert allies of the Quraysh,¹³⁴ and a crackdown upon political opposition within the Medinan territory.¹³⁵ These actions signified that the consolidation of his political power came in tandem with a shift to an aggressive policy of warfighting that also saw the continuation of guerrilla-styled raids.¹³⁶

¹²⁷ *WQ*, p.104; *I.H.*, pp.393-4

¹²⁸ See 3.2.1.; *WQ*, p.101

¹²⁹ For the tactical events on the battlefield see Rodgers (2012), pp. 118-28; Gabriel (2007), pp.111-26

¹³⁰ *I.H.*, pp.420-3

¹³¹ Rodgers (2012), pp. 128-9; Gabriel (2008), p.122

¹³² Gabriel (2007), p.125

¹³³ Donner (1979), p. 232; *I.I.*, pp.445-50

¹³⁴ *WQ*, pp.203-8; Donner (1979), p. 233; Schwartz-Barcott (2004), p.119; Rodgers (2012), pp.137-40

¹³⁵ In accordance with **Propositions 6 & 7**; see *I.I.*, pp.437-8; see Gabriel (2007), pp. 86-107, 127-8, 141-5; Buti (2007), p.273

¹³⁶ In 625, the *ghazwa* of Hamra al-Asad and against Banu Nadir; the *saraya* to Qatan, Bi'r Ma'una, al-Raji' - *WQ*, pp.163-88; in 626, the *ghazwa* of Badr al-Maw'id; Dhat al-Riqa'; Dumat al-Jandal I; al-Muraysi; and the *saraya* of ibn Atik to Abu Rafi'; *WQ*, pp.188-202

Consequently in 627 a confederate army,¹³⁷ led by the Quraysh returned once more to strike at Medina, this time with the intention of decisive victory.¹³⁸ At the battle of Uhud, despite his reservations, the Prophet had not yet consolidated his political authority in Medina to over-turn the popular vote to meet the Quraysh in conventional battle.¹³⁹ The Prophet, now uncontested in politico-military decision-making, was able to apply his strategic preference to induce urban warfare against the approaching army. This event, also known as the Battle of the Trench, is famous for the trench dug around Medina acting as a moat and forcing the adversary into siege warfare.¹⁴⁰ Unprepared for such warfighting with no artillery to attack the confederate army was held for 20 days with only minor skirmishes taking place.¹⁴¹ Eventually, after a series of protracted attempts to breach the Muslim defences, and multiple episodes of political in-fighting and dissension between the confederate tribes and the Quraysh, the coalition force fell apart and withdrew from Medina.¹⁴²

In the aftermath of the Battle of the Trench, emboldened by their resistance to the Quraysh-confederate force, the Prophet escalated his crackdown upon political opposition within the Medinan territory and laid siege to the tribe of Banu Qurayza who had committed a collective act of treachery.¹⁴³ Following the extermination of Banu Qurayza, the Prophet made a show of military strength and prowess¹⁴⁴ as the guerrilla raids resumed once more with 15 taking place in under a year.¹⁴⁵ This 'surge'¹⁴⁶ of raids pushed the Arab tribes onto the defensive immediately, reacting to the Muslims as they seized the tactical initiative that the pagan Arabs had held until the Battle of the Trench.¹⁴⁷ The tempo of military operations pressed the Arabs, and

¹³⁷ *I.I.*, p.450; *WQ*, p.217

¹³⁸ *I.I.*, p.453; *WQ*, p.216; Gabriel (2007), pp.131-141

¹³⁹ *WQ*, p.105

¹⁴⁰ *I.I.*, pp.451-2; *WQ*, pp.225-7

¹⁴¹ *WQ*, pp.228-32; Rodgers (2012), pp.143-6; Bashier (2006), p.146

¹⁴² *WQ*, pp.235-42

¹⁴³ See *WQ*, pp.244-61; Rodgers (2012), pp.144-5, 148-60

¹⁴⁴ Donner (1979), pp. 239-40

¹⁴⁵ Between 627 to 628, the *saraya* of Unays; al-Qurta, al-Ghaba, al-Ghamir, Dhul-Qassa I, Dhul-Qassa II, al-'Is, al-Taraf, Hisma, Dumat al-Jandal II, Banu Sa'd in Fadak, Umm Qirfa, Khaybar to kill Usayr, Dhul-Jader; and the *ghazwa* of Banu Lihyān. See - *WQ*, pp.261-281; *I.I.* mentions that the *sariya* of Banu Mustaliq also took place during this year, - pp.490-9; and *I.H.*, pp.479-82

¹⁴⁶ Rodgers (2012), pp.172-85

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p.236

diminished their morale allowing the Prophet to dictate the pace of the offense and disrupt his opponent's ability to prioritise their own.¹⁴⁸

3.5.5d. Milestone # 4: The Treaty of Hdaybiya (628)

The failure of the largest confederate army ever assembled in Arabia to breach the defences of Medina was a political disaster for the Quraysh and a valuable strategic victory for the Prophet.¹⁴⁹ The damage to the reputation of the Quraysh was worse than that of Badr, whilst the prestige of the Prophet was rising fast amongst the unaligned Arab tribes who saw a potentially powerful ally.¹⁵⁰ In order to curb the rising stock of the Prophet and an attempt to buy time to rebuild their defeated armed force and political status,¹⁵¹ the Quraysh offered terms to the Prophet at a landmark known as Hdaybiya, during a stand off outside Mecca in 628.¹⁵² The Quraysh attempting to regain the strategic initiative from the Prophet set the Treaty of Hdaybiya, against the backdrop of a failing war effort.

The Prophet had already escalated his guerrilla raids and had exhausted the Quraysh in war and compromised their trade routes.¹⁵³ It is highly probable that the Quraysh perceived that they had lost, or were in danger of losing the strategic initiative against the Prophet who certainly had gained the tactical initiative from the Quraysh.¹⁵⁴ The attempt of the Quraysh to maintain the status quo by advancing a *fait accompli*¹⁵⁵ that was designed to impose favourable terms of settlement upon the Prophet failed. The Quraysh had underestimated the results of entering into a treaty with the Prophet. In doing so, they had effectively conferred legitimacy to the Prophet as an actor or tribal chief within the tribal political system.¹⁵⁶ Conferring legitimacy by the most prestigious tribe in Arabia was in effect also permitting any and all other tribes to formally enter into alliance with the Prophet if they so chose to do so.

¹⁴⁸ Ibid., pp.237-8

¹⁴⁹ Bashier (2006), pp.145, 155-8; Gabriel (2007), pp.132, 145, 149

¹⁵⁰ Donner (1979), p.235

¹⁵¹ Gabriel (2007), p.148; Donner (1979), p.238

¹⁵² *II.*, pp.499-507; *WQ*, pp.281-311

¹⁵³ Gabriel (2007), p.150; Rodgers (2012), p.188

¹⁵⁴ **Hypothesis E**; see also Rodgers (2012), p.188

¹⁵⁵ **Hypothesis F**

¹⁵⁶ Gabriel (2007), p.150

Prior to Hdaybiya, the Prophet's attempts at alliance building were relatively unsuccessful, with all the major tribes avoiding him.¹⁵⁷ Although the terms of the agreement were heavily stacked in favour of the Quraysh,¹⁵⁸ the Prophet was extremely shrewd, negotiating in accordance with his political master plan. The sophistication of the bargaining dynamic was quite intriguing given that the primary element of the agreement was a ten-year truce wherein no warfighting or raids would be conducted by either side¹⁵⁹ – a move that essentially guaranteed the Muslims the tactical initiative for the next ten years.¹⁶⁰ The Prophet had always been after one thing – political legitimacy, without which his message could never have held any credibility with the Arab chiefs and elders.¹⁶¹ While the Quraysh assumed they had regained the strategic initiative through *fait accompli*, this was actually only a short-term gain.

The Prophet, playing a long-term game quickly overturned the immediate advantages accrued by the Quraysh. The Quraysh had attempted, by imposing restrictions of warfighting between them, to reestablish the status quo and prevent any more disruption to the balance of power in Arabia whilst simultaneously restoring the safe-passages of their caravan trade routes.¹⁶² They did not realise that by their own terms they had restricted their own actions. Donner describes what happened next

the Quraysh, by failing to insist on some clause extending the truce to include their allies at Khaybar, made the fatal miscalculation upon which Muhammad was, perhaps, depending. By this omission they unwittingly converted what they undoubtedly thought would be the guarantee of their supremacy into an instrument of their own destruction. They had tied their own hands in the struggle with Muhammad, but left him free to pursue his consolidation in the northern Hijaz and thereby to break out of the vise-grip in which the Mecca-Khaybar alliance had so firmly held him.¹⁶³

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., pp.150-1; Rodgers (2012), p.188

¹⁵⁸ Bashier (2006), pp.199-201; Rahman (2003), pp.47-8

¹⁵⁹ *I.I.*, pp.504-5

¹⁶⁰ Gabriel (2007), p.150

¹⁶¹ Donner (1979), p.242

¹⁶² Gabriel (2007), p.151

¹⁶³ Donner (1979), p.244

In a surprising turn of events, the secondary centre of gravity fell.¹⁶⁴ The Prophet continued to dominate the northern *Hijaz* region until he 'was able to subdue all the important settlements for several hundred miles up the *Hijaz*.'¹⁶⁵ The northern Hijaz was a more fertile region of Arabia with valuable agricultural produce and important trade zones for the southern towns and cities such as Mecca.¹⁶⁶ By establishing supremacy in the north the Prophet could economically strangle Mecca by denying them food supplies and access to the oases of the northern *Hijaz*.¹⁶⁷ Now it was the Prophet who imposed an embargo upon the Quraysh.

In the two years after the Treaty of Hudaibiya and the fall of Khaybar, the Muslims engaged in an additional 17 military operations.¹⁶⁸ Diplomatic alliances were forged with tribal groups around Mecca during these years, effectively encircling the Quraysh under their very noses.¹⁶⁹ As the Prophet used a strategy of guerilla strikes to diminish and weaken the food supplies, restricted produce and trade from the northern *Hijaz*, it was not long until the Meccan's experienced famine.¹⁷⁰ In that very same year, the primary centre of gravity fell as the Prophet seized Mecca in a bloodless revolution.

3.5.6a. Analysis of Phase Two - The Horizontal Reconfiguration of Jihad

After the Prophet's migration to Medina, the basic linguistic meaning of Jihad was conferred a special but restricted form of employment according to the Qur'an.¹⁷¹ Whilst the vertical design, *absolute Jihad* endured, the newly reconfigured Jihad was distinguished from its previous horizontal implication as *nisus*, and given a distinct technical meaning,¹⁷² which was directly connected to the idea of warfighting (*qital*).¹⁷³

¹⁶⁴ *WQ*, pp.311-41; *II.*, pp.515-8

¹⁶⁵ Donner (1979), p. 245; *II.*, pp.510-19

¹⁶⁶ Rodgers (2012), p.204

¹⁶⁷ Gabriel (2007), pp.168-171; Donner (1979), p.245

¹⁶⁸ In 628 following Khaybar, there was one *ghazwa* of Wadi al-Qura, and *saraya* that targeted the tribes of Najd, Hawazin, Banu Kilab, Banu Murra I, Banu Tha'laba, Banu Murra II,; and in 629, the tribes of Ghatafan, Banu Sulaym, Banu Mulawwi, Banu Layth, Banu Amir, Banu Quda'a I, Mu'ta, Banu Quda'a II, Juhayna, Ghatafan – see *WQ*, pp.355-84; Rodgers (2012), p.195

¹⁶⁹ Bashier (2006), pp.191, 217-8

¹⁷⁰ Donner (1979), p.245

¹⁷¹ Bonner (2006), pp.25-7

¹⁷² *Q*, 16:110

¹⁷³ At least twenty-six references are made to Jihad in this sense from the *Madinan* chapters of the Qur'an; see for example: 4:95, 9:41, 9:88, 61:4.

Further distinctions were conferred to the new meaning broadening the technical employment of the concept of Jihad and uniting it to the expression *fi sabil l'Allah* - which implied *nisus specifically expended according to the commands of God Himself*. Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah* was an extremely dynamic evolution of the original linguistic and horizontal notion of *nisus*. This evolution reconfigured the Meccan interpretation of Jihad by fusing a moral character to *nisus*, such that Jihad was exclusively an extension of *nisus* in the service of God alone. The reconfiguration of Jihad broadened the idea of *nisus* expended according to the commands of God and explicitly included financial expenditure in relation to the 'war efforts' taking place or in preparations for it, further emphasizing the 'total' implication of the Jihad to politico-strategic ends.¹⁷⁴ Thus, financial expenditure *fi sabil l'Allah* was not disconnected from warfighting (*qital*), since it provided the platform for arms acquisitions, defensive fortifications, and supplies.¹⁷⁵

This suggests that Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah* was understood to refer to the war efforts as a whole, politically, militarily and also socio-economically, and was applicable to those elements connected to *qital* directly or indirectly¹⁷⁶ all the same. This expansion in the application of Jihad to the horizontal plane is congruent with the emerging guerrilla nature of the politico-military activities undertaken by the Prophet with Medina as his base of operations in Arabia.

3.5.6b. Jihad in Reality

Jihad in Phase two was total, meaning there was no determination of the traditional levels-of-analysis problem (systemic, domestic or individual) and a hierarchy did not judge it, rather strategic interaction at any particular level could be considered as *Jihad fi sabil l'Allah*. According to proposition three of the strategic paradigm, *the rational instrumentalisation of war demands the establishment of clear and attainable objectives through a cost-benefit calculus of the utility of force*. Barring the risky strategy of direct military engagement at Badr, thereafter the Prophet was careful to calibrate the use of force according to the objectives sought.

¹⁷⁴ See *Q*, 8:60, 9:41-2,

¹⁷⁵ Bonner (2006) pp.27-30

¹⁷⁶ Indirect means of non-violent military assistance includes spreading of propaganda by the tongue, collecting and disseminating intelligence and disinformation, scouting enemy movements, and the employment of all skills that furthered or aided the enterprise of Jihad such as blacksmithing, providing logistical assistance, and so forth.

War in reality, that is, Jihad conducted horizontally, was distinct from the *nisus* of Mecca and the notion of *absolute Jihad*. *Jihad fi sabil l'Allah*, unlike *absolute Jihad*, required the management of escalation and the variables of friction in order to attain the overarching objectives of *nisus* expended *fi sabil Allah*. Unlike *absolute Jihad*, the threat of *Jihad fi sabil l'Allah* had to be limited. *Jihad fi sabil l'Allah* was limited warfare not holy war. *Jihad fi sabil l'Allah* was waged as fast and efficiently as possible at the lowest politico-economic costs. Warfighting methods were strategic not religious.

The repertoire of guerrilla actions, which were considered as Jihad included the use of 'decapitation strikes' or political assassinations of tribal chiefs¹⁷⁷ and traitors. Furthermore, over the duration of numerous battlefield and raiding engagements between the Muslims and the various other Arab and Jewish tribes, the military organisation and operational efficiency increased rapidly.¹⁷⁸ Eventually, the Prophet was able to mobilise with such speed following Hdaybiya that he was able to maintain the strategic initiative and strike almost at will across the north creating an atmosphere of fear amongst the tribes.

Guerrilla warfare was adopted because it was the most strategically pragmatic option, under the continued political constraints and military restrictions that the Muslims experienced. Clausewitz wrote, 'No one starts a war- or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so- without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.'¹⁷⁹ Smith adds to Clausewitz's dictum, with the warning that

Failure to accurately define the role of force in the political process can prevent the military instrument from being properly directed to achieve appropriate ends. At worst, this can lead to the indiscriminate application of violence in a manner which can hinder the attainment of objectives. Because low intensity warfare strategies often seek to use military engagements as a means of

¹⁷⁷ Rodgers (2012), pp.154-7

¹⁷⁸ Gabriel (2007), pp.145-9, 152-60

¹⁷⁹ *OW*, p.579

pressure rather than physical denial, their practitioners have to exercise considerable political caution in order to avoid both the wastage of scarce military resources and the provocation of enemy counter-measures which restrict the freedom to operate.¹⁸⁰

Whilst the guerrilla character of Jihad remained throughout the period of phase two, it was evolving according to expected models of guerrilla movements into a distinctly political struggle wherein the Prophet himself was eventually accorded political legitimacy by his opponents as his power grew. The guerrilla warfare campaign of the Prophet bears close resemblance in its cumulative progression as Mao's war of national liberation. The guerrilla nature of the *maghazi* precluded the search for decisive battle rather the guerrilla campaign had effectively destabilised Mecca, and more broadly the regional balance of power in Arabia.¹⁸¹ Warfighting was used to serve the political aim but battle was not a sequential strategy characteristic of the Clausewitzian emphasis upon direct battlefield engagements.¹⁸² Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah* was a revolutionary form of collaborative *nisus* - a political instrument that included warfighting but was not restricted to it; or in Clausewitzian terms, not 'something autonomous but always as an instrument of *politik*'.¹⁸³ The Prophet as part of his assessment of the conflict scenario with the Quraysh employed a careful but calibrated application of guerrilla warfare called Jihad to maximise his political interests during the second phase of his mission.¹⁸⁴

3.6. Phase Three (630-632)

In 630, the Prophet, backed by an army of 10,000-armed Muslims and a confederacy of Arab tribes, seized Mecca from a sapped and weakened Quraysh in a bloodless coup.¹⁸⁵ In a remarkable turn of events, not only had the once-persecuted and self-exiled man of Quraysh returned to overthrow his enemies, but also he achieved it so decisively without the use of violence but with a show of force.¹⁸⁶

¹⁸⁰ Smith (1997), p.183

¹⁸¹ See **Proposition 9**

¹⁸² Wylie (2014), p.54

¹⁸³ *OW*, p.88

¹⁸⁴ Smith (1997), p.142

¹⁸⁵ Bashier (2006), pp.223-5; Rodgers (2008), p.17; Lings (1991), pp.299-305

¹⁸⁶ *I.I.*, relates that the Prophet did have a hit-list of names that were exceptions to the otherwise non-violent entry into Mecca, but did not authorise the use of violence if resistance was met. – pp.550-1;

The Prophet also used a method known in the Qur'an as *ta'lif al-qulub* – reconciliation of hearts to win over his Meccan captives.¹⁸⁷ The essence of this political technique is to show generosity in the face of adversity, or mercy in triumph.¹⁸⁸ The gesture of forgiveness and sparing the lives of the helplessly conquered displayed magnanimity in victory that quickly won over the Meccan population, not in the least since violent retribution was expected in accordance with traditional Arab values of the *jahiliya* that promoted acts of retaliation and vengeance.¹⁸⁹ This technique absorbed potential threats and people of distinction and skill into the Muslim movement and conferred upon them managerial and leadership positions, binding their interests to that of Islam.¹⁹⁰

3.6.1. Political Victory

No vendetta was revealed by the Prophet, reiterating the consistent non-zero sum strategy he had held since his days of persecution and ridicule in Mecca more than twenty years prior. The Prophet was to pass away two years later in 632, however in this time significant politico-strategic actions were instigated. After claiming political victory, the Prophet returned to Medina and established the Medinan polity as the new capital of Arabia, receiving tribal allies and oaths of allegiances there and not in Mecca, which he left under the governance of his now allied Quraysh. Policy at this stage of the Prophet's operation broadened such that the revolution directed itself internationally. The once guerrilla army, now a legitimate armed force, was directed toward the northern external strategic environment of Arabia.

A marked shift in political trajectory also took place following the takeover of Mecca; now the Prophet began political dealings as an established political figure and not as a guerrilla. No longer did the Prophet approach his political dealings from a position of disadvantage but now possessing an armed force of over 12,000 warriors, the Prophet launched campaigns to suppress any tribes from reorganising alliances in the wake of

Bashier (2006), p.231 mentions some resistance was encountered resulting in 13-28 pagan deaths; also notes the hit-list – pp. 239-40

¹⁸⁷ *Q*, 9:60

¹⁸⁸ Blankinship (1994), p.24; this technique is exemplified concerning the division of war booty and spoils after the Battle of Hawazin in 629, see *I.I.*, p.592-6; Buti (2007), pp.501-5

¹⁸⁹ *I.I.*, p.553

¹⁹⁰ Donner (2012), pp.94-6

Qurayshs' fall.¹⁹¹ An additional 15 assaults are recorded as taking place over a two-year period that included the siege and eventual submission of Banu Thaqif (the tribe that had formerly rejected and ridiculed the Prophet's request for political asylum), and the show of force towards the Byzantines on the northern frontier of Arabia known as *ghazwa* of Tabuk.¹⁹² The Prophet also ordered symbolic strikes that served as spectacle for the rest of Arabia.¹⁹³ From Medina the new capital of Arabia, the Prophet dispatched emissaries to the regional Kings, Caesars, and rulers of neighbouring lands¹⁹⁴ and received deputations from the regional actors.¹⁹⁵

In 632, the Prophet died from a fever at his home in Medina.¹⁹⁶ Since his mission began in 610, he had participated in 'at least twenty-seven campaigns and deputized some fifty-nine others – an average of no fewer than nine campaigns annually.'¹⁹⁷ Whilst politico-military control of Arabia had not been consolidated,¹⁹⁸ strategic domination of the major political actors had; the capital of Mecca was seized, and its most powerful tribe humbled. All politico-military competition had been crushed, and the tribes of Arabia were in both awe and fear of Allah's Messenger. *Jihad fi sabil l'Allah* had triumphed as an instrument of limited war in service of the Prophet's Mandate from God.¹⁹⁹

3.6.2. Analysis of Phase Three – Trinitarian Success

The Prophet applied increasingly escalated pressures against Mecca, employing force indirectly alongside political concentration. His magnanimity in victory and pardon against the people who had spent considerable effort to malign and harm him, was an act of political genius. The result was not only a decisive political victory but also the political consolidation of Mecca, and the Quraysh in particular, was permanent and lasting. Peace was imposed on his terms alone, his authority acknowledged, and the

¹⁹¹ See Rodgers (2012), p.221 for a list of campaigns and troop numbers

¹⁹² *WQ*, pp.429-65, 480-5; On Tabuk specifically, *WQ*, pp.485-502; *II*, p.602-9

¹⁹³ Khalid ibn al-Walid's *sariya* to al-Nakhla was to destroy the temple and idol of al-'Uzza, one of the premiere goddesses worshiped by the pagan Arabs. - *II*, pp.565-6; Rodgers (2012), pp.219-20

¹⁹⁴ *II*, pp.652-9

¹⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.627-44; Bashier (2006), pp.274-281

¹⁹⁶ *II*, pp.678-83

¹⁹⁷ Bonner (2005), p.6; *II*, pp.659-60

¹⁹⁸ The widespread belief is that full territorial control of Arabia had been achieved but this is a gross exaggeration of the geo-political situation, as the following chapter will explain. This common error is often found, for example in Sallaabee (2007), p.264;

¹⁹⁹ *Q* 9:33

jurisdiction of the Shari‘a was supreme, all within his lifetime. Understanding that warfighting itself could never secure such a decisive victory, and given the nature of the Prophet’s mission, victory rested within the alignment of the trinity to the objectives of his mission.

War in reality was the translation of *absolute Jihad* into *Jihad fi sabil l’Allah*. According to Clausewitzian theory,²⁰⁰ the aim of warfare is the eventual disarmament of the adversary - disarming being the equivalent of the objective - to render the opponent incapable of continuing the contest in order to impose terms without resistance. *Absolute Jihad* sought the incapacitation of the opponent - at the very minimum his ability to spread his theological claims by overcoming him with superior strength to subdue (or crush) his value-system. Replacing paganism and the culture of *jahiliya* with Islam through the horizontal application of *Jihad fi sabil l’Allah* achieved the objectives of *absolute Jihad* also.

The Prophet aligned the calculus of his policies and the overarching objectives to the circumstances and dictates of the strategic setting and environment. The theological imperative that championed *absolute Jihad* and aroused *hostile feelings* and *intentions*²⁰¹ in the Muslims against the pagan Arabs was tempered by the Prophet’s rational calculation of policy and calibrated use of force. The patience and forbearance of the Prophet in the midst of continuous morale defeating experiences throughout his life contributed to the many qualities that displayed the ‘genius’ Clausewitz commented on as the quintessential factor in overcoming the variables of chaos.²⁰²

Furthermore, by adopting guerrilla warfare, the Prophet was able to operate under less friction than his opponents and thus increase operational efficiency over time at a greater rate than his opponents. The balance of guerrilla operations to force a political decision in his favour was a perfect blend of acute political acumen and strategic vision; as Robert Taber succinctly explains: ‘... the guerrilla fighter’s war is political and social, his means are at least as political as they are military, his purpose is almost

²⁰⁰ *OW*, p.90

²⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p.76

²⁰² *Ibid.*, pp.100-12

entirely so. Thus we may paraphrase Clausewitz: *Guerilla war is the extension of politics by means of armed conflict.*²⁰³ *Jihad fi sabil l'Allah* was the 'people's war'.²⁰⁴ Having examined the *maghazi* proper, a differential diagnostic shall be applied in order to test the tenability of not only the strategic paradigm to explain events, but also the claim of the continuation of strategic interactions as manifestations of *politik*.

3.6.3. Offense-Defense Analysis of Phase Three

The coup of Mecca is an excellent illustration of the combination of the offense having gained critical momentum with critical mass, resulting in a *fait accompli par excellence*. The build up of Phase Two demonstrated how guerrilla warfare led to the coup, and that the utility of Jihad was initially battle-centric to achieve the tactical initiative, that is, an increasing relation of offense dominance to impose political objectives. The abducted *signs* and *symptoms* are charted below, revealing that eight variables of intervening factors that lead to war are identifiable between the *hijra* in 622 and the death of the Prophet in 632.

Offense-Defence Variables of Intervening Factors that lead to War²⁰⁵

Period	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
<i>Maghazi</i> 622-630	✕	●	✕	✕	✕	✕	✕	✕	●	✕

The nature of guerrilla warfare and opportunistic raiding could be explored under *symptoms* of Hypothesis A²⁰⁶ or Hypotheses D and E; the three explanatory predictions derived from the hypotheses of offense-defense theory (or *signs*) that most clearly elucidate how and why offense dominance perceptions increasingly influenced Jihad and the strategic calculus of force employed by the Prophet are F, G, and J.

²⁰³ Taber (2002), p.16 - (*italics in the original*)

²⁰⁴ *OW*, pp.479-83

²⁰⁵ Key: ✕ = Primary Offense-Defense Variable of analysis
 ✕ = Secondary Offense-Defense Variable of analysis
 ● = non-applicable Offense-Defense Variable of analysis

²⁰⁶ Van Evera (2004), p.244

3.6.3a. ODT - D/Dx # 10. Offense Grows Even Stronger - Hypothesis J

Hypothesis J proposes that offense dominance is self-reinforcing such that under favourable conditions for conquest actors will advocate a more offensive military posture and policies to suit it, thus furthering the perception of inevitable war.²⁰⁷ Van Evera posits three reasons why offense dominance is self-reinforcing,²⁰⁸ two of which are applicable to the *maghazi* post-Battle of the Trench: Firstly, 'Alliances assume a more offensive character when the offense dominates because aggressors can more easily drag their allies into their wars of aggression.'²⁰⁹ Secondly, offense-dominance creates a vicious circle whereby a status quo tribe such as the Quraysh,

are less able to protect their allies from conquest when the offense dominates because attackers can overrun defenders before help can arrive. Thus offense dominance raises the danger of greater offense dominance. Once entered, an offense-dominant world is hard to escape.²¹⁰

The Prophet consistently, during the guerrilla phase of his mission, sought to exploit windows of *vulnerability* and *opportunity* against the Quraysh, always preferring to pre-empt his opponents whenever possible. These traits are *symptomatic* of offense-defense Hypotheses D and E. Yet, it was not until after the Battle of the Trench that the Prophet assumed the tactical initiative and actually began to fulfill the characteristics of offense-dominance behaviours associated with both hypo-deductive sets. The boldness of the Prophet's offensive strategic actions striking at his enemies and the alliances of the Quraysh at will did much to shift perceptions regarding who actually held the offensive dominant position between Mecca and Medina. Later, shackled by their own terms agreed to in the Treaty of Hudaibiya, the Quraysh were unable to come to the aid of their allies as the Prophet struck at them.

²⁰⁷ Van Evera (2004), p.228 – Hypothesis J is a cumulative escalation combining all previous hypotheses.

²⁰⁸ Ibid., pp.236-8

²⁰⁹ Ibid., pp.236-7

²¹⁰ Ibid.

The message that the Quraysh would not come to the aid of their allies lent greater credibility to the Prophet's increasingly apparent offense dominance over Quraysh. Non-aligned tribes, as well as allies of the Quraysh did not have time to forge alliances to balance against the common threat of the Prophet's challenge to the status quo. As the hypotheses would predict, in the face of an offense dominate actor, other powers (status quo or regional non-aligned/neutral actors) will be more inclined to come to the aid of the victim than align with the aggressor.

Far from being an altruistic act, other actors shrewdly calculate the lack of action on their part will only encourage, embolden, and signal weakness to the aggressor which only threatens their own security later.²¹¹ However, the speed of operations by which the Prophet conducted his guerrilla assaults meant that he was able to own both the strategic and tactical initiative. Accordingly, most of the tribes realised they were on a sinking ship so to speak as long as they maintained their alliance with Quraysh, thus abandoning them in favour of the Prophet.

3.6.3b. ODT - D/Dx # 6. Faits Accomplis are More Common and Dangerous -

Hypothesis F

Hypothesis F posits that offense dominance will embolden actors to impose situations which rationally favour outcomes and payoffs in their favour through offsetting their risk against the risk of another such that they are left with only options which suit the initiator rather than their own interests. These are more commonly expressed as *fait accompli* tactics in diplomacy and business. Thomas Schelling refers to these strategies as 'the last clear chance'²¹² and the act of 'burning bridges'²¹³. Van Evera further elucidates the idea writing:

A *fait accompli* is a halfway step to war. It promises greater chance of political victory than quiet consultation, but it also raises greater risk of violence. The acting side moves without warning, facing

²¹¹ Van Evera (2004), p.237

²¹² Schelling (1980), p.37

²¹³ Ibid., (2008), pp.43-4

others with an accomplished fact. It cannot retreat without losing face, a dilemma that it exploits to compel the others to concede. But if the others stand firm, a collision is hard to avoid.²¹⁴

The march on Mecca in 630, backed by 10,000 soldiers armed for war, was ‘the last clear chance’ the Prophet offered the Quraysh and the Meccans in general. The risk was that they would resist him thereby provoking an all-out war. However, the Prophet had in the intervening years since Hudyabiya built a military coalition that had clearly shifted the balance of offense dominance to him making the rewards promised by violence more valuable.²¹⁵

3.6.3c. ODT - D/Dx # 7. States / [Actors] Negotiate Less - Hypothesis G

Accordingly, coupled with Hypothesis F, the explanation of Hypothesis G maintains the flush logic of the increasingly offense-dominant approach of the Prophet whereby, unlike a few years earlier at Hudaybiya, bargaining and negotiations by words began to hold less incentive over bargaining through deeds. Abu Sufyan, who heard of the troops amassing to march on Mecca, had preemptively made a visit to Medina to seek a political settlement with the Prophet in 629.²¹⁶ However, just as Hypothesis G predicts, negotiations failed²¹⁷ leaving differences to fester unresolved.²¹⁸

The Prophet’s entry into Mecca though relatively bloodless was an act of highly aggressive *bargaining*, with scarce concessions for the Meccans. The real significance of the political technique of *ta’lif al-qulub* – reconciliation of hearts – was that it was premised upon the fact that the Prophet held in reserve the latent threat hurt and to inflict unlimited violence.²¹⁹ This not only incapacitated resistance, but also exemplified mercy. The culmination of monopolising the strategic and tactical initiative was the demonstration of superior offense-dominance to the Quraysh and

²¹⁴ Van Evera (2004), p.232

²¹⁵ Ibid.

²¹⁶ *IL*, pp.543-4;

²¹⁷ As-Sallaabee (2007), p.139

²¹⁸ Van Evera (2004), p.227

²¹⁹ Schelling (2008), pp. 9, 12, 30

the skillful de-escalation of the propensity to war by employing a highly aggressive *diplomacy of violence*²²⁰ to impose his will.

3.6.3d. ODT - D/Dx Conclusions

The differential diagnostics have revealed indirectly or by default the following claims; firstly, that the unfolding events of the Prophet's mission were not accidental or coincidental. Clearly, strategic decision-making was taking place throughout his mission. The Prophet was largely acting within the parameters of expected rational actor behaviours and had an increasingly astute comprehension of how to balance political objectives with his available means.

Secondly, the three explanatory predictions (or *signs*) F, G, and J, derived from the hypotheses of offense-defense theory, alongside the symptomatic variables (A, C, D, E, & H); supports the overall strategic condition identified throughout the *maghazi*, and the strategic explanations that have been abductively derived. A diagnostic opinion that the Prophet employed a *diplomacy of violence* as a continuation of *politik* coupled with offensive military action is clearly signaled by the explanatory predictions F, G, and J, as to how offense dominance perceptions increasingly transformed the application of Jihad and the strategic calculus of force employed by the Prophet.

It is also clear that the whilst the Prophet's strategy held established political goals, opportunity, vulnerability, and the failure of his opponents to exploit the deficiencies of the Muslims largely contributed to an eventually successful mission over the Quraysh. Thus, the strategy of the Prophet was operating under the burden of friction and the play of chance and probability just as much as the Quraysh. The explanatory predictions of offense-defense theory however, demonstrates how the Prophet was able to offset and reduce the variables of friction, chance and probability, through increasing offense-dominance achieved by attaining the tactical initiative, aggressive political bargaining, and escalating offensive power.

²²⁰ Ibid., pp.1-10

Finally, the diagnostic explanation of *signs* derived from the *maghazi* demonstrate an entirely rational and strategic explanation of events without any need for religious interpretation to substantiate the reasons or causes of events indirectly answering research question three. Employing the strategic paradigm alongside the propositions of strategic theory, diagnostic evaluation has deduced a set of verifiable hypotheses to explain strategic interaction and the utility of force driven by the political goals of actors, the strategic interests that were bargained for, and the pressures of the strategic environment on decision-making and the utility of force.

3.7. Conclusion

The objectives of this chapter were to locate and explicate answers to the following sub-investigative questions a. and b. However, exploring these sub-investigative questions this chapter has also proposed preliminary findings for research questions 1, 2, & 3. This chapter began by establishing a working linguistic definition of Jihad; and mapped the origins and evolution of the term in relation to politico-strategic developments during the *maghazi* establishing a baseline zero by which to interpret the original role and function of Jihad. An examination of both the theory (linguistic) and application (*maghazi*) of Jihad revealed three distinct forms that correlated to three stages of *strategic dynamics*; a conventional linguistic meaning and usage existing in pre-Islamic Arabia of *nisus*; an abstract concept of *absolute Jihad* that developed in relation to an Islamic meta-narrative and the theological imperative of Truth versus Falsehood; and finally, *Jihad fi sabil l'Allah* as an act of policy, thereby answering research question two as a consequence.

As the diagnostic testing has revealed, research question 3 is directly revealed by our examination of sub-investigative question b.; whilst Jihad was a teleological function of Islam, *Jihad fi sabil l'Allah* and its development as an act of policy was the consequence of politico-strategic behaviour rooted in developments of the strategic setting and environment rather than a product of a religious worldview. In each stage, the idea of warfighting is directly or indirectly only part of the meaning to either a greater or lesser degree. The independent variable that governs the extent to which warfighting is impressed upon its application is the degree to which the *nisus* is in service to political objectives or as part of a rational calculus.

Strategically interpreted, it may be stated that Jihad was a teleological function of Islam though warfighting was not, since *qital* was only one aspect of *Jihad fi sabil l'Allah*. As explained, *Jihad fi sabil l'Allah* was broad enough to encompass a variety of non-violent or bellicose functions as long as it contained a key element – *nisus* in relation to God.²²¹ *Jihad fi sabil l'Allah* is a 'total' term that signifies a broad 'war effort' of which warfighting is the foundational expression.²²² Where warfighting is intended, *Jihad fi sabil l'Allah* was considered, and practiced as limited warfare. The practice of limited warfare was, as the baseline zero has demonstrated, *a continuation of politik by other means* (research question 1).

That the Prophet as commander of Jihad *par excellence* considered and employed *Jihad fi sabil l'Allah* in a manner which is strategically interpretable, has been corroborated by the propositions of the strategic paradigm and the results of our diagnostic examination of the strategic condition during the *maghazi*. Accordingly, the investigation has arrived a *strategic* definition of Jihad, which includes its linguistic meanings but also incorporates the known features of its earliest application.

²²¹ Meaning in relation to something God has ordered or is pleased by its performance.

²²² Q 4:95

CHAPTER FOUR

4.0. The Evolution of the Islamic Strategic Setting

This chapter charts the evolution of the Islamic strategic setting and the background that created a political crisis and a new strategic setting and environment that differed from that which the Prophet left behind. This chapter examines the formation and development of policies that shifted the application of warfighting to the ends of new political objectives. Specifically, we will examine how the baseline zero of Jihad evolved according to the needs and interplay between shifting strategic settings and environments during the first administration of the *Rashidun* Caliphate, and offer explanatory avenues for research question 1 - 3:

1. The prime agenda is to ascertain *whether Jihad is a continuation of politik by other means*; that is to ask the question therefore, what is the link between *politik* (policy and politics) and the application of force in the name of Jihad?
2. Logically proceeding from the aforementioned, can a consistent link be demonstrated to have existed so as to establish that the evolving *strategic dynamics* affected Jihad as a mechanism for policy?
3. To what extent is Jihad and its development a consequence of religio-political circumstance? In other words, was strategic behaviour rooted in a set of strategic preferences and assumptions as the product of a religious worldview or, was Jihad largely determined as a result and consequence of the pressures and nature of the anarchic environment?

This chapter begins however by approaching the Caliphate of Abu Bakr from the avenue of sub-investigative question c, since the backdrop of the domestic political turmoil that generated the crisis environment within which Jihad was instrumentalised begins with investigating this question, and continues to influence Abu Bakr's tenure:

- c. What is the relationship between Jihad and politics? Were there distinctive policies that directed the application of Jihad, and if so, under what circumstances did these policies come to bear and how did they evolve?

Each Caliphate represents a distinct set of strategic interactions that they would later be characterised by. The Caliphate of Abu Bakr is characterised by the *Ridda* Wars or ‘The War against the Apostates’, and contains the earliest forms of force projection outside of Arabia proper; as well as the most violent application of the military instrument to serve political objectives of all the *Rashidun* era. Hence, in this chapter, the relationship between Jihad and politics during the Caliphate of Abu Bakr is to be examined, identifying distinctive policies that directed the application of Jihad; under what circumstances these policies came to bear and how they evolved.

4.1. The *Rashidun* Caliphates (632-661)

The *Rashidun* Caliphate - ‘*Al-Khulafa’ al-Rashidun*’ – lit. ‘The Rightly-Guided Caliphs’ refers to the political rule of the first four Caliphs who took office following the death of the Prophet in 632. The ‘*Rashidun*’ era developed as a ninth-century Islamic revisionist construct loaded with moral accusations and assumptions that was used to selectively account for the period of political succession in Islam and the violent turbulence that ensued amongst the Companions of the Prophet (*al-sahaba*).¹ This thirty-year period would come to be championed as the ‘golden age’ of pious-political authority within Islam *par excellence*, after which political office becomes associated with moral decadence and irreligious pursuits of power.² The *Rashidun* period was in many ways, the rise to prominence of an elite group of men crafted by the Prophet to lead the *umma* after him.³ The *Rashidun* begins with Abu Bakr ‘al-Siddiq’ (d. 634), followed by ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab (d. 643), then ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan (d. 656) and finally ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib, (d. 661).

4.2. The Caliphate of Abu Bakr (632-634)

The most salient influence upon the course of Islamic history following the lifetime of the Prophet belongs to the brief reign of Abu Bakr. The intimate connection between the *maghazi* of the Prophet, and the subsequent *Ridda* Wars fought by Abu Bakr as two parts of the same continuum are vital to explicating the *strategic dynamics* of Jihad as a continuation of *politik* by other means.⁴

¹ Madelung (1997), pp.1-2; Crone (2003), pp.1-3; Donner (1981), p.82

² Robinson (2005), p.33

³ Kennedy (2007), p.51

⁴ Donner (1981), p.87

Indeed, subsequent Caliphates inherited the strategic background and setting that gave rise to the organised development of the Islamic territories (*dar al-Islam*) that was created as much as a consequence of Abu Bakr's policies as those of the Prophet himself.⁵

4.2.1. Political Succession

Abu Bakr (573-634), whose birth name was 'Abd Allah "Atiq" ibn Abu Quhafa, was from the Banu Taym clan of the Quraysh.⁶ Abu Bakr was the closest friend of the Prophet before Islam and during his mission; father-in-law to the Prophet and one of the earliest converts to Islam.⁷ Abu Bakr was known for his political sagacity (*dhahiya*)⁸ within the tribe of Quraysh, and was a specialist in tribal politics and genealogy with a detailed knowledge of tribal power structures, historical alliances and rivalries.⁹ He had served the tribe as chief of compensation and creditor – managing the affairs of the tribe in relation to debt crediting and blood money, and was in his own right a wealthy businessman.¹⁰

The Prophet's death in 632 tore at the very fabric of the nascent Muslim community ushering a crisis of leadership that threatened a catastrophic end to the Muslim community. The power vacuum set in motion a series of political contests that would contend political leadership of the Muslim community until today.¹¹ The Prophet not having left behind a written will or instructions for succession left the Muslim community with no direct guidance on how to continue the mission of Islam. Accordingly, Wellhausen notes, 'The political community of Islam grew out of the religious community'¹² by which he is referring to the events of the succession that forced the nascent Muslim community to face the universal realities of power that Ibn Khaldun mentioned, but had been veiled from during the tenure of the Prophet.

⁵ Kennedy (2007), p.56

⁶ Sallaabee (2007), pp.27-9, 42

⁷ Buti (2001), p.695; Sallaabee (2007), pp.51-4

⁸ Madelung (2001), pp.4-5; Donner (1981), p.84

⁹ *I.I.*, p.115; Sallaabee (2007), pp.42-3

¹⁰ Sallaabee (2007), pp.42-3

¹¹ Madelung (2001), p.1

¹² Wellhausen (1927), p.1

The appointment of Abu Bakr was contentious at the time, primarily amongst those who preferred a representative from the House of Hashim, in particular ‘Ali ibn Abu Talib.¹³ However, it was Abu Bakr who had been instrumental in shaping the Prophet’s policy towards the tribes of Arabia;¹⁴ a significant element in the institution of the Prophet as chief magistrate of Medina;¹⁵ and had been the premiere advisor of the Prophet throughout the *maghazi* period.¹⁶ Therefore, succeeding the Prophet as the *Khalifat ul’Rasul Allah* – the Deputy of the Prophet, was not a major surprise in politico-strategic terms, especially as he was acutely aware of the politico-strategic environment he inherited.¹⁷

4.2.2. Crisis Management

In his inauguration speech, Abu Bakr had pressed the strategic value of maintaining a strong military capability and reminded those in attendance that *Jihad fi sabil l’Allah* did not end with the death of the Prophet rather ‘A people do not abandon *Jihad fi sabil l’Allah* except that Allah abandons them, leaving them to be humiliated.’¹⁸ His speech was telling of what was to come as three sets of politico-strategic problems surfaced within days of Abu Bakr’s inauguration.¹⁹ Growing reports of rebellion began to circulate throughout Arabia that threatened open revolts against Islam and Abu Bakr’s political authority.²⁰ With the exceptions of the Muslims in and around Mecca and Medina, and the tribes of Quraysh and Banu Thaqif, most other tribes that had previously been subdued by the Prophet were now potential threats to the new Medinan authority.²¹ The strategic threats can be summarised as three problem sets:

¹³ Madelung (2001), pp.1-2

¹⁴ Donner (1981), pp.84, 300 - fn.128

¹⁵ Wellhausen (1927), p.1; Sallaabee (2007), p.81; Hamid (2004), p.135

¹⁶ Watt (1961), pp.35-6; Madelung (2001), p.39

¹⁷ *I.I.*, p.689; *I.K.*, records that the Prophet would refer to his advisors Abu Bakr and ‘Umar as his ‘eyes and ears’. - p.219

¹⁸ Sallaabee (2007), p.264

¹⁹ For a detailed but pro-‘Ali account of the events surrounding the political issues of succession see Madelung (2001), pp.28-45; on the threats of the new Caliph see Sallaabee (2007), pp.264-5, 317; Akram (2004), p.127

²⁰ Akram (2004), p.119

²¹ *Ibid.*, p.120; *I.K.*, p.32

4.2.3. Strategic Threat # 1: Political Insurrection

The oaths of allegiance sworn to the Prophet following the fall of Mecca in 630 became the subject of controversial interpretation between the subordinated tribes and Abu Bakr. The vast majority of these tribes had submitted to the Prophet because they were unable to resist the imposition of his will as he decisively routed the tribal network of Arabia. With his passing, almost all of the tribes considered themselves absolved from their oaths of allegiance with the Prophet, and secondarily to the rulings of Islam. The Medinan political authority now directed by Abu Bakr however, considered the oaths of allegiance sworn to the Prophet (*bay'a*)²² as binding and permanent oaths of loyalty and obedience.²³ The resulting political condition of each side was not mutually exclusive or sustainable since it threatened the internal cohesion of the new Muslim polity that had been built by the Prophet. However, Abu Bakr was not the Prophet, his claims to authority were not credible as far as the Arab tribes were concerned, and they challenged the legitimacy of his claim.

Secondly, Abu Bakr faced the internal problem of diminishing political confidence and authority, which arose almost immediately as challenges to his strategic decision-making began. Specifically, the issue of dispatching a 3,000-man contingent under the command of Usama bin Zayd towards Syria, to engage the Byzantines²⁴ was challenged in the face of looming political insurrection. By allowing the dispatch, it was argued, they were in effect weakening their own defensive capabilities should any attack on Medina occur.²⁵ Furthermore, Usama bin Zayd, only eighteen years of age at the time with considerably less military experience than many of the generals in the Muslim army lacked the confidence of the political elite in Medina to achieve military victory.²⁶ Abu Bakr was resolute in dispatching the unit, flatly rejecting any change in leadership of the force.²⁷ His answer was simply that the unit and mission had been constructed by the Prophet himself, and the last military command issued by the Prophet before his death was to ensure the dispatch of the armed force.²⁸

²² Sallaabee (2007), pp.247-51

²³ Rodgers (2008), pp.232-3

²⁴ *I.I.*, pp.652, 678 & fn.917; *I.K.*, pp.24-6

²⁵ *I.K.*, pp.32-3; Gabriel (2007), p.202; Sallaabee (2007), p.323; Akram (2004), p.117

²⁶ Buti (2001), pp.667-8; Sallaabee (2007), pp.316, 325-6

²⁷ Lings (2001), p.339

²⁸ *WQ*, pp.546-8; Sallaabee (2007), pp.314-7, 323

4.2.4. Strategic Threat # 2: False Prophets

The second set of problems was the rise of ‘new’ and ‘false prophets’. Each claim to prophecy was in fact a claim to political legitimacy and independent sovereignty from the Medinan capital.²⁹ Each of the false prophets had amassed large followings with armies of fighters ready to contend or overthrow the Medinan authority.³⁰ The copy-cat claims to prophecy and the Prophet’s political legacy were most prominently driven by three individuals: Tulayha bin Khuwaylid of the tribe of Asad in the Najd (west-central Arabia); Sajjah bint al-Harith ‘the False prophetess’ who was supported by the tribes of Tamim and Taghlib in northeastern Arabia;³¹ and Musaymala bin Habib aka ‘The Liar’³² (*al-Kathab*) in north al-Yamama. Lastly, the ‘false prophet’ al-Aswad al-Ansi from the south (al-Yaman)³³ had already been killed via sanctioned assassination by the Prophet, but the news of his end only reached Medina after Abu Bakr’s inauguration.³⁴

4.2.5. Strategic Threat # 3: *Zakat* Collection

The most politically contentious problem concerned the institution of *zakat* or the mandatory poor-alms levied upon all Muslims.³⁵ Near the end of 631, the Prophet had organised and dispatched official delegations responsible for the collection of the *zakat* to every tribe subject to Islam.³⁶ Most tribes received the Prophet’s representatives and paid their dues to the Muslim treasury. The final collection of the *zakat* was not completed by the time of the Prophet’s passing, thus Abu Bakr believed he had inherited the responsibility to see the matter through.³⁷ Those tribes who contested Abu Bakr on the issue of *zakat* generally premised their insurrection against Abu Bakr’s claims of credible authority justifying the levy of *zakat* rather than his claims to political legitimacy.³⁸

²⁹ Akram (2004), p.132

³⁰ *BLD*, p.145; Sallaabee (2007), p.354

³¹ *I.I.*, p.636-7; *BLD*, p.151

³² *I.I.*, p.649

³³ *Ibid.*, p.664

³⁴ *BLD*, pp.159-162; *I.K.*, pp.26-30

³⁵ Murata & Chittick (2006), p.16

³⁶ *I.I.*, pp.648-9; *WQ*, pp.476-80; Madelung (2001), pp.46-7

³⁷ *I.K.*, p.31

³⁸ *BLD*, pp.143-4; *I.K.*, p.30; Sallaabee (2007), p.353

Some tribes who had not paid saw an opportunity to re-negotiate the rates of *zakat*.³⁹ Re-negotiation was deemed reasonable given the fragile strategic setting. Additionally, the reputation of Abu Bakr was well known across the tribes for being a meek, but politically astute man. It would have plausibly been assumed that the former political advisor to the Prophet, and a man of Quraysh, known to incline towards settlement and tribal diplomacy;⁴⁰ would recognise the politically fragile state of the Muslims following the loss of the Prophet.

Furthermore, the departure of Usama's unit clearly left Medina militarily vulnerable.⁴¹ Under such conditions, it would seem reasonable to negotiate or settle with the disenchanted Arab tribes who viewed the *zakat* as an unreasonable tax. This sentiment was also shared to a large degree amongst members of Abu Bakr's own administration who considered *zakat*-avoidance as a lesser crime than false prophecy.⁴² Abu Bakr was challenged by his closest advisors on the utility of force against such tribes and the ethico-religious implications thereof.⁴³

4.2.6. Rational Calculation

In each of the three strategic threats Abu Bakr declared the actions of those involved as *ridda* – or apostasy. The logic behind the pronouncement was that the Prophet, as God's Emissary, had been the medium of effecting the subordination of the human will to God's Will – which could only have been a permanent condition. Consequently, a breach of the oath was a breach against God Himself, an act of absolute rebellion (*kufir*) and thus an act of apostasy. That the Prophet was no longer the living medium made no difference. As for those that claimed a share in prophecy, they were violating the conclusive status of the Prophet, which was therefore heresy and act of apostasy.⁴⁴ In short, any form of tribal recalcitrance or claims resulting in political contests were breaches against God's Will since he, Abu Bakr, was only acting as deputy of the Prophet and not as the Prophet to whom they had made their oaths.⁴⁵

³⁹ *I.K.*, pp.30-1; Gabriel (2007), p.205

⁴⁰ Rodgers (2008), p.235

⁴¹ *I.K.*, pp.30-2; Akram (2004), pp.117, 119, 122

⁴² *I.K.*, p.31

⁴³ Sallaabee (2007), p.358

⁴⁴ *I.I.*, p.689 & fn.920; Gabriel (2007), p.205; Sallaabee (2007), p.353

⁴⁵ Gabriel (2007), p.202; *I.K.*, pp.28-31

James Morrow describes crises as public actions, whereby external actors can profit by the unfolding of events, and especially in the context of security, crises provide a stage for leaders to signal their resolve to an audience external or internal of their territories, and can make or break leaders' reputations.⁴⁶ Crises are opportunities for violent escalation or bargaining and de-escalation through negotiations. Based upon the strategic setting, and after examining the strategic environment, Abu Bakr prepared a strategy that would change the region forever. Two key ideas can be used to explain the primary objectives of the two-stage strategy Abu Bakr initiated. Phase one was designed to protect the political infrastructure of the new Islamic polity created by the Prophet, which was the *referent object* of security for Abu Bakr; and phase two, was to address the broader security threat that the Medinan capital faced from the Arabian tribes in the northern grasslands.

4.2.7. Pure Military Strategy

Abu Bakr's strategy in phase one of his security policy was designed to be strategic offensive action, 'the taking and holding of territory'⁴⁷, that is, the territory of Arabia and all tribal territories that refused to submit to the central authority in Medina. Saliently, the calculus of the offense-defence dynamic concerns the strategic estimation of successful military victory,⁴⁸ meaning decisive victory, which is not the same as political victory.

Because the political objective was to be found in military victory,⁴⁹ Abu Bakr developed a military strategy to serve the objectives of his security policy. According to Platias & Koliopoulou *pure* military strategy is characterised by the emphasis it places on 'a) first strike capabilities; b) offensive capacity for territorial conquest (specific or complete); and c) the intent to achieve decisive victory over the armed forces of the enemy.'⁵⁰ Offense dominance is therefore achieved by converting raw military power into suppressed forms of violence, since offense dominance is itself a strategic condition not a military one.

⁴⁶ Morrow (1999), p.109

⁴⁷ Van Evera (2004), p.227, fn.1

⁴⁸ Platias & Koliopoulos (2010), p.8

⁴⁹ See *OW*, p.81

⁵⁰ Platias & Koliopoulos (2010), pp.7-8

4.3. Phase One: The *Ridda* Wars (632-633)

The primary strategic interest, the *referent object*, for Abu Bakr was the security of the new Islamic tribal union, which meant that he had to prevent secession or internal fragmentation through challenges to his authority or the claims of new prophets.⁵¹ The policy of the eradication of paganism on the Arabian Peninsula had been instituted by the Prophet prior to his death, and effectively designated that the Arab population of the Peninsula had no right of self-determination whatsoever.⁵² Abu Bakr now understood his role to 'tie-up loose ends' that the Prophet had lacked the time to complete. Prophetic precedent had also legitimated the use of force for the continuation of policy that had been adopted following the political consolidation of Mecca that stressed the unlimited use of force against any remnant of paganism or pagan practice in Arabia.⁵³ Hence, the ensuing *Ridda* Wars fought by Abu Bakr cannot otherwise be understood as anything other than the continuation of policy set by the Prophet. The incident of dispatching the army of Usama was representative of Abu Bakr's resolve to maintain the trajectory and set policies and plans of the Prophet.⁵⁴

4.3.1. Military Genius

Abu Bakr appointed 'Umar ibn al Khattab as his political advisor on Muslim affairs,⁵⁵ and Khalid ibn al-Walid Field Marshal of the Muslim armies and his military advisor.⁵⁶ Khalid ibn al-Walid was the son the former head of the House of Makhzum, who were trained in relatively more advanced military skills and practices compared to the other clans of Quraysh.⁵⁷ Khalid ibn al-Walid being the most accomplished in the art of war and stratagem had been charged with overseeing such duties on behalf of the Quraysh before Islam.⁵⁸

⁵¹ Rahman (2003), p.56

⁵² *I.I.*, p.689; Wellhausen (1927), p.24

⁵³ This policy excluded the Jews and Christians, although they were barred from Mecca; See Gabriel (2007), pp.200-1

⁵⁴ Madelung (2001), pp.46-7; Sallaabee (2007), pp.324-5; see El Fadl (2001) for a masterful study on the related legal issues

⁵⁵ Buti (2001), p.696; Akram (2004), p.118

⁵⁶ *BLD*, p.158

⁵⁷ *I.I.*, p.167

⁵⁸ Sallaabee (2007), p.41

After becoming Muslim shortly before the conquest of Mecca,⁵⁹ Khalid had served in the Muslim army with great fortune, leading the Prophet to declare himself that Khalid was ‘The Sword of God’.⁶⁰ The partnership between Abu Bakr and Khalid formed the foundation of the first form of Jihad without the Prophet. It was a drastic change; in perhaps its most aggressive expression ever, Jihad was executed with an escalated sense of urgency and drive against the entire Peninsula,⁶¹ with the unlimited objective of total victory. Clausewitz’s statement that war was the application of violence to impose one’s will was characteristically expressed as a zero-sum calculus. The strategic objective set by Abu Bakr was the destruction of all forms of resistance to the Medinan polis, without compromise.

4.3.2. Isolate and Destroy

In eerily similar fashion, the following explanation given by Clausewitz encapsulated the Jihad designed by Abu Bakr and spearheaded by Khalid ibn al-Walid: ‘If you want to overcome your enemy, you must match your effort against his power of resistance, which can be expressed as the product of two inseparable factors, viz. the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will.’⁶² The *bargaining* strategy of Abu Bakr tested the will of Jihad *fi sabil l’Allah* against the will of the Arabs who resisted him.

The strategy demanded the rapid transfer of warfighting away from Medina to the territories of the rebel tribes. Abu Bakr struck in four different directions simultaneously over a period of eighteen months.⁶³ With Khalid in command of all military operations overcoming friction with remarkable speed,⁶⁴ the Muslim armed forces were mobilised and configured into eleven military divisions, each charged with its own vector of attack and strategic objectives.⁶⁵ The ensuing *Ridda* Wars resulted in a strategic success, paving the way for decisive victory, and devastating the apostate tribes who had little hope of any form of military response or retaliation against Khalid’s strategic initiative against them.

⁵⁹ Akram (2004), pp.67-73

⁶⁰ *I.K.*, p.36; Akram (2004), p.78

⁶¹ Akram (2004), p.126

⁶² *OW*, p. 77

⁶³ Gabriel (2007), p.208

⁶⁴ Buti (2007), p.616

⁶⁵ *I.K.*, pp.34-45; Akram (2004), pp.128-9

4.3.3. The Pacification of Arabia

In the midst of the political crisis following the Prophet's death, Abu Bakr signaled to the whole of Arabia not only the continuations of the Prophet's vision, but the clear resolve to crush all opposition and punish rebellion. The offensive posture adopted by Abu Bakr towards the apostate tribes was punitive as well as demonstrative.⁶⁶ The need to pacify the threats posed by the tribes was met with a clear demonstration of intent to wage war without compromise or, the 'burning of bridges'⁶⁷ such that no negotiations were recognised. The pacification of Arabia was a demonstration of resolve that the new administration in Medina sent to all the Arab tribes but also any regional actors watching. Gabriel summarises the events pithily writing:

During the two year period of the wars of the Riddah we see Muhammad's reformed armies operating on a larger scale over greater distances than ever before with several campaigns taking place at once, all of them operating under the unified command [of Khalid ibn al-Walid] to implement a single strategic goal formulated by Abu Bakr. The same operational characteristics that became typical of the armies of the later Arab conquests were first revealed during the Riddah, and it was Abu Bakr who was the political and military genius behind it.⁶⁸

Whilst the objective was not to destroy the tribes themselves, it was to destroy their means of resistance and military power. Hence, as an act of highly aggressive *bargaining*, Abu Bakr, upon victory seized political hostages from each of the defeated tribes as a means of deterrence against the possible threat of returning challenges from the tribes.⁶⁹ This act alone demonstrates that the unlimited military action authorised by Abu Bakr was not intended as an act of extermination, even though the nature of the strategic threat risked an all out war of annihilation.⁷⁰ Additionally, it proves that Abu Bakr was well aware that the result of military victory was not final.⁷¹

⁶⁶ Schelling (2008), pp.2-6

⁶⁷ Ibid., pp.44-5

⁶⁸ Gabriel (2007), p.206

⁶⁹ Schelling (1980), pp.134-6

⁷⁰ Ibid., pp.190-9; (2008), pp.92-9, 105-7; & **Propositions 6 & 7**– See **2.8.1.**

⁷¹ **Proposition 10**

Abu Bakr had gained a fearsome reputation,⁷² coupled with the reputation of Khalid bin Walid who had reduced many tribes to the verge of extinction;⁷³ their partnership sent shock waves throughout Arabia. The crushing and decisive victory Abu Bakr and Khalid won over the Arabs effectively ended the crisis that originated with the death of the Prophet and the leadership vacuum.⁷⁴ The political consequences of the *Ridda* Wars was to create a new stratification of tribal society in Arabia, with the primacy of the 'Islamic ruling elite' of Medina consisting of the close and early allied companions and tribes to the Prophet (with many of the newly converted Quraysh) dominating the structure.⁷⁵

4.4. Analysis of Phase One – Expressing the Strategic Paradigm

Thus far we have explained the relationship between Jihad and politics in the backdrop of the crisis environment inherited by Abu Bakr's succession and the security policy that developed and under what circumstances. These were the problems set by sub-investigative question c. Before commencing a diagnostic evaluation of the *Ridda* Wars, in order to contextualise our interpretation of events phase one of Abu Bakr's administration, in the framework of the strategic paradigm, can elucidate more fully the strategic logic of interpretation for the problems set by sub-investigative question c.

The conduct of the *Ridda* Wars conforms quite directly to the fundamental propositions of the strategic paradigm. Abu Bakr's extremely aggressive security policy was in fact a well calibrated, albeit risky, strategic use of force. Clausewitz wrote that 'No one starts a war - or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so - without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.'⁷⁶ Where the *maghazi* illustrated a great example of calibrated use of force for the purposes of limited war; the *Ridda* Wars were exemplary in illustrating the use of unlimited military force for the purposes of existential political objectives. In both cases, the strategic objective of an end peace-state was sought and won.

⁷² Akram (2004), p.119

⁷³ Ibid., p.141-2; Kennedy (2007), p.56

⁷⁴ Rahman (2003), p.57

⁷⁵ Donner (1981), pp.88-9

⁷⁶ *OW*, p.579

Smith makes the salient remark that ‘Peace is a highly contestable political end-state. The attainment of peace through war is not a contradiction. Any objective can be pursued by violent or non-violent methods.’⁷⁷ That Abu Bakr attained his objective through escalated warfighting might be perceived as a strategic deficiency, but in reality it was quite the opposite as it was clear that policy constantly permeated all military operations during the *Ridda* Wars.⁷⁸ Clausewitz warned that ‘The result in war is never final.’⁷⁹ The vast majority of the Arab tribes had converted or sworn allegiance to the Prophet as he overran resistance in Arabia post-Mecca with unrelenting momentum. His greatest political victory, over the Quraysh, would be lasting; however, the vast majority of his victories over the Arabs were military and thus short-lived. Therefore, as Clausewitz might have predicted the affair of tribal subjugation and allegiances arose again once he had passed on.⁸⁰ Abu Bakr considered the utility of force, its efficacy and the manner in which it was waged as the appropriate response to the security threats that surfaced during his administration.⁸¹ The identification of the enemy as a continuation of the same threat that the Prophet faced permitted warfighting as an acceptable variable of rational calculation.⁸²

However, unlike the Prophet, Abu Bakr initiated an unlimited and escalated response to the crisis, in order to seize and maintain the strategic initiative.⁸³ It may be argued that Abu Bakr, being an astute politician, used violence as a language to bargain with the Arab tribes, since it was a language they understood well;⁸⁴ in either case, offensive Jihad was the strategic preference for the ends of policy.⁸⁵ The strategic logic behind Abu Bakr’s calculus for permitting all avenues aimed at the destruction of the various tribal threats was on account of the strategic environment and the will of the Arabs to revolt.⁸⁶ The immediate goal was the unconditional military surrender of the tribes, and their political challenge to central authority.

⁷⁷ Smith (1997), p.ix; Schelling (2008), p.9

⁷⁸ See *OW*, p.87; Smith (1997), p.102

⁷⁹ See *OW*, p.80

⁸⁰ **Proposition 10**

⁸¹ **Proposition 2**

⁸² Tabari (1993), p.43; Kennedy (2007), p.48

⁸³ **Proposition 8**

⁸⁴ **Proposition 4**

⁸⁵ **Proposition 5**

⁸⁶ **Proposition 9**

The strategy was designed in the knowledge that time was not in their favour.⁸⁷ Abu Bakr's war council understood and considered the stakes to be necessarily of an existential nature,⁸⁸ formulating strategic action according to worst-case scenario planning.⁸⁹ Unconditional surrender had to be obtained as soon as possible, which meant the pressure to escalate was extremely high from the onset;⁹⁰ that in turn limited the restrictions placed on a nonzero-sum concept of victory, the hallmark of the Prophet's approach.

The strategic escalation of violence directed toward the revolting tribes was a reaction to the aggressive disposition they directed toward the Medinan capital.⁹¹ The objective of political survival drove the policy of escalated warfighting and the elimination of all external and existential threats to the fragile Medinan polis and beyond.⁹² In phase one, the destruction of all existential threats posed by the apostate tribes, was met with an unlimited military response with little to no limitations on the use of force as a means for victory. The *Ridda* Wars are hallmarked by the unlimited and offensive use of Jihad as an instrument for decisive victory.

4.5. Diagnostic Evaluation of Phase One

Offense-defence theory cannot explain the reasons why certain propositions or preferences exist, why particular variables may affect an actor over others, value-systems, cultural norms, or beliefs.⁹³ Therefore, we have provided an overview of the most salient features and information available concerning the events of Abu Bakr's succession and the *Ridda* Wars. However, the question may be posed: were there not alternative courses of action aside from offensive strategic action? Or, it might also be suggested: Was the military strategy designed in accordance with religious or Qur'anic injunctions, that is, was it 'holy war'? The following diagnostics tests both of these questions. Abu Bakr inherited a strategic setting in a state of crisis with multiple threats looming and the survival of the Prophet's mission in a most critical state.

⁸⁷ **Proposition 3**

⁸⁸ See Johnston (1995), p. 61; Stone (2011), pp. 6-7

⁸⁹ **Proposition 6**

⁹⁰ **Proposition 7**

⁹¹ *I.K.*, pp.32-3; Sallaabee (2007), p.363

⁹² **Proposition 5**; Sallaabee (2007), p.365

⁹³ See Van Evera (2004), p.264

The risks of warfighting were inescapable, and the use of Jihad was an acceptable teleological consequence of protecting Islam. Jihad was as an instrument of political will employed according to the needs of the inherited crisis environment. The table below suggests six *symptoms* of a strategic condition under which Abu Bakr was operating within.

Offense-Defence Variables of Intervening Factors that lead to War⁹⁴

Period	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
Phase One 632-633	✕	●	✕	✕	✕	✕	✕	✕	●	✕

The build up to the *Ridda Wars* was a clear example of the misperception and thus miscalculation of the strategic initiative by one side relative to the other.⁹⁵ Abu Bakr, known for his meek character, was misperceived to have preferred a political course of action premised upon negotiation, bargaining, and the constrained use of force according to the Arab chieftains who opposed him. However, Abu Bakr had a clear preference and estimation of the efficacy of force over diplomatic avenues because he was attempting to offset the strategic consequences of the crisis environment through superior tactical operations, thereby adopting a distinctly military course of action and resolutely refusing any form of negotiation.⁹⁶

Secondly, history reveals the curious case of the problem of ‘Usama’s mobilisation. For all the disagreement within Abu Bakr’s administration, and the perception of weakness that it invited from Abu Bakr’s external enemies who were circling Medina;⁹⁷ it seems to have been the very dispatch of the army that created the misperception with whom the strategic initiative laid. Either the rebel-apostates assumed that Medina was sufficiently reinforced that it was capable of dispatching another force, causing them to rethink their strategy, assuming they did not have the strategic initiative; or believing they had the upper hand they collectively delayed their preparations to strike, whilst Abu Bakr covertly plotted to seized the strategic

⁹⁴ Key: ✕ = Primary Offense-Defense Variable of analysis
✕ = Secondary Offense-Defense Variable of analysis
● = non-applicable Offense-Defense Variable of analysis

⁹⁵ Morrow (1999), p.110

⁹⁶ A symptomatic derivation of **Hypothesis G**

⁹⁷ A symptomatic derivation of **Hypothesis A**

initiative and set in motion his security policy.⁹⁸ In either case, the delay in striking at Medina afforded Khalid ibn al-Walid, under orders from Abu Bakr, to create a superior operational time-frame within which to exploit the vulnerability of the rebel-apostates and crush the ‘false prophets’. There are no indications of any form of religious dictate that can explain the adoption of offensive strategic action during the build up of the events leading to the *Ridda* Wars.

These *symptoms* of the strategic condition undoubtedly resulted in the course of military strategy designed and employed by Abu Bakr to serve his security policy, and are verifiable by hypothetical problem sets D and E as the clearest *signs* for the explanatory diagnosis of the offensive strategic interaction initiated by Abu Bakr. These two signs are therefore evaluated in consideration of the plausible tenability of alternative non-offensive military action.

1.5.1. ODT - D/Dx # 4. Moving First is More Rewarding - (Hypothesis D)

+ ODT - D/Dx # 5. Windows are Larger - (Hypothesis E)

Offense-Defense differentials D and E, posit that an actor will maximise rewards by seizing the initiative, and that the incentive of a successful surprise attack affords the most seductive payoff for preemptive action. Hence the predilection to war is heightened by the facility of the offensive under such circumstances. Specifically, Hypothesis E concerns the efficacy of violence or the expected utility of force. When windows of opportunity and vulnerability are larger, the propensity to engage preemptively is raised. The effect of exploiting a window of opportunity is the same as a surprise attack or a sudden declaration of war against an unsuspecting actor; it is to activate a crisis.⁹⁹ The more militarily inclined a strategy is, the closer it resembles the ideals of absolute war, such that an actor will find a tactical initiative or windows of opportunity irresistible.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ A *symptomatic* derivation of **Hypothesis H**

⁹⁹ The activation of a crisis is generally a strategic problem, while the operational actions undertaken within the crisis are usually tactical matters. - Young (1968), p.337; a *symptomatic* derivation of **Hypothesis F**

¹⁰⁰ Hence a *symptomatic* derivation of **Hypothesis A**

Abu Bakr's preference for the offensive strategic initiative and the design of a pure military strategy was clearly an attempt to offset the strategic consequences of the crisis environment with superior tactical results. Furthermore, since the attainment of his political objectives rested in military victory, the strategic design of offensive military action was entirely logical and a clear *sign* of decision-making within a strategic condition.

The strategic logic of pre-emption is the foundation of war's theoretical route to the absolute. Between two opponents, the one able to reach war's absolute nature the quickest will have the advantage.¹⁰¹ This means, if *x* is able to strike *y* first with an instantaneous blow crushing *y* or at least his capability to take any further action following the blow, then *x* will have achieved as close as possible the 'absolute' level of warfighting that was possible for him.¹⁰² This explains why Abu Bakr introduced an exceptionally high level of escalation into his strategy - the military strategy was designed to be explosive in both demonstration and application – using the maximum exertion of strength to disarm or render the Arabs unable to resist - attack first, hit hard and aim to crush the opponent's ability to resist. The opponent has no option but to surrender, if he survives the assault.¹⁰³

Between two opponents however, who are aware of each other's mutual enmity, as was the situation for Abu Bakr, such a strike is difficult to achieve. An opportunity resides in surprise, another in deception, though both seek the same objective – the strategic initiative. If *x* (the loyalists) can pre-empt *y* (the rebel-apostates) then *x* (the loyalists) will have a superior time-frame to exploit the vulnerability of *y* (the rebel-apostates). The subsequent violence, destruction, politico-strategic pressure, and overall friction created by such an attack will either be a strategic success paving the way for decisive victory, or at least render *y* completely on the defensive with little hope of any form of military response or retaliation.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹ See *OW*, p.75

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p.77

¹⁰³ A *symptomatic* derivation of **Hypothesis J**

¹⁰⁴ Another a *symptomatic* derivation of **Hypothesis J**

The design of Abu Bakr's strategy was to control the strategic initiative. Naturally strategic initiative is lost almost instantly once both opponents mobilise for it, unless one side is able to create a superior operating time advantage to the other. Once both opponents mobilise the result is essentially a state of war. In order for both sides to mobilise, there must be the belief that either timing is in their favour, or they believe they have a superior offensive advantage, or are offense dominant in comparison to the other. Hence, depending upon the beliefs and capabilities of each side and their estimations regarding the other, a state of peace or war is the result of neither side controlling the strategic initiative. This diagnostic evaluation confirms the predictions of strategic decision-making and action within the crisis environment along lines of rational expectation and a prudent estimation regarding the efficacy of violence as the only strategic course of action.

4.6. Conclusion of Phase One – The Art of Commitment

In strategic jargon, the overall strategy of Abu Bakr was a *compellent* strategy. Just as the Prophet during the *maghazi* employed a *diplomacy of violence*, the *Ridda* Wars demonstrated a bargaining tactic that Schelling terms, *the art of commitment*.¹⁰⁵ In order to assert credibility as the Prophet's successor, with the full, and legitimate, authority of the Muslim community, Abu Bakr imposed a *fait accompli* (Hypothesis F) upon the rebel-apostate tribes. Refusing to negotiate or concede (Hypothesis G), Abu Bakr began the *process of commitment* by exploiting the *windows of vulnerability and opportunity* by moving first to seize the strategic and tactical initiative (Hypotheses D & E).

Abu Bakr's commitment to offensive action was a means to not only exploit the operational time frame of tactical action but also to *circumvent* and *discredit* the commitments of his opponents to defy him by initiating compellent action after having threatened a violent response to continued defiance.¹⁰⁶ Abu Bakr, who had considerably less time in which to operate, could not replicate the Prophet's manipulation of limited war to bring to bear a *diplomacy of violence*. The urgency of the situation demanded that the latent power to hurt had to be brought to bear upon

¹⁰⁵ Schelling (2008), pp.35-91

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., pp.49, 59, 66-7, 72

the threats to his authority as a means of spectacle and thus credibility. Warfighting communicated the threat most effectively to the Arabs,¹⁰⁷ and the escalation of means to unlimited warfighting was a risky albeit strategically sharp calculation, that sought to test the will of his opponents, as Schelling explains:

One cannot initiate *certain* disaster as a profitable way of putting compellent pressure on someone, but one can initiate moderate *risk* of mutual disaster if the other party's compliance is feasible within a short enough period to keep the cumulative risk within tolerable bounds.¹⁰⁸

Far from being a reckless strategy of unlimited war, the calculus of Abu Bakr can be strategically interpreted as demonstrating an astute understanding of the strategic setting and environment that he had inherited and was operating within, balancing means and ends to achieve a decisive victory. Having explored and evaluated the strategic condition of the *Ridda* Wars, the analysis proceeds to the second strategic phase of Abu Bakr's administration, (a continuation of exploring sub-investigative question c.) and the evolution of his strategy from a 'Homeland security' policy to systemic projection of an extended security strategy.

4.7. Phase Two: Border Control (633-634)

Relative to Arabia, the rich and fertile lands of the northern Fertile Crescent symbolised great economic prosperity and an invaluable source of wealth for an Empire. For this reason, both the Byzantine and the Sassanid Empires had contested each other for the region. The emerging Muslim power base in Arabia however, initially conceived of the Fertile Crescent in quite different terms. Abu Bakr's strategic interest in the region, it is proposed, was in continuation of the security policy found in phase one. The second stage of Abu Bakr's policy projected a geo-strategic calculus that foresaw potential security threats were amassing at the Arabian borderlands. It was competition for political control of the nomadic tribes between the Muslims and the Byzantine-Sassanid Empires that motivated Abu Bakr's policy.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., pp.81, 86,

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p.91

In other words, the second stage of the security policy was to dominate the nomads in the region in order to ensure the security of the political authority in Medina and thereby broadening the regional security of Islam. It is further advanced that this course of action had been identified during the *maghazi* period as Donner writes, 'Muhammad's concern with ensuring control over nomadic groups as a basic strategy in building a secure base of power thus seems to have been continued by Abu Bakr at the beginning of the expansion into Syria.'¹⁰⁹ Certainly the dynamics involved since the *maghazi* through to the *Ridda* Wars suggested an identifiable consistency concerning policy on this issue as shall be explored.

4.5.1. The Regional Strategic Setting

The grasslands that separated the Fertile Crescent from the Arabs were patrolled by former auxiliaries of both the Persian and Byzantine powers. In 581, at the Syrian border, the Christian Monophysite Ghassanid chief was charged with treason and seized by Byzantine forces. The Ghassanids who were Arab nomads and auxiliaries of the Byzantines, had their privileges and subsidies revoked as they were disavowed by the Ceasar, thus ending their long-standing association. Elsewhere, in 605 near the Iraqi borderlands the Lakhmids fell out of favour with Chosroes.¹¹⁰ The region had been controlled by the kingships of the Arab tribes of the Lakhmid Dynasty and the House of Mundhir for generations, but had over time become little more than auxiliaries of the Persian Empire maintaining the buffer zone between Iraq and Syria against inroads from Arabia proper. They were less formidable than they had once been, both sets of auxiliaries weakened and diminished their political leverage from the great power allies who had now left them to fend for themselves having depleted their military capabilities against one another to the point of exhaustion from 602-628.¹¹¹

Beyond the grasslands, lay the great arch of trade routes running across from Sinai through northern Levant to Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf.¹¹² During the Byzantine-Persian wars these routes were disrupted - leaving the buffer zones

¹⁰⁹ Donner (2012), 121

¹¹⁰ Tabari (1999) devotes an entire chapter in his history to the background and events of the strategic setting and the regional actors

¹¹¹ Quigley (2013), p.718

¹¹² Ibid., p.718

deprived of trade and opportunities for raids. Left to themselves, a series of reciprocal raids between the Ghassanids and the Lakhmids took place that served to diminish their military strength vastly.¹¹³ With no politico-economic incentives to maintain their traditional protection of the region, the Lakhmids left large areas of the grasslands virtually unguarded and lawless.¹¹⁴ Following Byzantine-Sassanid peace in 628,¹¹⁵ the Byzantine Empire moved to restore their auxiliaries as part of their renewed strategic interest in the region to build a defensive coalition in the southeast region of Syria.¹¹⁶

4.5.2. The Extended Security Strategy

Phase two intended strategic offensive action as part of a regional security policy, and consequently advanced an offensive strategy aimed at overthrowing the existing status quo of the grassland nomads through the use of force.¹¹⁷ The extended security strategy had two logical objectives; firstly, to eliminate the threat of the northern tribes to the new Muslim polity as independent tribes, and secondly, to prevent them re-establishing politico-strategic alliances with the Byzantines (or the Sassanid Empire) which could be used to balance power against the Medina. A tertiary objective may have been to clear the auxiliaries in order to exploit access to the trade routes thus instigating *strategic denial* of financial revenues to the regional powers. In any case, it is clear that the nomadic tribes were perceived as latent security threats to the nascent Medinan polis, because they were geopolitical pivots¹¹⁸ that had historical ties to the great powers in the region.

Encouraged by the military success of the *Ridda* Wars, with strategic, operational, and tactical developments that facilitated increased logistical capabilities and vast tracts of desert between the Islamic polis of Medina and the outside world;¹¹⁹ Abu Bakr took counsel with his advisors on the timing of the strikes against the former clients of Byzantium and Persia.¹²⁰ The result of the consultation was the decision to strike in

¹¹³ Akram (2004), p.197; Donner (1981), p.172; Quigley (2013), p.718

¹¹⁴ Rahman (2003), pp.33-4

¹¹⁵ Ibid., p.49

¹¹⁶ Donner (1981), pp. 98-101

¹¹⁷ Platias & Koliopoulos (2010), pp.7-8

¹¹⁸ Brzezinski (1997), p.41

¹¹⁹ See Donner (2012), p.103;

¹²⁰ Buti (2001), p.697; Akram (2004), p.201; *I.K.*, p.75; Donner (1981), p.113

633 at the former Sassanid auxiliaries first, with the strategic objective of controlling the grassland nomads between Iraq and Arabia.¹²¹

4.5.3. Contain and Consolidate - Iraq

The strategic objectives of the extended security strategy towards Iraq were clearly a continuation of policy from the *Ridda* Wars, whereby the nomadic Arab tribes were systematically hunted and suppressed to prevent any future challenges or new alliances.¹²² Although significant territorial gains were made, this first phase of attack did not seek to conquer the territory of Iraq, as it was to politically control the grassland Arabs and reduce any threat of regional balancing by the Sassanid Empire, who indirectly maintained control of the buffer zone between Iraq and Arabia.

The intended targets reveal the strategic interest in Iraq, which would also be the case for Syria: the Arab and Arabic-speaking nomadic and semi-nomadic tribes that occupied those regions.¹²³ The Sassanid Empire had become war-weary from years of warfighting with the Byzantines, and it is unlikely they even knew of the Muslim strikes in the region until much later. Even so, with limited manpower available it is highly probable they were not inclined to protect their former auxiliary Arab tribes as the historical records say nothing of any assistance being forthcoming. Under the military command of Khalid, the Muslims armies swept through the region and took control of the buffer zone between Iraq and Arabia, seizing large sections of the Persian territories.¹²⁴ By early 634, Abu Bakr ordered Khalid to join the Muslim offensive launched towards Syria and to engage the Byzantines.¹²⁵

4.5.4. Contain and Consolidate - Syria

The regional security policy to contain the independent Arab nomadic tribes extended northwards towards Syria. A handful of Syrian-Arab nomadic tribes presided over the buffer space between Arabia and the Byzantines, most notably the Ghassanids who had previously operated under annual payment as proxies for Byzantine interests in the region before the Sasanian occupation.¹²⁶

¹²¹ *BLD*, pp.387-400

¹²² Donner (1981), p.174

¹²³ *Ibid.*, p.118

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.173-4; *I.K.*, pp.61-70

¹²⁵ *BLD*, p.167; Akram (2004), pp.272, 28, 286; Rahman (2003), pp.58-9

¹²⁶ Quigley (2013), p.718

It seems retrospectively plausible that the identification of the independent nomadic tribes of the north as a force multiplier for Byzantine interests in Arabia was originally identified by the Prophet, which is why he organised the expedition of ‘Usama prior to his death.¹²⁷ Nonetheless, the northern incursions of ‘Usama had provided a sufficient reconnaissance expedition for Abu Bakr to plan his assault. By 633 Abu Bakr had dispatched three military forces to engage the Byzantines, Khalid joined with these forces and assumed supreme command, naturally a series of victories ensued.¹²⁸

The most important of these came when the combined Muslim force decisively defeated the Byzantine forces at Ajnadain, southwest of Jerusalem.¹²⁹ Shortly after the victory at Ajnadain, in 634, Abu Bakr died aged 63,¹³⁰ after having served as *Khalifat al-Rasulillah* for two years, three months, and three days.¹³¹ Before his death, to avoid another crisis of succession, he consulted with his war council and decided to appoint his political advisor ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab as his successor.¹³²

4.5.5. The Legacy of Abu Bakr

The Caliphate of Abu Bakr was the Caliphate of Jihad. Though extremely short, his tenure enhanced the prestige and reputation of the Muslims as a serious contender for regional power, simultaneously bequeathing the Muslims with unprecedented strategic vantage points from which to exploit and penetrate both regional powers. By decisively crushing all forms of resistance and threats, actual and potential, Abu Bakr had created considerable strategic depth between the Medinan polis and the regional powers. The swift annexation of former Sassanid and Byzantine territories demonstrated the attacking potential of the Muslims to the regional powers, but also sent a clear message throughout Arabia.

¹²⁷ Donner (1981), pp. 108-9

¹²⁸ *BLD*, pp.165-8; *WQS*, pp.116-7

¹²⁹ *IK.*, pp.78-81; *BLD*, pp.169-75; Rahman (2003), p.59

¹³⁰ *BLD*, p.175

¹³¹ Buti (2007), p.611

¹³² *Ibid.*

4.5.6. Analysis of Phase Two – De-Escalation to Limited War

In phase two, the strikes against the nomadic tribes were also an extension of the homeland security policy. Sub-investigative question c is also concerned with how policy directing the application of Jihad, come to bear and how did they evolve? Phase two of Abu Bakr's administration clearly demonstrates an evolution of Jihad in service of 'homeland security' into a policy of extended security. Effectively, the extended security policy was a strategy of denial, that is, denial of any form of territorial encroachment into Arabia by the tribes themselves or as auxiliaries of regional powers who might have used them as proxies. Accordingly, it is likely that the objectives were twofold; firstly, to remove any possible external threats or alliances with regional powers with strategic vantage points into Arabia; and secondly, to increase the strategic depth which the Medinan capital enjoyed from the regional powers. The security policy of Abu Bakr had the overall strategic goal it is suggested, of securitising the borders and territory of the Muslims such that with no resistance or internal threats to central authority, a process of unification could begin.

Phase two was a return to limited war and the de-escalation of the military strategy of the *Ridda* Wars. The strategy of phase two did not have the same urgency of phase one, and therefore required greater controls on the use of force. To prevent the strategy returning to pure military strategy, Abu Bakr issued specific instructions regarding the conduct of war to each of the military units he dispatched to maintain political control and use calibrated violence.¹³³ Flying on high morale after the victories of the *Ridda* Wars, and having learnt to navigate with tactical and operational mobility never seen on the Arabian Peninsula;¹³⁴ the Muslim armed forces were able to easily overrun the defences of the war-weary and the surprised opponents they encountered.¹³⁵ The qualitative difference between the Muslims and their opponents was morale as the quintessential force multiplier. It is reasonable to assume that Abu Bakr must have understood that brimming morale could accommodate deficiencies in military and technological capabilities.

¹³³ **Proposition 8** [sub-point]. On warfighting restrictions see *WQS*, p.13 and Sallaabee (2007), pp.341-2

¹³⁴ Quigley (2013), p.718

¹³⁵ Hodgson (1977), p.199

4.6. Diagnostic Evaluation of Phase Two

To consider Abu Bakr's reign therefore, as a continuation of political design, is further substantiated in the context of actions taken during phase two. The table below emphasises the continuation of those *signs* and *symptoms* sustained from the *Ridda* Wars with the emphasis of Hypothesis B and H as explanatory diagnostics of the extended security policy initiated by Abu Bakr.

Offense-Defence Variables of Intervening Factors that lead to War¹³⁶

Period	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
Phase Two 633-634	✕	✖	✕	✖	✖	✕	✕	✖	●	✕

4.6.2. ODT - D/Dx # 2. Defensive Expansion - Hypothesis B

Hypothesis B is an almost self-explanatory exercise in strategic interaction and provides support to the claim of politico-strategic consistency in Abu Bakr's policies. According to Hypothesis B, defensive expansionism on account of insecurity is the either the product of an emerging security dilemma or a believed threat. Whilst the threat against Islam during the Prophet's lifetime was removed, new existential threats emerged in Arabia thereafter.

No external regional actor had a significant effect on the Muslim political consolidation of Arabia, however, that was not to say there could not or would not be. The latent possibility of external intervention would most certainly have aroused Muslim perceptions of insecurity and fear, especially after the *Ridda* Wars. Since early inception after all, the collective Muslim psyche had been developed by the concept of *absolute Jihad*, considering themselves in a state of perpetual hostility with everyone outside of themselves. On these imperatives alone, even without the turmoil of the *Ridda*, it is entirely plausible that regional security would have independently developed as policy.

¹³⁶ Key: ✖ = Primary Offense-Defense Variable of analysis
 ✕ = Secondary Offense-Defense Variable of analysis
 ● = non-applicable Offense-Defense Variable of analysis

The extended security policy of Abu Bakr during phase two correlates to the assumptions and theory of Hypothesis B and the theory of a continuing broader strategic policy from the *maghazi* period to consolidate the broader areas of Arabia and the Arabic speaking populations.

4.6.1. ODT - D/Dx # 8. Secrecy is More Common and Dangerous - Hypothesis H

Hypothesis H is a continuation and extension of Hypothesis D and E, and maintains the same *symptomatic* demonstrations of the offensive strategic actions of the security policy of Abu Bakr as employed during the *Ridda* Wars. Hypothesis H, explains that when the offensive dominates, foreign and defence policy is more secretive.¹³⁷ Timing, or the strategic initiative, affords advantage based upon superior information to offset the timeframe of operation between two actors, such that the initiative of a first strike is virtually guaranteed or retains a high level of probable success (Hypothesis D and E).

Van Evera explains the offense dominance behaviour in this case as follows: ‘It can ease surprise attack by concealing preparations from the victim. It opens windows of opportunity and vulnerability by delaying states’ reactions to others’ military buildups, raising the risk of preventive war.’¹³⁸ Regionally, the Arabs had never constituted a serious strategic or military threat to either Empire, merely requiring management via auxiliaries. Therefore, there had never been any real consideration that Arab interests would have extended into the grasslands.

Looking back at the *maghazi*, there is an identifiable trend between the Prophet’s increasing politico-strategic strength (in other words, increasing offense-dominance) and the frequency with which he engaged in tactical subterfuge and misdirection to mask his strategic designs.¹³⁹ Following the Treaty of Hdaybiya to the conquest of Mecca,¹⁴⁰ all the way through to the Caliphate of Abu Bakr and the beginnings of the Caliphate of ‘Umar,¹⁴¹ an element of secret policies seems to have been in place that had specified targets designated long since back to the days of the *maghazi*.

¹³⁷ Van Evera (2004), pp.227-8

¹³⁸ Van Evera (2004), pp.233-5

¹³⁹ Rodgers (2012), p.237

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., pp.214-15

¹⁴¹ An explanation shall follow the next chapter.

Indeed, between 628 and 630 (from the Treaty of Hudaibiya to the conquest of Mecca), the Prophet authorised seventeen offensive strike missions against his opponents, never relinquishing the strategic initiative.¹⁴² Although experiencing some losses, the general offensive of the Muslims grew stronger and stronger finally seizing Mecca (see Hypothesis D, E and J). For example, in 629 the Muslims made military contact with a Byzantine force approximately 5-6,000 strong at a town named Mu'ta in modern-day Jordan, part of Byzantine Syria at the time. A force of 3000 men was dispatched by the Prophet to breach the Byzantine border, although the specific objective remains unclear. It has been suggested that the objective was to retaliate for the murder of a Muslim envoy sent to the Ghassanid tribe,¹⁴³ or as part of a show of force alongside a missionary objective, or even that the objective was to raid a Byzantine armory in the location.¹⁴⁴

The result of the engagement was a tactical defeat for the Muslims who lost several high-ranking commanders and had to depend upon the recently converted Muslim, Khalid ibn al-Walid, to rally the Muslims to a strategic retreat to avoid a decisive loss.¹⁴⁵ A month later, it is reported that the Prophet dispatched another mission to strike at Bali and Quada'a - two northern tribes who were part of the 'Ghassanid frontier defence coalition' that had defeated the Muslims a month earlier.¹⁴⁶ It seems that the re-organisation of the northern Byzantine frontier defences in response to the Muslim infiltration was also provocation enough for the Prophet to preemptively strike rather than wait for their organised response. The initial task force sent to disrupt the frontier defence coalition was later reinforced by the dispatch of Abu Bakr, 'Umar, and Abu Ubayda, to augment the strike.¹⁴⁷

Furthermore, prior to the march on Mecca in 630, 'Aisha, the wife of the Prophet and daughter of Abu Bakr narrates a discussion that took place as she prepared provisions for the Prophet's departure.¹⁴⁸ Abu Bakr, unaware of a scheduled journey of the Prophet enquires as to the nature of the trip. He quickly surmises, from the fact that

¹⁴² Gabriel (2007), p.165

¹⁴³ Bashier (2006), pp.218-9

¹⁴⁴ See Gabriel (2007), pp.161-2; Rodgers (2012), pp.206-7

¹⁴⁵ Bashier (2006), p.221

¹⁴⁶ Gabriel (2007), p.164

¹⁴⁷ Ibid.; also Rodgers (2012), pp.210-11

¹⁴⁸ *I.I.*, p.544; *WQ*, p.392

his own daughter would not reveal to him details of the journey that the Prophet was preparing for a *ghazwa*. Abu Bakr proposes the three most likely targets to be a. the Byzantines, b. the Arabs of the Najd region, or c. the Quraysh. The Prophet confirms the latter.¹⁴⁹ Once again, the early identification of the Byzantine threat can be clearly seen on the Prophet's radar. Additionally, this event takes place before the Quraysh have been overthrown, that is, still within the guerrilla phase of the Prophet's mission.

Thus, it is entirely plausible that the events of 629/630 set in motion a secret policy that intended to subdue the Ghassanid frontier defence coalition to pave the way for further incursions into the Byzantine territories.¹⁵⁰ This was continued by Abu Bakr and finally completed during the reign of 'Umar. These points suggest the plausibility of the extended security policy of phase two by Abu Bakr as a continuation of policy designed and initiated by the Prophet.¹⁵¹ In more dramatic terms, Donner arrives at the same conclusion, suggesting that the Islamic domination of the Near East specifically was a continuation of the Prophet's master plan that Abu Bakr completed.¹⁵²

There is an obvious series of additional events such as the diplomatic delegations sent to both Caesar Heraclius¹⁵³ and Choreses in 628;¹⁵⁴ the expedition to Tabuk (northern Syria – Byzantine territory) in 630;¹⁵⁵ and the final military dispatch of the army of 'Usama to the Byzantine borders; that are all sure indications that the Prophet had political designs against the regional powers. Hence, not only were the Arab nomads taken by surprise when the armed forces under Khalid struck, but so were the neighbouring regional powers, Byzantium and Sasanian Persia. The misperception and miscalculation by all strategic actors concerning Abu Bakr resulted in significant losses; the Arab opposition during the *Ridda* Wars suffered a humiliating defeat; and the Arab auxiliaries of the regional powers were swept aside with such speed and determination that both empires were left exposed to military inroads into their territories.

¹⁴⁹ As-Sallaabee (2007), pp.139-40

¹⁵⁰ Hodgson (1977), p.198

¹⁵¹ *WQS*, pp.7-8; Rodgers (2012), p.164; Donner (1981), p.101; Madelung (2001), p.46

¹⁵² Donner (1981), p.90 & (2012), p.121

¹⁵³ *IL*, pp.654-6

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.658-9

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p.602; *WQ*, pp.485-502

The diagnostic assessments of phase two build upon those demonstrated during phase one, with the same consistency in predicted by offense dominance behaviours. The administration of Abu Bakr over both stages of his security policy reveals a definitive preference for offensive strategic action, that is, the expected utility of Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah* as a mechanism to serve and attain political objectives. Abu Bakr displayed a certain preference and belief in the estimation of the efficacy of violence, and the continued presence of the offense variables as constitutive of his rational calculus, inevitably resulting in war in the name of Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah*. The diagnostic examination therefore provides direct explanations affirming the positive to research questions 1 and 2.

During the administration of Abu Bakr, Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah* was identifiably *a continuation of politik by other means* (research question 1); and a consistent link can be demonstrated to have existed so as to establish that the evolving *strategic dynamics* affected Jihad as a mechanism for an extended security policy (research question 2). Offensive military action during the *Ridda* Wars, were as we have diagnostically examined, a result and consequence of the pressures and nature of the anarchic environment. The extension of policy to the grasslands was largely determined and designed as a result and consequence of the anarchic environment and a belief in self-help (research question 3). In conclusion, by way of summarising the results of our examination of *politik* during Abu Bakr's administration we shall map the trinitarian developments of the period 632-634.

4.7. Trinitarian Interpretation of the Caliphate of Abu Bakr

The first evolution of Jihad from the practice of the *maghazi* began during the crisis of succession inherited by Abu Bakr that forced him to operate under the conditions of an impending crisis within the anarchic environment. 'In general terms a crisis' Oran Young writes, 'can be thought of as an acute transition in the state of a certain system or, to be even more specific, as a decisive or critical stage in the flow of events that together constitute an acute transition'.¹⁵⁶ The *strategic dynamics* between the practices of the *maghazi* through phase one and then phase two of Abu Bakr's

¹⁵⁶ Young (1968), pp.6-7

security policy reflects the vital importance of such an acute transition because of the nature and setting of the anarchic environment.

Accordingly, the Caliphate of Abu Bakr is perhaps the most significant stage in the evolution of the *strategic dynamics* of Jihad. The *Ridda* Wars were a clear demonstration of the return of tribal politics, rousing the emotions and irrational forces (primordial violence, hatred, and enmity) of the tribal society against central authority. Abu Bakr did not have the time that the Prophet had had to sublimate the problem. Instead, through rational calculation (policy) Abu Bakr adopted a military strategy of *compellence* to achieve his ends. Enlisting the military genius of Khalid ibn al-Walid, Abu Bakr was able to mastermind the overthrow of various centres of gravity that spread across Arabia from his seat in Medina. Jihad was employed to deliver overwhelming military force, since political goals were inexorably fused with military victory the escalated use of force was strategically sound.¹⁵⁷ Jihad was applied as a demonstration of military strength that reflected the resolute political will of Abu Bakr.

Jihad functioned as a *bargaining* signal of resolve, escalating Muslim warfighting to the only instance of zero-sum conceptualisation during the *Rashidun* period. Consolidating the strategic initiative with an escalated degree of violence, and the military prowess of Khalid ibn al-Walid, was the difference that ultimately secured decisive victory. By crushing the ability of any tribe to resist his authority, Abu Bakr simultaneously neutralised the ability of the Arab tribes to form any system of confederacy or conspiracy against him. Under such circumstances, Abu Bakr was able to impose peace terms upon the Arabs as a whole, more comprehensively and with greater finality than the Prophet had. In other words, as the diagnostic examination has demonstrated, strategic behaviour during the *Ridda Wars* was rooted in a set of strategic preferences and assumptions as a consequence of the crisis environment and the nature of anarchy rather than as the product of a religious worldview (research question 3). The first phase of Abu Bakr's administration was dedicated to the restoration of the policies and central authority established by the Prophet during the *maghazi* (research question 1).

¹⁵⁷ *OW*, p.81

The second phase of Abu Bakr's administration was the resumption of policies set by the trajectory of the *maghazi* period (research question 2). Abu Bakr identified the centres of gravity that needed clearing before the policy proper could be implemented. This resulted in the initial assaults of the grasslands that separated Arabia from the Fertile Crescent, and the Byzantine and Sassanid powers. Building upon the successive decisive victories of the *Ridda* Wars, Abu Bakr harnessed the momentum of the blind forces at play, buoying morale and an increasing fervour to fight the good fight (*Jihad fi sabil l'Allah*); Abu Bakr devised an extended security policy to dominate the borders in order to seize the strategic advantage of a first-strike capability against the regional powers.

Abu Bakr was able to mastermind decisive victories against the auxiliary tribes of the grasslands and annex the various centres of gravity as strategic vantage points for invasion. By the end of his tenure, Abu Bakr had decisively dominated Arabia proper and established new territorial gains from former Byzantine and Persian interests. The Prophet's mission to make Islam as the dominant force in Arabia before spreading out universally was consolidated by Abu Bakr, whose administration can be conceived of in strategic terms as nothing other than a continuation of *politik* by other means (research questions 1 & 2).

The metanarrative of Islam supported the direction that strategic logic had dictated but not the manner in which Jihad was instrumentally applied (research question 3). Retrospectively, as Young explains 'Crises do, nevertheless, tend to have important catalytic effects in crystallizing and setting in motion forces of change that are only fully consummated over a longer period of time.'¹⁵⁸ The long-term effects of this transition would be revealed during the subsequent caliphates of Abu Bakr's successors, where 'the impact of crises on relevant attitudes, perspectives, and expectations can be far greater and more influential than their palpable impact.'¹⁵⁹ Thus, whilst Abu Bakr's administration was highly successful, it is best understood as a vital transition stage in the *strategic dynamics* of Jihad from an instrument of emancipation and security to an instrument of systemic force projection to serve foreign policy objectives.

¹⁵⁸ Young (1968), p.94

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

The victories during the *Ridda Wars* were final in a strategic sense, but the crisis that started it all would return to haunt the Muslim community again and again. Though Abu Bakr decisively removed all forms of resistance amongst the Arabs thereby unifying the central authority at its most vulnerable point, the premium placed upon warfighting to impose terms was sustainable only while he lived. In that sense, the administration failed to achieve a permanent political victory. The result in war is never final,¹⁶⁰ Clausewitz wrote, and as a matter of policy violence is always a means and not an end.

¹⁶⁰ See **Proposition 10**; *OW*, p.80

CHAPTER FIVE

5.0. The Rise of the Dar al-Islam

This chapter charts the evolution of the Islamic strategic setting following the death of Abu Bakr and the rise of the *dar al-Islam* or the ‘Islamic territories’ on the international stage. The *dar al-Islam* was built in part as a consequence of policies and shifts in the application of warfighting. This chapter examines how the security policy of Abu Bakr evolved according to the needs and interplay between shifting strategic settings and emerging strategic environments during the administration of ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab - the second of the *Rashidun* Caliphs. This chapter is particularly interested to explore research question 4 and sub-investigative questions c and d. but not excluding analysis of research questions 1, 2, and 3 and sub-investigative question b.¹ An examination of sub-investigative question c is the pivot from which the other research questions are addressed. This is because the complexity of the strategic setting and its effects on policy at the systemic level is of primary concern for strategic interpretation.

Strategic analysis in this chapter factors the variables of VUCA into consideration which ‘may suggest a variety of equally attractive solutions, some of which will prove to be good and others bad. Certain knowledge is often lacking and intentions may be surmised, but never entirely known.’² Accordingly, the focus of strategic explanation is not the external anarchic environment but rather the realities of what happened underneath the surface and outward appearance of external strategic interactions. The Caliphate of ‘Umar is characterised by the *Futuhat* or ‘expansions’ at the systemic level of the *dar al-Islam*, where the *dar al-Islam* rose to become a regional power. However, the reality of this rise was far more complex than it appears to have been. For this reason, the more accessible variables of strategic interpretation are those that pertain to the *bargaining dynamics* of the domestic strategic setting, which in turn, inform explanation of systemic policy and action, that is, the *Futuhat* or ‘expansions’.

¹ Sub-investigative question a. on the definition of Jihad remains static since our exploration of the question in chapter 4 until the end of the following chapter.

² Yarger (2006), p.18

5.1. Preliminaries

A constant and consistent issue of the lack of early source materials has already been discussed from the perspective of historiographical research. Early oriental scholars were generally dismissive of the early Muslim historical collections, but frustrated by the evident lack of external source material otherwise. Little was known about the systemic interactions of the *dar al-Islam* by outside commentators and the same was true of the Muslim sources. Hence, the *Futuh* genre of historical literature is often ambiguous to whether certain territories were taken by force (*anwatan*) or by peaceful surrender and negotiated tax settlement (*sulhan*).³

A striking example is the case of Damascus; the various narrations recounted by the early Muslim chroniclers describe Khalid ibn al-Walid storming the city via the Eastern Gate in 636, but also another narration is mentioned stating that the commander of the army, Abu Ubayda, was in the Western sector of Damascus concluding a peaceful surrender of the city at the same time.⁴ Given the importance of Damascus at that time, it is a strange turn of events that there might be uncertainty as to how it was captured and by whom. This leads to the inference of a general premise that consideration of *strategic dynamics* during this period cannot be situated within a discourse that depends upon operational and tactical levels of analysis and record.⁵ Indeed, even at the strategic level historical information is impoverished. This inference emphasises the importance of abductively exploring sub-investigative question c. as the backdrop of contextualisation and explanation for the primary research questions investigated in this chapter.

Secondly, an extremely pervasive theme throughout the Muslim *Futuh* literature is that of providentialism, and thus raises the contextual importance of sub-investigative question b. in this chapter to validate these claims or deny them. As Robinson explains, the early Muslim chroniclers took a distinctly unilateral approach to history:

What happened outside of the caliphate might have been of some interest to the curious, but information was necessarily scarce, and

³ Kennedy (2007), p.19

⁴ I.K., pp.89-91; Buti (2007), p.616; Kennedy (2007), p.20

⁵ Donner (1981), p.269

besides, why should it have a sure place in the historiographic vision if God had not yet made it part of His order by sending successful armies to conquer it?⁶

According to Bernard Lewis, ‘These [*Futuh*] were not seen as conquests in the vulgar sense of territorial acquisitions, but as the overthrow of impious regimes and illegitimate hierarchies, and the “opening” of their peoples to the new revelation and dispensation...’⁷ Lewis further explains that ‘The use of the root *fth* is thus not unlike the twentieth century use of the verb “liberate”, and is indeed sometimes replaced by the latter verb (*harrara*) [freedom or liberation] in modern Arabic writing on early Islamic history.’⁸ These linguistic clarifications provide a connection to how the dominant conception of the *Futuh* was linked to the policy.

Robinson elaborates further upon this perspective, explaining the *providentialism* attached to this genre of work: ‘With God Standing at the centre of history, the task that fell to Muslim historians was therefore not so much to explain human actions as it was to *exemplify* known truths and to teach lessons by describing them.’⁹ Caution must be attached to this statement which, although fairly accurately represents much of the earlier sources pre-dating the ‘Abbasid Caliphate, the later sources cannot be so generalised. In particular, the voluminous work of Ibn Khaldun, which in many ways is the exact antithesis of the early approach described by Robinson. However, the point is extremely important as it reinforced the meta-narrative and the idea of Islam as a Divine Mandate.

Donner summarises the importance of the *Futuh* literature as a key historiographical theme;¹⁰ firstly because the *Futuh* provided a narrative justification for the Muslim conquest and rule over non-Muslims in the form of a quasi-teleological overtone of the Divine Plan or meta-narrative of the theological Imperative.¹¹ Secondly Donner

⁶ Robinson (2003), p.138; see also Kennedy (2007), p.30

⁷ Lewis (1988), p.93

⁸ Ibid., pp.93-4

⁹ Robinson (2003), p.131 (*italics* in the original)

¹⁰ Donner (1998), pp.177-180

¹¹ According to Ibn ‘Abd al-Hakam and al-Azdi, the *futuh* - the ‘openings and victories’ - were tantamount to the signification of ‘truth overcoming falsehood’, that is, the *righteousness* associated to the actions of conquest –see Mourad (2000); and Mulalic (2012), p.123

notes, the *Futuh* literature provided a medium of promoting future Jihad and encouraging Muslims to follow the duty and practice of their pious predecessors simultaneously providing ‘raw material for the nascent Islamic community as it began to grapple intellectually with its own identity and with its position as the ruling community that dominated others.’¹² Thus, in the sections that follows, the investigation of a strategic condition will also account for the influence of domestic power politics and providentialism on the influence of Jihad and those policies that governed its application (sub-investigative questions b. and c.).

5.2. Dynamic Expansionism

The Caliphate of ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab is celebrated amongst Muslim historians as the great tenure of the *futuhat*.¹³ Amongst Sunni Muslims, the Caliphate of ‘Umar is the most glamourised example of the *righteousness* associated with Islamic rule, and was the most popular Caliph of the *Rashidun* era.¹⁴ The Caliphate of ‘Umar was known for strict internal rectification. A developed system of civil infrastructure developed during his rule and the homeland security policy established by Abu Bakr was subsumed and sublimated as a function of a new policy - the policy of Da’wa.

‘Umar built upon Abu Bakr’s legacy and drew first blood against both of the regional powers, Byzantine and Persia, delivering crushing blows to their empires with such bold offensive behaviour that it was recorded in the annals of historians thereafter as ‘a fundamental watershed of world history.’¹⁵ ‘Umar continued firmly upon the politico-strategic trajectory set by Abu Bakr, completing the conquests of both Iraq and most of Syria, and raising even greater armies than his predecessors. Between 634-638 ‘Umar had consolidated the Muslim expansion of Syria and Armenia effectively pushing out the regional hegemon – the Byzantine Romans; ‘Within the short time span of 10-15 years they conquered the lands of Syria, Iraq, Egypt and Persia, halving the territory of the ancient Byzantine empire based in Constantinople, and bringing the Sasanian Persian empire to a close.’¹⁶

¹² Donner (1998), p.180

¹³ Rahman (2003), p.60

¹⁴ Madelung (2001), p.76

¹⁵ Bonney (2004), p.54

¹⁶ Cook (2001)

The Caliphate of ‘Umar has been celebrated as the period of the great expansions of *Futuh*. The vast territories acquired under the Caliphate of ‘Umar read as a long list of victories that in the popular Muslim conception reflected a clear consciousness of providentialism. In particular, the territorial expansions against the regional powers are listed below.¹⁷ Whilst each campaign listed could be extensively researched, the focus of these expansions is the shifts and effects upon the strategic setting and not the operational and tactical details of the military campaigns. Yet to answer research question 4, the usual pre-occupation of detailing long lists of territorial conquests during ‘Umar’s administration distracts from the most salient *dynamics* between the military conquests of the period and its relationship to policy, namely the driving imperative of *bargaining dynamics* in domestic politics and the quest for internal stability.

Byzantium	Syria (634–637)¹⁸	Palestine (635–636)¹⁹	Campaigns in Eastern Anatolia (638)²⁰	Armenia (638 & 644)²¹	Upper Egypt (640–641)²²	Lower Egypt (641–642)²³	North Africa (643)²⁴
Persia	Iraq (636–637)²⁵	Fars (642),²⁶	Isfahan & Tabaristan (642–643)²⁷	Kerman & Makran (643–644)²⁸	Sistan (643–644)²⁹	Azerbaijan (643)³⁰	Khurasan (643–644)³¹

Figure 4. - Conquests Against the Regional Powers 634 – 644

¹⁷ See also *I.K.*, p.220; Rahman (2003), pp.62-73

¹⁸ *BLD*, pp.165-212; *I.K.*, pp.88-93

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 213-222; Rahman (2003), pp.67-73

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.226-234;

²¹ *Ibid.*, pp.305-310;

²² *Ibid.*, pp.335-345;

²³ *Ibid.*, pp.346-351;

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p.342, 352-362

²⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.401-408; *I.K.*, pp.94-8; Rahman (2003), p.65

²⁶ *BLD*, pp.409-452; Donner (2012), pp.128-130

²⁷ *BLD*, pp.409-452; Donner (2012), pp.126-9

²⁸ *I.K.*, p.217

²⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.217-219

³⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.214-215

³¹ *Ibid.*, pp.211-214

5.3. The Caliphate of ‘Umar ibn al-Khattab (634-644)

‘Umar ibn al-Khattab (579-644) belonged to the clan of Banu ‘Adee ibn K‘ab of the Quraysh.¹ Before his conversion to Islam, he had been appointed to represent the tribe of Quraysh as their chief ambassador² and was noted as being ‘a man of strong determination, a keen sense of duty and a remarkable gift for administration.’³ From amongst the earliest of converts to the Prophet’s mission,⁴ ‘Umar had served the Prophet diligently and was noted as being from amongst the Prophet’s closest advisors.⁵ ‘Umar was distinguished in title from Abu Bakr, who was the *Khalifat ‘ul-Rasul ‘l-Allah* (The Deputy of the Prophet), with the title of *Amir al-Mu’meneen* (Commander of the Believers).⁶

This contrast in titles reflects the first sign of a shift in policy between the two Caliphs and the evolving *strategic dynamics* of Jihad.⁷ Abu Bakr, as Deputy of the Prophet, maintained the politico-strategic trajectory set by the Prophet; ‘Umar, as Commander of the Believers, laid the foundations for the Muslim homeland, or the *dar al-Islam* (lit. the territories of Islam) by building upon the strategic environment shaped by his predecessors. Jihad, under the administration of ‘Umar, it is proposed, was subordinated to an act of foreign policy, specifically known as the Da’wa. The administration of ‘Umar reveals two important shifts in the *strategic dynamics* of Jihad during his tenure. The first was between 634-640; the second, being thereafter until his death in 644.

5.4. Stage One Post-Ridda (634-640)

Had the scope of Jihad been limited to concerns or threats against the survival of the Islamic government, then the policies of Abu Bakr would have been sufficient to maintain a *defense dominant* stance against any offensive or threatening behaviour from the regional powers. ‘Umar’s decision to engage offensively therefore suggests that Jihad was instrumentally applied as a further development in its application from his predecessors. However, strategic interactions are never dictated by one will alone.

¹ Rahman (2003), p.60

² Sallaabee (2007), p.42

³ Rahman (2003), p.60

⁴ *I.I.*, pp.155-9

⁵ *I.K.*, p.219

⁶ Buti (2001), p.705; *I.K.*, p.87, 223

⁷ Hodgson (1977), p.207

Having secured the domestic tribal population during the *Ridda* Wars, Abu Bakr had sought to expand security through the neutralisation of the borderlands with the regional powers. Such an unprecedented move was initially extremely successful with sweeping victories for the Muslims. Contemporary theory would argue that Abu Bakr's extended security policy, or 'attempts to establish buffer zones [...] can alarm others who have stakes there, who fear that undesirable precedents will be set, or who believe that their own vulnerability will be increased' Jervis explains, leading to the logical conclusion that: 'When buffers are sought in areas empty of great powers, expansion tends to feed on itself in order to protect what is acquired, ...'.⁸ Hence, 'Umar's policy of offensive engagement with the regional powers during the post-*Ridda* stage, was in alignment with standard strategic logic, and it is proposed, a continuation by consequence of the earlier security policy by default and not by design. The domestic power politics that drove the subordination of Jihad to a new reformed policy (sub-investigative question c.) is explored next.

5.4.1. Post-*Ridda* Political Damage Control

Before 'Umar's policy of offensive strategic action could be put into play, political damage control had to be managed following the previous administration. The post-*Ridda* community had exhibited the dominance of the Quraysh over all other tribes in Arabia, with the highest serving generals and governors being either Meccan or specifically from the ranks of the Quraysh.⁹ The efficiency of Abu Bakr's security policy had decimated tribal competition in Arabia leaving the Quraysh and their loyalist allies as undisputed masters of the Arabs.

However, Abu Bakr had failed to achieve a decisive political victory over the Arab tribes. Instead, he had dealt them a crushing military victory that had resulted in their shame and humiliation amongst the loyalist Arabs and sullied their reputations. 'Umar, unsurprisingly as former chief ambassador of the Quraysh, set in motion a diplomatic course of damage limitation amongst the Arab tribes.¹⁰ Just as the Prophet had in his annexation of Mecca shown magnanimity and pardon to his defeated foes, showering them with gifts and position within his movement;¹¹ so too did 'Umar,

⁸ Jervis (1978), p.169 (both quotes)

⁹ See Kennedy (2007), pp.52-3

¹⁰ Madelung (2001), p.60

¹¹ See 3.6.

reintegrating the surviving rebel-apostates into the Muslim community as full members. ‘Umar would henceforth build his administration based upon meritocracy rather than tribal aristocracy as Abu Bakr had.¹²

Almost immediately, ‘Umar took himself to task in re-negotiating the terms of the political settlement Abu bakr had imposed by releasing political hostages taken as collateral against any further tribal uprisings. ‘Umar also announced an amnesty for other political prisoners and the surviving rebel-apostate tribes.¹³ Because the terms of the new political bargain were more generous to the remnants of the rebel-apostate tribes than that of Abu Bakr had been, ‘Umar was able to consolidate their loyalty to him almost immediately. Furthermore, by offering the surviving apostate tribes full re-integration into the Muslim society ‘Umar simultaneously increased the size of the Muslim army since many of them enlisted as either an act of gratitude or to demonstrate loyalty to the new Caliph.¹⁴

5.4.2. Administrative and Military Reform

‘Umar’s penchant for administration shined as he set about radically transforming the Medinan polis. During Abu Bakr’s administration, Medina continued to serve, as it had done for the Prophet, as a base of operations. During ‘Umar’s tenure, political infrastructure developed alongside civil and bureaucratic administration with regional governors dispersed over the newly conquered territories and peoples. In particular, the fiscal system and justice system became more formalised than under Abu Bakr, with courts, policing infrastructure, and official records and registries implemented.¹⁵

‘Umar disbanded Abu Bakr’s war council and commissioned a special council of advisors that was known as the *shura* committee or the consultative body of his administration.¹⁶ ‘Umar’s *shura* council had been a development of his meritocratic approach¹⁷ wherein he appointed the close and highest standing members of the early Muslim community who had served the Prophet, or those with elite skills that warranted their place on the council, irrespective of their tribal backgrounds. All

¹² Madelung (2001), p.58

¹³ Ibid., p.59-60

¹⁴ Donner (2012), p.127

¹⁵ I.K., pp.219-20; Rahman (2003), p.61

¹⁶ As-Sallabi (2008), pp.181-8; see al-Raysuni (2011)

¹⁷ The Qur’anic principles of this practice are mentioned here *Q*, 3:159; 42:38

politico-military decisions were passed through the council including socio-economic policies and matters of criminal justice.¹⁸

However, it is the military instrument in particular that was restructured with rosters compiled of military personnel (*diwan*) laying the foundational infrastructure for a standing army.¹⁹ This restructuring was a direct consequence and evolution of the policies set by Abu Bakr, but also the springboard for all later conquests and the changing policy of Jihad from security to expansionism. ‘Umar’s new meritocracy had no place for Qurayshite aristocracy, even less so it seems for those who had been part of the loyalist army that had so decisively crushed the rebel tribes. In the reorganisation of the military, ‘the members of the Qurayshite aristocracy, so prominent in the leadership of the Muslim armies under Abu Bakr, were conspicuously absent.’²⁰

The *Ridda* Wars had significantly increased the operational efficiency of the Muslims, and the preliminary military engagements in both Iraq and Syria further increased operational capabilities. These operational developments were complimented by enhanced logistical knowledge and substantial battlefield experience, with units engaged in year-long campaigns and missions.²¹ Furthermore, the accompanying victories spearheaded the growing momentum within the military ranks of the Muslims affording an unshakable belief in their Jihad. With an increasingly efficient military, brimming with morale and victory, ‘Umar took a bold step to reinforce the army by sacrificing one man for many.

5.4.3. Sheathing the Sword of God

No single act of political re-negotiation was perhaps more indicative of the new authority and shift in policy concerning Jihad than ‘Umar’s bold demotion of Khalid ibn al-Walid from Field Marshal of the Muslim Armies to that of a private as his first political order.²² The impact of ‘Umar’s action was the most salient example of the new shift in policy that subordinated the will of Jihad to foreign policy, as distinct to

¹⁸ As-Sallabi (2008), pp.184-5, 188

¹⁹ *I.K.*, pp.219-220; Rahman (2003), pp.61-2

²⁰ Madelung (2001), p.60

²¹ Donner (2012), pp.104-5

²² Madelung (2001), p.60; *WQS*, p.159

the security policy of Abu Bakr, which was a military strategy of victory and dominance. In order to realign Jihad with limited warfare, the general of the *Ridda Wars* had to be removed in order to subordinate Jihad to the design of a new policy without challenge.²³

Furthermore, it had been primarily at the hands of Khalid that the defeated rebel and apostate tribes, who would be given amnesty under ‘Umar, had been hunted and beaten. Under Abu Bakr’s administration, only loyalists during the *Ridda* campaigns were enrolled into the Muslim armed forces and hence were recipients of the associated plunder and prestige that victory brought. Khalid would not have welcomed former rebels and apostates back into the army he was commanding.²⁴ Khalid’s demotion cleared the way for military enrollment of the former rebels and apostates. Hence, in sacrificing Khalid, ‘Umar was able to not only bolster military recruitment, but also raise the size of his military forces to numbers previously unknown by Arabian standards.²⁵ Although demoted, Khalid maintained a position in the military as Chief of Staff and a military advisor.²⁶

5.4.4. Popular Government

As the Muslim military establishment began its formal development under the direction and management of ‘Umar, new policies of internal rectification and meritocracy conveyed an atmosphere of greater of social justice that bolstered popularity. Van Evera writes: ‘Popular governments can better raise larger, more loyal armies that can bypass others’ border forts and can operate far from home with less logistical support. This gives popular regimes greater offensive power.’²⁷ ‘Umar could not have been unaware of the growing offensive military power at his disposal,²⁸ and the consequences of the extended security policy had effectively opened access to clear areas of exploitation belonging to the Sassanid and Byzantine empires²⁹ creating the belief in an impending security dilemma brought on by the acquisition of the grasslands.

²³ Hodgson (1977), p.207

²⁴ Akram (2004), p.135

²⁵ Donner (2012), p.127

²⁶ I.K., p.150, 197; Madelung (2001), p.60; Rahman (2003), p.64; As-Sallabi (2008), p.107

²⁷ Van Evera (2004), p.242

²⁸ Symptom of **Hypothesis I**

²⁹ Symptom of **Hypothesis D & E**

Yet the Caliphate of ‘Umar was arguably premised upon balancing domestic stability with developments in the systemic strategic setting rather than maximising territorial acquisition. Hence, in order to retain careful calibration of the domestic setting with the systemic, a vehicle of communication was needed to balance systemic strategic action that could not have been ignored. To meet the impending threat of the security dilemma, during the administration of ‘Umar, *Jihad fi sabil l’Allah* fast became a function of foreign policy, designed to promote and expand the Islamic meta-narrative and the territorial sovereignty of Islam.³⁰ However, the shift in policy of Jihad as an instrument of security to an instrument of foreign policy required a language with which to frame the new direction of Jihad and its application.

5.4.5. On the Rhetoric of Righteousness

If we recall back to the days of the *maghazi*, the Prophet’s proselytisation to the message of Islam was referred to as *da’wa*, lit. to call or invite. The invitation was a return to God, submitting before His sovereignty and abandoning the authority of men. The objective of *da’wa* automatically infused a sincere belief amongst the population in the noble cause of the Da’wa policy, and conferred popular credibility on its implementation. The *da’wa* had been a liberating ideology, and backed by the use of force - *Jihad fi sabil l’Allah* – during the *maghazi*. Now, it became instituted as a core constituent of ‘Umar’s foreign policy, reframed and projected systemically as a form of ‘humanitarian interventionism.’ By reframing the continuation of policy from the *maghazi*, the ‘righteous’ cause of the Da’wa policy would not only be emphasized, but the application of violence would be divinely sanctioned as it served the purposes of furthering or defending the jurisdiction of God’s authority on earth, whilst predicating its legitimacy upon the *absolute Jihad*.³¹

Both the Byzantine and Sassanid Empires had military capabilities and standing armies that far exceeded the Muslim military capabilities, let alone the tactical experience of fighting large-scale battles. Nonetheless the Muslims were able to not only meet and sustain warfighting with their more powerful opponents, but also to eventually defeat them both.

³⁰ Symptom of **Hypothesis G**

³¹ Symptom of **Hypothesis F**

The morale that was generated from a belief in *providential righteousness* was the quintessential force-multiplier that certainly infused courage and efficiency honing the military assaults of the Muslim armies. Morale, as Clausewitz noted,³² being unquantifiable, and thus an unpredictable variable in the strategic calculus of war, would prove to be vital for expansions under ‘Umar. The roots of this morale was undoubtedly the result of earlier successive victories during Abu Bakr’s Caliphate, encouraging the introduction of a policy that continued warfighting and the potential domination of adversaries. Thus, instilled with a sense of *providential righteousness*, unfazed by their deficiencies in arms and strategic capabilities compared to their more illustrious opponents and with a transformed belief in the righteousness of their cause; the Muslim armies directed by the policy of Da’wa pursued a relentless path of expansion developing an unshakable belief in their own *offense dominance*.³³

At this point we have elucidated the political background and circumstances that gave rise to the reformulation of Abu Bakr’s security policy. During Abu Bakr’s administration, Jihad was transformed from an instrument of political revolution serving as a vehicle for religious emancipation and social equality, into an instrument that served an aggressive homeland security policy. In its second-stage development (post-*Ridda*), geopolitical and geostrategic interests heavily directed the regional or extended security policy. Jihad was subordinated to the political aim of achieving immediate regional hegemony as well as controlling the strategic initiative and depth required to offset territorial invasion or as a prelude to expansive incursions of pre-emptive strikes.

As suggested in the last chapter, it is very likely that the second-stage development of Jihad during the administration of Abu Bakr was a consequence of pre-determined policy that had been designed since the days of the *maghazi*. The continuation of this policy under ‘Umar became known as Da’wa. The Da’wa policy was initiated on account of the inherited strategic environment and geopolitical and strategic setting rather than by intended or unilateral design. These preliminary observations are the clearest *signs* for diagnostic evaluation.

³² See *OW*, pp.184-5

³³ Symptom of **Hypothesis J**

5.5. Diagnostic Evaluation of the Da'wa Policy

The diagnostic testing of stage one of the Da'wa policy as a strategic condition conforming to the preliminary strategic interpretation and symptomatic hypotheses concerns two fundamental questions firstly, was the policy determined by teleological consequence of *absolute Jihad* (the Islamic meta-narrative and the promise of God's Providence), that is, sub-investigative question b.; and secondly, was the Da'wa policy an aggressive policy of imperial ambition (sub-investigative question d.).

Offense-Defence Variables of Intervening Factors that lead to War³⁴

Actor	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
Stage One 634-640	✕	✕	✕	✕	✕	✕	✕	●	✕	✕

The *symptomatic* indications of the strategic setting and environment conditioning the creation and application of the Da'wa are extremely convincing and are presented in the table above. Nonetheless, they are *symptoms* of the strategic condition and not clear *signs* of its state. As we shall proceed to examine, the nature and function of the Da'wa policy has been subject to alternative accounts that seek explanation in a context other than being purely strategic. These alternative explanations challenge the proposed hypothesis we have laid out above. If these alternatives can be discounted then our proposed strategic interpretation can be supported by diagnostic opinion. Diagnostic evaluation is conducted on Hypothesis A followed by Hypothesis C.

5.5.1. ODT - D/Dx # 1. Opportunistic Expansion – (Hypothesis A)

In chapter 3, we explicated the teleological connection between Islam, *absolute Jihad*, and *Jihad fi sabil l'Allah* reflecting the shifting *strategic dynamics* of the period. In this section, we shall consider the issue in relation to policy design, specifically, was the Da'wa policy designed as an instrument of Providence whereby the means justifies the ends, or strategic opportunism?

³⁴ Key: ✕ = Primary Offense-Defense Variable of analysis
 ✕ = Secondary Offense-Defense Variable of analysis
 ● = non-applicable Offense-Defense Variable of analysis

A basic premise of offense-defense theory is that windows of opportunistic expansion will invite aggression, even by temperate powers, on account of the perceived ease of action and belief in success. The simple principle is that weakness invites the strong, meaning those stronger than the weak and not necessarily the *strongest* power in the vicinity. Under conditions of anarchy, actors will maximise their ability to accrue power through relative gains and exploit windows of vulnerabilities and opportunity. Self-help and advancing one's interests are dependent upon relative power in relation to one's neighbours and the regional powers, or competitors.

The premise does not however suggest that the opposite, that the weak do not attack the strong since the first military actions recorded in the *maghazi* literature demonstrate no inconsistencies in this point of fact, nor the strategic actions of Abu Bakr. However, *why* 'Umar initiated the aggressive expansions of the *Futuh* is the subject of many, arguably antiquated, beliefs that overlook the central influence of the perceived security threat that we have proposed. These theories are unanimously rooted in the fundamental assumption that survival drove the *Futuh*, rather than security.

Hugh Kennedy's ascription to such a belief claims the dynamics of the *Futuh* (including the *Ridda Wars* as a precursory form of conquest by another name) were driven by the threat of survival based upon the scarcity of resources within the Arabian Peninsula.³⁵ Kennedy, borrowing from Reuven Firestone, regurgitates a form of the popular 'ecological thesis'³⁶ that posits a unified Arabia following the *Ridda Wars* was faced with a lack of inter-plunder and raiding opportunities and as a matter of maintaining the new found socio-political cohesion and stability, looked outward beyond the desert for material growth to assuage the threat of civil implosion or a Malthusian population disaster.³⁷

On the other hand, Fred Donner disagrees and advances two striking points concerning the fallacy of hunger, overpopulation or the desiccation of pasturelands;

³⁵ Kennedy (2007), p.56

³⁶ Donner (1995), p.342

³⁷ Kennedy (2007), pp.56-7; Firestone (1999), pp.124-5; On the idea of poverty, famine, Malthusian overpopulation, economic necessity and scarcity which drove the Muslims outward rather than Jihad, see Bonner (2006), pp.62-3

firstly, ‘ ‘Umar is said to have complained that he had difficulty locating enough men to conscript into the armies during the third phase of the conquests, which suggests that overpopulation was hardly a problem in the peninsula.’ And secondly, ‘How, after all, could any significant “surplus” population have managed to survive in an area of such precarious agricultural resources as were possessed by Arabia?’³⁸ Montgomery Watt also firmly discounts the credibility of such arguments stating that the ecological thesis and arguments based upon economic changes have ‘no good evidence’ to support them.³⁹ Watt further argues that the evidence suggests that during ‘Umar’s administration the *Futuh* had the opposite effect of actually increasing food supplies and general economic health of the region with the influx of massive revenues accrued from taxation and territorial gains which included agriculture and livestock.⁴⁰

There is simply, as Watt and Donner have argued, no good evidence to support the claim except the economic interpretation based upon inferred rational assumptions of behaviours undertaken as a result of perceived scarcity. Arguably, the origins for the ecological thesis are more convenient than demonstrable or even logical. This is because, the perceived threat of impending reprisal strikes from the regional powers, imagined or not, is a greater and more logical explanation of strategic offensive action than the claim of hunger to spark massive military mobilisation and conquests.

Additionally, consistent anecdotes found throughout all the collected histories by the early Muslim chroniclers suggest economic incentives were held otherwise.⁴¹ In such instances, it has been consistently recorded that Muslim commanders refused bribes and economic enticements to retreat. This claim is surprising if booty and fresh pastures were the primary objective, as the ecological thesis suggests. It is highly implausible that starving nomads would have gambled sure economic gains over improbable military victory against vastly superior military forces. The ecological thesis implicitly proposes scarcity as the driving force for strategic action, which is clearly contradicted by historical actions even if the narratives are dismissed as later fabrications.

³⁸ Donner (1981), p.267

³⁹ Watt (1953), p.3

⁴⁰ Ibid., pp.3-4

⁴¹ See *WQS*, pp.60-1; *I.K.*, pp.78-81; Rahman (2003), pp.63-4;

Whilst a constant stream of war booty was politically expedient for the continued credibility of the Da'wa policy as well as supporting domestic policies, Donner convincingly offers an explanation that is both logical and realistic regarding the material encouragements of plunder to the incentives for the Da'wa, arguing that 'the two dimensions were complimentary, not contradictory':

The Believers were motivated by religious commitment but saw the material benefits that came with their expansion as the natural consequence – or, rather, the divinely ordained consequence – of their success in creating a righteous new order. In their view, the influx of wealth that followed their conquests and expansion was nothing less than God's grace to them for having adopted his cause.⁴²

The question actually concerns motivation; and to this end, assumptions of security provide the most parsimonious explanation that preserves strategic consistency and is logically demonstrated on the side of the Muslims. Strategic conditions are not unilaterally dealt with however and consideration of the opponent(s) elucidates further why the Hypothesis A is best understood in the context of security and systemic anarchy. In both instances the Byzantines and the Sassanids, despite the strategic vantage points acquired by Abu Bakr, the Muslims were not afforded the belief that they were capable of militarily exploiting them. Rather, ceding the newly acquired strategic depth through political bargaining with the regional powers was the most likely and expected course of action. Van Evera states that 'Balancers balance to avert regional hegemony; hence pure balancers oppose expansion only by potential regional hegemons.'⁴³ Undoubtedly the great powers in the region were the war weary Persian and Byzantine empires,⁴⁴ and as is the practice of great powers, balancing small threats is usually left to weaker allies more local to the problem, or if the threat is too small to be threatening, it is left to reach its own inertia.⁴⁵

⁴² Donner (2012), p.143

⁴³ Van Evera (2004), p.243

⁴⁴ See Bonner (2006), p.58

⁴⁵ On balancing, bandwagoning, and theories of alliances, see Walt (1987)

Undeniably, neither power could have foreseen the rise of the *dar al-Islam* in its early inception. Although the Prophet's message was disregarded outside of Arabia, the 'Roman Emperor' Heraclius monitored the Prophet's rise to power,⁴⁶ but considered that the Arabs themselves would later topple him. Likewise, during the reign of Abu Bakr, the *Ridda* Wars were expected to destroy the emerging *dar al-Islam* internally; and had it not; it was not conceivable that the Arabs would have reached out to strike at the grassland nomadic tribes as they did. This explains why they were initially and constantly offered economic incentives to withdraw as part of a political settlement, and not treated as serious military threats.

The point of emphasis here is that they were offered political settlements; economic aid was only part of the bargaining process.⁴⁷ The belief that the empires possessed a 'defense-dominant' status in relation to the Muslim armies was the fundamental strategic miscalculation. The costs of war, was presumably another politico-strategic miscalculation on the part of the war-weary Romans and Persians who did not factor the influence that providential zealotry empowered the Muslims with to fight *Jihad fi sabil l'Allah*. By the time the Byzantines and Sassanids realised that the new Caliph had no intention of bargaining or backing down from warfighting, substantial territorial gains had already been accomplished in both regions by Khalid's forces and the Muslims had seized the tactical initiative and the geostrategic pivot points needed to access both empires.

The overall events clearly *signalled* a strategic condition that was treated as such by all sides, sooner or later. Hence, strategic opportunism cannot be discounted as a clear *signal* for the commencement of the *Futuh*, based upon the open areas of exploitation that demanded one of the regional actors to take control. The failure to balance by Persia and Byzantium, led to the Muslims retaining the military initiative, with larger windows of strategic vulnerability and tactical exploitation (symptoms of Hypotheses D, E, and F), Van Evera explains:

⁴⁶ *I.I.*, pp.654-7

⁴⁷ See *WQS*, pp.60-1; *I.K.*, pp.78-81

Historians have often suggested that a “breakdown in the balance of power” caused war. They usually mean (and should recast their claim to say) that states failed to engage in balancing behavior, which made aggression easier, causing war. War occurs not when the balance of power breaks down, but when balancers fail to balance, leaving aggressors unchecked,⁴⁸

The Persian attempts to buy-off the small emerging Muslim power with offers of economic and agricultural aid are best explained as part of a series of ‘buck-passing’ and ‘external balancing’⁴⁹ attempts that backfired and delayed affirmative military action such that when the Persians for example, were forced to ‘balance’ the emerging threat of the *dar al-Islam* themselves it was too late to resolve the threat militarily. The consistent belief that the *dar al-Islam* was a failing project seems to have been the standard reason for political apathy towards any direct action, despite increasing border skirmishes and deployments by the Muslims towards their frontiers. The poorly armed desert Arabs were taken so lightly that they were allowed considerable leeway to build momentum (symptom of Hypothesis J) such that the perception of offense-dominance was fused with morale.⁵⁰

In conclusion, the diagnostic opinion reached, is that the inherited strategic setting and environment generated the policy of Da’wa as a means to engage in limited war to pre-emptively offset anticipated or emerging security threats and seize the strategic and tactical initiative. Stage one of the *Futuh* in this sense, were opportunistic expansions not by the choice of one strategic actor alone but rather as demanded by the characteristics of VUCA and basic assumptions of self-help and anarchy. The successes of the Muslim incursions were greatly assisted by catastrophic miscalculation and misperceptions by the regional powers and actors resulting in a balancing collapse.

⁴⁸ Van Evera (2004), p.243, fn.32

⁴⁹ See Mearsheimer (2001), p.156-162

⁵⁰ Hugh Kennedy (2007), p.24

5.5.2. ODT - D/Dx # 3. Defensive Resistance - [Hypothesis C]

If increasing offensive power coupled with strategic opportunism is the most parsimonious and logical explanation for the commencement of hostilities; how tenable is the hypothesis that sub-investigative question d. broadly probes, suggesting that the Da'wa might later have served as a means of imperial policy. In other words, was the Da'wa policy championed for selfish interests, seeking territorial expansions and enlarged political dominion; or, was the Da'wa a form of intervention designed to liberate oppressed populations according to the values preached by the Islamic metanarrative. Or was there another reason for its continuation? To be even clearer, was *absolute Jihad* a driver of the Da'wa policy once hostilities commenced? Hypothesis C tests the claims of the continued influence of the Islamic meta-narrative and the promise of God's Providence, that is, sub-investigative question b.; and secondly, the claim that the Da'wa policy was an aggressive policy of imperial ambition (sub-investigative question d.).

Seeking regional domination was not an issue for 'Umar's administration or later caliphates in general, politically or domestically in the midst of two imperial powers battling for regional hegemony. In fact, it seems more plausible to state that having systemic ambitions was the cost of entering the systemic arena, or as Schelling writes concerning military victory, the *price of admission*.⁵¹ Hence, detracting of the idea of Da'wa as being an imperial or hegemonic function of Islam is a problem for ethicists of war and violence and not the concern of strategic theorists.⁵² Of course, such a policy has its contentions as a product of a political-religious authority, since it raises the question of whether the Da'wa policy was a policy exclusively designed to serve religious functions (*da'wa*), or a politico-strategic consequence of anarchy.

Whilst it cannot be argued otherwise that Abu Bakr adopted an aggressive offensive military strategy that sought decisive victory during the *Ridda* Wars, his policy of limited warfare thereafter, like the *maghazi*, and the offensive campaigns during the Caliphate of 'Umar, are often interpreted as being defensive military strategies, which

⁵¹ Schelling (2008), p.13

⁵² See 2.7.5.

are defined as ‘attempts to retain the existing status quo by the use of force; in other words, it aims at repelling the enemy’s offensive.’⁵³

The supposition is that the offensive action undertaken, whether by the Prophet, Abu Bakr or ‘Umar, was pre-emptive in the full knowledge of an impending attack by external forces and thus entirely justified. Whilst we have already clarified these assumptions regarding the *maghazi* and defensive expansionism on account of the regional security threat (Hypothesis B) during the Caliphate of Abu Bakr, ergo, the following examination of Hypothesis C is advanced with the assumption that the initial *Futuh* were extensions of the consequences of policies set by the Prophet and - or a continuation of the trajectory set by the extended security policy of Abu Bakr (as demonstrated by Hypothesis A).

Offense-defense theory expects fierce resistance to defensive expansionism by neighboring actors prompting a cycle of violence (Hypothesis C). As a function of realist theory of international relations, offense-defense theory considers only the state actor when considering defensive resistance; in reality it strategically takes the form of two interactions – and therefore this hypothesis is amendable to a second actor – namely that of the local population. Therefore, having examined the strategic interaction between the Muslim offensive and the Byzantine and Persian empires in the previous diagnostic; we will consider the Da’wa policy and the defensive resistance by the populations of the Byzantines and Sassanids to the Muslim conquests.

5.5.3. Defensive Resistance by the Population

Luttwak, in his strategic history of the Byzantine Empire notes the natural defensive resistance of the populations to any new religious imposition. Luttwak notes the nature of the territories that the Muslim armies conquered were after almost three decades of war and reciprocal invasions between the Byzantine and Sassanids, decrepit and war-torn. Luttwak describes the contest between the regional powers which

⁵³ Platias & Koliopoulos (2010), p.8

had ruined many of their cities, destroyed commerce, emptied their treasuries, exhausted their manpower, and wrecked frontier defenses and field armies alike, while bitterly antagonising provincial populations on each side, left undefended to be despoiled by enemy looters yet harshly taxed before and after.⁵⁴

Quigley in his history of political stability, describes the environment in the following manner:

They [the Muslim forces] intruded into areas of disorganized peoples, largely alienated from their former rulers and protected by weak, unreformed, and passive military garrisons. To many of these peoples the alternative offered by the Muslims seemed a welcome relief from disorder.⁵⁵

Moreover, the inhabitants of these regions were also representatives of the religious rivalries between the Christian Romans and the Zoroastrian Persians. With each empire championing each faith, their rulers accordingly either discriminated against the religiously diverse indigenous populations, or rewarded those who shared their religious affiliation. More valuable than the new territorial gains, was the Muslim achievement of a surprising political victory over both the Roman and Sassanid empires,⁵⁶ by winning the consent of the new conquered inhabitants. Luttwak reduces the surprising political victory down to two salient actions the Muslims imposed; the first, was the sweeping reduction in taxes that had debilitated the inhabitants replacing it with the *Jizya* tax; the second, ‘was truly paradoxical’ Luttwak writes, ‘by imposing discriminatory rules on all non-Muslims, the Muslim Arabs ended the arbitrary religious persecutions that had recently oppressed the majority of the inhabitants of Syria and Egypt.’⁵⁷ The Muslims thereby neutralised any form of hostility from the conquered peoples and ‘paradoxically’ gained their acceptance as the new legitimate political authority.

⁵⁴ Luttwak (2011), pp.198-9

⁵⁵ Quigley (2013), pp.719-20

⁵⁶ Luttwak (2011), p.199

⁵⁷ Ibid., p.199, 201-11; see also Donner (2012), pp.108-111; Quigley (2013), p.720

This pattern of political victory seems to have been a consistent trend that accompanied Muslim expansions continuing for over a century, such that, as Blankinship writes, the norm was ‘Once Muslim rule was established it faced little actual resistance from its inhabitants’.⁵⁸ This trend was in some instances even more pronounced and evidently demonstrated by the case of the willingness of the newly conquered Jews and Christians in conquered regions of Syria to bear arms and fight alongside the Muslims to defend the conquered territories from renewed Byzantine assaults.⁵⁹ In the Caucasus region, territory was contested between the Byzantine and Sassanid empires, and just as in Syria and Iraq, the conquering Muslims were received with a sense of relief from their previous Byzantine, Sassanid, and Khazar subjugators as their political demands were relatively modest, disposing the local population toward them.⁶⁰

This paradoxical development affords explanation, where the more traditional thesis of the ‘violent conquest model’⁶¹ is commonly advanced. This hypothesis suggests that the initial successes of Abu Bakr’s policies to strike against the Arab tribes in Byzantine Syria and Sasanian Mesopotamia created a certain lust for battle that Abu Bakr’s successors would continue implicitly ascribing imperial ambitions to the *Futuh*. The model supposes that defensive resistance by the local populations were met with crushing military response. However, the major problem with this line of argument according to Donner is that literary accounts recorded by predominately Near Eastern Christian writers of wanton Muslim bloodlust finds no archeological evidence of widespread destruction despite archeological explorations to find them.⁶²

[E]arlier generations of European scholars believed that conversion to Islam were made at the point of the sword, and that conquered peoples were given the choice of conversion or death. It is now apparent that conversion by force, while not unknown in Muslim countries, was, in fact, rare. Muslim conquerors ordinarily wished

⁵⁸ Blankinship (1994), p.23

⁵⁹ *BLD*, pp.210-11; *IK.*, p.239

⁶⁰ Qurbanov (2010), p.114, 116

⁶¹ Donner (2012), p.107

⁶² *Ibid.*, pp.106-7

to dominate rather than convert, and most conversions to Islam were voluntary.⁶³

In fact, the archeological data suggests the contrary, and sociological evidence has arrived at a similar conclusion that the Muslim conquerors did not invade, rape, and pillage the territories they seized. Instead, all historical records unanimously record that conversions were, as Kennedy writes, a ‘long-drawn-out process, and it was not until the tenth and eleventh centuries that the majority of the population[s] was converted to Islam. Conquest and settlement took only a decade; conversion of the majority took three hundred years.’⁶⁴ Furthermore, archeological discoveries have revealed that the religious infrastructures of competing faiths were not destroyed, such as churches and synagogues, and even pagan establishments.

These facts overwhelmingly suggest a consistent application of the Da’wa policy as an indifferent means of intervention whereby politico-strategic control was sought over religious conversion or imposition.⁶⁵ The implementation of the Shari‘a in conquered lands was as much a matter of law and order as it was a symbol of power and victory for the *absolute Jihad*. Thus the population was not targeted once the imposition of the Shari‘a had been established. It can be confidently stated that the extreme ends of extermination or even genocide were never considered as strategic goals and in distinct contradiction of the aims of the *da’wa* that was the foundational philosophy of the policy. Accordingly, in its ideation, the policy was not directed towards resources or territory, it was about the people, keeping alive a sense of hope that they would emancipate their hearts to God, and therefore it was never a strategic option to consider extermination when employing Jihad on the offensive.

The emancipatory zeal to ‘liberate’ the non-Muslim lands from the tyranny and oppression of their human masters is a rational and parsimonious explanation for the credibility of the *Futuh* as a matter of policy. Of course, this does not mean that all those who served in the Muslim armies shared such lofty ideals. ‘Although we cannot hope to explain the mystery of human faith, however, we can point to its undeniable

⁶³ Lapidus (2002), p.198

⁶⁴ Kennedy (2007), p.6 and 63

⁶⁵ Bonney (2004), p.64; see also Blankinship (1994), p.22

role in human affairs;’ Donner writes, there are numerous examples in the Arabic literature, attesting to the fact that whilst many did fight for the sake of plunder, many did not, yet, ‘even if not every Muslim was so inspired, there can be little doubt that some Muslims, in their zeal to do well by the new religious and social dispensation of Islam, would have clung firm to the Islamic state and fought for its interests to the death.’⁶⁶

Rather Jihad was a means of limited war, and political emancipation became a known feature of the Muslim conquests. The process of creating and expanding a new nation is often achieved through destroying the indigenous people of the lands that have been conquered; the Muslim practice shows the complete opposite. Given a growing reputation for better socio-political treatment, it is not implausible to posit that domestic resistance was weak or non-existent in many cases on account of Muslim popular reputation. Van Evera predicts that popular regimes have a greater momentum of the offense for both conquest and self-defense than unpopular regimes, whereby conquest becomes easier because of domestic support.⁶⁷

Muslims, that is, the Arabs, were kept separate from the conquered populations as a matter of policy during ‘Umar’s administration. They were to remain for the most part in garrisons, as an occupying force in many ways, amongst their respective tribes that had been resettled to the particular location.⁶⁸ The administration of local systems was left to the conquered peoples themselves, with taxation the primary interest of the Arabs. Since the socio-economic advantages were still too early to be recognised owing in large part to the fact that the Muslims had not yet become the regional hegemon, and given that conversion was not compulsory, the conquered population were generally happier than they had been prior to the Muslim arrival.

Politically, such as states today seek to expand their own ideologies with an infused character of ‘righteousness’ that, self-legitimizes the use of violence for the ends of its establishment; the Da’wa policy and interventionism (a euphemism then, and today, for aggressive expansionism) was justified on account of righteous emancipation from

⁶⁶ Ibid., p.256; see also Kennedy (2007), pp.51, 63; see also *I.K.*, pp.109-112; *BLD*, pp.412-13

⁶⁷ Van Evera (2004), p.241

⁶⁸ Quigley (2013), pp.721-2

the tyranny of human law. As such, Jihad as an instrument of foreign policy (Da'wa) outwardly returned to a closer rendition of the Prophetic approach than it had been as a function of security. Jihad was realigned to the theological imperative of *absolute Jihad* horizontally expressed as limited war.

5.6. Stage Two - Political Stability (640 - 644)

By way of concluding our exploration of the *Futuh*, we must therefore dissect the Da'wa policy further and answer the primary research questions 1-4.⁶⁹ To recap our examinations thus far, we have proposed that the true investigative value of the *strategic dynamics* of Jihad during the Caliphate of 'Umar resides in interplay of domestic political developments alongside the perception of an imminent security dilemma with the regional powers (sub-investigative question c.). The resulting *Futuh* campaigns were not designed to advance territorial conquests *per se* (sub-investigative question d.) and whilst the belief in Providence certainly emboldened the war effort, Jihad was more broadly a consequence of the Muslims entering the systemic space and coming to terms with the anarchic environment (sub-investigative question b.).

Additionally, the effects of the policy at local and domestic levels were positive; with domestic audiences supporting the expansions and local conquered populations expressing little to no resistance thus affording successive strings of political and military victories.⁷⁰ Tracing the *strategic dynamics* thus far has revealed that the Da'wa policy absorbed the security policy designed by Abu Bakr and subordinated warfighting in the name of *Jihad fi sabil l'Allah* to foreign policy goals. However, developments in the domestic strategic setting also generated a new and un-named socio-political policy of resettlement.⁷¹

⁶⁹ This section is also an in-depth elaboration of sub-investigative question c.

⁷⁰ Greater discussion of this point is to follow.

⁷¹ References to resettlement are designated as '*hijra*' or migrations such as that undertaken by the Prophet during the *maghazi*. Was this a means of identifying the connection to Precedent or simply the application of its conventional linguistic meaning to the act, it is not clear. See Hodgson (1977), p.211

5.6.1. The Resettlement Policy

Although writers have discussed resettlement policies during this period,⁷² they have not been connected for the purposes of politico-strategic design. Such an insight is acutely strategic because the foundational interpretation is trinitarian. Because the policy is never explicitly mentioned but only described, the early Muslim historians have not discussed explanations for its origin. It is proposed in this study that the resettlement policy was in fact a stealth policy of pacification by demographic redistribution, only made apparent by the passage of time. The resettlement policy that began during the Caliphate of ‘Umar would continue to be implemented throughout the remaining *Rashidun* and Umayyad Caliphates up until the ‘Abbasid Dynasty.⁷³ The resettlement policy served to develop the evolving *dar al-Islam* by extending political control over the disparate Arab tribes that had been pacified by Abu Bakr’s security policy and subordinating them to the structures of a developing military establishment.⁷⁴

The previously autonomous tribes were, through resettlement, absorbed into the political directives of the Da’wa policy. The power struggles of the later Caliphates would be accentuated by the implementation of this policy on account of the discrepancies in socio-economic benefits and privileges that accompanied resettlements.⁷⁵ But for now, let us now examine the internal mechanics of the policy to better understand how and why it developed.

5.6.2. Origins

The origin of the policy begin with events in Persia with the defeated Sassanid King Yazdegerd III who had fled Persia following the defeats of his armed forces at Nahavand in 640; attempted to reunite the Persians and force battle upon the emerging Muslim power in the region by inciting attacks from within recently conquered localities such as Bosrah, which was now under Muslim control.⁷⁶

⁷² In particular see Donner (1981); Qurbanov (2010); Hallaq (2005); Quigley (2013); Hodgson (1977).

⁷³ Qurbanov (2010), p.114

⁷⁴ Donner (1981), p.265

⁷⁵ These events are to be discussed in the subsequent chapters.

⁷⁶ I.K., p.160

The region, which had various non-Persian communities, such as the Kurds in Ahwaz, was requested to assist in the balancing.⁷⁷ However, the *paradoxical* consequence of Yazdegerd's continued efforts to incite the local populations to rise up against the Muslims was to change the resettlement policy of 'Umar. Previously, it had not been policy to encourage Arab resettlement into the new territories, but with sustained provocative propaganda being used by Yazdegerd throughout the region it was feared that a general uprising coming from the non-Arabs was a potential threat.⁷⁸

'Umar, under the counsel of one of his advisers Ahnaf ibn Qays, instituted a new policy in 640⁷⁹ of settling the Arabs in newly conquered territories as a means of combating the anti-Muslim sentiment that might otherwise grow.⁸⁰ Accordingly, it was the change in policy that would have a greater influence on the continued expansions, especially because shifting Muslim populations to the new territories reduced logistical burdens. 'Umar, used the resettlement policy designed with Ahnaf ibn Qays, to make strategic strongholds within the new territories to be used as springboards for continued expansions.⁸¹ This practice would continue well into the following caliphate with 'Uthman, continuing the population resettlement policy, transferring large segments of the Muslim population from Bosrah to the Levant and Egypt to balance the local populations where some local dissent had begun to arise.⁸²

The resettlement of the nomadic tribes from within Arabia into the newly conquered territories and the newly emerging frontiers, took place alongside the garrison (sing. *misr*, pl. *amsar*) developments and distributions that occurred across the new territories. Most notably, beginning in Iraq with Basra in 635, followed by Kufa, then Jabiya in Syria, Fustat in Egypt, and Qayrawan in Tunisia.⁸³

⁷⁷ Ibid., p.158

⁷⁸ Rahman (2003), p.69

⁷⁹ The timing of the policy incidentally occurs within a several months after Khalid's permanent discharge from the Muslim armed forces, suggesting the planning for the policy had begun earlier that year perhaps with the onset of stirring domestic discontent.

⁸⁰ I.K., p.163

⁸¹ Ibid., p.165

⁸² Ibid., p.260 – the event took place in 655.

⁸³ Quigley (2013), p.724; Hallaq (2005), p.30

Of contemporary authors and works written in the English language, Fred Donner has been the most influential source of analysis concerning the origins of the Islamic state, the conquests, and the shifting demographics of the region.⁸⁴ It is difficult not to depend on his works as a foundation for historiographical information. However, his studies on the matter are intended to serve historiography not strategic analysis, rendering them extremely useful but at the same time deficient in the answers a strategic theorist searches for. Thus we shall propose a set of politico-strategic interpretations of the policy continuing upon the analysis presented so far, based in large part by default upon Donner's studies. The politico-strategic features of the resettlement policy of 'Umar can be interpreted and summarised as four distinct vectors:

1. Systemic Projection of Military Force
2. Islamic Propaganda (*da'wa*)
3. Security protocol
4. Policing

5.6.3. Systemic Projection of Military Force

Firstly, and arguably the most demonstrative feature of the Da'wa policy, was the strategic objective of dispersing latent military force within and across the new territories as a buffer, but also as a force multiplier to support and augment the Muslim troops in those regions. This meant that not only could those troops be redeployed without leaving a vacuum, but also that they were not isolated from their language, customs, and culture even if foreign tribes were resettled in the same locale.⁸⁵ Additionally, garrisons effectively facilitated the bounding of troops from one area to another thus easing the logistical burdens of supply and deployment as a network of garrisons streamlined the movement of soldiers from newly acquired towns and regions to the next. Donner, explaining it as follows, has noted this feature:

⁸⁴ Donner (1981), (1998), (2008), (2012)

⁸⁵ Quigley (2013), p.723; Hodgson (1977), p.207

On the way to the front, the core forces so assembled were also able to raise further recruits as they passed through the territories of various tribes and could contact the tribesmen at the wells and towns they frequented. These recruited tribesmen were not simply a horde wandering aimlessly toward the Fertile Crescent, furthermore, but were organized into contingents of a relatively well-coordinated army whose objectives and general movements were established by the ruling elite.⁸⁶

Hence, garrisons were in effect forward operating bases (FOB) that were necessary to push new frontiers in the Muslim expansion: ‘The Arabs only occupied the most important places in the conquered lands, while small groups of soldiers defended the transportation routes; the rest of the army, its greatest part, continued to fight.’⁸⁷ The net political outcome was a chain of political control that continued to direct military operations extending from Medina into Syria, Iraq, and then north into the Caucasus; and as far east as China; and as far west as North Africa.

5.6.4. The Hunt for Yazdegerd

An example of this ability to systematically project force deep into new frontiers is found in the hunt for Yazdegerd. The successful expansions into Persia forced Yazdegerd to flee Persia with the Muslim armies in pursuit following the Battle of Nahavand. As Yazdegerd took flight from one city to another, the Muslim armed forces chased and conquered the cities on his trail, creating FOBs in their wake.⁸⁸ When the Muslims, under the orders of ‘Umar, continued expansion beyond the territory of Persia into Khurasan territories, it was a continuation of policy to deny Yazdegerd any gains in his lost territories, but also to reduce the strategic depth between the Muslims who were still predominately located in Arabia and the frontiers.⁸⁹

⁸⁶ Donner (1981), p.253

⁸⁷ Qurbanov (2010), p.117

⁸⁸ See Kennedy (2007), pp.182-91

⁸⁹ *I.K.*, p.211

Yazdegard sought the help of regional powers, writing to the king of the Turks, the King of Sughad (the Principality of Chaghaniyan), and the emperor of China.⁹⁰ Ibn Kathir notes that the Turks assisted and fought alongside Yazdegard but retreated after citing over-extension and the belief that victory would not be possible; the King of Sughad⁹¹ sent supplies and some soldiers to bolster Yazdegard's forces but nothing more; and the Chinese Emperor sent an envoy who, after compiling a report on the Muslim forces for the Emperor, returned to Yazdegard with the advice that he could not win and should seek a diplomatic settlement. The Emperor feared that direct involvement would bring the military situation to his borders also.⁹² Yazdegard's flight would continue into the reign of the following Caliph, until he died.⁹³ The point of interest is the continued projection of military force that the resettlement policy afforded in tandem with the development of garrison networks that was able to project orders from Medina all the way into Khurasan, the Caucasus, and to the borders of China.

5.6.5. Islamic Mission (*da'wa*)

Secondly, 'as Muslims,' Hodgson explains, 'the Arabs were not merely an army of occupation. They were also representatives of God's good order among mankind, founded on adherence to His revelation.'⁹⁴ Hence, the motive to embed an 'Islamic' presence in the new territories as a means of applying soft-power for the purposes of religious and political propaganda was the second strategic feature of the policy.⁹⁵ We have already indirectly discussed this area under section 5.4., nonetheless, a few additional comments may be made.

The intended targets of the resettlement policy were the resettled Arabs who were mostly new Muslims, and predominantly from nomadic backgrounds. Religion was used as a means to assist the transition and enforce military discipline within the garrisons,⁹⁶ most importantly 'by providing organizational goals that were supratribal in the context of a justifying ideology.'⁹⁷

⁹⁰ Ibid., p.212

⁹¹ Sughd is the land of Soghdia, which is north of the Hissar Mountains in modern Uzbekistan. See Kennedy (2007), pp.230-1

⁹² *I.K.*, pp.212-14

⁹³ See Kennedy (2007), p.191

⁹⁴ Hodgson (1977), p.208

⁹⁵ Ibid., pp.199, 209

⁹⁶ Hallaq (2005), p.31; Hodgson (1977), pp.209-10

⁹⁷ Donner (1981), p.258

Qurbanov, in discussing the effects of the resettlement policy notes the same intentions that were identifiable in the Caucasus regions of expansion such as Azerbaijan (which was acquired during the administration of ‘Uthman), writing:

The Arabs also conducted a resettlement policy and territorial expansion was directly associated with spreading their religion. The conquerors wanted the Muslims, with their way of life, traditions, and views, to coexist with the indigenous people; this is precisely how Islam was spread.⁹⁸

Hence, there is a direct connection between our exploration of Hypothesis A & C since the belief in Providence contributed to the political policy of domestic non-interventionism.

5.6.6. Security Protocol

Critically, the transformation of the security policy to a protocol of resettlement has been often overlooked in relation to the continued success of the *Futuh*. Arab migration during the administration of ‘Umar was clearly intended to serve as an alternative means of continuing the security policies of Abu Bakr. The short-term measures that Abu Bakr had implemented in the wake of his decisive victories over the *Ridda* rebels were not sustainable. ‘Umar (in counsel with his advisors), initiated the mass resettlements to recruit and enhance military strength rather than allow the subjugated tribes to become idle or attempt to regroup for subversive insurrection.

Sometime prior to The Battle of Nihavand ‘Umar took counsel with his administration on the possibility of leading the army against the Persians in what would be recorded in the Arabic annals as ‘the victory of victories’⁹⁹ so decisive was the battle. However, he was persuaded otherwise, on the basis that should he leave Medina there would be uprisings from the Arab tribes in the Najd (central Arabia, including modern-day Riyadh).¹⁰⁰

⁹⁸ Qurbanov (2010), p.115

⁹⁹ Rahman (2003), p.71

¹⁰⁰ *BLD*, p.471

Four years earlier, ‘Umar had expressed a similar desire to join the expeditions against the Byzantines and the Persians, and was warned by ‘Ali ibn Abu Talib: ‘If you depart from this land, the Arabs will rise up against you from all quarters,’¹⁰¹ suggesting the continued management of the Arabs was a matter of policy not resolution. Therefore, the concerns of Abu Bakr’s security policy were maintained albeit while being implemented differently. Garrisons served in a secondary capacity as a means to monitor and control the resettled tribes who were the instrumental conduits for the Da’wa policy’s implementation. Consequently, under the cover of the Da’wa policy, problematic Bedouin tribes were resettled away from the centre of government in Arabia and to the frontiers where their energies could be used to serve policy and not disrupt it.

5.6.7. Policing

The final feature of the resettlement policy, was of course a means of enforcing politico-military control over the territories, this was the enforcement and collection of taxes or the *Jizya* or taxation from the local non-Muslims. Donner writes:

It is generally agreed that the garrisons were established primarily to control the non-Arab populations of the conquered domains, to defend Arabia from invasion by either the Byzantines or the Sasanians, and to function as the springboards for further Islamic campaigns into yet unsubdued areas.¹⁰²

Where local uprisings or rebellions occurred, such as in the Caucasus¹⁰³ the resettlement of Arabs meant that they were in effect a strategic reserve to the stationed troops: ‘The Arab settlement zone covered territory from the south to the north; Islamic armies were deployed in the central cities, strategically important districts, and in places where there were potential military threats.’¹⁰⁴ This meant that not only were lines of political communication constant such that ‘Umar was aware of

¹⁰¹ Buti (2007), p.617

¹⁰² Donner (1981), p.266

¹⁰³ Qurbanov (2010), p.115

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., p.116

events taking place so far away, but also that taxation could be recorded and collected systematically with minimal disruption.¹⁰⁵

Lastly, and most obviously, the garrison network served as frontline defences, especially those in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt against Sasanian or Byzantine aggression.¹⁰⁶ Hodgson notes that 'Each garrison town was situated for maximum military effectiveness-normally near enough to the desert that a potential retreat thither remained open.'¹⁰⁷ Aside from the desire to recapture lost territory, an even more pressing reason for expected aggression from the empires was the cost of the newly acquired territories that had conferred control of the trade routes across the grasslands. Now, the *dar al-Islam* could not only hold to ransom trade from east to west, but also from the south (the Yemen) to north.

5.6.8. The Resettlement Policy as Political Stability Programme

The resettlement policy then can be seen as a means to support the Da'wa policy by means of continued pacification with the long-term objective of creating enduring unification amongst the Arab tribes through a unifying faith in Islam. As expansions were sustained, continued material prosperity afforded the administration the resources to countermand traditional tribal loyalties for the 'greater good' of the policy.¹⁰⁸

Understanding the strategic setting and the dynamics that existed in the environment since the administration of Abu Bakr and then that of 'Umar, provides a more convincing explanation of the strategic interests that retrospectively advanced Islamic expansion with such momentum following the death of the Prophet. What is often explained as an unforeseen explosion of invasion and conquest out of the deserts of Arabia is in fact quite the opposite, and our investigations has explicitly shown they were, 'necessary for straightforward political and strategic reasons.'¹⁰⁹ Unfortunately, this particular facet of the conquests has received virtually no academic attention bar that detailed by Donner.

¹⁰⁵ *I.K.*, p.157

¹⁰⁶ Donner (1981), p.267

¹⁰⁷ Hodgson (1977), p.208

¹⁰⁸ Donner (1981), p.258

¹⁰⁹ *Ibid.*, p.101

5.7. The Trinitarian Imperative for Resettlement

Whilst we have illustrated the politico-strategic features of the resettlement policy, it remains to be explained *how* ‘Umar was able to demographically displace large segments of the tribal populations from their traditional desert territories. Whilst this may seem somewhat superfluous to events, it saliently demonstrates the strict attention to detail that strategic theoretics demands in the analysis of *bargaining dynamics*. As shall become clearer in the following chapters, the policies, whether Da’wa or resettlement, are forged in the heat of *politik*.

5.7.1. Controlling Blind Forces and the Play of Chance and Probability

The massive expansions that had taken place within the first six years of ‘Umar’s administration were so profound as to have shifted the balance of power in favour of the Muslim presence in the region.¹¹⁰ Now as an established regional actor with a growing garrison network and massive territories to administer alongside their populations, the continued expansions required increasing amounts of manpower simply to maintain the acquired territories.

The resettlement policy provided two very important strategic solutions to ‘Umar’s administration. Firstly, resettlement under the cover of the Da’wa policy could be used to re-integrate the former *Ridda* tribes that had been subdued and effectively humiliated into the new unified Arab-Muslim community. A chieftain could through resettling his entire tribe, not only distance his tribe from their current state of inferiority in the midst of victorious loyalists; but the move also held the potential for tribal redemption and restored reputation in living memory through the participation in military victories.¹¹¹ This possibility provided powerful incentives for former rebel-apostate tribes not only to accept military service and excel,¹¹² but also to voluntarily uproot themselves from their traditional homelands into foreign territories.¹¹³

Secondly, the resettlement policy served to strategically placate the ability of the former rebel tribes to re-group and pose a continued threat to the Medinan government. ‘Umar used the cover of the Da’wa policy alongside a political technique

¹¹⁰ See 5.2.

¹¹¹ Donner (1981), p.259

¹¹² Ibid., p.253

¹¹³ Ibid., p.265

instituted and crafted by the Prophet known as *ta'lif al-qulub* – or ‘reconciliation of hearts’.¹¹⁴ The first stage was to align the goals of the Da’wa with the loyalties of the rebel tribes to ensure cooperation. This was achieved through the same avenues as those directed towards the loyalist tribes that were, via guaranteed stipends and religious exhortation to the meta-narrative of *absolute Jihad* and *Jihad fi sabil l’Allah*.

Hence, ‘Umar established ‘a system of stipends or direct salary payments (*‘ata*) to warriors serving in the Islamic armies,’ and with characteristic diligence ensured that payments were predictable in order to create ‘a direct and enduring link between the interests of those recruited into the Islamic armies and the interests of the state and the ruling elite in a way that merely sharing in the distribution of booty from a successful campaign could not.’¹¹⁵ The strategic result was that rebellion or desertion by a tribe would result potentially, in a zero-sum outcome - in effect to lose a handsome and consistent stipend.

The second stage combined the first with a focus on buying the tribal chieftains themselves, or their loyalty at least. The promise of additional booty, or ‘by granting them special gifts of land to be held as private estates; these appear to have been larger tracts than the [...] lands distributed to the ordinary tribesmen.’¹¹⁶ The logic was simple enough; the tribe would rebel only in accordance with the political strategy of their elders. If the Medinan polity satisfied the interests of the chiefs, then they had no reason to rebel or to encourage rebellious behaviour from within. In fact, it would be in their interests to ensure the loyalty of their tribal members.

Additionally, they could present a degree of *largesse* to their tribe that would appear to be from their own fortunes (but in reality a simple redistribution of the secret payments made to them) to encourage warfighting to meet the objectives of the Medinan polity in difficult terrain or environments. Thus, ‘Umar’s administration of the *diwan* served as a register of the military payroll, that was used to bind the loyalty of the tribal chiefs to the objectives of the Da’wa policy.

¹¹⁴ Ibid., p.259

¹¹⁵ Donner (1981), p.257

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p.259

By buying out the tribal chiefs, ‘Umar ‘increased the status of the tribal leaders and their ability to command and control the tribesmen under them.’ In doing so, ‘Umar drove a new bargain that ‘attempted to tie tribal leaders to the state by special acts of favoritism and to exploit the nexus of tribal allegiances focused on them to the advantage of the state.’¹¹⁷ Consequently, the central government was able to effectively recruit ‘nomadic tribesmen into the Islamic armies and ensure their settlement in garrison towns away from the desert and the home territories of their tribes.’¹¹⁸ Thus, the new bargain enhanced the military strength of the army whilst simultaneously decreasing the military power available for rebellion.

5.7.2. The Resettlement Policy as Military Enrichment Programme

We have proposed that the resettlement policy was a function of grand strategy promoted via the Da’wa policy. Rational calculation was used to manage the variables of the military establishment via the resettlement of the Arab population to curb the propensity of blind forces escalating and also to manage friction that accompanied it. Additionally, social-cultural friction was de-escalated by resettlement, as well as enhancing the efficiency of military capabilities and force projection. The resettlement policy was a very shrewd strategic policy that began after effectively conquering both Syria and Iraq, establishing dominance in the region.

‘Umar having permanently retired Khalid ibn al-Walid, filled his void with massive manpower to enhance combat operations as he set his sights on destroying Sassanid power and taking Persia proper. The consequences of this form of enrichment shall be discussed in the following chapter, however it is important to note that these actions were *symptomatic* and fall within the remit of Hypothesis I, concerning the development of military power. The remaining years of ‘Umar’s administration were thus extremely politically stable, popular, and prosperous as continued political and military victories ensued until his death.

¹¹⁷ Donner (1981), pp.261-2

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p.265

5.8. Final Conclusions

The evolution of Jihad, it is argued in this chapter, during the administration of ‘Umar was a direct consequence of the policies that not only directed it - the Da’wa policy - but also additional policies that were a sub-function of the Da’wa itself. The military expansions that resulted were the consequences of systemic pressures that drove, in part, the evolution of Jihad as a continuation of *politik*. The domestic politico-military relations of the new Muslim community drove deeper creative political responses by ‘Umar’s administration, rather than the battlefield exploits of the Muslim armies during the *Futuh*. The Caliphate of ‘Umar does reveal a second evolution in the *strategic dynamics* of Jihad, which would be lasting, and eventually enshrined into legal code by the later jurisconsults. This evolution was a consequence of policies implemented by Abu Bakr that was in turn, inextricably bound to the mission and policies of the Prophet. The dynamism behind the successive evolutions between administrations therefore reveals an escalating relationship between the influence of the strategic setting and the inherited strategic environment of each period.

Despite episodes of vast expansions, our trinitarian interpretation of events has revealed the subtle complexities involved in the *strategic dynamics* of Jihad that are often lost in the customary historical recollection of victories, chronology, and the naming of generals. The Caliphate of ‘Umar is by far the most politically sophisticated tenure of the *Rashidun* era, whereas Abu Bakr’s regime was by far the most militant. However, in each case, we see the development of policy as a reaction to domestic *political bargaining* moves, that is, not as the will of one man alone. Accordingly, the *strategic dynamics* of *Jihad fi sabil l’Allah* was continually evolving on the basis of horizontal and pragmatic socio-political developments that resulted in offensive strategic and military decisions as opposed to theological imperatives.

CHAPTER SIX

6.0. The Vicissitudes of Jihad (644 - 661)

The Caliphate of ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan (644-656), is the penultimate administration of the *Rashidun* period. Fraught with political reverberations from his predecessors, the *strategic dynamics* of Jihad during his administration altered little from the trajectory set by ‘Umar. The last Caliphate of the Rashidun era is that of ‘Ali (656-661) and is more commonly known as the period of *Fitna*, or the First Civil War in Islamic history, which is the final theme of the *Rashidun* era. The research questions addressed in this chapter are a continuation of those set on the *strategic dynamics* of Jihad from the previous administration, in particular the broader issues of Jihad as a continuation of *politik*.

6.1. Preliminaries

The second half of the *Rashidun* period is extremely contentious and religiously sensitive amongst Muslims. The drama that unfolds concerning the accusations of socio-political impropriety on the part of ‘Uthman, the events surrounding his death, the ‘election’ of ‘Ali ibn Abu Talib to office, and the ensuing Civil War; has become so politicised with several hundred of years of propaganda from both defendants and detractors of various allegiances that it is difficult to be certain how much of what has been recorded is actually the case.

Although it stands to reason that even lies require some truth to circulate, the historical sources cannot be discounted as completely false either. Our approach in this study has been to accept the records as they stand since strategic examination is distinct from historiography and textual analysis. Thomas Schelling explains best the approach of strategic theorists to issues such as these, since strategic analysis is: ‘usually about the situation, not the individuals – about the structure of incentives, of information and communication, the choices available, and the tactics that can be employed.’¹ Thus far we have remained firm to this principle in our treatment of the *maghazi*, *Ridda* Wars, and the *Futuh* and continue so in this chapter.

¹ Schelling (1984), pp.198-9

6.2. The Caliphate of ‘Uthman ibn ‘Affan (644 – 656)

‘Uthman ibn Affan (d. 656) was one of the earliest converts to Islam, having been converted to Islam by non-other than Abu Bakr himself.² ‘Uthman was also the son-in-law to the Prophet twice over and a close confidant.³ His clan, Banu Umayya, was a sub-clan of the prominent Banu Abd Shams clan of the Quraysh.⁴ Most of the Prophet’s feud with the Quraysh was during the leadership of Abu Sufyan ibn Harb (d. 650/2), the head of Banu Abd Shams who became the unofficial leader of the Quraysh following the death of al-Walid ibn al-Mughairah after the Battle of Badr in 624.⁵ Banu Abd Shams was from the elite clans of the Quraysh. Consequently, ‘Uthman’s heritage was one accustomed to politics, and wealth, for he himself had been an extremely wealthy merchant prior to spending all his wealth during the *maghazi*.⁶ ‘Uthman had also served as an advisor to both Abu Bakr and ‘Umar.⁷

In 644, during the pre-dawn prayers (*fajr*) in Medina, an assassination attempt upon ‘Umar left him critically injured and dying.⁸ At ‘Umar’s request, the tribal elders of the Arab tribes were to vote and elect his successor at the time of his imminent death.⁹ Unsurprisingly, ‘Uthman was elected, a decision that echoed the faith placed in a man from Banu Umayya to lead, over the other candidates that included ‘Ali ibn Abu Talib, of the Banu Hashim and relative of the Prophet.¹⁰ The decision not to elect ‘Ali, a constant grievance of his supporters (the *shi‘at ul-‘Ali*),¹¹ was a clear sign that early Islam functioned according to political decision-making over irrational forces or genealogical claims.¹²

² As-Sallabi (2007a), p.18

³ Madelung (2001), pp.78-80

⁴ As-Sallabi (2007a), p.11

⁵ See 3.5.5.

⁶ Madelung (2001), pp.78-80; As-Sallabi (2007a), pp.17-8

⁷ As-Sallabi (2007a), pp.73-80

⁸ Buti (2007), pp.619-20; Rahman (2003), p.73

⁹ I.K., p.224; Buti (2007), pp.620-3

¹⁰ I.K., pp.233-7; Rahman (2003), p.74; As-Sallabi (2007a), pp.103-9; Quigley (2013), p.735

¹¹ Madelung (2001), pp.1-18; As-Sallabi (2007a), pp.99-103; Hodgson (1977), p.212

¹² Madelung (2001), pp.70-3; Donner (2012), p.147; Quigley (2013), p.706

6.3. Period One - A Continuation of Policy by the Same Means

The link between the *maghazi* and the administration of Abu Bakr has been well established in Chapter 4. Furthermore, we have already explained in the previous chapter how ‘Umar attempted to balance the inherited domestic environment and manage the strategic setting, whilst contending with the consequences of the extended security policy which had caught the attention of the regional powers at that point. The initial *Futuh* up until 640, wherein the resettlement policy came into being, were a continuation of policy derived from the security policy of Abu Bakr albeit in new theatres and against the backdrop of systemic strategic settings. The new policy of Da’wa balanced a volatile security policy by rooting its aims in limited war. Thereafter, in order to maintain the delicate domestic peace, ‘Umar developed a grand strategic doctrine that attempted to achieve a trinitarian harmony of interests according to events on the ground that were married to systemic interactions. The grand strategic Da’wa policy or the ‘*Umar Doctrine*’ henceforth, was used to not only promote the *absolute Jihad*, but to enhance Trinitarian harmony through *Jihad fi sabil l’Allah*.

Just as the *Ridda* Wars had cleared the way for ‘Umar’s strategy of limited war – the *Futuh*; the initial Da’wa policy was a consequence of a pacified internal security environment inherited from Abu Bakr. The ‘*Umar Doctrine*’ effectively consolidated pacification of the problematic tribes and secured cooperation, thereby creating firm political stability within the Muslim community. ‘Uthman inherited a domestic setting that was enjoying virtually no internal dissidence or rebellion to his authority or existing policies. Consequently, the utility of force and the central concerns of security for the emerging *dar al-Islam* were restrictive and bound to a tighter calculus of balanced escalation and diplomatic avenues as set by the ‘*Umar Doctrine*’ and the Da’wa policy. Thus we can state, in relation to research question 2, that the first period of ‘Uthman’s administration was clearly a continuation of the Da’wa policy and *strategic dynamics* of Jihad. Clearly a consistent link existed so as to establish that the evolving *strategic dynamics* affected Jihad as a mechanism for policy.

This pattern of *strategic dynamics* affecting Jihad extended to ‘Uthman’s administration also, at least to begin with. In his first official communications with the Military establishment ‘Uthman sent letters to the commanders posted in the various garrisons and on the frontiers

You are the guardians of the Muslims and their shield. ‘Umar gave you a particular mission which is not hidden from us, rather it is known to everyone. I do not want to hear that any one of you has changed the deal, lest Allah replace you with someone else. So watch what you do and I shall try my best to fulfill the mission that Allah has enjoined on me.¹³

The content suggests a continuation of the Da’wa policy, with the trajectory of military action and pre-planned missions to continue without alteration. By ‘known to everyone’ it is clear this is in reference to ‘Umar’s *shura* council, which was the foundation of his administration and of which ‘Uthman had been part. Hence, ‘Uthman had inherited ‘Umar’s position in full knowledge of the policies in place and future mission planning that had been discussed or ordered. ‘Uthman’s warning of replacement is further evidence to the effect that strategic planning and military action was to continue without amendment and that he backed the strategies and policies that were in place.¹⁴ The reference to himself, is furthermore a reiteration and reassurance to the military establishment that he was aware of the shoes he had to fill, and would support them as ‘Umar had done so.¹⁵ The salient feature of this communication was plausibly to encourage the status quo by policy through action that would take place between administrations and to assuage any fears.

6.3.1. The Systemic Strategic Setting

‘Uthman’s inheritance of the *dar al-Islam* did not result in any significant shifts in foreign policy itself, although new events transpiring on the systemic stage forced ‘Uthman to undertake (or more accurately permit,) new forms of military activity.

¹³ As-Sallabi (2007a), p.120

¹⁴ As-Sallabi (2007a), p.120

¹⁵ Ibid., p.202

The employment of Jihad during ‘Uthman’s administration can be reduced to four areas of dynamic systemic interactions:¹⁶

1. Pacification of local revolts and counter-insurgency operations in recently acquired Muslim territories by Persian and Byzantine instigators
2. Establishing a defense-dominant stance at borders through the establishment of border posts and garrisons
3. The continuation of expansions, in particular in those areas beyond the insurgency zones so as to prevent logistical support
4. The development of naval sea power

The second area of systemic interaction has already been discussed in the previous chapter and only a few additional comments need be made. The third and last areas of systemic interactions cover the most salient developments concerning the *strategic dynamics* of Jihad and are subject to additional offense-defense analysis.

6.3.2. Counter-insurgency Operations

In the previous chapter, we examined defensive resistance to expansion by the local population as part of an investigation of Hypothesis C of differentials for offense-dominant behaviour. The sub-premise of Hypothesis C we stated, expects fierce resistance to defensive expansionism by the local population prompting a cycle of violence. Evidently, not all subjugated regions and populations were content with Muslim rule as the counter-insurgency operations that took place during ‘Uthman’s administration indicate. These developments in the area concerning the *strategic dynamics* of Jihad were strategic interactions related to the haunting principle of **Proposition 10** of our strategic paradigm, namely Clausewitz’s warning that *the result in war is never final*.

In 645, a Byzantine attempt to recapture Alexandria from the Muslims resulted in insurrection against Muslim rule,¹⁷ allowing the Byzantines to briefly seize Alexandria again before losing it once more to a reinforced Muslim army the

¹⁶ As-Sallabi (2007a), p.242

¹⁷ Ibid., pp.283-6

following year.¹⁸ In 646, troops were dispatched from the garrison in Kufa to lead counter-insurgency operations in Azerbaijan and the region of al-Rayy (modern Dagestan),¹⁹ where peace was eventually imposed by military decision after a series of broken treaties.²⁰

Troops were also sent from Kufa to Syria, to help disrupt the influence of Byzantine subterfuge in the region.²¹ ‘Subversion’, Van Evera comments, ‘is a form of offense, and it affects international relations in the same way as do offensive military capabilities.’²² This truism explains why military force was sent to suppress a minor insurrection even though no direct Byzantine assault took place. Furthermore, in 650, counter-insurgency operations in al-Bab and Balanjar (northern Caucasus) also took place.²³ In these instances, the garrison networks were essential to the restoration of territory and the suppression of insurgency; in particular, the garrison of Kufa once again experiencing significant combat that would further battle-harden their warfighting capabilities.

Although the reasons for insurrections are not clear, with the traditional Muslim sources simply citing ‘rebellion’ rather than explain the strategic setting or socio-political grievances (if they were the issues). It is known that Cyrus of Alexandria (d. 642) had surrendered Alexandria to the Muslims without the population’s knowledge, which would plausibly explain their hostility to Muslim rule and their willingness to rebel.²⁴ What is known in principle, is that ‘Unpopular regimes are more vulnerable to subversion or revolution inspired from abroad’;²⁵ and that the instrument of war cannot confer victory or legitimacy without political credibility.²⁶ It is clear that Muslim rule during ‘Uthman’s administration did meet with some resistance and that Jihad *fi sabil l’Allah* was employed to suppress insurrection or recover lost territory.

¹⁸ *BLD*, p.351; Kennedy (2007), p.162

¹⁹ *I.K.*, p.239

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p.238

²¹ *Ibid.*, p.239; As-Sallabi (2007a), pp.243-5; Kaegi (2000), p.255

²² Van Evera (2004), p.242

²³ *BLD*, p.319; *I.K.*, p.252

²⁴ See Kennedy (2007), pp.158-60

²⁵ Van Evera (2004), p.242

²⁶ See 2.2.3. (sub-proposition B)

Three salient conclusions can be drawn on account of these interactive developments; firstly, Jihad was employed for ‘counter-insurgency’ purposes, albeit, in a manner non-distinct from previous applications of Jihad. The positive outcome of these episodes is that Jihad was used as a ‘defensive’ measure to reacquire lost territory. Secondly, through decisive victory, (or *fait accompli*²⁷ in the case of Alexandria),²⁸ the Muslims had won the right to impose terms, and held the strategic initiative over their new subjects. At some point however, they lost tactical initiative, which the local population gained thereby claiming first strikes against the Muslim authorities or being able to forge clandestine alliances with external powers.

Whilst much of the political decision-making and tactical information concerning battles during early Islam was not recorded, this curious case of the ‘initiative’ differential apparently suggests early cracks in military discipline that had been strictly regulated under ‘Umar, and previously under management of Khalid ibn al-Walid. The last point continues from the aforementioned laxity onto the second form of strategic interaction, regarding the failure in establishing complete defense-dominant border posts and garrison defenses.

6.3.3. Border Control and Defense-Dominance

Developments in areas of systemic interactions concerning the *strategic dynamics* of Jihad were not restricted to offensive military campaigns but also applied to the functions of border control zones and coast guarding known as *ribat* or *murabata* which were considered as military actions *fi sabil l’Allah*.²⁹ The garrison network established through the ‘Umar Doctrine was transforming already under ‘Uthman’s administration into less segregated establishments, in some instances into bustling zones of social interactions, in particular Kufa and Basra in Iraq; Damascus, Syria; and al-Fustat in Egypt.³⁰ The Arabs locked away in their garrisons receiving monthly stipends had money to spend, and the locals, perhaps with great curiosity, had goods to sell them.³¹

²⁷ See **Hypothesis F**

²⁸ Kennedy (2007), p.159

²⁹ Bashear (1991), pp.194-5

³⁰ As-Sallabi (2007a), p.242; Donner (1981), p.267

³¹ Quigley (2013), p.723

The policing function of the garrisons established by the ‘*Umar Doctrine*’ had also created newer, smaller outposts at the frontiers and regions less densely populated but still containing a border that required guarding. The efficiency that the garrison of Kufa in particular, demonstrated in dispatching troops to the various regions to support and suppress insurrection, fortifies the efficiency of those strategic features to which the garrisons were intended to function. However, striking failures were also apparent, such as in Alexandria where Byzantine ships were able to easily overrun the garrison; and the failure of the garrisons and *murabata* to effectively police the local populations in the Caucasus.

The deterrent purpose of the garrisons and *murabata* in some regions were clearly lacking, such that defensive strategies had to be employed so as to hold the recently acquired territories and prevent recapture. The early expansions were not quick, but rather *explosive*, and disproportionate military power ensured that the Muslims would have to fight hard for many years, and continue multiple battles before achieving decisive victory. The first two forms of strategic interaction therefore suggest that the garrisons were still developing in their efficiency of purpose but still strong enough to maintain the new status quo, thereby retaining the initiative at the strategic level. The retention of the strategic initiative resulted in an unabated continuation of the Da’wa policy.

6.3.4. Continued Expansions

The third area of systemic interaction concerned the continuation of the Da’wa policy. As explained above, the military commanders were practically left to continue with their orders from the previous administration.³² ‘Uthman, seemingly left them to indulge their military goals and roam free. Accordingly, the frontiers continued to either hold or extend, in many instances as in the case of the Armenian provinces and local territories, battle between the Muslims and the Byzantines was a matter of decades-long sustained attrition.³³ Gains were made in North Africa and Spain via Egypt, as well as further inroads into Armenia in the campaigns that started in the year 647.³⁴

³² Hodgson (1977), p.212

³³ Donner (2012), p131

³⁴ *BLD*, pp.287, 311; *I.K.*, pp.240-1; Kennedy (2007), p.207

Famously, during ‘Uthman’s tenure, the Persian highlands and Fars were consolidated (650)³⁵ and the Roman army led by Constantine II was also defeated in 653.³⁶ In 652, inroads were made into the Sudan after the defeat of the Kingdom of Makuria.³⁷ Of particular note were the extensions of the Muslim frontiers into Khurasan (modern day Afghanistan, Amu Darya and Uzbekistan,) taking Herat, Merv, and Balkh between 650-2;³⁸ moving in as far as the River Oxus (654), Makran (modern day Pakistan), and to the borders of India.³⁹

Whilst continued expansions and the creation of new frontiers certainly suggest the enduring success of the Da’wa policy; the continuation of expansions cannot be reduced to a matter of simple party-political harmony. ‘Umar had, in the last two years of his reign, halted most of the campaigns arguing that it was more prudent to consolidate before resuming *Jihad fi sabil l’Allah* again.⁴⁰ Indeed, substantive expansions did not take place during ‘Uthman’s administration relative to his predecessor.⁴¹

Hence, we might ask why the expansions continued, or why ‘Uthman did not simply halt the expansions to consolidate the vast territories already acquired as ‘Umar had begun to do?⁴² In other words, why did ‘Uthman simply continue (or resume) the policies of his predecessors? More specifically, we might recall that Abu Bakr took radical actions immediately after his appointment, and ‘Umar’s massive politico-military reforms was also an early development of his administration. However, ‘Uthman’s administration began without any significant changes such that the Da’wa continued. Addressing research question 3 specifically frames the broader context of the issues as follows: firstly, to what extent was Jihad and strategic behaviour the product of a religious worldview or, was Jihad largely determined as a result and consequence of the pressures and nature of the anarchic environment?

³⁵ Hodgson (1977), p.212

³⁶ *I.K.*, p.249

³⁷ As-Sallabi (2007a), p.287

³⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.257-60

³⁹ Rahman (2003), p.79; Kennedy (2007), p.299

⁴⁰ Kaegi (2000), p.245

⁴¹ Quigley (2013), p.724

⁴² Kaegi (2000), p.246

The investigation of the previous administration clearly resulted in the later, and it is proposed that ‘Uthman also followed suite. In strategic terms, if war is an instrument of rational calculation, it is never the first or the last resort, but rather it should be the most effective means at one’s disposal.⁴³ By adhering to the Da’wa policy, it can be argued that either ‘Uthman continued to use Jihad as part of a rational instrumentalisation of war ends that were established upon clear and attainable objectives resulting from a cost-benefit calculus of the utility of force in the strategic interactions between actors and the environment. Or, decisions were left to the military to continue implementing the Da’wa policy, thereby jeopardising the risks of escalation through non-political restraint or stewardship?⁴⁴ To provide answers to these questions, an examination of the strategic environment sheds greater clarity.

6.3.5. The Regional Strategic Environment

Shadowing almost thirty years of war, the weakened and war-weary empires of the Byzantine and Sassanids had both been left fragile and militarily vulnerable. Yet, with no tertiary power conceivably capable of posing a military threat to either spent force, a few years of peace by default was probably anticipated by all in the region. What was perhaps inconceivable however was that it would be the Arabs who would seize the strategic initiative against the great powers.

Luttwak expresses the military shock as follows: ‘In 632 when Muhammad died, no reasonable person could have foreseen that the Roman empire [sic] that had possessed Syria, Egypt, and all the lands between them for six centuries would lose every part of them by 646.’⁴⁵ The uncertainty that originated with Abu Bakr continued with his successor ‘Umar, whose stage one Da’wa policy of ‘defensive expansion’ was another unforeseen development.⁴⁶

Despite the clear avenues of exploitation into both Byzantine and Sassanid territories following the cursory military operations under Abu Bakr’s extended security policy, it was probably not considered a strategically plausible avenue of approach for the significantly weaker Muslim military to attempt to exploit which is why when the

⁴³ See 2.3.1. (see P²)

⁴⁴ See 2.3.2. (see P²: **Sub-Proposition C**)

⁴⁵ Luttwak (2011), p.199; also Robinson (2005), p.124

⁴⁶ See 4.6.2. & 5.6.2.

Muslims did, they were able to demolish their opposition fairly quickly.⁴⁷ Going head-to-head with regional powers in the face of vast discrepancies in military power could hardly have been conceivable and was largely the product of the failure to balance the strategic environment by the regional powers. By the time of ‘Uthman’s administration, the Muslims had turned over an incredible asymmetry of military power. How the Muslims did this is a vital precursor to diagnostic evaluation and testing.

6.3.6. Naval Power

The development of naval power to meet the demands of dynamic systemic interaction during the administration of ‘Uthman also provides an answer to research question 4: Can the *strategic dynamics* of Jihad explain the offensive military conquests of Islamic history within the remit of policy to facilitate a coherent explanation for the origin and evolution of warfighting? Understanding the development of the Muslim naval fleet is extremely important as it *signalled* most clearly the continuing conditions by which offense-dominance was responsible for the continuation of policy.

Mu‘awiya ibn Abu Sufyan (d. 680) was the son of Abu Sufyan ibn Harb the leading tribal chief of the Quraysh who had opposed the Prophet. He was also ‘Uthman’s cousin, and effectively became his right hand man during his administration in a manner similar to, but not as vital as, Khalid ibn al-Walid had been to Abu Bakr during his administration. Mu‘awiya had been appointed as Governor of Syria during ‘Umar’s administration,⁴⁸ and had sought to develop a naval fleet at that time. ‘Umar had flatly refused the proposal.⁴⁹ Now under ‘Uthman’s administration, Mu‘awiya sought and received permission to develop the first Muslim naval ships. These ships were invaluable in the defeat of the Byzantine attempt to recapture Alexandria in 645 following the insurrection of the population.⁵⁰

⁴⁷ Donner (1981), p.269

⁴⁸ *BLD*, p.217; Mu‘awiya had made a similar request of ‘Umar who flatly rejected the idea. See *I.K.*, p.244

⁴⁹ Kennedy (2007), p.326

⁵⁰ Rahman (2003), p.75

In 649, and thereafter, Mu‘awiya’s strategic vision to extend the Muslim projection of force began as he sought and received permission again from ‘Uthman this time to build a full naval fleet. The Navy fast became an extremely efficient force-multiplier to the projection of the Da’wa policy, and was quick to seize Cyprus, an important strategic naval base of the Byzantines.⁵¹ The navy continued to develop, capturing the Rhodes Islands in 653/4,⁵² before crushing the Byzantine naval fleet of approximately 500 warships in 655 on the coast of Lycia in the Battle of the Masts.⁵³ Since his days as Governor of Syria under ‘Umar and then ‘Uthman, Mu‘awiya had been in constant military engagement with the Byzantine armed forces.⁵⁴ His vision to create a naval fleet was therefore undeniably a strategic decision and an important evolution in the *strategic dynamics* of Jihad that would extend its application in the form of sea power. By diagnostically examining the development of naval power alongside other developments mentioned so far, the investigation can arrive at a sound diagnostic opinion regarding the strategic condition and action undertaken during the administration of ‘Uthman.

6.4. Diagnostic Evaluation

The continuation of the Da’wa policy during ‘Uthman’s administration is *signalled* and very simply explained by a cluster testing of Hypotheses C, A, and I, alongside VUCA analysis, which emphasises the role that uncertainty and fog in the strategic environment plays on decision-making by actors that subsequently determine the course of actions undertaken. As the table below shows, the prevalence of symptoms that encouraged offense-dominant behaviours were complete.

Offense-Defence Variables of Intervening Factors that lead to War⁵⁵

Actor	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
‘Uthman 644-656	✕	✕	✕	✕	✕	✕	✕	✕	✕	✕

⁵¹ I.K., p.244; Rahman (2003), pp.76-7; Kennedy (2007), pp.326-7

⁵² Kennedy (2007), p.327

⁵³ Rahman (2003), pp.80-1; Kennedy (2007), p.327

⁵⁴ Rahman (2003), p.96

⁵⁵ Key: ✕ = Primary Offense-Defense Variable of analysis ✕ = Secondary Offense-Defense Variable of analysis ● = non-applicable Offense-Defense Variable of analysis

Since ‘Uthman continued the policy of Da’wa from ‘Umar, it is not surprising that the majority of the phenomena A-J were secondary causation, that is, inherited from the previous administration, driving offense-dominant behaviour.⁵⁶

6.4.1a. ODT - D/Dx # 3. Defensive Resistance - [Hypothesis C]

Strategic interactions are never the product of one actor. ‘Umar had not created the strategic environment in which the Byzantines, for example, were operating. The strategic environment was still in flux and thus status quo actors sought to rebalance the environment along its previous configuration wherein they dominated. The rise of the Muslims as an actor in the systemic strategic environment reiterates the fog and friction at play, and brings to mind the strategic importance of acknowledging VUCA – volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity - to describe the strategic environment. The self-regulation during ‘Uthman’s administration of the strategic environment was a game of survival of the fittest. Some basic theory elucidates the sequence of events within a rational framework of expected utility of action.

‘The basic problem’ Van Evera posits ‘is that resources are more cumulative when conquest is easy. The ability to conquer others and to defend oneself is more elastic to one’s control over strategic areas and resources.’ This means that gains are more additive – ‘states can parlay small conquests into larger ones - and losses are less reversible. Hence small losses can spell one’s demise, and small gains can open the way to hegemonic dominance.’⁵⁷ Therefore, regional actors will attempt to balance the system and maintain the status quo when disturbances in the strategic environment arise, especially those that signal hegemonic ambitions. Either a defensive actor is strong enough to deter, or is defense dominant with respect to the aggressor; or states acting in concert (organised or otherwise) will attempt to maintain status quo; or a great power intervenes as an off-shore balancer.⁵⁸ ‘States therefore compete harder to control any assets that confer power, seeking wider spheres for themselves while fiercely resisting others’ efforts to expand.’⁵⁹

⁵⁶ This explains the insertion of **Hypothesis F**

⁵⁷ Van Evera (2004), p.230

⁵⁸ On the subject of regional hegemony, balance of power and balancing, a greater depth of discussion will be afforded to this area in the following chapter.

⁵⁹ Van Evera (2004), p.230

The unexpected surge from Arabia that resulted in catastrophic military defeats for both the Byzantine and Sassanids who were unable to organise and effectively deny⁶⁰ the Muslim expansions did result in the *dar al-Islam* attaining a state of regional offensive dominance over all other actors. Defensive resistance is a strategic denial of the offensive capability of the aggressor to gain momentum such that it is able to carry itself to a state of regional offensive dominance over all other actors. This is partly an extension of the premises proposed in Hypothesis A and *symptomatically* Hypothesis J.

The result of the Muslim incursions into Byzantine and Sassanid territory was to promote offense behaviours amongst status-quo states over defense.⁶¹ Some of the expected offensive reactions Jervis notes as follows:

- Become the aggressor: ‘Attacking is the best route to protecting what you have’;
- ‘Incentives to strike first will turn crises into wars.’
- ‘Decisive victories and conquests will be common.’
- ‘States will grow and shrink rapidly, and it will be hard for any state to maintain its size and influence without trying to increase them.’
- ‘Cooperation among status-quo powers will be extremely hard to achieve.’⁶²

These *symptoms* of offensive behaviour are all apparent from even a cursory reading of the historical events that ensued.⁶³ We shall not detail these since their occurrence is not the issue but the norm. The relevant feature for our analysis is that it is clear the strategic environment was attempting to rebalance itself as a result of waning powers.⁶⁴ The security dilemma and basic principles of self-help were animating all sides toward offensive military action.

⁶⁰ Jervis (1978), p.187

⁶¹ These are symptomatic expressions of **Hypotheses B, C, D, E, F, G, & I**

⁶² Jervis (1978), p.211

⁶³ See Kennedy (2007)

⁶⁴ See **2.4.2.**

‘The security dilemma’ Jervis explains, ‘is at its most vicious when commitments, strategy, or technology dictate that the only route to security lies through expansion.’⁶⁵ This brings the discussion to a head regarding the continued validity of Hypothesis A to the Da’wa policy. By re-evaluating Hypothesis A in relation to Hypothesis C, we are testing either that the relative ease of offensive action in the regional strategic environment was the underlying reason to continue along the trajectory set by the previous administration; or the continued Muslim expansions were designed or advanced as a matter of rational calculation and in accordance with the vicissitudes of the systemic strategic environment.

6.4.1b. ODT - D/Dx # 1. Opportunistic Expansion – [Hypothesis A]

The basic hypothesis of Opportunistic Expansion posits that ‘When conquest is easy, aggression is more alluring: it costs less to attempt and succeeds more often.’ This means that aggressive offensive actions are conducted with ‘less fear of reprisal because they win their wars more decisively, leaving their victims less able to retaliate later ... and even quite benign powers are tempted to attack if the offense is strong.’⁶⁶ Carroll Quigley champions the idea of Hypothesis A in his study on *Weapon Systems and Political Stability* arguing that the ease by which the cursory *futuh* during Abu Bakr’s administration were achieved invited continued and increased military enthusiasm as submission was easily attained at relatively low costs.⁶⁷

‘Umar continued the opportunistic practice, with the implicit suggestion that Hypothesis J came to play a great role in the consolidation of events. Luttwak similarly proposes that Abu Bakr’s extended security policy was nothing more than opportunism in the shadow of exhausted superpowers, that gained momentum resulting in the *Futuh* during ‘Umar’s administration. Weak and impoverished political systems of the conquered had only made the Muslim victories seem greater than they were.’⁶⁸

⁶⁵ Jervis (1978), p.187

⁶⁶ Van Evera (2004), p.229

⁶⁷ Quigley (2013), p.717

⁶⁸ Luttwak (2011), pp.198-9

Donner also suggests that ‘The initial conquests had a centralized impetus but had nonetheless been carried out *ad hoc*, in response to the unpredictable developments on various fronts;’ that is, according to the dictates of the strategic environment subject to VUCA and the manipulation of the strategic setting. But Donner attributes the offense-dominant character of the Jihad during the *Futuh* as a consequence of an opportunistic preponderance of military power: ‘... we might say that the embryonic regime in Medina that provided such centralized direction as existed was dwarfed by the military forces that were at its service.’⁶⁹ These forces are a reference to the engorged army that resulted from the resettlement policy of the ‘*Umar Doctrine*. Thus, according to Donner, Hypothesis A and I reflect the underlying cause for the offensive character of the *Futuh*. Before reconciling the problem of attribution between Hypothesis C and A, and examination of Hypothesis I is necessary.

6.4.2. ODT - D/Dx # 9. Intense Arms Racing [Military Power] – [Hypothesis I]

Hypothesis I (is *symptomatically* related to D, E and G, and thus indirectly to H, B, & C) and is a matter of arms escalation or more broadly, controls on military power. Hypothesis I posits that actors have seven incentives to build larger forces when the offense is strong;⁷⁰ if the defense dominates, the strategic logic is reversed which means less emphasis is strategically placed upon acquiring a large force, because the impetus to the offense is reduced significantly.⁷¹ Van Evera lists these as the following, all of which are relevant to this section with the exception of the last point:

1. Resources are more cumulative. Wartime gains and losses matter more. Gains provide greater increase in security, and losses are less reversible.
2. Self-defense is more difficult because others’ forces have more inherent offensive capability.
3. States are more expectant of war. Their neighbors are more aggressive, so they must be better prepared for attack or invasion.
4. The early phase of war is more decisive. Lacking time to mobilize their economies and societies in the event of war, states maintain larger standing forces. The possibility of quick victory puts a premium on forces-in-being.

⁶⁹ Donner (2012), p.172 (both quotes)

⁷⁰ Van Evera (2004), pp.235-6

⁷¹ For a chain reaction created by defense dominance see Van Evera (2004), p.236

5. States transfer military resources from defense to offense because offense is more effective. Others then counterbuild because their neighbors' capabilities
6. States hold military secrets more tightly when the offense dominates. This causes rational overarming, as states gauge their defense efforts to worst-case estimates of enemy strength.⁷²

Therefore, the first avenue of examination is to ascertain whether the decision to invest in naval power was a function of increasing military power of the *dar al-Islam*.

6.4.3. Growing Military Power

Whilst there is no doubt that the growing military force at the disposal of the caliphs was as much an offensive encouragement as it was a force multiplier for morale, it is salient to remember that Abu Bakr refused to admit the defeated apostates or their tribal members into the Muslim armed forces preferring smaller, loyalist cadres than a potentially larger military force. Although the administration of 'Umar witnessed a reversal in this policy with a view to specifically enlarge the standing army of the Muslims, 'Umar maintained the basic premise of Abu Bakr's policy in theory. 'Umar did admit the former apostates and their tribes back into military service; he did not permit the newly conquered non-Arabs to join the Muslim armed forces. Instead, the non-Muslim citizens of the conquered lands (*ahl al-Dhimma*) were specifically exempted (or barred) from military service in lieu of paying the *Jizya*.

Thus even though 'Umar sought to actively enlarge the capacity of the military,⁷³ he still restricted its admission criteria to those who were Muslims. However, the fact that military rosters (*diwan*) had to be compiled so as to register the ever increasing number of soldiers does credit the argument that the numerical abundance of willing warriors had to be accommodated in some manner. Therefore, it is more accurate to state that the *Futuh* were determined in part by the combination of the resettlement policy designed to augment the Da'wa policy to promote systemic regional interests, whilst maintaining the foundations of security implemented by Abu Bakr.

⁷² Point seven reads: States reach fewer arms control agreements when the offense dominates, because agreements of all kinds are fewer. Hence states are less able to limit arms competition through agreement. – See Van Evera (2004), pp.236

⁷³ I.K., p.105

The resettlement policy was a proxy to the continuation of the security policy of the previous administration. Reinforcing military power was a means to an end other than conquests, although the continued enhanced numbers undoubtedly assisted it. Accordingly, ‘Umar did invest heavily in the military instrument but not in arms racing *per se*. ‘Umar’s refusal to authorise a naval programme more than likely was based upon the belief that the *dar al-Islam* enjoyed a greater degree of defense-dominance over their enemies, thereby placing less emphasis on acquiring a larger military force, or innovation in military capabilities.

‘Umar’s assessment of having reached a level of defense-dominance was most likely on account of two developments that had taken place already, these were geostrategic, and logistical. Geostrategic advantage was in the form of natural strategic depth and geographic insulation from invasion. Logistical advantage was a result of the garrison distributions that created a string of forward-operating bases for military force to be streamlined and projected forward at an unrelenting pace. Combined, these two factors afforded an invaluable strategic advantage for the Muslims to transfer warfighting onto the territories of their opponents with little to no risk at the rear. Additionally, a defeat would only create a frontier, not a risk of territorial loss of the homelands. Furthermore, the costs of war were reduced since logistical supplies and the distribution of warfighting capabilities to the frontiers were highly efficient.

Mu‘awiya must have disagreed with ‘Umar’s assessment of the situation, at least in the northern theatres of the Levant. To better understand Mu‘awiya’s strategic vision in naval development, a brief glance at his strategic interactions is telling. Mu‘awiya had consolidated the Muslim control of the Levant territories within two years of ‘Uthman’s ascendancy. Since being instated as governor of Syria, Mu‘awiya had also instituted a policy of annual pre-emptive strikes on the neighbouring regions, specifically those still under control of the Byzantines (often Anatolia or along the Aegean coast).⁷⁴ The more famous strikes were known as the *ghazawat al-sa’ifah* or the ‘summertime campaigns’ because they were conducted during the summer season.⁷⁵ However operations were conducted during the winter just as frequently.⁷⁶

⁷⁴ Humphreys (2006), p.2

⁷⁵ I.K., pp.249, 252

It is against this background of constant military engagement that the development of a navy is most salient. Mu‘awiya’s vision to build a naval force reflects not only a strategic vision, but also a policy choice intended by the acquisition of particular military capabilities. Simply put, Fordham writes: ‘Decision makers build military (and other) capabilities based on the policies they expect to pursue and the international conditions they expect to face. State leaders who expect to use force more frequently will build more military capabilities.’⁷⁷ Although the relationship between armament acquisitions and the decision for direct military engagements appear to be reciprocal,

... choices about capabilities must be made long before force is actually used, it is important to consider the extent to which any observed relationship between capabilities and policy choice stems from the decision makers’ anticipation of their future needs and their resulting decisions about military spending and procurement.⁷⁸

Mu‘awiya envisioned that the battle for control of the strategic initiative through naval supremacy demanded a shift in ratios of forces between the small Muslim navy and the Byzantine fleet if the Muslims were to maintain and improve upon their relative capacity to conquer and defend territory.⁷⁹ According to J.C. Wylie, maritime strategy normally consists of two phases: ‘The first, and it must be the first, is the establishment of control of the sea. After an adequate control of the sea is gained comes the second phase, the exploitation of that control by projection of power into one or more selected critical areas of decision on the land.’⁸⁰ Control of the sea, consists of ensuring one’s own use of the sea whilst simultaneously denying the opponent or others use of the sea.⁸¹

⁷⁶ A list of both summer/winter and land/sea operations between 661-680 are provided in Bewley (2002), pp.50-1

⁷⁷ Fordham (2004), p.636

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ Van Evera (2004), p.231

⁸⁰ Wylie (2014), p.125; also Corbett (2004), p.87

⁸¹ Wylie (2014), p.125

The annual operations instituted by Mu‘awiya served two important functions: firstly, they kept the borders in a state of deterrent agitation whereby the Byzantines did not risk pre-emptive strikes during the non-summer seasons but rebuilt their forces and remained on the defensive throughout in expectation of the customary Muslim assault in the summer. Hence, the Byzantines began to develop a defensive military strategy rather than offensive, leaving the initiative of the offense with Mu‘awiya. Mu‘awiya would seek, and later did seek, to institute a similar naval policy, harassing the Byzantines with regular naval operations.⁸² These attacks ‘blunted’ the Byzantine offensive forces reducing their capability to strike at the Muslims.⁸³

Secondly, the seasonal routine in striking at the Byzantines across the border became a series of annual ‘training exercises’ maintaining the Muslim armed forces’ development. ‘Uthman approved of Mu‘awiya’s policy since it brought a regular income of booty and captives for ransom and slavery, as well as pacifying the neighbouring regions, although this is mostly likely to have been post-facto, given that Mu‘awiya was prone to unilateral decision-making in his political capacity.⁸⁴ It was Mu‘awiya’s fondness of pre-emptive strikes that spurred his strategic institution and development of the Muslim navy, which brought substantial dividends to the Muslim expansions and regional dominance. Thus, the *momentum* of military power, or more accurately, the *momentum of Jihad* was continued offensive strategic action in order not to lose the strategic initiative that had been gained.

6.4.4. Diagnostic Evaluation

Hence we have two sides of a story, on the one hand, Hypothesis C argues that systemic interactions will follow avenues of expected utility thus revealing predictive behaviours within the *strategic environment* as it seeks to regulate and reestablish a balance of power. In the case of the *Futuh* these seem to have been fairly accurate. On the other hand, we have Hypothesis, A which posits that the random and unpredictable events of the *strategic setting* determined the ease by which the Muslims continued to enjoy their offense dominance and parlayed it into a greater momentum for continued expansion.

⁸² Bewley (2002), pp.48-9

⁸³ Symptomatically expressed by **Hypotheses D & E.**

⁸⁴ *I.K.*, p.262

In both instances, VUCA analysis is apparent albeit in different modes of exploration. This explains why, VUCA analysis ‘... may suggest a variety of equally attractive solutions, some of which will prove to be good and others bad. Certain knowledge is often lacking and intentions may be surmised, but never entirely known.’⁸⁵ This point, that information is lacking and intentions are ultimately conjecture, forces a parsimonious and strategically logical explanation that is not intellectually offensive. If we understand both sets of Hypotheses correctly, the disparity is resolved not within their differing interpretation of events, but at their natural end.

That is, both argue that it was the achievement of offense dominance in relation to other actors that continued warfighting or Jihad *fi sabil l’Allah*. Hypothesis C is somewhat self-contained in its propositions and predictions but acknowledges the intervening factors contained in Hypothesis A and later Hypothesis J. Hypothesis A is an explanatory hypothesis for the starting point of events that, in the context of an evolving situation, parlays into Hypothesis I, and later Hypothesis J. In both sets of hypothetic-deductions, the underlying resolution is found in the attainment of offense dominance. Hypothesis C argues that offense dominance is contended for at the systemic stage or environment and conferred through results; whereas Hypothesis A suggests that offense dominance is a matter of perception, not necessarily reality, that becomes a matter of established fact through continued momentum and the accumulation of victories.⁸⁶ It was according to these demands of offensive momentum that consideration of Hypothesis I must be understood as a compound strategy combining other intervening factors - Hypothesis D & E - Moving First is More Rewarding and Windows are Larger, and More Dangerous.

In diagnostic conclusion, the Caliphate of ‘Uthman, during its first period, reflects the Da’wa policy in full swing, with Jihad employed as a fully offensive instrument. The Caliphate of ‘Uthman was a period wherein all ten variables of intervening factors are present clearly illustrating the strength of the offense during ‘Uthman’s administration.

⁸⁵ Yarger (2006), p.18

⁸⁶ Donner and Quigley might be forgiven for their failure to recognise these distinctions, since their analysis is given as historians; Luttwak however, steps on his own foot in this instance as he fails to recognise the *paradoxical* reality of the perception of the offense and the absurdity of strength it confers.

The continued frequency of warfighting and conquest was therefore expected according to the prime predictions of offense-defense theory.⁸⁷ The cumulative increase of offense-defense variables between the period of the *maghazi* until the administration of ‘Uthman demonstrates an escalating offense-dominant approach and perception of warfighting as a means of policy.⁸⁸

6.5. Period Two - The New Crisis Environment

Jihad continued to serve as a function of the Da’wa policy⁸⁹ before political echoes of grievances that had previously been managed resurfaced. The Caliphate of ‘Uthman would develop a series of internal security issues that revived the problems faced during the administration of Abu Bakr; and the consequences of socio-political ‘blowback’ accrued from the policies of ‘Umar. ‘Uthman’s tenure was fraught with complaints and grievances based on a failure to maintain the standards of consistent internal rectification from his predecessor’s example. These problems of socio-political dissent and insurrection, though important, have traditionally overshadowed the more salient features of the *strategic dynamics* of Jihad that occurred during the administration of ‘Uthman which we have examined.

If the *Ridda* Wars defined the Caliphate of Abu Bakr, and the *Futuh* than of ‘Umar, it was a series of internal insurrections (*bughat*) that characterised the Caliphate of ‘Uthman. The insurrections, that demanded counter-insurgency operations against non-Muslims, have been discussed above under Period One. The second period of ‘Uthman’s tenure was marred by Muslim insurrection that created an internal crisis. Whilst the second period of insurrection saw no active developments in the *strategic dynamics* of Jihad, there were by implication, passive developments to the employment and function of Jihad *fi sabil l’Allah*.

6.5.1. The Shadow of ‘Umar

The *Futuh* during the Caliphate of ‘Umar was so successful that an abundance of wealth was acquired by the Muslim polity. In the hands of formerly desert merchants was the wealth and riches of the Byzantine and Persian empires. With vast lands

⁸⁷ Van Evera (2004), p.244

⁸⁸ A clear symptom of **Hypothesis J**

⁸⁹ Rahman (2003), p.74; Donner (2012), p.133

under the Medinan authority and with the taxable administration of the *dar al-Islam*, immense revenues poured into Medina that was duly redistributed throughout the Islamic community and its economy.

The socio-economic and political prosperity associated with ‘Umar’s reign is undoubtedly a factor which heavily contributed to the stability of his reign and the resounding enthusiasm for the Da’wa policy that cloaked the resettlement programme. The correlation between good government and the internal rectification of his tenure, and the resulting external security has a distinct Confucian-Mencian accent suggesting that the ruler’s cultivation of virtue was the basis for security and prosperity of the *dar al-Islam*.⁹⁰ Before his expiration, ‘Umar had left written counsel for his successor. From amongst the many instructions and recommendations, were to be fair and just in the distribution of war booty, to prevent the monopolisation of wealth by one clan or class, fear favouritism, and an emphatic stress upon the equality of the Muslim citizenship.⁹¹ Economic prosperity had been enjoyed during the Caliphate of ‘Umar, but during ‘Uthman’s tenure the prosperity was in even greater abundance and socio-political problems formed as a consequence.⁹²

6.5.2. The ‘Umar Doctrine

‘Uthman continued the resettlement policy of the ‘Umar Doctrine but with some changes. The resettled Arab tribes were encamped just outside of conquered towns in garrisons. ‘Umar had established clear directives regarding protocol between the inhabitants of the garrisons: they were not to engage with the locals financially so as to disrupt the local economy or to own land and engage in agriculture.⁹³ The locals were free to continue their lives as normal, administering amongst themselves with the exception of bearing or acquiring armaments. Thus, bar fiscal interactions in the form of tax collection, the Arabs were essentially segregated from the conquered peoples. The Arab settlers would receive regular stipends paid to their tribal chieftains who would then redistribute within the tribe. Soldiers stationed at the barracks were also given a regular wage with pensions for retired soldiers and their dependents.

⁹⁰ Johnston (1995), p.63

⁹¹ As-Sallabi (2007a), pp.88-94

⁹² Ibid., p.203

⁹³ Hodgson (1977), p.212

‘Umar had ensured that those Arab tribes which had been dislocated from Arabia and resettled in the new lands were not financially lacking and thus remained supportive of his administration.⁹⁴ ‘Uthman raised the stipends of the troops by 100 dirhams above the rate set during ‘Umar’s administration.⁹⁵ Furthermore, ‘Umar had prevented the rich and famous of Mecca and Medina from settling in the new provinces to curb their influence in those regions and their desire to create new wealth by benefitting from the newly acquired trade routes.⁹⁶ ‘Uthman however, was unable or perhaps unwilling to continue this segregation and especially in the new Iraqi territories, instructing his governor of Syria, Mu‘awiya ibn Abi Sufyan, ‘to settle some of the nomads in places away from towns and villages where they could make use of empty lands (presumably as farmers?); others were granted stipends and assigned to the cities, towns, and frontier posts as garrison troops.’⁹⁷ Wealthy Meccan families began establishing new financial ventures.⁹⁸ With vast sums of plunder requiring administration, distribution became a hotly contested issue, as did seats of political office within the newly acquired territories.

6.5.3. From Meritocracy to Nepotism

Under the previous administration, the character and reputation of ‘Umar was sufficient to manage tribal competition for power and standing. However, the new Caliph, ‘Uthman, did not have the character of ‘Umar or the resolve of Abu Bakr.⁹⁹ Thus ensued a series of complications as ‘Uthman sought to continue the policies of distribution, taxation, and resettlement that had been instituted under the previous administration. In his list of counsels to his successor, ‘Umar had explicitly stated: ‘Do not leave anyone who was appointed during my reign for more than one year’.¹⁰⁰ In part, this order had been made in light of the ageing ‘old guard’ that had served the Prophet, Abu Bakr, and ‘Umar, where age would have raised questions as to their competencies in posts as governors or military commanders.

⁹⁴ Quigley (2013), pp.721-3

⁹⁵ *I.K.*, p.237

⁹⁶ Hodgson (1977), p.212

⁹⁷ Donner (1981), p.266

⁹⁸ Hodgson (1977), p.212

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁰ As-Sallabi (2007a), p.94

As a result, ‘Uthman looked to a younger generation of leadership, unsurprisingly from within his own clan and to the affront of other tribal clans.¹⁰¹ ‘Uthman’s judgement on employing appropriate officials to replace those commissioned by ‘Umar was consistently challenged on the grounds of nepotism especially since the character and conduct of those officials and governors appointed by ‘Uthman were contentious at the very least.¹⁰² ‘Uthman was accused of exploiting the Muslim treasury, unfair distribution of war booty, territorial distributions and land estates.¹⁰³

A general resentment grew, especially amongst the other Arab tribes, who previously enjoyed a modicum of political inclusion during the Caliphate of ‘Umar, especially as their standing in the political order of ‘Uthman’s administration dwindled. Discontent bred opposition groups that began to form both outwardly and as underground movements.¹⁰⁴ ‘Uthman’s reputation quickly tarnished as he fast became perceived as a ‘weakling’¹⁰⁵ and a puppet of Banu Umayya. It was widely held that ‘Uthman was either naïve or complicit, to not see that the Banu Umayya were attempting to rebuild and recover the political influence and power they had held before Islam.¹⁰⁶ Indeed, of important note is that ‘Uthman had no previous military experience, never having been commissioned by the Prophet to lead any of the *saraya*,¹⁰⁷ and had a less than flattering past having deserted the battlefield at Uhud.¹⁰⁸ Additionally, as a man of Banu Umayya, ‘Uthman did have a superficial political background with many political contacts but no real experience in political leadership and decision-making.¹⁰⁹

Rather, ‘Uthman had shone in areas of financial and economic development, and his administration did enlarge the wealth and prosperity of the *dar al-Islam*.¹¹⁰ Despite the flourishing economy and state of prosperity, the apparent degeneration of internal rectification developed by ‘Umar was constantly highlighted by the detractor’s of

¹⁰¹ Donner (2012), p.150

¹⁰² Madelung (2001), pp.81-2

¹⁰³ Hawting (2002), pp.25-7

¹⁰⁴ For an overview of grievances and associated criticisms of ‘Uthman see Madelung (2001), pp.81-92

¹⁰⁵ Quigley (2013), p.735

¹⁰⁶ Hawting (2002), p.27

¹⁰⁷ Donner (2012), p.155

¹⁰⁸ *WQ*, pp.135-6

¹⁰⁹ Madelung (2001), p.80

¹¹⁰ As-Sallabi (2007a), pp.165-70

‘Uthman. The cabal of Banu Umayya was the primary target of political unrest, as charges of internal corruption were levelled against ‘Uthman. Problems of government and tribal politics increasingly overshadowed the issues of external security threats and foreign policy such that the *Futuh* lost momentum.¹¹¹

6.5.4. Insurrections

Successful territorial gains in North Africa and Spain had come at great cost. As politico-military efforts were concentrated externally, domestic dissidence rose and was left unchecked in the Muslim territories. With most of the Muslim armed forces stationed at the frontiers or engaged in protracted conflicts with external opponents, domestic dissent was able to flourish. In particular, major cities in Egypt and the Medinan capital in particular, were short of military and security personnel.¹¹² By 655, dissent had already spread throughout the Muslim territories with protests and revolts cited in the garrison of Kufah.¹¹³

A restricted policy of resettlement in Egypt¹¹⁴ had reduced the strategic features of the ‘*Umar Doctrine* to maintain a standing reserve in the form of settlements for policing and management of the non-Muslim population. With only three garrisons, in Fustat, Alexandria, and Aswan (a defensive outpost in the north guarding against Nubian strikes); insurrectionaries exploited the bare security conditions and travelled to Mecca and Medina to incite the growing political dissatisfaction there also. In the same year, delegations were sent from the major garrison-towns of Kufah and Fustat to seeking to remove ‘Uthman from office.¹¹⁵

By 657, rebel forces from Egypt, Kufah, and Bosra, made a coordinated march toward Medina to overthrow ‘Uthman.¹¹⁶ The insurgents had timed the siege to coincide with the Hajj pilgrimage season, meaning that Medina would be less populated and thus more vulnerable, in addition to the fact that ‘Uthman had refused to allow any security forces to protect the city.¹¹⁷ Medina was under-siege as the insurgent forces

¹¹¹ Hodgson (1977), p.212

¹¹² *I.K.*, p.293

¹¹³ Hodgson (1977), p.212

¹¹⁴ Kennedy (2007), pp.162-3

¹¹⁵ Quigley (2013), pp.735; Hodgson (1977), p.213

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.267-8

¹¹⁷ *I.K.*, pp.270-15

encircled a defenseless Medina. The Caliph was detained in his residence under insurgent cordon for forty days before being killed; his residence looted, and the State Treasury (*bayt al-mal*) pillaged.¹¹⁸ The violent murder of ‘Uthman triggered the First Civil War of Islam, more commonly referred to in the earliest Arabic literature as the *Fitna*.

6.5.5. Diminishing Returns of Jihad

The events leading up to the First Civil War in Islam occurred in tandem with the deterioration of the Jihad *fi sabil l’Allah*.¹¹⁹ Insurrections developed as ‘Uthman’s credibility plummeted. Accordingly, ‘domestic legitimacy is a *conditio sine qua non* for the success of a grand strategy. All strategies, all strategic designs will collapse unless there is domestic legitimacy’;¹²⁰ and therefore, the support of the Da’wa policy began to dwindle. As support for the Jihad *fi sabil l’Allah* became overshadowed by internal politics, the growing inertia of the Da’wa policy resulted in the fears of ‘Umar being realised as the former rebel tribes began to regroup under the cover of political dissidence.¹²¹ ‘Uthman’s attempts to keep a firm grip upon central authority faltered as his attempt to consolidate power within the security of his own kinsmen was perceived as pure nepotism, effectively excluding former tribal allies and strengthening the disenfranchised tribes who now saw an opportunity to make relative political gains lost since the administration of Abu Bakr nearly two decades earlier. Both the security policy of Abu Bakr and the ‘*Umar Doctrine* were undone.

‘Uthman clearly had an extremely low estimation of the utility of force, and was adamant in his refusal to employ the military instrument against his challengers.¹²² ‘Uthman also refused Mu‘awiya’s offer of an armed security force to be sent to guard the city of Medina from any uprisings or direct attack on the Caliph.¹²³ One is reminded once more of the fallacy that Clausewitz exposes:

¹¹⁸ Ibid., pp pp.282-5

¹¹⁹ As-Sallabi (2007a), pp.472-3

¹²⁰ Platias & Koliopoulos (2010), p.52

¹²¹ Donner (1981), p.267

¹²² I.K., pp.260-1

¹²³ Ibid., p.262

Kind-hearted people might of course think there was some ingenious way to disarm or defeat the enemy without too much bloodshed, [...]. Pleasant as it sounds, ... War is a dangerous business where mistakes that come from kindness are the very worst.¹²⁴

Unlike his predecessors who were far from shy in enforcing law and order, ‘Uthman’s famous pacifistic character,¹²⁵ condemned the political stability of the *dar al-Islam* to civil war. Yet, there may be another viable, *political* explanation, for ‘Uthman’s restraint on force.

6.5.6. The Political Restraints of Jihad

There are two reasons in the context of this study so far, that might better elucidate why ‘Uthman did not employ force against the insurrections. Both passively reveal an existing dynamic of Jihad that originated at its inception, and was upheld during ‘Uthman’s administration. Our study thus far has revealed that when examined, research question 3 consistently results in an answer that promotes the strategic explanation that Jihad was predominately determined as a result and consequence of the pressures and nature of the anarchic environment. The influence and consequence of religio-political circumstance or strategic behaviour rooted in a set of strategic preferences that were religiously determined, has been largely negligible. This is not to argue that it was not present, but rather the influence of strategic actors and their value systems has not been demonstrated to have overruled or to have contradicted expected strategic actions or decision-making, especially regarding systemic strategic interactions.

Relative to the domestic strategic setting, ‘Uthman’s lack of action raises serious questions as to why the military instrument was not employed as they had been by Abu Bakr for example. Firstly, the strategic calculus of ‘Uthman’s political circumstances was complicated by the number of actors involved. Not only did ‘Uthman have to continue the external projection of the *dar al-Islam* via the Da’wa policy as discussed above; but also political dissidence and threats of revolt to his

¹²⁴ *OW*, p.75

¹²⁵ *I.K.*, p.262

political authority. External enemies such as the Byzantines could be demonised to the extent of being a zero-sum threat, but internally such a reconfiguration of the threat was not possible. The conditions of apostasy and rebellion by the Arab tribes during the period of Abu Bakr's administration were not synonymous with 'Uthman's circumstances, and thus the hard line taken by Abu Bakr was not a viable strategic option for 'Uthman without invoking all-out civil war.

Secondly, whilst the external enemy could be destroyed, internal threats by Muslims effectively negated the military instrument being engaged as a matter of Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah*. The policy of Da'wa could not authorise its use, nor could a political decision cite precedent to Abu Bakr's security policy either. The policies of the 'Umar had strengthened the Arab tribes considerably and to use military force against the tribes was unthinkable. Furthermore, Jihad was, as an instrument subordinated to policy, employed either to extend or defend the jurisdiction of the Shari'ah, or the territories of the *dar al-Islam*. Since these were not violated on account of political grievances and contests for power by Muslims against Muslims, Jihad as an instrument of policy was effectively retired on such matters. Consequently, we see that for the first time since Jihad was practiced, an essential limitation is revealed to the scope of its application. If we recall in chapter 3, we addressed sub-investigative question a.:

- a. What is Jihad? Specifically, can a general definition be proposed, with respect to distinguishing word from concept; and how will this distinction advance strategic interpretation?

Since Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah* in its horizontal expression, could only be used in service (*nisus*) of making the jurisdiction and sovereignty of God paramount, which included defending its institutions where founded; an internal, that is Muslim, threat to authority could not be considered synonymous with non-Muslim threats to authority. To be even clearer, since the challenges to 'Uthman's authority were based upon diminishing credibility, his overthrow did not seek the non-implementation or eradication of the *dar al-Islam* but the continuation of it. Under such circumstances Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah* could not be subordinated to a policy of counter-insurgency since the insurgents were themselves believers.

Since Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah* was an expression of the *absolute Jihad* at the horizontal level, unlike the systemic environment that we have previously discussed above, Jihad was inherently regulated by religio-political circumstances at the domestic strategic setting. This means that research question 3, has a second answer, previously unrevealed by our investigation. The pressures to escalate could not override the inherent restrictions of warfighting against Muslims that was the by-product of the meta-narrative and essence of *absolute Jihad*. Consequently, strategic behaviours did not follow rational expectations of the utility of force. This perhaps also explains why the rebels to Abu Bakr's authority were classified as apostates, since had they been considered Muslims; Abu Bakr could not have waged the military instrument against them.

The conclusions we must draw from this episode are two: firstly, there must have been some precedent known or imparted by the Prophet that informed both Abu Bakr and 'Uthman that warfighting in the name of Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah* was restricted to non-Muslims only; and secondly, that Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah* was effectively a systemic instrument, bar exceptions such as apostasy or invasion.

6.6. Trinitarian Analysis and Conclusions

The Caliphate of 'Uthman represents the first failure to balance between internal rectification and external power management in the history of Islam. Remarkably the shortcomings of his administration are never considered for strategic reasons, perhaps because of the overwhelming influence of irrational forces at play. These influences most notably begin but also recurred consistently throughout remaining successive administrations. It would be easy to identify the first element lacking during his administration – that of leadership, both politically and militarily, the character of 'Uthman fell short in the shadow of his predecessors. 'Uthman's dependence upon Mu'awiya to continue and innovate created a vital evolution in the *strategic dynamics* of Jihad via naval power. 'Uthman's individual ability to manage the non-rational elements of warfare decreased fairly consistently during his administration with the Da'wa noticeably increasing in inertia under his command.

‘Uthman’s fall from grace began as soon as his credibility was called into question. Accusations of nepotism and a breach of Islamic austerity on the part of political leadership had been the main crimes levied at ‘Uthman, neither of course were *illegal* by the Shari‘ah, though were frowned upon.¹²⁶ Perhaps the examples of his predecessors, including the Prophet himself had created expectations of behaviour and conduct appropriate for the Caliph, though not explicitly declared, had become conventionally *a priori* expectations that ‘Uthman had fallen short of in the eyes of others. Some argued radical change of character, citing the corrupting effects of power upon once good men.¹²⁷ Whilst others found reasons in apocryphal accounts of the inevitable decline of Muslim community and righteous leadership said to have been predicted by the Prophet himself.¹²⁸

Secondly, ‘Uthman’s credibility was further damaged as his dependency upon the political skill and experience of the Banu Umayya became increasingly apparent. ‘Uthman as the legitimate Caliph was undermined by his lack of political acumen in being exploited by his clan to empower themselves.¹²⁹ Finally, ‘Uthman failed to show the same determination in maintaining political control over tribal cabals as his predecessors had done. As his political authority dwindled, violent uprisings laid claims and contested his power. Lacking the political resolve or ability to militarily crush the uprisings in his midst, as Abu Bakr had so emphatically done, the violence spread and escalated beyond his control. ‘Uthman sought to de-escalate in the face of increasingly escalatory blind forces by committing to *relinquish the initiative*.¹³⁰

Conceivably it was a wise idea in theory in order to calibrate the potential risks of violence. And perhaps, ‘Uthman had the foresight to recognise that were he to escalate matters by the use of force, he would not have been able to win swiftly and at low costs, thereby creating a state of civil war. The irony is that his attempts to de-escalate and discard the use of force still resulted in civil war.

¹²⁶ Rahman (2003), pp.74-5

¹²⁷ Donner (2012), p.155

¹²⁸ Ibid., (1998), pp.192-3; *I.K.*, pp.261-2, 274, 288, 483; As-Sallabi (2007a), pp.65-71

¹²⁹ Hodgson (1977), p.213

¹³⁰ Schelling (2008), p. 43

Policy was completely undermined by the politics of the domestic strategic setting; violence and emotions were rousing as tribal power politics and the virtues of *jahiliya* returned to the fore.¹³¹ This occurred for various reasons as we have mentioned, however the failure to effectively adapt and continue the security protocol implemented by ‘Umar to check tribal tensions and prevent any escalation in political claims is perhaps the most obvious culprit that led to domestic weakening.

It was without a doubt, the failure of the resettlement policy (that is, its strategic features designed to have held the integrity of policy together)¹³² that had created the fissures from which civil strife would flow. The mass demographic shifts and relentless conquests had created an enlarged Muslim community that had an increasingly less ‘Islamic’ character as the ‘old guard’ from the days of the *maghazi* were dying from battle or old age.¹³³ The result was to be five years of civil war inside the *dar al-Islam*, and the end of Muslim cohesion cemented by Abu Bakr and consolidated by ‘Umar.

From a trinitarian perspective, the Caliphate of ‘Uthman was the caliphate of friction. Everything escalated that could have ‘whether by lack of foresight, slow execution, or factors beyond the actor’s control, ... [amplifying] itself into a cascade of things going wrong to create potential chaos.’¹³⁴ ‘Uthman was overshadowed by an inherited strategic setting and environment that had been too delicately balanced by his predecessor, whom he could not equal. The reason why his administration continued for so long can almost definitely be attributed to the momentum of the offense [Hypothesis J] and morale created by his predecessors. As the prosperity and privileges came to require renewal ‘Uthman had not managed to balance the re-negotiations of the *bargaining dynamics* within the domestic strategic setting accordingly, and the swinging pendulum collapsed.

¹³¹ As-Sallabi (2007a), pp.470-2

¹³² These were four: 1. Systemic Projection of Military Force; 2. Islamic Propaganda (*da’wa*); 3. Security protocol; 4. Policing

¹³³ As-Sallabi (2007a), pp.457-70

¹³⁴ Yarger (2006), p.24

6.7. The End of The *Rashidun* (656 - 661)

The Caliphate of ‘Ali ibn Abu Talib (656-61) is the last administration of the *Rashidun* period. The *strategic dynamics* of Jihad during this administration was negligible at the systemic level. This is because the period of ‘Ali’s administration brought a halt to foreign policy as the pressing concerns of domestic instability brought on by the murder of ‘Uthman overshadowed the Da’wa. Thus, since the beginning of military operations in 622 under the command of the Prophet until 656, Jihad had been employed without cessation to advance and defend the interests of the *dar al-Islam* and the jurisdiction of the Shari‘a. The first hiatus of Jihad lasted the duration of ‘Ali’s tenure. ‘Ali’s administration, was essentially an administration of martial law, serving as an involuntary transition government between ‘Uthman and the next Caliph.

6.7.1. Preliminaries

The *maghazi* period, which was also a civil conflict, was not as bloodied and anarchic as the events of the *Fitna* that characterises ‘Ali’s administration. The growing animosity and tensions that quickly spiraled into civil war were a distinctly Arab affair.¹³⁵ The policies of the ‘*Umar Doctrine* remained largely intact that separated the conquered populations from the Arab settlements. As an intra-tribal power struggle between the Quraysh ensued, the Da’wa effort was overshadowed and effectively withdrew from any new developments at the systemic level.

The sequence of events traces the essential features that fueled the *Fitna*. These events did not alter the policy of Da’wa in its philosophy of purpose, but they would heavily influence and transform the authority and claims of legitimate ‘right’ to apply the Da’wa on behalf of the Muslim community. The events that transpired during ‘Ali’s administration between the former Companions and associates of the Prophet, is highly controversial and sensitive. Accordingly, exactly what happened during many events is uncertain. Various factions that were created during the Civil War or *Fitna* have continued until today to transmit a selective memory of events.¹³⁶ Donner, who has succinctly summed up the strategic interests of these writings, explains:

¹³⁵ Donner (2012), pp.189-90

¹³⁶ Abou El Fadl (2002), pp.34-6

... this theme represents historicizing legitimation in Islam *par excellence*, since the purpose of many *fitna* accounts is to describe how leadership of the community was won (or lost) by a particular person or party through a sequence of mundane events, and to lament or celebrate those events. The events themselves can be viewed either from the victor's side as divine confirmation of his claim to rule, or from the loser's vantage point as an explanation of how the 'legitimate' candidate (legitimate on moral or genealogical or other grounds) was deprived of his rightful rule by deceit or oppressive force.¹³⁷

Consequently, it is difficult to relate or examine the specific events of the *politik* during this period. Thus broad sketches of events suffice the purposes of this section. Henceforth, this chapter covers only those matters pertinent to the research questions stipulated below, in full knowledge that the period was fraught with numerous other events and problems some of which have been included in the footnotes below as references to surrounding events. On the whole, what happened during the Civil War or *Fitna*, led to the rise of the Umayyad Caliphate making this administration an important transition stage in the dynamic evolution of Jihad.

To this end, we continue to explore the consequences of research question 3 and sub-investigative question a. in this final section as a continuation of developments from the administration of 'Uthman and the rise of Muslim insurgents.

6.7.2. The *Fitna*

The major concern of this period and the core issues of the *Fitna* as it unfolded in history and as related in the literature, are connected to the following historical sequence of episodes that comprised the First Civil War of Islam:¹³⁸

- The political dissidence and eventual mutiny and murder of the Caliph 'Uthman;

¹³⁷ Donner (1998), p.185

¹³⁸ The following chain of events are quoted from Donner (1998), p.185

- The election of ‘Ali as his successor, and the political contests for the leadership of the *dar al-Islam* by Mu‘awiya ibn Abu Sufyan, ‘Aisha bint Abu Bakr,¹³⁹ Talha ibn ‘Ubayd Allah,¹⁴⁰ and Zubayr ibn al-‘Awwam^{141,142}
- The ensuing contests via battles for political power: the battles of the Camel,¹⁴³ Siffin,¹⁴⁴ and against the Kharijites at Nahrawan;¹⁴⁵
- The issues and repercussions of political arbitration that occurred between the Caliph ‘Ali and his main political rival Mu‘awiya and the battles between them;¹⁴⁶
- The eventual murder of ‘Ali and the attempted murder of Mu‘awiya¹⁴⁷
- The coup of Mu‘awiya following ‘Ali’s death and the abandonment of Hasan (son of ‘Ali) to contest Mu‘awiya’s leadership;¹⁴⁸
- The various groups and factions who refused to acknowledge Mu‘awiya and the subsequent Umayyad House as legitimate authority, and the rebellions against them.¹⁴⁹

6.8. On The Caliphate of ‘Ali ibn Abu Talib (656 – 661)

‘Ali ibn Abu Talib (d. 661) was the cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet, and the son of Abu Talib, the former chief of Banu Hashim and the Prophet’s political protector in Mecca until his death.¹⁵⁰ ‘Ali had been the first male convert to Islam,¹⁵¹ and had gained a strong reputation as a fierce warrior having distinguished himself on the battlefield on a number of occasions.¹⁵² Considered by some to have been the natural successor to the Prophet,¹⁵³ ‘Ali had been consecutively passed over three times.

¹³⁹ A’isha bint Abu Bakr (d. 678) – youngest wife of the Prophet leads the call for vengeance against the murders of ‘Uthman, who are if we believe some reports, are now part of ‘Ali’s administration.

¹⁴⁰ Talha ibn ‘Ubayd Allah (d. 656) - Companion of the Prophet who supports ‘Aisha

¹⁴¹ Zubayr ibn al-‘Awwam (656) – another Companion of the Prophet who supports ‘Aisha

¹⁴² See Hawting (2002), pp.27-8

¹⁴³ In 656 – See Wellhausen (1927), p.53; As-Sallabi (2011b), pp.25-93 for a comprehensive account of the traditional apologetic-Muslim narration of events

¹⁴⁴ In 657 – See Wellhausen (1927), p.56; As-Sallabi (2011b), pp.150-82

¹⁴⁵ In 658 – See As-Sallabi (2011b), pp.273-82; Donner (2012), pp.163-5

¹⁴⁶ See Hawting (2002), pp.28-9; As-Sallabi (2011b), pp.183-210

¹⁴⁷ Abou El Fadl (2001), p.55

¹⁴⁸ See Hawting (2002), p.30

¹⁴⁹ See following chapter

¹⁵⁰ As-Sallabi (2011a), pp.55-60; Donner (2012), p.157

¹⁵¹ *I.L.*, pp.114-5

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, pp.323-4

¹⁵³ *Ibid.*, p.325; Donner (2012), p.157

6.8.1. The Strategic Setting

In 656, ‘Uthman was murdered by an angry mob of insurgents who stormed his residence and killed him as he sat reading the Qur’an.¹⁵⁴ ‘Uthman’s tenure as caliph had lasted approximately twelve years. ‘Ali ibn Abu Talib accepted leadership¹⁵⁵ and was named as his successor within a day by his long-time supporters in Medina and, according to some reports, the insurgents who had murdered ‘Uthman.¹⁵⁶ ‘Ali’s appointment received marginal to little support of the Meccan and political elite of Quraysh as a whole, most of whom were in Mecca at the time.¹⁵⁷ This lack of support from the now well-established political elite, coupled with the fact that many of the insurgents who had stormed the residence of ‘Uthman and killed him had endorsed and supported ‘Ali’s claim to power, created a storm of political opposition to the new administration.¹⁵⁸

The election of ‘Ali as ‘Uthman’s successor by a select portion of non-Quraysh clans and tribes, some of whom had been deemed rebels during the caliphate of Abu Bakr, others who had partaken of ‘Uthman’s murder, fragmented the Muslim community into three political factions:¹⁵⁹ firstly, those who supported ‘Ali as the new and legitimate caliph; secondly, the clan of Banu Umayya (and their allies) who maintained that legitimacy of rule ‘had through ‘Uthman become “their property” and that no new caliph could be appointed until ‘Uthman’s murderers were brought to justice; and lastly, the majority of the ruling elite from the Quraysh who sought a return to a caliphate based upon the precedent of Abu Bakr or ‘Umar – meaning an elected appointee through their own collective decision-making.¹⁶⁰ These three factions formed the basis of the actors who fought for political control during the *Fitna* and those claims and ideals that would further outlast both the caliphate of ‘Ali but also the Umayyads.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁴ Bewley (2002), pp.17-8

¹⁵⁵ Madelung (2001), pp.144-5

¹⁵⁶ Hodgson (1977), p.214; Madelung (2001), pp.141-4; As-Sallabi (2011a), attempts to counter the claim that rebels were involved in the appointment of ‘Ali - pp.306-9

¹⁵⁷ Donner (2012), pp.157-9; Hodgson (1977), p.214

¹⁵⁸ Madelung (2001), p.146; Hawting (2002), p.27

¹⁵⁹ Madelung (2001), pp.146-7; As-Sallabi (2011a), p.323

¹⁶⁰ Madelung (2001), p.147

¹⁶¹ Donner (2012), pp.190-1

6.8.2. Political legitimacy

The move by ‘Ali to establish his capital, or perhaps more accurately, base of operations, in the garrison town of Kufa was symbolic of the militant character of his administration.¹⁶² The events of the *Fitna* had removed the central authority that had unified the tribes.¹⁶³ ‘Ali’s attempts to impose his claim of legitimate leadership were in effect an attempt to reestablish centralised authority to remove the state of anarchy through martial law.

The events of this period clearly reflected the return of the tribal strategic environment that the Prophet had been operating within however, ‘Ali lacked the deft hand of inter-tribal diplomacy that his predecessors were able to fall back on. Accordingly, ‘Ali was unable to replicate the success of his predecessors in decisive political victory against those who discredited his claims to leadership. The political elite of Quraysh gathered in Mecca, defying ‘Ali’s request for recognition as the new *Amir al-Mu‘mineen*,¹⁶⁴ with ‘A’isha, the surviving widow of the Prophet, rallying the Quraysh to revolt. It was not the Quraysh however who contested ‘Ali for political power most rigorously, but the clan of ‘Uthman led by Mu‘awiya ibn Abi Sufyan, the Governor of Syria, now the appointed leader of the Banu Umayya who pressed his own claim of leadership against ‘Ali.¹⁶⁵

6.8.3. Trinitarian overview of the Civil War

The blind forces of primordial violence, hatred, and enmity - feature as the most quantitatively dominant qualitative feature of ‘Ali’s administration. The qualitative nature of ‘Ali’s administration is extremely significant in that it experienced the greatest outpouring of uncontrolled and escalating irrational forces since the beginning of the *maghazi*. Inheriting a fractured domestic strategic setting, where the swinging pendulum of socio-political balance had collapsed, ‘Ali’s administration was barely capable of overcoming the interplay of chance and probability, that is, the fog and friction of civil war, without resorting to escalated warfighting to meet escalating claims for power.

¹⁶² Hodgson (1977), p.214

¹⁶³ Wellhausen (1927), p.55; Hodgson (1977), p.217

¹⁶⁴ Madelung (2001), p.155

¹⁶⁵ Rahman (2003), pp.83-90

Of course, this resulted in a politico-strategic disaster for ‘Ali’s administration. ‘Ali however, was hardly at fault for the collapse of societal harmony that previously had existed,¹⁶⁶ but lacked the political acumen of Abu Bakr or ‘Umar to navigate through the problems of VUCA in the strategic environment and harness the strategically correct means-ends policies to re-establish trinitarian harmony. There was one man who could however, his rival and eventual victor - Mu‘awiya ibn Abu Sufyan.

Clausewitz wrote: ‘No one starts a war - or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so - without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it.’¹⁶⁷ Mu‘awiya demonstrates the weight of political shrewdness that balanced the forces of escalation during the Civil war. Mu‘awiya’s extensive political experience outweighed ‘Ali’s, coupled with the backing of the northern armies; was able to rationally calculate and out-maneuver ‘Ali through superior politico-strategic calculation of the strategic environment and the operational centres of gravity.¹⁶⁸ While Mu‘awiya’s actions during this period clearly exhibits a grasp of the *politik* involved, balancing rational calculation with armed force; ‘Ali’s administration were almost always reacting to unfolding events attempting to manage the innate forces of VUCA more often than not through escalating military action.

The Battle of the Camel in 656 was a tactical victory but a political disaster as ‘Ali took to battle against the widow of the Prophet. Again, at the Battle of Siffin 657, despite being on the verge of tactical victory with a view to decisive victory over Mu‘awiya, ‘Ali bowed to pressure from within his war cabinet and halted the final stages of battle to accept Mu‘awiya’s request for arbitration.¹⁶⁹ With no real policy direction, as an administration of martial law, ‘Ali fell victim to a catastrophic political blunder by entering into diplomatic arbitration with Mu‘awiya,¹⁷⁰ from which he relinquished the initiative and was effectively undermined and politically rendered dead weight by his own followers.

¹⁶⁶ Hodgson (1977), pp.216-7

¹⁶⁷ *OW*, p.579

¹⁶⁸ Donner (2012), pp.165-70

¹⁶⁹ See 6.7.1.

¹⁷⁰ Bewley (2002), p.27

The details of the process of arbitration are sketchy, with multiple versions of events recorded in the early sources.¹⁷¹ What is known is that ‘Ali made the fatal mistake of not attending the final round of negotiations in person, sending in his place a representative that was more neutral than partisan to ‘Ali’s cause. The ensuing negotiations reached a settlement in which Mu‘awiya was able to politically outmanoeuvre ‘Ali’s representative, and thus ‘Ali’s claim and jurisdiction over the Muslims.¹⁷² With the jurisdiction of martial law effectively compromised, from this point onwards, the brittle administration ‘Ali presided over fell to pieces as no rational forces were able to contain the irrational outpouring of violence and emotion.

As internal collapse took place, tribal power politics and the virtues of *jahiliya* returned alongside questions of faith that began to permeate the shattered administration as former supporters turned into open enemies to ‘Ali (the Kharijites or ‘seceders’) resulting in a battle between former allies at Nahrawan in 658.¹⁷³ As ‘Ali’s army exhausted themselves through political infighting and actual war amongst themselves, Mu‘awiya was able to dominate the remainder of proceedings as he gathered greater political support throughout the Muslim territories as the audience of non-Quraysh and other Muslims watched ‘Ali’s government collapse.

After four years and nine months, a protracted series of battles,¹⁷⁴ negotiations,¹⁷⁵ and internal fighting¹⁷⁶ between ‘Ali and Mu‘awiya, it was a Kharijite assassin who killed ‘Ali as he went for prayer in 661.¹⁷⁷ Mu‘awiya had already seized control of most of the Muslim territories from ‘Ali, including Mecca and Medina and was able to press his claim for leadership to convince Hasan the son of ‘Ali to forgo any claim to power in exchange for an annual pension of significant proportion.¹⁷⁸ In doing so, he was able to bring the civil war to an end and unite the Muslims under central authority once more.

¹⁷¹ See Hinds (2010); Bewley (2002), pp.23-5

¹⁷² Hodgson (1977), pp.214-6

¹⁷³ See Kenney (2010)

¹⁷⁴ Madelung (2001), pp.168-173; *I.K.*, pp.330-7; 362-74, 428-33

¹⁷⁵ *I.K.*, pp 342-44, 366-9, 387-90

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.345-6; 390-400

¹⁷⁷ Rahman (2003), pp.90-1

¹⁷⁸ See *I.K.*, pp.44-5, 483; also Donner (2012), p.167; and Rahman (2003), p.91

6.8.4. The Domestic Dynamics of Jihad

Armed with this background of events, analysis returns to sub-investigative question a.: What is Jihad and how will this distinction advance strategic interpretation? Whilst systemic evolution in the practice of Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah* did not alter, salient shifts in the perception of Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah* took place in the midst of the *Fitna*. Most strikingly was the shift in the rightful claim to authorise Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah*. Depending on the source, 'Ali did unlike his predecessor 'Uthman, invoke Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah* against his Muslim opponents.¹⁷⁹

'Ali himself is recorded as complaining that his calls to rally an army in the name of Jihad would fall upon deaf ears whilst Mu'awiya's calls for the restoration of justice by vengeance of 'Uthman's killers and the usurpation of political power (by 'Ali), was met by obedience.¹⁸⁰ There are four politico-strategic reasons that can be advanced for this lack of enthusiasm towards 'Ali's rallying calls. Firstly, 'Ali had a coalition force to depend on that was factious and united only in their desire for power,¹⁸¹ but Mu'awiya on the other hand, commanded a loyal and trained armed force that not only had conquered Syria,¹⁸² but regularly experienced battle in some form or another in protecting the borders or the annual campaigns against Byzantium.¹⁸³

Secondly, whilst Mu'awiya held political control of his territories and allies firm, 'Ali suffered terminal deterioration in his political credibility as caliph following the failed arbitration between himself and Mu'awiya in 658 which had essentially deposed him as caliph.¹⁸⁴ Political infighting and rebellion arose within the territories under his official authority but many of the tribes revolted against what they conceived to be the inevitable failure of 'Ali's political administration and the ever-widening power vacuum.¹⁸⁵

¹⁷⁹ Abou El Fadl (2002), pp.34-6

¹⁸⁰ *I.K.*, pp.424, 428

¹⁸¹ Hodgson (1977), p.216

¹⁸² Wellhausen (1927), p.58

¹⁸³ See 6.4.2.

¹⁸⁴ *I.K.*, p.428

¹⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p.426

Thirdly, ‘Ali’s attempt to incite the rightful claim to authorise Jihad *fi sabil l’Allah* lacked any credibility since his predecessor ‘Uthman, never initiated Jihad against his Muslim opponents even when they had besieged him. Furthermore, most of the insurgents had joined ‘Ali’s armed forces and given him control of the Caliphate on a platter; thus to incite Jihad *fi sabil l’Allah* on account of political rebellion or insurgency would by necessity also mean that they had been legitimate targets of Jihad for ‘Uthman, and thus were also liable for his death. To wage Jihad was to condemn themselves. Mu‘awiya on the other hand, never cited Jihad specifically but called for the restoration of justice and retaliation against ‘Uthman’s killers – both claims being acceptable according to the Shari‘a and traditional Arab values.

Lastly, is the idea that the domestic nature of the *Fitna* rendered the instrument of Jihad inoperable against Muslim opposition. This was evidenced by the fact that most of the Companions of the Prophet (*al-Sahaba*), a number going from the hundreds to thousands, living in Medina had refused to partake in the *Fitna*, most of them withdrawing after ‘Uthman’s murder and remaining neutral between ‘Ali and Mu‘awiya. This seems to reinforce the proposition previously stated, that it had been known Jihad was not to be waged against Muslims, or was effectively rendered an illegitimate use of the military instrument.

However, the Kharijites whose break from ‘Ali’s camp after the event of arbitration, attempted to reconfigure recourse to authorising Jihad by declaring its commission as *a legitimate independent instrument of military means* in the face of oppression or political heresy. Their argument was that through arbitration, ‘Ali, and Mu‘awiya by extension, had apostatized by ruling outside of the Qur‘an; this meant that they were now legitimate targets of Jihad since they were no longer Muslims. Perhaps, their attempts had been encouraged by ‘Ali’s own claims to invoke Jihad which had been collectively ignored by the Companions. This event becomes the first recorded instance in Islamic history wherein Jihad *fi sabil l’Allah* is advocated outside of official central authority. The claim was in effect, the attempted privatisation of politico-religious rectitude laid claim by extension, to the right of waging Jihad *fi sabil l’Allah*. Whilst this development had little direct systemic consequence, it was an important historical development.

However, to stress the *strategic dynamic*, the Kharijite innovation in the conception and practice of Jihad was to self-authorise Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah* external to central authority of the Muslims, such as the Caliph, thereby removing the employment of Jihad from structured policy to raw means. This was a reverberation to both the pre-Islamic use of the term as well as the early second-stage *function* of Jihad bar it's authorising figure. Up until this point, it can be conclusively stated, Jihad had been exclusively authorised in relation to policy. During the *Fitna*, after central authority had been overthrown, when 'Ali's claim to authority had been undermined, and with no other outstanding candidates available, Jihad was taken up as an individualistic enterprise without legitimate claim.

6.8.5. Systemic Recession

'Ali's administration was a bloody and violent political drama, where the interplay of tribal politics fused with religious fervor as the *dar al-Islam* plummeted into civil war. Systemic expansions virtually halted as the domestic crisis consumed the energies of *dar al-Islam* and absorbed the political will of the Muslims. Research question 3 has an almost self-explanatory answer at this stage; nonetheless the answer may be stated as follows: inconsequential changes took place systemically, with no movements in the *strategic dynamics* of Jihad as an instrument of policy.

Although there were some territorial skirmishes during 'Ali's tenure, these were more accurately responsible or can be attributed to the continuation of policy by commanders in the respective theaters of operations, far removed from the political upheaval of the *Fitna*. To this extent, in relation to research questions 1 and 2, a continuation of policy is apparent although not necessarily having been issued from central government, but rather carrying on its own momentum reacting to the pressures and nature of the anarchic environment. Territories were often lost, as the military capabilities were withdrawn from major garrisons and redirected to the civil crisis zones.

6.9. Conclusions of Caliphate of ‘Ali

Just as Abu Bakr’s administration was really the continuation of the Prophet’s policies; ‘Ali served more as an *Advocatus* or ‘Lord Protector’ of the *dar al-Islam* in a fashion more similar to Oliver Cromwell than a Caliph relative to ‘Umar and ‘Uthman. In the end, the administration of ‘Ali was the Caliphate that never really was. Recorded in history as the fourth of the *Rashidun*, ‘Ali’s administration is best conceived as a transition government of martial law between the administrations of ‘Uthman and eventually Mu‘awiya rather than an official institution of the Caliphate series. Nonetheless, almost certainly for reasons of political conviviality and harmony, the Muslim historians and later jurists designate ‘Ali’s administration as the last of the *Rashidun* era.

Hodgson writes that throughout the early period ‘writers have marked off the periods of the caliphate according to extraneous criteria.’¹⁸⁶ Hodgson argues that writers have followed later Sunni Muslims in acknowledging the administration of ‘Ali and for some peculiar reason, the brief claim to power that his son al-Hasan held before being bought off his claim by Mu‘awiya; as the fourth Medinan (and sometimes ‘fifth’) ‘Orthodox’ caliphate.¹⁸⁷ Mu‘awiya on the other hand, and the *Sufyanids* are considered ‘Umayyads’ bunched together with the later *Marwanids*. Hodgson argues that the modern historian need not be bound by such considerations as the older Muslim historians, for whom the division between ‘Orthodox’ and ‘Umayyad’ caliphs had an emblematic value:

When ‘Ali came to be lumped with the three Medina caliphs (quite late), Mu‘awiyah was correspondingly lumped with the Marwanids. This allowed the Muslims to split the work of establishing the caliphal structure into two parts: into the ‘good’ side of that work (including whatever was approved, of the work of subsequent caliphs), which was ascribed to ‘Umar; and into the ‘bad’ side (including much of what ‘Umar did), symbolized in the setting up of ‘kingship’, which was ascribed to Mu‘awiyah and the

¹⁸⁶ Hodgson (1977), p.221, fn.7

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

‘Umayyads’. For this purpose, ‘Uthman was ‘Orthodox’ and not ‘Umayyad’.¹⁸⁸

If the Caliphates are to be numbered of the early period of Islam, then they are indeed four spread across five administrations. The first Caliphate by default belongs to the Prophet, but its administration was completed by Abu Bakr, thus delineating the first Caliphate proper; the second and third, belong exclusively to ‘Umar and ‘Uthman; the administration of ‘Ali was a transitional government or protectorate during the Civil War before the establishment of the final Caliphate of early Islam, that belonging to Mu‘awiya to whom our final chapter is concerned with.

¹⁸⁸ Ibid.

CHAPTER SEVEN

7.0. The Rise of the Jihad State (661 - 680)

This chapter examines the formation and restoration of policies that reignited systemic warfighting to the ends of political objectives specifically, the administration of Mu‘awiya bin Abu Sufyan victor of the First Civil War of Islam (656-661). This chapter explores the culmination of research question 2, 3, and 4; sub-investigative question b and in particular, sub-investigative question d:

- d. Is Jihad an instrument of aggression or offensive imperial ambitions? Can the early period of Islamic expansion be explained in a manner that demonstrates strategic coherence for the application of warfighting as a means of policy?

7.1. The Caliphate of Mu‘awiya ibn Abu Sufyan

Mu‘awiya was the first Caliph of the Umayyad House and the head of the later known ‘Sufyanid’ branch of the dynasty.¹ Although commonly referred to as the ‘first king of Islam’,² Mu‘awiya adopted the epithet of his predecessors *Amir al-Mu‘meneen* (Commander of the Believers).³ Mu‘awiya had served the Prophet as an officer in the Muslim army and also as secretary⁴ and scribe of the Qur’an,⁵ being particularly noted for his political acumen.⁶ He would later serve as governor of Syria from 639 until 656 officially, retaining ‘unofficial’ control of power in Syria until he was declared as the new Caliph in 661.⁷ Mu‘awiya’s tenure as Caliph would continue until 680, after which he appointed his unpopular son Yazid (680-3) his successor;⁸ and then his grandson whose rule lasted less than a year ending the controlling influence of the *Sufyanid* branch belonging to the Umayyad House in 684.⁹

¹ Hawting (2002), p.34

² *I.K.a.*, p.21; Bewley (2002), pp.52, 59

³ *I.K.a.*, p.48; Humphreys (2006), p.104

⁴ Bewley (2002), pp.3-6

⁵ Humphreys (2006), p.6; *I.K.a.*, p.22

⁶ Hawting (2002), p.44; Robinson (2005), p.65

⁷ During the Caliphate of ‘Umar from 639-644 and the Caliphate of ‘Uthman 644-56.

⁸ See Rahman (2003), pp.98-9; and *I.K.a.*, p.82; Yazid’s attempts to press his claim for legitimate recognition resulted in the Second Civil War in Islam (680-692) – see Donner (2012), p.177

⁹ Rahman (2003), pp.104-4

Two decades of rule under Mu‘awiya was domestically a calm affair compared to the turbulence that had been experienced since the Caliphate of ‘Uthman, and broadly speaking was an ‘unqualified success.’¹⁰ It has been noted that it was more or less during this period that the *dar al-Islam* develops to become what would be recognised by contemporary standards as a state;¹¹ with infrastructure developing to accommodate a full standing army, taxation systems, administration and bureaucracy.

7.2. The Two Faces of Mu‘awiya

Mu‘awiya’s administration was a product of the socio-political turmoil of the *Fitna* and not considered a natural development of Islamic political transition.¹² In this sense, the administration of Mu‘awiya, and the Umayyad Caliphate in general, was retrospectively considered the first truly *political* administration that facilitated the political organisation of the Muslims into a recognisable political state. Mu‘awiya’s apparently legendary political skill that reduced his estimation on the efficacy of violence, preferring to win without warfighting, and using low-coercion diplomacy and economic incentives as strategies rather than dependence upon offensive dominance.

Early accounts of Mu‘awiya unanimously portrayed him as ‘a clever and successful ruler who got what he wanted by persuasion rather than force.’¹³ Mu‘awiya’s policies appeared to have had the character of ‘accommodationism’,¹⁴ as Mu‘awiya fondly practiced the method of *ta’lif al-qulub*. Mu‘awiya was known to shower gifts to regional actors, and when pressed as to his motives he would answer that he preferred to bribe than decapitate, or that ‘a war costs infinitely more.’¹⁵ Mu‘awiya’s political philosophy was summarised in his own words when he said: ‘I never use my voice if I can use my money, never my whip if I can use my voice, never my sword if I can use my whip; but, if I have to use my sword, I will.’¹⁶

¹⁰ Robinson (2005), p.24; Kennedy (2007), p.349

¹¹ Donner (2012), p.172

¹² Khan (1973), p.69

¹³ Hawting (2002), p.42; also Humphreys (2006), p.3; Bewley (2002), p.11

¹⁴ Johnston (1995), p.112

¹⁵ Bewley (2002), p.39

¹⁶ Hawting (2002), p.42; also Bewley (2002), p.11; Humphreys (2006), p.3

Mu‘awiya became the proverbial *godfather* of the Umayyad House and probably the only Umayyad representative to enjoy legitimate acceptance by the majority of the Muslim population (bar the *Shi‘at ul-‘Ali*) during his lifetime. Later generations would accuse Mu‘awiya and his descendants as having imposed a kingship (*mulk*) over the Muslims, no different to practice of designating a king by the title of ‘Caesar’ or ‘Chosroes’¹⁷ as opposed to the egalitarian rule of the *Rashidun*. Ibn Khaldun, arguably the most important socio-historian Muslim scholar in Islamic history, was also one of the few Muslim historians, who wrote positively concerning the *Sufyanid* period of Umayyad rule casts them in a better light,

The Umayyads continued to hold on to the power that had been established for them and to preserve it, and to protect the power that Allah had given them. They aspired to lofty matters and rejected base ones. Eventually, the power passed to their wasteful descendants who were only concerned with the gratification of their desires and with sinful pleasures.¹⁸

Two things follow from Ibn Khaldun’s comment; firstly, the early recognition that the legitimacy of their rule was based upon the Divine Right that followed the aftermath of the *Fitna*; and secondly, the credibility of their government was tied to their pursuance of ‘lofty’ matters, which systemically could have only meant one thing – *Jihad fi sabil l’Allah*. The transition between the successive *Marwanid* administrations (684-750)¹⁹ succeeding the *Sufyanid* administrations of the Umayyad House, were plagued by the problems of legitimacy that sullied the reputation of the Umayyad House until its fall in 750.²⁰ Successive generations of *Marwanid* administrations often sought to tie their policies to a credible origin - Mu‘awiya and his two-decade long administration during which he pressed his claim to legitimate authority, inherent ‘right’, and in many ways, royal distinction.²¹

¹⁷ Hawting (2002), p.12

¹⁸ Ibn Khaldun (1980a), p.424

¹⁹ Hawting (2002), p.47; Robinson (2005), pp.23-6

²⁰ Donner (1998), pp.187, 189, 191

²¹ Blankinship (1994), p.24

7.2.1. Manifest Destiny

Ibn Khaldun is adamant of two things; that the early historians agreed that the Umayyad (*Sufyanid*) administrations of which Mu'awiya was the standard, were legitimate and credible authorities that acted in the interests of maintaining the integrity of the *dar al-Islam*; and secondly, that their policies were a continuation of those set by the *Rashidun* and therefore in accordance with the trajectory of the Prophet.²² Ibn Khaldun, though broadly speaking of the *Sufyanid* administrations, inadvertently characterises the qualitative nature of their policies writing:

Even though they were kings, their royal ways were not those of worthless men and oppressors. They complied with the intentions of the truth with all their energy, except when necessity caused them to do something (that was worthless). Such (a necessity existed) when there was fear that the whole thing might face dissolution. (To avoid that) was more important to them than any (other) intention. That this was (their attitude) is attested by the fact that they followed and imitated (the early Muslims). It is further attested by the information that the ancients had about their conditions.²³

The Caliphate of Mu'awiya was a return to the Caliphate of 'Umar in many ways,²⁴ and perhaps with a view to achieving the status and immortality of 'Umar in the collective memory of the Muslims, Mu'awiya sought legacy over absolute dominion.²⁵ It is proposed that the reintroduction of the Da'wa policy backed by unceasing Jihad was in no doubt a policy driven and maintained by the demands of credible demonstration. Just as the Prophet and the *Rashidun* (bar 'Ali) had demonstrated that God was with them through the spectacle of war, Mu'awiya astutely recognised that victory in battle afforded the greatest demonstration of God legitimating his rule and establishing his legacy.²⁶

²² Research question 2 is therefore historically validated according to Ibn Khaldun.

²³ Ibn Khaldun (1980a), p.423

²⁴ Hodgson (1977), p.217

²⁵ Humphreys (2006), p.104

²⁶ Luttwak (2011), p.212

Abu Bakr and ‘Umar were the only two real policy-making administrations at the systemic level, with ‘Uthman’s administration continuing the work of ‘Umar. Both administrations were ‘parabellum’ governments, that is, administrations in preparation for or in anticipation of war to protect or promote Islam, premising their identities based upon the metanarrative of Islam and the concept of *absolute Jihad*. The perpetual contest of *absolute Jihad* naturally resulted in a state of hostile tension, sometimes argued as a permanent condition of the international.²⁷ The anarchical society was, according to the meta-narrative the result of denying God’s Sovereignty.²⁸ Mu‘awiya had been a part of the *Rashidun* legacy. He was well versed in the policies of ‘Umar and ‘Uthman, and had substantial politico-military experience. He had participated in the crucible of the *Ridda* Wars as Abu Bakr and Khalid against the odds destroyed the rebel-apostates.²⁹

Mu‘awiya is reported to have said of his predecessors: ‘As for Abu Bakr, he never craved for the world and it never wished for him. As for ‘Umar, it sought him but he never wished for it. And as for us, we are immersed in it.’³⁰ Elsewhere, Mu‘awiya stated: ‘I desired the way followed by Abu Bakr and ‘Umar, but I was unable to follow it’.³¹ Mu‘awiya is further reported to have said to Abu Bakr’s son ‘Your father smoothed the terrain for me and set up the basis of our dominion. If your father acted arbitrarily [meaning not according to some undisclosed policy ordered by the Prophet], then we are content to follow in his footsteps.’³² Mu‘awiya had emerged from the ashes of the *Fitna* with God’s favour, and believed that he had to take measures to prevent the Muslim community from sinking back into chaos. It was this sense of mission and purposes that arguably influenced Mu‘awiya more than anything else. In fact, there is no reason to suggest that Mu‘awiya sought other than to continue and build on the example of his predecessors, with the belief in Providence and Manifest Destiny as the bedrock,³³ with the policies of the *Rashidun* as the foundation.

²⁷ Spencer (2002), p.145; Khadduri (1955), pp.51-4

²⁸ Wellhausen (1927), p.8; Robinson (2003), p.130

²⁹ Bewley (2002), p.48

³⁰ *I.K.*, p.221

³¹ Bewley (2002), p.33

³² *Ibid.*

³³ Sub-investigative question b. is thus proposed as being extremely relevant to the strategic actor as part of the value system that influenced decision-making.

7.3. The Grand Strategy of Da'wa 2.0.

Mu'awiya did not publically promote any particular 'version' of Islam nor can be identified as having a specific foreign policy that substantively differed to the trajectory set by 'Umar ibn al-Khattab.³⁴ Mu'awiya's new Caliphate differed however, in that it focused on the more secular concerns of strategic interactions that had been swept under the current of Providence by his predecessors. Islamic history has long held that the *maghazi* and *Rashidun* periods of leadership represented the establishment of God's Sovereignty on earth and that leadership of the *dar al-Islam* should be religious or pious, before political. Piety, and not policy, represented an ideal aspiration of the emerging Muslim collective that was fronted as the duty of the Caliph. However, Mu'awiya's new grand strategic Da'wa policy was clearly a consequence of the strategic environment rather than by the religious determination of policy.

A second difference between Mu'awiya's Da'wa policy from its previous incarnation was that material incentives that were previously complimentary to the *da'wa*, became an established strategic objective within the new version of policy. In other words, where previously the material gains were a welcome bonus to the primary objective of *da'wa*; now, the material rewards of *missionary* practice became very much an integral variable in the politico-strategic calculus and military planning. This reconfiguration of the Da'wa policy from the 'pure' practice of the *Rashidun* was heavily criticised by those who viewed such variables to be contaminating a pure calculus *fi sabil l'Allah*.³⁵

Looking back at the military campaigns and policies undertaken by Mu'awiya during his administration, it can be proposed that he had two identifiable objectives: first and foremost, to maintain and enhance the domestic political stability of the *dar al-Islam*; and secondly, to disrupt regional systemic stability. Both objectives were sought within the confines of a total strategy of Da'wa that like the original Da'wa policy of 'Umar, served as a covert means to marry systemic goals with domestic stability.

³⁴ Humphreys (2006), pp.1, 19

³⁵ Ibid., pp.3, 10

7.3.1. Political Stability Measures

By design or not,³⁶ the Banu Umayya, or the Umayyad House, had within thirty years following their fall from power in Mecca, repositioned themselves within the new political structure rejoining the elite ranks of political power and authority;

As a result the *Fitna* has often been interpreted as the climax of a struggle for power within Islam between that class of Meccans typified by the Umayyads, the wealthy and powerful leaders of pre-Islamic Mecca, and those, largely from a lower social stratum, whose acceptance of Islam was more wholehearted. To use expressions frequently applied, it was the result of a struggle between the old and the new aristocracy.³⁷

Emerging from the ashes of the *Fitna* as the uncontested Caliph, the pragmatic and politically astute Mu‘awiya was able to reorganise his administration with great political efficiency so as to maximise his authority with the remaining tribal elders. Mu‘awiya moved quickly to consolidate public opinion and win the favour of the Arab political elite through a decentralised government more aligned with traditional Arab tribal policymaking.³⁸ This domestic stability prompted a sense of internal peace and prosperity and externally facilitated the resumption of the Da’wa policy from the temporary hiatus of the First Civil War.

Although Medina had always been the capital of Muslim power, bar ‘Ali’s brief claim to power operating out of the garrison town of Kufa,³⁹ Mu‘awiya established his capital in Damascus, Mecca or Medina would never be a seat of power again in Islamic history.⁴⁰ Successive Muslim governments would avoid both cities that were infused with the legacy of Prophet and most likely, the expectations of religious standards and conformity that no administration wanted to be judged by.⁴¹

³⁶ Hawting (2002) notes that it has been suggested, predominantly within the Shi‘ite literature, that the *Fitna* had been engineered by the Umayyads as a means to reclaim their former glory – pp.31-2

³⁷ Ibid., p.31

³⁸ Donner (2012), pp.170-2; Robinson (2005), pp.63-4; Bewley (2002), p.31-3

³⁹ Rahman (2003), p.85

⁴⁰ Hodgson (1977), p.217

⁴¹ Wellhausen (1927), p.54

7.3.2. Post-Fitna Damage Control

Mu‘awiya was in his element when it came to *bargaining* and balancing the fragile peace following the *Fitna*.⁴² Mu‘awiya held an extremely sensitive strategic calculus to his policies, whilst adhering to the trajectories set by his predecessors and was relatively restrained in his use of force and the estimation of force to advance his interests in general. Mu‘awiya had grown up in a powerful political household and had learnt the art of politics.⁴³ The Quraysh were a political tribe whose more recent economic successes had only entrenched their diplomatic credentials amongst the Arab tribes. As regional balancers between tribal politics and economic fortunes, the Quraysh were, as a tribe, highly adept politicians. In the traditions recorded of Mu‘awiya he is portrayed as someone who embodied the concept of *hilm par excellence*. *Hilm* was ‘a traditional Arab virtue signifying subtlety and cunning in the management of men and affairs and it is seen as a desideratum for the traditional Arab leader.’⁴⁴

Mu‘awiya’s style of *bargaining* was well-known to prefer ‘using flattery and material inducements rather than force, ruling in the style of a tribal shaykh who has no coercive power at his disposal and depends upon his own reputation and persuasive skills.’⁴⁵ Furthermore, Mu‘awiya was able to win over public opinion by avoiding the pitfalls of his predecessors by actively responding to the demands of the public.⁴⁶ Mu‘awiya would discharge governors who lost the public vote so to speak, preferring to appoint or re-appoint based upon opinion polls of whom the regional public preferred.⁴⁷ A return to meritocracy identified the character of Mu‘awiya’s administration.⁴⁸ Additionally, taxation was balanced, and the citizens were not only protected, but also prospering under his fiscal, economic and social reforms. Political dissidence was tolerated so long as allegiance was maintained,⁴⁹ and the form of dissidence did not escalate beyond words and ideas.⁵⁰

⁴² Bewley (2002), p.32

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Hawting (2002), p.42; see also Humphreys (2006), p.3; Bewley (2002), p.11

⁴⁵ Ibid. all; and Hodgson (1977), p.219

⁴⁶ Bewley (2002), p.54

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Quigley (2013), p.741; Hodgson (1977), p.219; Bewley (2002), p.56

⁴⁹ Hodgson (1977), p.218; Blankinship (1994), p.24

⁵⁰ Bewley (2002), p.52

7.3.3. Administrative Reforms

Mu'awiya stabilised the Muslim community by returning to the model of 'Umar's administration, but realised that it was inherently unstable following the *Fitna*. The decentralised nature of 'Umar's administration was not safe for the new strategic setting and environment, and therefore began political and military reforms to slowly introduce a central government and authority that was independent of tribalism and the haunting culture of *jahiliyya*. Quigley argues that Mu'awiya's administrative reforms were conducted on the model of the Persians, but were part of a long-term programme to centralise government with institutions of policing, judiciary, and financial bureaus that he never lived to see out.⁵¹ Most of these reforms were introduced slowly so as not to undermine the tribal system still in play at the time of his early administration. It would not be a far claim Quigley argues, to suggest that Mu'awiya's master plan had always been to supplant the tribal politics of the Arabs that had ravaged the Muslim community with a new model of central authority.⁵²

Muawiya's chief reform was in political organisation. It is possible that he was not clear as to his real aims in his own mind, but the general trend of his reforms was to replace the previous system of Arabic tribal exploitation by a relatively secular state organized as a dynastic monarchy in the Omayyad family. This system would have subordinated all subjects, Arabs and non-Arabs, Moslems and non-Moslems, to the state.⁵³

Hodgson similarly agrees that the long-term goal of centralisation was what Mu'awiya's administrative reforms were designed to implement as 'Mu'awiyah took measures to make the central control of revenue more effective than 'Umar had made it.'⁵⁴ In the midst of the anarchy generated during the *Fitna*, Mu'awiya sought to create a quasi-Hobbesian Leviathan to bring stability amongst the Arabs and by extension, throughout the *dar al-Islam*.

⁵¹ Quigley (2013), p.739

⁵² Bewley (2002), disagrees and argues that the shift to centralisation coincided with the decadence of the later *Marwanid* administrations, finally becoming state practice under the 'Abbasid dynasty from 750 onwards. – pp.68-72

⁵³ Quigley (2013), p.739

⁵⁴ Hodgson (1977), p.218

7.3.4. The Reinstatement of the *Shura* Council

Mu‘awiya’s initial preference for a decentralised administration meant that political decision-making was inclusive of all members of the political elite, new or old, who were invited to offer and discuss their opinions on policy.⁵⁵ It is commonplace amongst writers on the Umayyad period to judge the entire dynasty in one fell swoop at their worst.⁵⁶ The consultative practices (*al-shura*) that were the foundational method of policy and decision-making during the *Rashidun* era, it is claimed, did not exist the moment after Mu‘waiya’s official status as Caliph.⁵⁷ This is simply not true and reflects popular regurgitation of the selective source materials we have previously discussed in our literature review.

The truth of the matter is that the administration of ‘Umar is the only real example of *al-shura* during the *Rashidun* period. Abu Bakr presided over a war counsel, a qualitatively different model of consultation and decision-making compared to the *shura* council of ‘Umar. During the administration of ‘Uthman, the basic institution of the *shura* council remained the same as inherited from ‘Umar but gradually experienced diminishing participation as ‘Uthman would increasingly ignore, overrule, or just choose otherwise to the council.⁵⁸ Finally the administration of ‘Ali reflected what the practice of *shura* had become by his time with political fragmentation and infighting rife so as to render the practice redundant. It was Mu‘awiya who restored the practice of *al-shura* to his administration, and in particular to the issue of policymaking for systemic strategic interaction.

At this juncture it should be quite clear that in relation to research question 2, the overwhelming historical evidence confirms that Mu‘awiya certainly attempted to revert back to a continuation of politics and policies that the ‘*Umar Doctrine* had established albeit within the context of the new strategic setting and environment.

⁵⁵ Bewley (2002), pp.52-8

⁵⁶ Madelung (2001), pp.309-10

⁵⁷ al-Raysuni (2011) in his study of the practice of *shura* is guilty of indulging this point whilst grossly exaggerating the practice amongst the *Rashidun*. See pp.94-113

⁵⁸ I.K., pp.261-2

7.3.5. The Return of the ‘*Umar Doctrine*

‘Ali had not been as politically astute as his predecessors;⁵⁹ Mu‘awiya, a man better adapted to politics, understood that the stability of his new regime depended upon his ability to control the tribes such that ‘[t]he success of their integration of the tribesmen into a state, then, depended as much upon their ability to use tribal ties for their own ends as it did upon their ability to override those ties.’⁶⁰ Donner continues to explain that this policy, that originated with the ‘*Umar Doctrine* calculated that

... the effectiveness with which the rulers were able to control the thousands of tribesmen now under their charge and to bring them to do their bidding, was also the result of the elite’s keen awareness of the ingrained strength of tribal ties and of the ways in which these ties could be used to foster, rather than to obstruct, their consolidation of power.⁶¹

In the post-*Fitna* years of his administration, there is little doubt that Mu‘awiya was a proponent of the ‘*Umar Doctrine*.⁶² Using the tried and tested methods that he himself had applied as a governor under orders from ‘Umar, Mu‘awiya was well aware of the doctrine and the political objectives of the resettlement policy. The move to reinstate a decentralised and open *shura* council paid dividends for Mu‘awiya as he was able to lure the tribal chiefs into his court and secure their allegiances through inclusive decision-making, political status, and financial incentives. The allegiance of a tribal chief was tantamount to the allegiance of the whole tribe.

During the first decade of the Umayyad Caliphate, Mu‘awiya not only continued the resettlement policy of the ‘*Umar Doctrine* but also the particulars of the policy such as non-intervention into non-security matters and administering tax collection alone without interference into internal affairs of the locals.⁶³ He differed with ‘Umar on enforcing Arab segregation between the populations and soldiers however.⁶⁴

⁵⁹ Humphreys (2006), p.107; Madelung (2001), p.310

⁶⁰ Donner (1981), p.258

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Quigley (2013), p.738

⁶³ Qurbanov (2010), p.116

⁶⁴ Quigley (2013), p.738

7.3.6. Military Reforms

Alongside the re-institution of the resettlement policy came the positioning of forward operating bases and border outposts (*ribat*) along the frontiers of the *dar al-Islam*, signaling the firm entrenchment of military operations continuing previous expansions.⁶⁵ Mu'awiya maintained a personal highly disciplined armed force in Syria, who had been under his command since his days as governor.⁶⁶ Mu'awiya's Syrian armed force were fiercely loyal to Mu'awiya who in turn, ensured they were well paid and their families were provided for when sent on extended campaigns into remote areas.⁶⁷ Mu'awiya made a point of improving organisation and infrastructure of the garrisons of Kufa and Basra;⁶⁸ and selectively appointing strong commanders and lieutenants in Basra and Kufa;⁶⁹ which was in order to maintain the integrity of the strategic features of the resettlement policies and discipline of the garrisons.⁷⁰

Mu'awiya was also very particular to appoint loyal and battle-hardened men to positions of command.⁷¹ Additionally, Mu'awiya presided over extensive military and naval reforms, which Quigley argues 'revolutionized their organisation and tactics.'⁷² By this Quigley is referring to the introduction of drill and discipline that the Byzantine armies had used. Mu'awiya's almost three-decade long relationship with Byzantine armed forces had left a strong impact on him,⁷³ as he modeled his armed forces upon Byzantine naval and infantry tactics and maneuver. Additionally, Admirals of the navy were given the same status and prestige of army generals.⁷⁴ In addition to military reforms, and between the administrative, Kennedy notes the establishment of the institutions of the *shurta* (police)⁷⁵ and the *haras* (close-protection units) within the same year of Mu'awiya's ascension to official power.⁷⁶ It is in the context and background of these developments that we propose the new Da'wa policy initiated by Mu'awiya.

⁶⁵ Donner (2012), p.172

⁶⁶ Hodgson (1977), pp.217-8

⁶⁷ Bewley (2002), p.48; Kennedy (2005), p.12

⁶⁸ Blankinship (1994), p.24

⁶⁹ Quigley (2013), p.738

⁷⁰ Bewley (2002), pp.54-5

⁷¹ Humphreys (2006), pp.105-6

⁷² Quigley (2013), p.738

⁷³ Humphreys (2006), p.105

⁷⁴ Bewley (2002), p.49

⁷⁵ Rashid (1983), pp.83-4

⁷⁶ Kennedy (2005), p.13; Lev (2006), p.622; Ebsstein (2010), p.113; Hawting (2002), p.35

7.3.7. Imperial by Divine Right

In a strategically sound development, it is proposed that Mu‘awiya restored the Da’wa policy to advance the strategic interests of the *dar al-Islam* by reigniting the residual energies left over from the *Fitna* in combination with ‘weaponising’ *providentialism*. Mu‘awiya’s policy of Da’wa was built upon the meta-narrative Islam and the human condition that concludes with the need for *da’wa* as a means to human emancipation from dependency and servitude to other human beings, to God alone. The new Da’wa policy was designed to reignite the fervor of *righteousness* and emancipatory mission of *da’wa* that had propelled the *Futuh*,⁷⁷ by translating the *absolute Jihad* as a matter of national policy and thus the duty of the military establishment.⁷⁸ Campaigns against the *dar al-Harb* (lit. the Territories of War) – any territory not under the jurisdiction of the Shari‘ah, therefore became not only a matter of foreign policy, but also a spectacle for both Muslims and non-Muslims. As far as Muslims were concerned, the Da’wa policy was designed to remind them that God was with Mu‘awiya, thus to overthrow the government would be to overthrow or at the very least, undermine God’s Will and Judgment in the matter of authority.⁷⁹

In relation to the non-Muslims of the *dar al-Harb* - the ‘Divine Right’ of Mu‘awiya could only be maintained by demonstration. Warfare in the medieval period, whether in Europe or the Middle East, shared the Judaic notion of inviting God’s Judgment through battle.⁸⁰ Jan Honig, writing on European warfare in the Middle Ages, explains the simple formula that translates exactly to what we propose was Mu‘awiya’s underlying motivation, and what would become the obsession of the Umayyad House and its conception of *Jihad fi sabil l’Allah* as a battle-centric policy:

In a society which believed that an omnipotent and omniscient God determined the course of history, ultimately for good and not ill, there naturally arose the problem of knowing the will of this supernatural being. Means were sought of inviting God to divulge His intentions. One means was the trial by battle. [...] Battle was

⁷⁷ Khalidi (1994), pp.65-67

⁷⁸ Hamid (2004), p.15; Robinson (2005), p.60

⁷⁹ Robinson (2003), p.133

⁸⁰ Donner (1991), p.37

not a simple test of strength, but a test of divine favour and justice.⁸¹

In Clausewitzian terms, battle was a test of the opponent's power of resistance – '*the total means at his disposal and the strength of his will.*'⁸² Contrary to popular opinion amongst their detractors, it is more than plausible that Mu'awiya and the Umayyad House firmly believed in their legitimate claim to political authority over the Muslim population that had been demonstrated in the crucible of the *Fitna*. Mu'awiya's new Da'wa policy sought to invoke the philosophy of Old Testament Jewish Holy War,⁸³ most reasonably something Mu'awiya had learned about through his extensive dealings with Christians and Jews in his capacity as governor of Syria, and the Byzantine Empire;⁸⁴ and follow in the footsteps of the heroes of Israel such as Joshua, Gideon and Samson who understood that there was no room for peaceful coexistence with their mutually exclusive systems of faith and values.⁸⁵

7.3.8. Holy War

The Imperial policy of Da'wa' authored by Mu'awiya raises the question of Jihad as a teleological consequence of Islam.⁸⁶ There are many verses in the Qur'an revealed during both phases two and three of the *maghazi* that suggest warfare is a permanent condition coupled with the hadith narrations found in various collections.⁸⁷ Although the Judaic notion of warfighting as a means to bring about God's Judgment is inherent to the notion of *absolute Jihad*, it seems that for Mu'awiya's designs, the value of *absolute Jihad* was the weaponising effect of morale that accompanied it rather than the objective of spreading the *da'wa* or actually invoking God's Judgment.⁸⁸ A Holy War of forced conversion seems to have been very far from Mu'awiya's objectives, as would a war of genocide or mass extermination.

⁸¹ Honig (2001), p.121

⁸² *OW*, p.77

⁸³ See Deuteronomy 7:1-6

⁸⁴ Robinson (2005), p.60

⁸⁵ Armstrong (2001), p.8

⁸⁶ Sub-investigative question b.

⁸⁷ See *Q*, 2:216, 244, 251; 9:5 & 25; a comprehensive selection of hadith from various collections are presented in Ibn al-Nuhhas (2002), pp.13-38; Spencer (2002), p.145; and Khadduri (1955), pp.51-4

⁸⁸ Humphreys (2006), p.104

Indeed, the later policies of his *Marwanid* descendants made the very distinct point to actively discourage conversions whilst simultaneously championing the mission of *da'wa* and the imperatives of *absolute Jihad*.⁸⁹ For sure, *absolute Jihad* shared the same theo-philosophical foundation of a state of war found in the Old Testament yet the practice of Jihad in reality hitherto Mu'awiya was anything like the practice of Jewish warriors. The state of war between the *dar al-Islam* and Hellenistic Byzantium, for example, was not one of extermination. Walter Kaegi explains:

This limited coexistence and occasional reciprocity or symmetry of policies – and it would be wrong to assume much symmetry – in no sense involved any concession by either leadership of ultimate principles and claims, which prevented or at least restricted any easy positive evolution toward genuine coexistence.⁹⁰

The *Rashidun* had all translated the existential threat of the state of war – *absolute Jihad* - between Islam and all other faiths and value systems into a pragmatic Jihad of relative gains under conditions of anarchy and relative security. The horizontal expression of the Da'wa policy had sought the offensive domination of the enemy but the friction of the systemic environment had reduced the initially explosive Jihad to an eventual form of attritional warfare. Mu'awiya's policy against Byzantium in particular, despite its grand imperial character was also non-zero sum and interpolated attrition into the strategic calculus over decisive victory.

Therefore, both sub-investigative questions b. and d. share a common explanation, that Jihad was subordinated to a policy of imperial ambitions that were premised upon teleological foundations of the meta-narrative of Islam. Providence was used to encourage Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah*, which was backed by a Divine Promise of victory.⁹¹ The desired result would be a heightened offense since the value of the Divine Promise transcended mortal threat, almost encouraging death.

⁸⁹ See Hawting (2002), p.4; Fierro (2007), pp.8-9

⁹⁰ Kaegi (2000), pp.254-5

⁹¹ *Q*, 2:246-9 & 8:19

‘Indeed,’ Blankinship writes, ‘the persistence of the Muslim movement forward on all fronts, for nearly a century, can only be explained if this basic doctrine of early Muslim ideology is taken into account.’⁹² Where the existential threat perceived by the anarchic environment drove the Da’wa policy under ‘Umar and later ‘Uthman, the new Imperial Da’wa policy was effectively a pragmatic means to extend political dominion in the name of God’s Sovereignty and balance domestic stability. Just as claims of conquest for material benefits alone during the *Futuh* can be dismissed as simplistic; so too, would it be to accuse Mu‘awiya of using Jihad to be solely a front for dynastic ambitions and material gains.

Donner and Blankinship likewise reach this conclusion, arguing that the character of early Islam was always that of a committed religious Believers’ movement, even during times of prosperity. A firm religious conviction in spreading God’s writ, infused with an apocalyptic inevitability dominated the general belief and support for Jihad over the corollary material gains which were increasingly concomitant with the success of the policy.⁹³ ‘Such a persistent dedication to armed struggle as exhibited by the early Muslims required an ideological belief to back it, even if worldly expectations also played a role.’ Blankinship writes, ‘After all, the Muslim fighters, especially in the earliest period, were not professional soldiers but, nevertheless, carried out the *jihad* continuously, despite numerous debacles and defeats.’⁹⁴

Mu‘awiya’s will to invite God’s Judgment through the trial of battle reiterates the battle-centric approach of the proposition that ‘War is an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.’⁹⁵ Accordingly, the best explanation for the design of an imperial policy is to be found in the supreme confidence that Providence might afford in decision-making as the ultimate force-multiplier. After all, if military capabilities alone are enough to inspire bullish confidence to advance offensive strategic action, what then of the Promise of God Himself?⁹⁶

⁹² Blankinship (1994), pp.1-2

⁹³ Donner (2012), pp.197-9

⁹⁴ Blankinship (1994), p.2

⁹⁵ *OW*, p.75

⁹⁶ Luttwak (2011), p.198

7.4. The Pragmatic Imperial Holy War

In building the new empire, it is proposed that Mu'awiya had four primary imperatives that the imperial Da'wa policy was designed to deliver: firstly, the Da'wa policy was needed to reinforce the meta-narrative of Islam and the certainty in *absolute Jihad* thereby increasing the recruitment of warriors to advance the frontiers of Islam. A new generation of warriors was to be recruited, who had not been part of the *Rashidun* era, but longed for the glory and immortality that only the battlefield could enshrine in history. Hodgson sums up the problem and answer that Mu'awiya had to address:

As was appropriate to the restorer of the caliphal state, the conquering force of Islam was renewed; but the expansive power was no longer so overwhelming. A new political balance had had time to develop in such lands as had not been overwhelmed at first, and henceforth further conquests were due as much to the resources of an established major empire still in full vigour, as to the pressure of the mass enthusiasms which seemed almost to carry themselves forward in the time of 'Umar and 'Uthman.⁹⁷

The secondary imperative demanded that warfighting had to be sustained for domestic purposes, and this was the greater or more pressing socio-political imperative. 'Mu'awiya's decisions were politically informed: he knew perfectly well that the caliphate was founded on *jihad*; that it was its *raison d'être* and the Arab soldiery who had created it knew no other *métier*.⁹⁸ During periods of conquest, there had been no rebellions during the administration of 'Umar,⁹⁹ and it was when the Jihad began to slow down during the administration of 'Uthman that the *bughat* began to arouse. Mu'awiya understood that '[w]ithout new campaigns to provide them with a sense of purpose and direction, they would turn to fighting amongst themselves and even against him.'¹⁰⁰ Ibn Khaldun explains the strategic setting as follows:

⁹⁷ Hodgson (1977), p.219

⁹⁸ Humphreys (2006), p.104

⁹⁹ Kaegi (2000), p.269

¹⁰⁰ Humphreys (2006), p.104

The restraining influence of religion had weakened. The restraining influence of government (*mulk*) and group (*asabiyya*) was needed. If, under those circumstances, someone not acceptable to the group had been appointed as successor (to the caliphate), such an appointment would have been rejected by it. The (chances of the appointee) would have been quickly demolished, and the community would have been split and torn by dissension.¹⁰¹

By government and group, Ibn Khaldun is referring to political authority and ties of solidarity. Thus, Mu'awiya sought to tie his Divine Right of authority to the imperative of Jihad as a means to bind the community to his authority by means of his policies. As the *Amir al-Mu'meneen* he was empowered to lead the Da'wa, to wage Jihad, and expand the dominion of God on earth;¹⁰² and as Muslims, their duty was to support him through the various means of Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah*. Thirdly, as a consequence of the former imperatives, warfighting had to be sustained in order to not only maintain and deploy ongoing military operations, the soldiers payrolls and pensions; but also the war booty which provided alongside material plunder, extended territories rich in agriculture, livestock, as well as captives for ransom, slaves, and most of all, taxes.

Finally, Mu'awiya was undoubtedly aware that it was during the Caliphate of Abu Bakr that Arabian hegemony was consolidated; and during the Caliphate of 'Umar, that the *dar al-Islam* established itself as a regional hegemony, the foundations of which the Umayyad dynasty would be built upon. Between the Caliphate of 'Uthman and Mu'awiya only bloody civil strife halted the systematic politico-military expansion of the *dar al-Islam*. Mu'awiya must have recognised that the earlier successes of the *Rashidun* had cleared the region of great powers and even managed to intimidate offshore threats. Mu'awiya knew that he had to maintain or regain the strategic initiative of his predecessors.

¹⁰¹ Ibn Khaldun (1980), p.431

¹⁰² Humphreys (2006), p.104

7.5. Return of the Security Protocol

So far, we have examined the immediate measures and policies undertaken by Mu‘awiya that were essentially designed to create, maintain and promote domestic stability. In doing so, we have already demonstrated the continuation of policies that subordinated Jihad to a politico-strategic calculus that Mu‘awiya designed to be ‘total’ in its effects and influence. Jihad was subordinated to imperial designs and dressed in the robes of holy war as a means to reunite the Muslim community against the external world.

However, the *strategic dynamics* of Jihad do not end with the identification of its continuation as an instrument of political design; rather, there exists another subtle, yet telling evolution in the application of warfighting that has hitherto yet to be explored. This element that shall be investigated for the remainder of the chapter, and tested diagnostically, since it concerns the qualitative nature of the offense in relation to the second objective of Mu‘awiya’s grand strategy of Da’wa – to disrupt regional systemic stability. The table below lists the cluster of *signs* and *symptoms* identifiably present during the period of investigation. Diagnostic evaluation begins with hypotheses H, F, G, followed by D and E.

Offense-Defence Variables of Intervening Factors that lead to War¹⁰³

Actor	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
Mu‘awiya 661-680	✕	✕	✕	✖	✖	✖	✖	✖	✕	✕

7.5.1. Strategic Misdirection and Disruption

‘Regarding the caliph Mu‘awiya in Syria,’ Hawting writes, ‘the period of his rule is portrayed as one of internal security and external expansion and aggression.’¹⁰⁴ Whilst Mu‘awiya resumed the Jihad and all fronts following the hiatus of the First Civil war, ‘We do not know where they went or what were either their immediate or

¹⁰³ Key: ✖ = Primary Offense-Defense Variable of analysis
 ✕ = Secondary Offense-Defense Variable of analysis
 ● = non-applicable Offense-Defense Variable of analysis

¹⁰⁴ Hawting (2002), p.41

long-term objectives’;¹⁰⁵ Humphreys writes, which is peculiar given that the investment and resources needed for war would not have been lost on such a politically astute man.

Indeed, the most accurate answer is that the specificities of decision-making were not recorded as to be the exact locations to which operations were directed and for what ends. Thus, the early Muslim historians note the campaigns and their general directions, such as Anatolia, Constantinople, North Africa, and the most frequently vague – against the Romans or Byzantines; but rarely more information than this except the outcome of the expedition and notables who might have died during them.¹⁰⁶ Poor historical record keeping is probably less to blame than the more plausible recognition that military campaigns became less publicised under Mu‘awiya than they had been during successive *Rashidun* administrations. For one reason, Mu‘awiya ‘drew on all tribes as much as possible for his military backing, playing them off against one another when necessary, but keeping the interests of all tied in one way or another to the state’;¹⁰⁷ this form of political manipulation would have allowed him to create a hierarchical set of information distribution. Such an artifice can be gleamed from the manner in which he had instructed his lieutenant and foster brother, Ziyad to manage the tribal factions in Iraq;

by using one group to control another, and by using the tribal notables to control the masses of ordinary tribesmen, he managed to keep most groups of tribesmen from becoming too powerful and preserved among them at least a modicum of interest in serving the state.¹⁰⁸

The overall strategy would have been one of misdirection; busying the tribal chiefs with local politics but not excluding them from the open floor of the *shura* council in the knowledge that they would agree to Mu‘awiya’s preferences as long as they could secure his backing for their own, more pressing, tribal politics. Furthermore, the tribal chiefs would be less inclined to discuss matters of international politics over their

¹⁰⁵ Humphreys (2006), p.2

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., p.106; Kennedy (2005), p.12

¹⁰⁷ Donner (1981), pp.276-7

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p.277

own, and even less inclined to busy themselves with informing others about Mu'awiya's intentions.

7.5.2. ODT - D/Dx # 8. Secrecy is More Common and Dangerous - Hypothesis H

Hypothesis H, explains that when the offensive dominates, foreign and defense policy is more secretive.¹⁰⁹ As a matter of policy, that is rational calculation, the reinstatement of the Da'wa to serve the interests of restoring, and advancing, the interests of the *dar al-Islam* towards regional hegemony would have been sound judgement. (Assumption A). Even if Mu'awiya believed that he still controlled the strategic initiative or remained offense dominant in relation to other regional actors (Assumption B); the prime predictions (2 & 3) of offense-defense theory would forecast a resumption of limited war in either case:¹¹⁰

2. States that have or believe they have large offensive opportunities or defensive vulnerabilities will initiate and fight more wars than other states; (Assumption A)
3. A state will initiate and fight more wars in periods when it has, or thinks that it has, larger offensive opportunities and defensive capabilities. (Assumption B)

The important relation of Hypothesis H is that of information and timing. Assumptions A and B stipulated above are both amenable to considerations of Hypothesis H in this context regarding secrecy and information, Van Evera explains the correlation as follows:

Governments cloak their foreign and defense policies in greater secrecy when conquest is easy. An information advantage confers more rewards, and a disadvantage raises more dangers: lost secrets could risk a state's existence. Thus states compete for information advantage by concealing their foreign policy strategies and military plans and forces.¹¹¹

¹⁰⁹ Van Evera (2004), pp.227-8

¹¹⁰ Ibid., p.244

¹¹¹ Ibid., p.233

As regards timing, conquest is given the advantage to position based upon superior information to offset the timeframe of operation between two actors such that the initiative of a first strike is virtually guaranteed or retains a high level of probable success (Hypothesis D and E). Van Evera explains the offense dominance behaviour in this case as follows: 'It can ease surprise attack by concealing preparations from the victim. It opens windows of opportunity and vulnerability by delaying states' reactions to others' military buildups, raising the risk of preventive war.'¹¹²

Hence, Hypothesis H is really an extension of the *symptoms* presented by Hypothesis D and E, and maintains the same *symptomatic* demonstrations of Jihad as directed by Abu Bakr and practiced by Khalid ibn al-Walid during the *Ridda* Wars and the extended security policy. As for the Caliphates of 'Umar and 'Uthman, the Da'wa Policy that directed Jihad did not have any need of it. The *shura* council planned and directed decision and policy making such that the Da'wa followed rigid protocols becoming an exercise in *fait accompli* tactics (Hypothesis F). Although military commanders must have taken a very different approach to the operational and theatre level requirements of information and intelligence, grand strategic policy was driven by a sense of *providentialism* over calculi based upon strategic interactions.

Mu'awiya's shrewd political acumen presented a character of calculated reserve that masked his intentions and motives to policies both foreign and domestic. Accordingly, Mu'awiya's secrecy on military movements, policies and operational planning may have been simply a matter of habit; but again, his biography reveals a markedly consistent approach to keeping his cards close but playing a devastating hand. In other words, as Humphreys writes: 'He consulted widely and listened closely but did not show his hand. ... Neither his friends nor his enemies ever quite knew what he was thinking until it was too late to do anything about it.'¹¹³ Thus, the consideration of Hypothesis H is not only amenable to Hypothesis D and E, to which we shall elaborate upon later, but also to Hypothesis F – *Fait accompli* or strategic coercion.

¹¹² Ibid., pp.233-5

¹¹³ Humphreys (2006), p.3

7.6. Coercive Diplomacy

It is useful at this point to suggest that Mu'awiya's calculus on the efficacy of violence and the value of offense-dominance was not only on account of his privileged upbringing, but also a progression of experience that he brought with him into his administration. Since his days as governor, a post that he held for over a quarter of a century, he had managed not only a domestic constituency as vast as Syria and later during the *Fitna* Iraq; but had been at the forefront of the relentless campaigns of Jihad against Byzantium in the northern frontiers. Mu'awiya's accommodationism was a product of seasoned practice in the art of coercive diplomacy and violence.

Mu'awiya's initial military contact with the Byzantines coincided with the fortification and increased resistance of Byzantine strongholds and defensive strategies under Emperor Constans II,¹¹⁴ accordingly, Kaegi notes:

Mu'awiya probably gained valuable experience in how to fight and negotiate with the Byzantines. He probably also gained an appreciation of the terrain and logistical problems of Anatolia. No other caliph had so much personal military experience against the Byzantines.¹¹⁵

We may take two steps back to advance this one step forward in the analysis as we refer back to Hypothesis F and thus indirectly to Hypothesis G to elaborate their significance to the offensive applications of Jihad before Mu'awiya's administration.

¹¹⁴ Kaegi (2000), p.247

¹¹⁵ Ibid.

7.6.1. ODT - D/Dx # 6. Faits Accomplis are More Common and Dangerous -

Hypothesis F

We previously explained¹¹⁶ that Hypothesis F proposes that offense dominance introduces the variable of escalation by promoting strategic preferences to impose zero-sum outcomes and payoffs in their favour by strategically undermining rational options of the opponent to a common denominator that suits the instigating actor. Offense-defense theory advances the claim that such diplomatic tactics become more common and dangerous because of offense dominance, which in turn increases the risk of war between actors:

Faits accomplis are more common when the offense dominates because the rewards they promise are more valuable. When security is scarce, winning disputes grows more important than avoiding war. Leaders care more how spoils are divided than about avoiding violence, because failure to gain their share can spell their doom. This leads to gain-maximizing, war-risking diplomatic strategies-above all, to fait accompli tactics.¹¹⁷

It may be retrospectively gauged that the administrations of ‘Umar and ‘Uthman used the Da’wa policy as an aggressive form of diplomacy threatening the full force of *Jihad fi sabil l’Allah*. This was hardly a religious motivation as it was a strategic recognition of the perception that offense-dominance generates, Van Evera writes: ‘Faits accomplis are more dangerous when the offense dominates because a successful fait accompli has a greater effect on the distribution of international power.’¹¹⁸ Diplomacy wasn’t co-operative because it had to be violent.¹¹⁹ War booty was essential to not only reward tribesmen for their participation, but also to maintain the incentives for the resettlement policy.

¹¹⁶ See 3.6.2.(2.)

¹¹⁷ Van Evera (2004), p.232

¹¹⁸ Ibid.

¹¹⁹ See Schelling (2008), p.32

Hence, Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah* became the latent threat¹²⁰ that would punish resistance to the imposition of Islamic sovereignty. The demand of the *da'wa*, that is, the right of Islam to be offered as a means of self-determination for a population came at the cost of a *fait accompli* – accept to become a client of the *dar al-Islam* and pay tribute (*Jizya*) or face the full force of Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah*. Hence, Jihad was an instrument of threat – *the power to hurt*;¹²¹ and the Da'wa was a policy characterised by the *fait accompli*. The policies of the 'Umar Doctrine, under which Mu'awiya operated, used this form of coercive violence as the momentum of the Da'wa overran territories with little resistance and scarce negotiations. Hypothesis G may be reintroduced as an elucidation.

7.6.2. ODT - D/Dx # 7. States Negotiate Less - Hypothesis G

Fait accompli is not a viable strategy if an actor seeks to negotiate. The generation of risk is so high that the expected reaction of the intended target will be nothing other than violence if they refuse; 'Hence faits accomplis are more alarming and evoke a stronger response from others. States faced with a fait accompli will shoot more quickly because their interests are more badly damaged by it.'¹²² Consequently, bargaining and negotiations are trickier because there is less incentive for co-operation between actors.¹²³ Political bargaining becomes more aggressive with scarce concessions. The *Rashidun* period generally records few cases of negotiations other than *faits accomplis*. This is not to claim that there were not diplomatic contacts and exchanges between the Muslims and systemic actors, but that they were tentative and almost always backed by the threat of latent force. During the administration of 'Umar, truces were scarce except in the event of terms that were highly favourable to the Muslims,¹²⁴ that in effect, designated a sense of victory (winning without fighting) by their very consolidation.

¹²⁰ Ibid., p.30

¹²¹ Ibid., p.12

¹²² Van Evera (2004), p.232

¹²³ Essentially because it is perceived that a relative gain by either side poses greater risks to the other's safety - Ibid., p.227

¹²⁴ Kaegi (2000), p.239

Kaegi notes that strategic interactions from the late 630s and 640s were ‘a grudging temporary existence of a sort. Neither government ruled out from the beginning occasional and useful or necessary diplomatic contacts to settle or neutralize specific problems.’¹²⁵ Political bargaining between ‘Umar and Heraclius were not uncommon, for example in 640/1, arrangements were made to return defectors and defecting Arab tribes in response to ‘Umar’s threat of seizing the Christian population of the *dar al-Islam* and subjecting them to captivity or expulsion.¹²⁶ Additionally, practical concerns such as prisoner exchanges;¹²⁷ armament controls and restrictions on communications between groups and persons on either side of the frontiers were also mutually arranged.¹²⁸ Maintaining the strategic initiative that originated with the inroads made during the administration of Abu Bakr had become the strategic focus of the Da’wa policy during the *Rashidun* administrations whereby the combination of the security dilemma and the perception and attainment of regional offense dominance overshadowed the strategic value of co-operative strategies or nonzero-sum preferences.

Mu‘awiya who had worked under this policy realised that the strategic setting and environment that he now operated in had become a different playing field from the days of ‘Umar and ‘Uthman. Hence, given what has been recorded concerning Mu‘awiya’s pragmatic and accommodationist inclinations, it can be assumed that Mu‘awiya would probably have preferred to use coercive threats to encourage weaker offshore powers to adopt isolationist policies, or to seek alliances with him rather than engage in extended warfighting.

Where diplomatic contacts have been recorded, the expected strategic behaviour that Hypothesis G predicts is invariably demonstrated.¹²⁹ For example, as Governor of Syria in 650, Mu‘awiya conducted a truce with the Byzantine Emperor but broke the treaty seizing a *window of opportunity* (Hypotheses D & E) to use his developing naval power to seize Rhodes in 653.¹³⁰ Mu‘awiya was not able to consolidate his control over the territory and by 654 had conducted another treaty with the Emperor

¹²⁵ Ibid., p.254

¹²⁶ Ibid., pp.249, 254

¹²⁷ Tabari (1989), pp.89, 91; Kaegi (2000), p.251

¹²⁸ Kaegi (2000), p.251

¹²⁹ Van Evera (2004), p.233

¹³⁰ Rahman (2003), p.80

for a truce in exchange for tribute.¹³¹ Van Evera explains the reason for the predictable actions of Mu‘awiya:

States break agreements more quickly when the offense dominates because cheating pays larger rewards. Bad faith and betrayal become the norm. The secure can afford the luxury of dealing in good faith, but the insecure must worry more about short-term survival. This drives them toward back-alley behavior, including deceptions and sudden betrayals of all kinds-diplomatic fails accomplis, military surprise attacks, and breaking of other solemn agreements.¹³²

Without a doubt, Mu‘awiya’s fledgling naval capability was still in its infancy and the Byzantines maintained the strategic control of the sea. In the offensively weaker position, Mu‘awiya, in accordance with the predictions of Hypotheses D & E, exploited the vulnerability that emerged as any commander would.

Again, during the *Fitna*, in order to protect his rear as he advanced to engage ‘Ali’s forces at the Battle of Siffin in 657, Mu‘awiya brokered another truce with Byzantium, which according to Blankinship, Mu‘awiya had to pay as much as 100,000 dinars per annum.¹³³ Blankinship suggests that over the duration of the *Fitna* (656-661) that this truce was probably renewed on multiple occasions,¹³⁴ reinforcing the technical humiliation of the situation and the authority of Mu‘awiya.¹³⁵ By injunction of the Qur’an,¹³⁶ the early Muslims did not cede tribute to non-Muslims even in the face of overwhelming odds and technological and numerical inferiority. Mu‘awiya though having had concluded truces as a governor did pay tribute, and therefore has claim to being the first governor to pay tribute to a non-Muslim ruler, which he duly broke after consolidating the caliphate in 661.¹³⁷

¹³¹ Bashear (1991), p.200

¹³² Van Evera (2004), p.233

¹³³ Blankinship (1994), p.285, fn.98

¹³⁴ Ibid.

¹³⁵ Ibid., p.23

¹³⁶ Q, 2:249; 3:146; 5:51-2, 47:35; 55-6; 60:9; there does appear to be a concession in verse 3:28

¹³⁷ Humphreys (2006), p.104

The enduring state of hostility with Byzantium had been a source of great agitation with ‘Umar, who had preferred to create a buffer zone between the Byzantine north and the Syrian frontier rather than enter into a truce or negotiated settlement with them.¹³⁸ The idea of ‘buffer zones’ is to create neutral zones of military action and thus enhance strategic depth between adversaries. Around early 650s, an attempt was made to make Armenia a buffer zone between the Byzantium and the *dar al-Islam*.¹³⁹ The design was intended to reflect ‘friendly’ relations Kaegi claims, and not to create a ‘neutral’ zone; this initiative faced strong opposition from the Byzantines.¹⁴⁰

The practice of creating ‘buffer zones’ had been used during the administration of ‘Uthman by Mu‘awiya as Majeed Khadduri and Walter Kaegi both correctly highlight that Cyprus was a ‘buffer state’ against the Byzantines.¹⁴¹ Additionally, policy seems to have also desired the creation of a buffer zone in northern Syria during the administration of ‘Uthman also.¹⁴² Cyprus was however, in modern parlance a ‘neutralised’ state. The difference between neutrality and neutralisation has best been explained as follows:

Neutrality refers to the legal status of a state during armed hostilities . . . These rules state, for example, that a neutral may not permit use of its territory as a base for military operations by one of the belligerents, may not furnish military assistance to the belligerents, and may enjoy free passage of its nonmilitary goods on the open seas and, under conditions, through belligerents blockades. A neutralized state is one that must observe these rules during armed conflict but that, during peace, must also refrain from making military alliances with other states.¹⁴³

As Hypothesis G would suggest, treaties favouring ‘neutralization’ over ‘neutral’ were conducted with states on the premise of continued impartiality, however such treaties never extended the Muslim pledge to defend or utilise the military instrument

¹³⁸ Kaegi (2000), p.244

¹³⁹ Ibid.

¹⁴⁰ Ibid., p.252

¹⁴¹ Khadduri (1979), p.262; Kaegi (2000), p.253

¹⁴² Kaegi (2000), p.202

¹⁴³ Holsti (1977), p.113

in their defence.¹⁴⁴ Baladhuri mentions that during the *Rashidun* era 648/9, Mu‘awiya negotiated a treaty with the governor of Cyprus on the basis of their continued neutrality between the Muslims and the Byzantines.

The agreement maintained that the Muslims would not strike at their territory in exchange for their neutrality and *Jizya*, but at the same time, the Muslims were not under any obligation to defend them if another state aggressed against them.¹⁴⁵ Because of Cyprus’s neutrality, the Muslims did not prevent tribute being paid to other powers.¹⁴⁶ However, their ‘neutralisation’ meant that they were not to hide information regarding the movement and deployment of the Romans, and that they were not permitted under the terms of their agreement with the Muslims to conclude military alliances with other powers.¹⁴⁷ Armed with this background of the strategic behaviour of the *Rashidun* and Mu‘awiya during his tenure as governor, let us examine how the continuation of the Da’wa policy took place as a prelude to our final diagnostic tests.

7.7. The New Offensive of the *dar al-Islam*

In the five-year hiatus of the Da’wa policy where Jihad on all fronts had lost its offensive momentum and taken a defense dominant posture, surviving regional actors, the Byzantines in particular, had not remained idle. With time to regroup and reorganise, especially at the Syrian frontiers that enjoyed a break from Mu‘awiya’s incessant attacks; the strategic initiative was arguably up for grabs.¹⁴⁸ It is highly plausible that Mu‘awiya considered that the *dar al-Islam* had lost, or were in the process of losing, its former offense dominant status in the region. In order to reestablish dominance, an aggressive policy of limited war was needed.

¹⁴⁴ Masri (1998), p.274

¹⁴⁵ See *BLD*, p.236; *I.K.*, p.244

¹⁴⁶ Kaegi (2000), p.253

¹⁴⁷ Masri (1998), p.274; Kaegi (2000), p.253

¹⁴⁸ Kaegi (2000), p.246

7.7.1. The Purge

One of the first matters of business Mu‘awiya attended to was to purge the remaining fire of the *Fitna* from within the ranks of the military by reactivating the Jihad.¹⁴⁹ Mu‘awiya did not forget the continued successes of his policy of pre-emptive strikes when he was made Caliph.¹⁵⁰ Accordingly, the customary seasonal raids of Syria against the Byzantines were extended to all frontiers of the *dar al-Islam*. Seasonally, campaigns were re-launched for scheduled periods of time wherein gains were either made or not.¹⁵¹

Although Mu‘awiya directed great energy against his opponents, Hodgson writes, ‘little permanent advance was achieved in Byzantine territories except for the subjection of the Armenian highlands.’¹⁵² These set campaigns were often up to twelve months in duration. Whilst the continued benefits of training and military experience were accrued through constant skirmishes that became a matter of policy, these campaigns lost the urgency that they had initially been premised upon. In many ways they became training exercises before they were actual attempts to make operational military inroads into the opponents territories.¹⁵³

Syria was geo-strategically vital for the western surge against Byzantium, whilst Iraq served a similar geo-strategic relevance for the east. The earlier strategic vision Mu‘awiya had developed a Muslim navy was now fully recognised as Mu‘awiya projected power across the Mediterranean. Accordingly, Mu‘awiya set about reclaiming any lost territory to the Byzantines during the *Fitna* along the Lebanese coast, and coastal areas in general resettling Persians to aid the defences,¹⁵⁴ since these were essential to the protection and development of a progressively important maritime force that was emerging as part of an increasingly aggressive naval policy.¹⁵⁵

¹⁴⁹ Humphreys (2006), p.104

¹⁵⁰ See 6.4.2.

¹⁵¹ Humphreys (2006), p.105

¹⁵² Hodgson (1977), p.219; Kaegi (2000), p.247

¹⁵³ Quigley (2013), p.751

¹⁵⁴ Kennedy (2005), p.12

¹⁵⁵ Bashear (1991), p.203

In 671, Mu‘awiya made significant inroads Eastwards, where ‘many further eastern Iranian lands were systematically subdued, including part of the middle Oxus valley. Much of Anatolia was garrisoned for brief periods,¹⁵⁶ which coincided with the reconquest and occupation of Khurasan and the establishment of garrison settlements to permanently relocate Arabs into the region¹⁵⁷ as part of a new surge supported by 50,000 troops from Iraq as a permanently stationed force to transform the Muslim presence in the area, and the continued penetration into Transoxania.¹⁵⁸

Mu‘awiya’s surge also included the fall of major cities in ‘the east and northeast into Sind and the lower Indus, across Afghanistan (Kabul taken 664), and toward Turkestan, crossing the Oxus to capture Bokhara and Samarkand, and extending Islamic rule to the Jaxartes.’¹⁵⁹ Mu‘awiya made successful strikes into Armenia and the Balkans and Anatolia in 662,¹⁶⁰ recovering significant war booty in addition to positive military victories. These initial campaigns encouraged another in the following year that penetrated as far as Constantinople.¹⁶¹ These operations continued with another major surge into the Balkans and Anatolia en route to Constantinople in 669.¹⁶²

As Jihad was resumed against the Byzantines, and territorial gains were made most notably in the Mediterranean (Sicily in 668, Rhodes in 672, and Crete in 674);¹⁶³ augmenting the increased penetration into North Africa as far as modern-day Algeria,¹⁶⁴ from the garrison base established in Qayrawan in 670 (present-day Tunisia).¹⁶⁵ Mu‘awiya should have fought for control of the sea along the coastal strip of Northern Africa where the Byzantine projected their naval control from their base in Carthage, but instead directed operations that eventually seized important Byzantine naval bases from land sides: having taken Acre (in Syria) and Alexandria

¹⁵⁶ Hodgson (1977), p.219

¹⁵⁷ Ibid.

¹⁵⁸ Kennedy (2007), p.237; Humphreys (2006), p.105

¹⁵⁹ Quigley (2013), pp.741-2; also Hawting (2002), p.42; and Donner (2012), pp.172-4

¹⁶⁰ *I.K.a.*, p.26

¹⁶¹ Ibid., p.27

¹⁶² Ibid., p.39

¹⁶³ Robinson (2005), p.41; Rahman (2003), p.80, 94, 97

¹⁶⁴ Hodgson (1977), p.219; Kaegi (2000), p.247

¹⁶⁵ *I.K.a.*, p.49; Rahman (2003), p.94; Kennedy (2007), p.209

in 642, Carthage was added in 698 under Mu‘awiya.¹⁶⁶ Without control of the sea, a prolonged blockade of Constantinople between 674 and 680 took place following failed attempts to seize the city in 670.¹⁶⁷

‘What was the objective of this constant warfare?’ Humphreys, much like most observers asks, ‘Most commentators, noting that Anatolian towns were constantly raided and pillaged but never permanently occupied beyond the Taurus passes, have argued that the only goals were pillage and plunder.’¹⁶⁸ Humphreys interprets that Mu‘awiya was directing ‘a war of attrition, to sap the economic and demographic foundations of Byzantine rule in Asia Minor and the Aegean and to wear down the Byzantine armies which Constans II and Constantine constantly struggled to rebuild.’¹⁶⁹ Certainly the campaigns directed to Asia Minor throughout Mu‘awiya’s reign suggests that he was employing a strategy of exhaustion (*ermattungsstrategie*) against the Byzantines. However, throughout his career since his days as governor until his death as caliph, despite annual raids both summer and winter, into Anatolia with penetration often of thousands of kilometers deep into Byzantine territory, Mu‘awiya failed to secure any real territorial gains.¹⁷⁰

7.7.2. *Ermattungsstrategie*

The basic strategy during the administration of ‘Umar (which subsequently carried over to that of ‘Uthman,) against Byzantine centers of gravity were to direct mass concentration of force and economy of effort to ‘from the poorly guarded periphery against nodal points, choke points or pressure points, rather than centers of population, where most Byzantine troops and their leadership were based.’ By zoning into the Byzantine population center through the removal of concentric circles of armed defence and population resistance, by the time the Muslims reached the targeted center of gravity, ‘the outcome of battle elsewhere’ made the Byzantine control of the center no longer defensible.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁶ Quigley (2013), pp.743; Kaegi (2000), p.247

¹⁶⁷ Rahman (2003), pp.96-8; Kennedy (2007), pp.329-30

¹⁶⁸ Humphreys (2006), p.106

¹⁶⁹ Ibid.

¹⁷⁰ Kaegi (2000), p.247

¹⁷¹ Kaegi (2000), p.259 [both quotes]

In 644, Mu‘awiya participated in the campaigns onto the Anatolian plateau engaging the Byzantines in strategic and predatory raids.¹⁷² Mu‘awiya learnt that constant harassment of the Byzantines even during the winter months was an unexpected strategic force-multiplier as the Byzantines, who believed the Arabs to be similar to Persians who did not fight in cold weather, disturbed the Byzantines as they were forced to react to costly winter raids and added pressure to their warfighting capabilities.¹⁷³ The Byzantines never really came to terms with developing successful tactical responses to the shifting patterns of attack the Muslims employed against them since the 630s.¹⁷⁴

Mu‘awiya continued the success of these strategies but with limited resources, unable to fortify smaller territorial gains with the stationing of garrisons in addition to logistical and supply problems on account of weather and terrain. Consequently, Humphreys argues, Mu‘awiya commissioned continuous short raids that were intended to serve as a means of attrition.¹⁷⁵ However, an astute man such as Mu‘awiya would have realized the futility of repeating raids for no purpose.

Instead, Kaegi explains, Mu‘awiya’s strategy of exhaustion was at the very least a means to ‘keep up appearances’ and maintain some level of prestige with his domestic audience, enriching the Muslims, and thus encouraging more tribesmen to enlist for Jihad whilst simultaneously maintaining pressure and devastation upon the Byzantine territories through the ‘loss of property and human lives and captives, and diminution of commerce and agriculture.’¹⁷⁶ Yet, the strategic explanation for Mu‘awiya’s application of the Da’wa does not seem to correlate to his grand imperial policy. In order to better elucidate we can return to Hypothesis D and E as previously mentioned.

¹⁷² Ibid., p.246

¹⁷³ Ibid., p.248

¹⁷⁴ Ibid., p.201

¹⁷⁵ Humphreys (2006), p.106

¹⁷⁶ Kaegi (2000), p.247

7.7.3. ODT - D/Dx # 4. Moving First is More Rewarding - Hypothesis D

Although both Hypotheses F and G are compelling to argue that the offense dominated Mu'awiya's application of Jihad, we are frustrated by the seemingly disparate strategic action of Mu'awiya to the tests. The plausible false-positive diagnosis would be a matter of falling into the trap of the *sins of confusion*.¹⁷⁷ Concerning Hypothesis D for example, Mu'awiya's predecessors more accurately took strategic action in order *not to lose* the strategic initiative rather than to gain it, which they maintained through continuous warfighting. Because they rarely suffered crushing defeats, even lost battles were temporary setbacks, which did not make them suffer the loss of initiative. Oran Young writes that under conditions of real or perceived crisis,

There is, in general terms, a presumption in favor of policies that permit an actor to acquire and retain the initiative at the strategic level. This presumption arises from considerations having to do with the ability to define the basic issues in the international arena, the acquisition of political support, the maintenance of morale, and the value of forward momentum in international politics.¹⁷⁸

However, Mu'awiya's calculus of the 'initiative' differential was probably that he had lost the *strategic initiative* but could still hold the *tactical initiative* as a prelude to controlling both. Thus we see the results of Hypothesis D validated but as a matter of offensive-defense dominance, that is, as a matter of maximising the tactical initiative. This leads to Hypothesis E, which is a better reflection of Mu'awiya's calculus to hold the tactical initiative.

7.7.4. ODT - D/Dx # 5. Windows are Larger - Hypothesis E

Given the probable loss of offense dominance, Mu'awiya resorted to force to stem and interfere with regional powers. According to this hypothesis, such action suggests that the utility of force maintains efficacy even for a waning power in so far as it facilitates the lock down of *windows of vulnerability* through preemptive war.¹⁷⁹

¹⁷⁷ Frieden (1999), p.49; refers to *sins of confusion* where policy and strategies are not separated.

¹⁷⁸ Young (1968), p.337

¹⁷⁹ Van Evera (2004), p.231

The main contention suggested in Hypothesis E is that shifts in the balance of power, in arms or resources, are potential strategic triggers to employ force especially in the case of waning powers. But, even though the signs and symptoms of Mu‘awiya’s strategic preference are present, it would be another false-positive result to attribute Hypothesis E to Mu‘awiya’s strategic behaviour absolutely. This is because, the preemptive warfighting of the Muslims during the *Futuh* was never intentionally employed, even if it appeared so, instead as Kaegi asserts

Most striking is the Byzantine armies’ inability to gain the initiative, move readily, and project their power during the course of military operations from the very start of the Muslim invasions. Too often the Byzantines merely reacted to Muslim initiatives or, even more frequently, just remained passive. This conscious or unconscious ceding of the initiative to the Muslims contributed significantly to the ultimate outcome.¹⁸⁰

Just as they had under ‘Umar, Mu‘awiya’s armed forces forced battle upon Byzantium, choosing where and when, the ordeal would occur.¹⁸¹ Thomas Schelling summarises the basic strategic idea and problem the following manner:

The danger of major war is almost certainly increased by the occurrence of a limited war; it is almost certainly increased by any enlargement in the scope or violence of a limited war that has already taken place. This being so, the threat to engage in limited war has two parts. One is the threat to inflict costs directly on the other side, in casualties, expenditures, loss of territory, loss of face, or anything else. The second is the threat to expose the other party, together with oneself, to a heightened risk of a larger war.¹⁸²

¹⁸⁰ Kaegi (2000), p.262

¹⁸¹ Ibid., p.269

¹⁸² Schelling (2008), p.105

The one theater that appeared to be an offense-dominant approach was against Constantinople. Mu‘awiya identified Constantinople as the Byzantine center of gravity, and launched strikes to pillage and plunder a route into the Byzantine center of gravity without fear of counter-attack and to prevent Byzantine forces access to the Muslim naval base at Cyzicus.¹⁸³ These land-based campaigns were augmented by a naval blockade, which was actually a series of continuous naval strikes designed to isolate the city and disrupt its commercial and economic activities so as to decimate its revenue streams.¹⁸⁴

The novelty of the joint-operations took the Byzantines by surprise who were not expecting such operational innovation from the Muslims,¹⁸⁵ lasted between 674-678, sapping the strength of the Byzantine Empire but culminating in defeat for the Muslims. Humphreys notes, ‘Mu‘awiya’s hope of bringing down the Byzantine Empire through a relatively low-cost and low-risk strategy of attrition and harassment had failed; he avoided further confrontation for the rest of his reign.’¹⁸⁶ Mu‘waiya was forced to seek a humiliating truce, and pay a tribute as high as 3,000lbs of gold, with slaves, and horses, per annum.¹⁸⁷ The reality was his aggressive policies against the Byzantines were more defensively designed than offensively intentioned.

7.8. The Strategic Dynamics of Defense Dominance

The foregoing diagnostics reveals that Mu‘awiya adopted a defense-dominant preference premised upon a minimax strategic calculus. Johnston explains a minimax strategy as the minimisation of maximum losses; a ‘quintessentially conservative, risk-averse strategy that eschews high-payoff victories (i.e., the extermination of the adversary or the acquisition of its political, economic, or territorial assets) because these are high-risk victories.’¹⁸⁸ Such high-risk victories were the hallmark of the *Rashidun* era, especially during the Caliphates of Abu Bakr and ‘Umar.

¹⁸³ Humphreys (2006), pp.106-7

¹⁸⁴ Ibid., p.107

¹⁸⁵ Kaegi (2000), p.248

¹⁸⁶ Humphreys (2006), p.107

¹⁸⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸⁸ Johnston (1995), p.121

The process of diminishing pay-offs associated with high-risk victories began proper during the *Fitna* for Mu‘awiya, though in retrospect, it accompanied him since his days as governor during the Caliphate of ‘Uthman.¹⁸⁹ Mu‘awiya understood that ‘[w]hen the defense has the advantage, it is easier to protect and to hold than it is to move forward, destroy, and take.’¹⁹⁰ Hence, Mu‘awiya’s minimax strategic calculus included the preservation of his armed forces, with his strategy of exhaustion keeping Muslim casualties to an acceptable level of management that did not affect morale.¹⁹¹

Mu‘awiya situated the utility of force in achieving defense-dominance for the *dar al-Islam* – where conquest was acknowledged as being very difficult thus maintaining the inherent advantage of defence.¹⁹² Defense-dominance Johnston writes, is where ‘[t]he purpose of force is to avoid maximum loss rather than achieve total victory. In strategic terms a preference for minimax strategies can be translated into a preference for deterrence through the capacity to deny the enemy military victory.’¹⁹³ The emphasis upon attaining defense-dominance is perhaps the most implicitly consistent strategic preference found in the second decade of Mu‘awiya’s reign after having realised that no real strategic gains had been made by the earlier objective set in Anatolia.

What began as an initially aggressive policy of war against Byzantium¹⁹⁴ revealed itself to be a defense-dominant strategy whereby the strategic objective of these operations was to keep ‘the Byzantines off balance by diverting their attention to defense and removing any hope of embarking on major offensive strategic policies against Muslim Syria.’¹⁹⁵ Mu‘awiya had most likely conceded he had lost the strategic initiative but did not want the Byzantines to believe that he had. Furthermore, believing that he was in a strategically weaker position, he intentionally introduced the variables of escalation¹⁹⁶ by designing an imperial grand Da’wa policy, as a means to project the illusion of strength though he knew that the *dar al-Islam* was

¹⁸⁹ See **7.6**.

¹⁹⁰ Jervis (1978), p.187

¹⁹¹ Kaegi (2000), p.247

¹⁹² Van Evera (2004), p.227 fn.1

¹⁹³ Johnston (1995), pp.121-2

¹⁹⁴ Kaegi (2000), p.246

¹⁹⁵ Ibid., p.247

¹⁹⁶ See **Proposition 8**

at its weakest. The continued Jihad was opportunistic (Hypothesis A) in the hope of building sufficient momentum to wrestle the initiative back and to serve as a catalyst for the offense to grow stronger (Hypothesis J).

In fact, another paradoxical development was that the continued raids in the region had ‘compelled their opponents to devote much time and effort to developing countermeasures.’¹⁹⁷ Paradoxically, as Mu‘awiya invited *absolute Jihad* to regain the strategic initiative, military victories became increasingly scarce and trivial as the old enemy Byzantium also adopted defensive strategies and deterrence based tactics. The result was the development of a status quo balance of power in the region. Hence the final evolution of the *strategic dynamics* of Jihad in this study reveals that following the first hiatus of Jihad since the *maghazi* period, Jihad *fi sabil l’Allah* was translated as a defense-dominant policy working off the tactical initiative to regain the strategic initiative whilst still subordinated to the Da’wa policy, albeit in its imperial 2.0. version.

7.9. Trinitarian Conclusions of the Caliphate of Mu‘awiya

The Caliphate of Mu‘awiya is the most unrecognised and unappreciated of all governments of early Islam. A trinitarian interpretation of events surrounding Mu‘awiya’s administration of the Caliphate has ended in a qualitatively different conclusion however to his predecessors. Mu‘awiya’s success was undoubtedly due to his foresight and understanding to balance the Clausewitzian trinity that facilitated the restoration of the Caliphate to its days of former glory under ‘Umar. Although the resumption of the new imperial Da’wa policy did not yield the spectacular successes that had been amassed during the Caliphate of ‘Umar, the Muslim territories were enlarged and Mu‘awiya used his deft hand in tribal politics to reestablish the ‘*Umar Doctrine* through an enlarged version of the *shura* (joint political decision-making) that had been extremely successful during his administration. Mu‘awiya accomplished this by effectively buying the favour of tribal chiefs, who in turn acted as agents of Mu‘awiya controlling and checking the escalation of irrational forces within their respective tribes. Thus, Mu‘awiya was free to pursue foreign policy unhindered by domestic threats of insurrection or interference.

¹⁹⁷ Kaegi (2000), p.247

The harmony and return of prosperity experienced during Mu‘awiya’s regime was unequivocally the result of trinitarian harmonisation, or perhaps more accurately the reestablishment of trinitarian harmony following the *Fitna*. Mu‘awiya’s defense dominant preference premised upon a minimax strategic calculus to advance the interests of the *dar al-Islam* through Jihad was extremely successful in masking his politico-military weaknesses and creating an illusion of military power. In doing so, Mu‘awiya balanced the elements of the trinity within the given strategic setting and environment quite covertly but consciously.

Although his reputation would be sullied and his dynasty vilified by the new rulers of the *dar al-Islam*, his final re-characterisation of Jihad as an instrument of imperial ambitions would remain, with Jihad becoming synonymous with the holy war of *absolute Jihad*. The qualitative nature of Jihad *fî sabil l’Allah* had radically altered during the administration of Mu‘awiya, for the ends to which it was subordinated to policy, how it was conducted, and the increasing escalation of attributing the *absolute Jihad* to the decision-making process at horizontal levels of policy. Arguably, Mu‘awiya intended these changes to have been temporary during the process of recalibration of the systemic environment and the attainment of the strategic initiative; however, in the tradition of his predecessors, he did not live to see his master plan come to fruition. Mu‘awiya died after 19 years and 3 months exactly according to Ibn Kathir,¹⁹⁸ his Leviathan survived him but was killed by the ‘Abbasid revolution of 750.

¹⁹⁸ *I.K.a*, p.112

CHAPTER EIGHT

8.0. Investigative and Substantive Conclusions

In our introductory chapter we stated that this study aims to chart the *strategic dynamics* of Jihad through the identification of critical stages and events that formed a consistent process of evolution that is congruent with our proposed *strategic theoretics*. Thus far we have used the Clausewitzian case study-approach, and presented our findings in the context of Trinitarian interpretation and the strategic paradigm at the end of each chapter. Combined, they have provided a lens through which to identify shifts in the variables of policy and politics for the application of Jihad. In this section we shall review the findings of the investigation, as a prelude to our final substantive conclusions.

8.1. Sub-Investigative Research Questions a. – d.

This investigation begun with the central research question to ascertain *whether Jihad is a continuation of politik by other means*, that is to ask the question, what is the link between *politik* (the interplay of policy and politics) and the application of force in the name of Jihad. In order to systematically investigate this link and establish the relationship between the efficacy of violence and politico-strategic decision-making; the prime agenda was compartmentalised into three further research questions and four sub-investigative questions to dissect the mechanics of Jihad and highlight the evolutions of its form, which we termed *strategic dynamics*.

The cascading dissection of the central research question was designed to not only simplify the central agenda by separating various avenues of exploration into smaller sub-investigative explanations; but also to incrementally build a simple yet finely tuned analysis of the evolving *strategic dynamics* of Jihad. Following a strict methodological procedure the investigation began by establishing a baseline zero of Jihad (sub-investigative question a.) as a means to establish an initial standard of strategic interpretation from which to derive *strategic dynamics* (research question 4), that is, shifts and evolution in its practice.

This would allow the investigation to explore the tenet of a consistent link (research question 2) to have existed, and thus a continuation of *politik* by other means, that is, a consistently established instrument of rational calculation (the fundamental proposition of the Trinitarian system). In order to distinguish Jihad as an instrument of rational calculation distinct from an instrument of theological imperatives (research question 3), this study applied a strategic paradigm rooted in strategic theory as a set of guidelines to distinguish strategic action from the non-strategic; that is, to differentiate decision-making based upon an identifiable and understandable strategic calculus, from preferences and assumptions rooted in a ‘believers’ framework of interpretation which was informed by meta-physical considerations (sub-investigative question b.).

The former would, reveal through the investigation that Jihad was instrumentally conceived and applied as an instrumental means to political ends by strategic actors operating within the strategic setting and environment (sub-investigative questions c. & d.). The following sections detail the findings of the sub-investigative questions as a prelude to discussing their implications for the broader research questions.

8.1.1. Sub-Investigative Questions a. & b.

- a. What is Jihad? Specifically, can a general definition be proposed, with respect to distinguishing word from concept; and how will this distinction advance strategic interpretation?
- b. Is Jihad a teleological consequence of Islam? To what extent does providentialism influence the application of Jihad as the means that justifies the ends?

The investigation and clarification of sub-investigative questions a. and b. were interlinked as a prelude to contextualising research questions 2, 3, and c. within the case study of the *maghazi*. A *strategic* definition was proposed by means of dissecting the term Jihad into an ideological framework of interpretation (vertical) and a pragmatic interpretation of its practice (horizontal) termed the baseline zero. This facilitated the distinction between the words Jihad as an ideological expression of the Islamic meta-narrative, *absolute Jihad*, and Jihad in reality as a political instrument.

This division of the term was subsequently used to advance strategic interpretation by distinguishing ideological motivation of strategic actors acting in the name of Islam from politico-strategic decision-making and bargaining based upon the strategic setting and environment, allowing for the *clashing of interests* to be included within the analysis.

The baseline zero demonstrated that at the vertical level of meaning, distinctions of ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ are empty in relation to *absolute Jihad*, retaining significance only as a matter of horizontal translation. This is because *absolute Jihad* was a ‘cosmic’ or theological contest for dominance that transcended the human life (that is, rooted in post-apocalyptic Judgement ending of human existence on earth) rather than war rooted in normal human lifespan(s). The violence threatened by *absolute Jihad* was, in a sense, beyond distinctions of ‘offensive’ and ‘defensive’ since it was commanded by God Himself.

The meta-narrative that derived from the *absolute Jihad* placed a premium upon believers to not only adhere to their faith in exchange for salvation, but also the *nisus* exerted for the missionary *da’wa*. *Absolute Jihad* was therefore very similar to previous monotheistic faiths that shared a similar bargain for Heaven in exchange for worldly servitude (*nisus*) to God.¹ This elucidation of *absolute Jihad* revealed an *essential* teleological connection to Islam (sub-investigative question b.) that arguably was as monotheistic as it was Islamic.

The baseline zero situated the original concept of Jihad in the metaphysical *dynamics* of *absolute Jihad*. Accordingly, the elitist mindset of the early Muslims viewed the external world as a clear existential threat or a micro-security dilemma. Hence, *absolute Jihad*, ideologically represented the metaphysical and theological imperative of the cosmic battle; and the teleological relation between *absolute Jihad* and *nisus* was determined by the Islamic meta-narrative rather than politico-strategic events, until the *hijra* of the Prophet.

¹ See *Q* 9:111

In the second phase of the Prophet's mission, the reconfiguration of the horizontal Jihad developed in accordance with the increasing demands of strategic interactions. The instigation of guerrilla campaigns by the Prophet against the Quraysh and regional tribes was the *idiom of military action*² and served two ends, that of security and that of survival. In terms of security, Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah* was the instrument of security for the new Muslim polis, simultaneously functioning as the means to secure survival in an increasingly hostile strategic environment that was perceived as existentially threatening. The ends of survival became especially prominent at the Battle of the Khandaq when the pagan Arabs sought for the first time a decisive war against the Muslims.

The first shift in the dynamics of Jihad therefore took place as *absolute Jihad* was translated horizontally into Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah*. This shift from the vertical to the horizontal was the necessary reification of the *absolute Jihad*. The result was a reframing of the word to signify a far broader concept of *nisus* than previously understood within the Arabic language. In the vernacular of the Muslims, the Arabic Jihad became inseparable from the notion of Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah*, which included but was not limited to, the *idiom of military action*. Military action and its associated activities, Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah*, was motivated by the belief in God's Providence and sanctioned by numerous Qur'anic injunctions. In practical terms, the sanction to employ violence created the social construction of Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah*, which subsumed the application of violence as a form of guerrilla warfare in its first practiced dynamic. However, Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah* included all activities that aided the war effort and was thus fluid in its breadth of application. Syllogistically, Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah* is logically explained as:

- Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah* is *nisus* in service of the Islamic metanarrative (*Absolute Jihad*)
- Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah* includes warfighting (*qital*)
- Therefore a form of *nisus* (*Absolute Jihad*) is Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah*
 - or Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah* can also be warfighting

² Schelling (2008), p.126

This syllogism does not preclude the fact that an act of Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah* can be completely bereft of any form of violent activity, only that violent actions can be Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah* so long as the initial premise holds true – that the *nisus* exerted is in service of the Islamic metanarrative (*absolute Jihad*). The most salient finding of this syllogism is that Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah* is the *idiom of military action* in the name of Islam. In other words, Jihad when employed as *qital fi sabil l'Allah* - is war - that is, the activity of warfighting.

During the administration of Prophet's successor, Abu Bakr, the threat which tribal rebellion posed was deemed existential. The new strategic setting was beset by the threats of political insurrection, the rise of 'False Prophets' vying for political power, and the refusal to pay the *Zakat*. The teleological function of Jihad was invoked by reference to *absolute Jihad*, and implemented as a pure military strategy. The ensuing *Ridda Wars* utilised force to either compel obedience, or isolate and destroy all opponents of the new Medinan administration. The notion of Providence, though not explicitly apparent,³ must have been a factor in the belief of the strategic actors involved, specifically Abu Bakr and Khalid ibn al-Walid. However, the management of the political crisis environment was distinctly a strategic affair overriding of the influence of providential beliefs. There were no alterations in either understanding of *absolute Jihad* or Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah*. In other words, Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah* remained as the *idiom of military action* in the name of Islam, or *qital fi sabil l'Allah* – war.

During the administration of 'Umar, the development of the Da'wa policy was accompanied by a *rhetoric of righteousness* to bolster credibility of the military effort against the regional powers whilst balancing domestic stability. The strategic design of the Da'wa translated action between *absolute Jihad* and Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah* as a matter of official foreign policy along the lines of an early idea of 'humanitarian' interventionism. The result was to marry systemic threat to policy, reinforcing assumptions of self-help. There were no alternations to the terms *absolute Jihad* and Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah per se*, except that the application of Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah* to policy became a dominant feature of Muslim politico-strategic thought thereafter.

³ Sub-investigative question b. was not addressed in Chapter 4 for this reason.

No alterations or changes took place during the administration of ‘Uthman except the actual demonstration of restraint in invoking *Jihad fi sabil l’Allah* against fellow Muslims, or to be more precise, the ineligibility of invoking *Jihad fi sabil l’Allah* against fellow Muslims. The following administration, that of ‘Ali, attempted a reversal of this principle but failed and the attempted privatisation of *Jihad fi sabil l’Allah* was a short-lived claim.

The role and influence of Providence resurfaces during the administration of Mu‘awiya as he effectively ‘weaponised’ *providentialism* in order to increase the credibility of the new imperial agenda. The meta-narrative that created the *absolute Jihad* was cast into foreign policy in a manner formerly unknown. Previously, the vertical impact of *absolute Jihad* had to be translated into strategic action, which took the form of *Jihad fi sabil l’Allah*. In other words, it was a means but not an end. However, Mu‘awiya fused the unlimited demands of *absolute Jihad* to foreign policy creating a permanent state of war. The essential distinction is that during previous administrations, the state of hostility that existed between the *dar al-Islam* and the external world was a product of anarchy and assumptions pertaining to survival, and thus security. The new state of tension Mu‘awiya created was predicated upon the theological imperative of *absolute Jihad* and the Manifest Destiny of the *dar al-Islam* to emancipate human beings from the tyranny of godless political institutions. It was, for all intents and purposes, a battle-centric policy of perpetual ‘holy’ war.

8.1.2. Sub-Investigative Questions c.

- c. What is the relationship between Jihad and politics? Were there distinctive policies that directed the application of Jihad, and if so, under what circumstances did these policies come to bear and how did they evolve?

The investigation of sub-investigative questions a. and b. highlighted the relationship between the Islamic redefinition and practice of the term Jihad as part of the Prophet’s evolving mission to bring Arabia under the jurisdiction of the Shari‘a.⁴ This evolution further revealed the relationship between Jihad and politics, the concern of sub-

⁴ See Q 9:33

investigative question c.; as the guerrilla campaign against the Arabs and the Quraysh in particular, was a consequence of challenging the tribal political system.

The *maghazi* demonstrates two forms of bargaining, that is, the process and interplay of politics and policy. The first was the metaphysical bargain between God and the Muslims by which the believers translate the cosmic *absolute Jihad* horizontally and engage *Jihad fi sabil l'Allah* in exchange for the promise of victory in this world (Providence) and God's favour in the next.⁵ The second, was the manner in which warfighting (*qital fi sabil l'Allah*), was instrumentally used to communicate the resolve of the Prophet to pagan Arabs.

The limited nature of the battle between the Muslims and the Quraysh, like all limited wars, was a process of two things, 'the outcome of the war, and the "mode" of conducting the war itself.'⁶ Whilst the Quraysh, and the Arabs in general held to the traditions of the *Ayyam al-'Arab*, the guerrilla tactics adopted by the Prophet was itself a means to re-negotiate the terms of peace by undertaking an aggressive conduct of warfighting not practiced by the Arabs. Under existing traditions, the means to raise dissent against tribal power would have faltered as it had in Mecca during phase one of the mission. The strategic relocation (*al-hijra*) to Medina was clearly a means to drive a more aggressive form of bargaining against the Quraysh. Indeed, the shift to Medina was the beginning of a phase whereby political bargaining was conducted by deed rather than words. The language of violence was a historically early attribute of the Islam, from the *absolute Jihad* that threatened latent eschatological violence, to the guerilla practice of *Jihad fi sabil l'Allah*.

It was not until the impasse at Hudaibiyya that tacit bargaining (in the form of a guerrilla campaign) finally resulted in an explicit political settlement, albeit a temporary one. The distinctly politico-strategic character by which Jihad was instrumentally applied was therefore a means to drive political purposes. The temporary peace with the Quraysh opened new political avenues that resulted in the formation of alliances as well as the return to Jihad this time against hostile allies of the Quraysh.

⁵ Q 4:74, 9:111, 61:10-13

⁶ Schelling (2008), p.135

Once again, violence was efficiently employed to either impose a military decision or demonstrative so as to induce political settlements over battle. Accordingly, Clausewitz's definition of strategy, reflects the mindset and practice of the Prophet and his estimation of the utility of force:

Strategy, in connecting these factors with the outcome of an engagement, confers a special significance on that outcome and thereby on the engagement: *it assigns a particular aim to it*. Yet insofar as that aim is not the one that will lead directly to peace, it remains subsidiary and is also to be thought of as a means.⁷

Indeed, Schelling explains that, 'It is in the wars that we have come to call "limited wars" that the bargaining appears most vividly and is conducted most consciously. The critical targets in such a war are in the mind of the enemy as much as on the battlefield;'⁸ which is perhaps the best explanation of why and how Jihad was employed by the Prophet and the course of actions that instrumentalised Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah* to the objective of striking at the principles or values of the opponent. Maududi writes: 'The objective of this attack, moreover, is not to coerce the opponent to relinquish his principles but to abolish the government which sustains these principles.'⁹ The 'pure conflict' of *absolute Jihad*, if translated at its ideal would have resulted in a war of extermination,¹⁰ instead a nonzero-sum strategy of limited war deescalated the tension of *absolute Jihad* through horizontal translation.

Schelling captures the essence of the resulting form of conflict, when he writes: 'For this reason, [de-escalating from 'pure conflict'] 'winning' in a conflict does not have a strictly competitive meaning; it is not winning relative to one's adversary. It means gaining relative to one's own value system'.¹¹ The *da'wa* of the Prophet, that is his missionary aims, was an expression of this translation, evidenced by his war against the Quraysh as an indirect means to eradicate paganism and the culture of *jahiliya* as a prelude to imposing the jurisdiction of the Shari'a.

⁷ Ibid., p.143 (emphasis in the original)

⁸ Schelling (2008), p.142

⁹ Maududi (1980), p.26

¹⁰ See sub-investigative questions a. and b.

¹¹ Schelling (1980), pp.4-5

The Caliphate of Abu Bakr further emphasised the importance of sub-investigative question c, since the domestic political turmoil generated the crisis environment that resulted in distinctive security policies that directed the instrumental application of Jihad. During the administration of Abu Bakr Jihad as the *idiom of military action* was escalated to its extreme function as a pure military strategy. Abu Bakr, like the Prophet, bargained by violent communication¹² to compel submission of the Arabs. Jihad was a means of the shortest path to the objective. Jihad was instrumentally used as a mechanism of policy that sought to generate risk through demonstrable escalation, coupling capabilities to objectives. The strategic employment of Jihad to the outcome of the *Ridda* engagements conferred a special significance to ‘the outcome and thereby on the engagement: *it assigns a particular aim to it*. Yet insofar as that aim is not the one that will lead directly to peace, it remains subsidiary and is also to be thought of as a means.’¹³ Peace was eventually imposed by Abu Bakr and brokered by latent threat in the form of political prisoners.¹⁴

Jihad had served a strategy of *offensive compellence* as a prelude to dominance. In the service of a homeland security policy, Jihad was employed with ruthless efficiency in the fog and VUCA of the strategic environment. As a matter of the extended regional security policy, under conditions of self-help, Jihad was instrumentally employed to tactically navigate between the broader strategic and geopolitical space of Arabia. In both instances, Jihad was instrumentally utilised to serve policies that were the consequence of domestic politics and the continuation of *politik* from the *maghazi*.

The Caliphate of ‘Umar was symbolised by the formation of the ‘*Umar Doctrine* which subordinated Jihad to the will of official foreign policy, thereby further de-escalating the warfighting spirit of the previous administration and sublimating its energy externally toward a common threat. The resulting harmony between politico-military affairs ushered in an era of prosperity and social cohesion in the aftermath of civil discord. The administrative and organisational developments during ‘Umar’s administration managed and balanced the elements of the trinity with a grand strategy of Da’wa.

¹² Schelling (2008), pp.144-7

¹³ Ibid., p.143 (emphasis in the original)

¹⁴ On hostage taking as a form of political bargaining see Schelling (2008), p.143

Furthermore, the development of political organisation and infrastructure was connected to the foundations of a new military establishment predicated upon the former homeland security policies of Abu Bakr. Abu Bakr's homeland security policies had neutralised threats generated from the grassland Arabs and created considerable strategic depth for the Medinan polis, but had also 'rocked the boat' by territorially encroaching upon the borderlands of the regional powers. 'Umar's offensive policy of Da'wa was conceivably driven by the belief that an impending series of reprisals from one or both of the regional powers had to be anticipated.

Whilst a belief that God would ensure victory for the Muslims in any offensive action taken was undoubtedly held sacrosanct by 'Umar's administration; it can be argued (in response to sub-investigative question b.) that the continuation of offensive strategic action in the region was not motivated by teleology or Providence but by rational assumptions of anarchy, self-help, and the belief that security threats were on the horizon. Indeed, the initial domestic political reforms undertaken within days of 'Umar's appointment as Caliph suggests a rational calculus of means and ends over and above religious considerations for politico-strategic action (research question 3.).

Political restructuring of the administration was also a means to bargain via signals shown to the various Arab tribes who had been involved in the *Ridda*. Retaining the outcome of submission and surrender imposed by Abu Bakr upon the rebel tribes was dependent upon the ability to politically manage the tribes in defeat. This form of political bargaining '... depends on how the adversaries conduct themselves as much as on the division of spoils;' Schelling explains, 'it involves reputations, expectations, precedents broken and precedents established, and whether the action left political issues more unsettled or less settled than they were.'¹⁵ It is this backdrop of events carried over from the *Ridda Wars*, which we have argued, influenced and directed the Da'wa policy, and thus the systemic application of Jihad.

¹⁵ Schelling (2008), p.143

The new political arrangement necessarily evolved alongside the highly successful *Futuh*, '[A]nd like any bargaining process, a restrained war involves some degree of collaboration between adversaries.'¹⁶ The new collaboration between 'Umar's administration, and the tribal chiefs, extended to the introduction of a policy of resettlement that projected the military power of the *dar al-Islam* into the newly conquered territories. The investigation has already detailed the intricacies of the resettlement policy in subduing the latent potential of domestic insurrection, suffice to note that the rising offensive power of Jihad as the *idiom of military action* in subordination to the Da'wa was critically generated by domestic politics over religious injunction. The manner in which it was deployed was however, in response to the pressures of the systemic environment (research question 3.) The idea that the domestic strategic setting and its power politics, over and above religious motivations, drove the subordination of Jihad to foreign policy is consistent with the trend of intervening tribal politics from the *maghazi* into the *Fitna* as a greater influence upon the development of policy than religious ideals (also a function of research question 3.)

The assassination of 'Uthman was part of the attempted re-negotiation of the distribution of tribal political power that had become increasingly centralised during the administration of 'Uthman. The breakdown of tribal political harmony inherited from the previous administration directly impacted the Da'wa policy and thus the application of Jihad. As the former collaboration between previous adversaries for tribal power crumbled the first hiatus of Jihad as the *idiom of military action* in the name of Islam began. The emphasis placed upon policies to maintain and enhance domestic stability had come undone and although no substantive changes took place in either the Da'wa policy or warfighting over the next 4 years (during the contested administration of 'Ali), the political turmoil of the domestic strategic setting took precedence over the systemic concerns. The offensive drive, without political stewardship, halted and Jihad was relegated to a defense-dominant function of the *dar al-Islam*.

¹⁶ Schelling (2008), p.143

The restoration of Jihad as a function of policy occurred as part of Mu'awiya's attempt to revive the '*Umar Doctrine*. A return to domestic political bargaining that focused upon the re-distribution of power amongst competing tribal factions in the aftermath of the *Fitna*, and the rebooting of the resettlement programme were the foundations of the Da'wa 2.0. demonstrating once again, that domestic political stability was the bedrock upon which Jihad and foreign policy, in general, required in order to function. Mu'awiya's restoration of the tribal *shura* council and military reforms in particular, were designed to promote and maintain domestic political stability and fortify his claims to legitimate leadership of the *dar al-Islam*.

8.1.3. Sub-Investigative Questions d.

- d. Is Jihad an instrument of aggression or offensive imperial ambitions? Can the early period of Islamic expansion be explained in a manner that demonstrates strategic coherence for the application of warfighting as a means of policy?

The primary objectives during the *maghazi* were situated in Arabia rendering a practical examination of this question fruitless. The implicit possibility that the domination of the tribal structure was intended as a run-up to controlling Arabia for the purposes of systemic expansion certainly appears to have been probable. However, the plausible intention and design for systemic projection is tied to the notion of *absolute Jihad* and a missionary cause of Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah*, during the *maghazi* period since systemic expansion would have been considered an extension of the Prophet's political objectives to bring Islam and the jurisdiction of the Shari'a.

Rather it is argued, that the quest for offense dominance began during Abu Bakr's administration. The continuation of the warfighting mentality from the *maghazi* period may well have resulted in an exaggeration of insecurity resulting in bellicose conduct, Van Evera states that it is often the case that actors 'are seldom as insecure as they think they are. Moreover, if they are insecure, this insecurity often grows from their own efforts to escape imagined insecurity.'¹⁷ However, if the mandate of the Prophet's mission was universal; then whether fear of insecurity were valid or not, the pacification of the Arabs as a prelude to systemic projection had always been an

¹⁷ Van Evera (2004), p.264

inevitable objective of the Muslim political leadership. The only real way to ascertain a strategically viable interpretation to this question is to investigate actual actions undertaken following the death of the Prophet until the end of our research period.

The administration of Abu Bakr we have negatively interpreted in relation to policies that were designed to serve offensive imperial ambitions. The Caliphate of ‘Umar, that is, the period of the *Futuh* and the official implementation of the Da’wa policy is the real investigative beginning point for sub-investigative question d. since the application of the Da’wa or the ‘*Umar Doctrine* remained virtually unchanged throughout the tenure of ‘Uthman until the hiatus induced by the *Fitna*.

During both administrations of ‘Umar and ‘Uthman, foreign policy was philosophically Islamic given its emancipatory goals,¹⁸ but also reflected the enduring characteristics of power politics and the pursuit for primacy amongst nations. Across both the administrations, Jihad was instrumentally employed according to the dictates of the Da’wa policy, which retained the controlling interest of Jihad, employing warfighting to retain the strategic initiative. The Da’wa policy was inextricably linked to the Caliph’s conception of political, territorial, and religious integrity, alongside security concerns. The ‘*Umar Doctrine* was created in response to the existing strategic setting and environment. It was designed to create domestic stability through systemic gains in the form of a series of calculated responses to identified strategic problems (sub-investigative question c.). Jihad sublimated potential insurrection into harnessed aggression and violence to be deployed at the frontiers, thus galvanising the nomads to raid and fight against a common enemy instead of one another. When Jihad began to dwindle, insurrection returned.

It was clear from the investigation that the observations investigated under sub-investigative question c. had a far greater impact and influence upon the development of the Da’wa policy. Whilst a politically manipulated *rhetoric of righteousness* certainly infused deployments with zeal to translate *absolute Jihad* through *Jihad fi sabil l’Allah*, it seems that this was clearly a development, and belief at the individual level of analysis (sub-investigative questions a. and b.).

¹⁸ Donner (1981), p.269

At the level of systemic interactions, realist assumptions of the strategic environment, such as anarchy and self-help, interpreted the Da'wa policy with greater clarity. In fact, it is hard not to see the strategic congruence of design, motivation, and coherence for the application of warfighting as a means of policy that were predicated upon the distinct assumptions of survival and security from the administrations of Abu Bakr to 'Uthman (632 – 656).

The imperial character of the Da'wa 2.0. was politically created and manipulated to induce the same effects that the *rhetoric of righteousness* had - to credit and legitimate the 'Umar Doctrine. In reality, the strategic investigation of the revived Da'wa policy during the Caliphate of Mu'awiya reveals that the policy was directed toward the new threat analysis and estimation, in the aftermath of the *Fitna*. Policy and the application of Jihad had, since the Caliphate of 'Umar, been consistently affected by the regional powers and with the end of the Sassanid Empire, the Muslims faced only Byzantium for regional dominance. Repetitive strategic interactions between the *dar al-Islam* and Byzantium resulted in shifting and changing dynamics with respect to preferences and strategies. General strategic assumptions generated under these circumstances were maintained with respect to Jihad as they had been with previous administrations.

It is in the context of Mu'awiya's politico-military reforms and domestic policies, that a comparison can be made with the model upon which he predicted his administration upon regarding Jihad as an instrument of offensive imperial ambitions. The following explanation also addresses the concern of research question 4. In chapter 5, regarding the administration of 'Umar, it was proposed that the Da'wa policy was a prudent means of protecting vital interests under conditions of self-help and an impending belief of reprisal attacks from the regional powers. To maintain the offensive strategic initiative and accumulate relative gains in an inherently hostile environment is a logical and strategically orientated policy with specific end-goals. In other words, as the Muslims entered the systemic space for the first time in their young history, as new actors in the strategic setting and with no experience of the systemic strategic environment, the adoption of the Da'wa policy (1.0.) was actually quite bold and sensible.

The new Imperial Da'wa policy (2.0.) designed by Mu'awiya held at its core the same assumptions of self-help, existential threat, and anarchy, but enshrined them as absolute and thus the belief that the permanent state of war reflected in *absolute Jihad* became an enduring political condition.¹⁹ The new Da'wa policy as a mode of imperial foreign policy in the seventh-century is still entirely understandable given the geo-political environment. The new Da'wa policy as a form of Islamic imperialism was not particularly different to the Hellenistic Byzantine or Zoroastrian Sassanid Empires who championed their religious ideologies to justify territorial expansionism and subjugation of the conquered.²⁰ Accordingly, an accusation of imperial ambitions would more than likely not have been recognised prior to Mu'awiya's reign since the language of the Da'wa had been constructed through a *rhetoric of righteousness* since the days of 'Umar. Furthermore, charges of 'aggression' could not be levied since ideals of *da'wa* as a means of emancipation was a divine right privileged to the Muslims by God. The Da'wa policy carried the metaphysical charge of humanitarian intervention sanctioned by God Himself.²¹

The consequent development of this new imperial policy in relation to *strategic dynamics* was to invest the office of the Caliph as permanently charged with the duty of translating the *absolute Jihad*.²² Thereafter, the early Muslim caliphate, according to Blankinship, more than any polity that had existed before it, was an ideological state, a state directed toward a single, unified ideological goal,²³ '... this imperative was the establishment of God's rule on the earth, for that was the sole legitimate sovereignty. God's rule was to be established by those kinds of efforts that He had ordained, which included armed struggle in His path.'²⁴ No longer could Jihad be championed to serve a homeland security policy, since Islam was not only the norm but obedience to the basic fundamentals had long been established. Additionally, the rhetoric of the Da'wa policy as a mechanism for emancipation had made such spectacular success already that a community emerging from civil war might well have been too conflict-weary to see the value in its continuation, preferring to consolidate what had already been achieved.

¹⁹ See Kamali (2006), pp.223-4; Zuhayli (1965), pp.130, 135; and Khadduri (1966), p.17

²⁰ Robinson (2005), p.60

²¹ See *Q*, 2:251

²² Robinson (2003), p.134

²³ Blankinship (1994), p.11

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p.1

This distinction between the new ‘imperial’ policy and the Da’wa policy of the ‘*Umar Doctrine*’, is the answer to sub-investigative question d. and is directly connected to the sense of *providentialism* raised by sub-investigative question b.; an aggressive and offense-dominant strategic intention required a policy that sought to escalate the offensive weapons capability of the *dar al-Islam*, but also an uncontested level of regional or even international superiority.

8.2. Research Questions 2 - 4

The sub-investigative questions tackled most of the specific issues that are raised when approaching the subject matter of Jihad from the perspective of the strategic approach. The findings of the following research questions are addressed in the context of the sub-investigative conclusions, and the overall pattern of the analysis.

8.2.1. Research Question 2

2. Can a consistent link be demonstrated to have existed so as to establish that the evolving *strategic dynamics* affected Jihad as a mechanism for policy?

The investigation as a whole has consistently demonstrated direct correlations between successive administrations and the application of Jihad as a mechanism for policy. The evolving *strategic dynamics* that accompanied some of the administrations is best explained by research question 4, and therefore we shall return to this point shortly. Suffice that the general investigative requirement of this research question has been clearly acknowledged throughout the investigation, demonstrating throughout the sub-investigative questions as well as the research questions, ample evidence of continuation.

8.2.2. Research Question 3

3. To what extent is Jihad and its development a consequence of religio-political circumstance? In other words, was strategic behaviour rooted in a set of strategic preferences and assumptions as the product of a religious worldview or, was Jihad largely determined as a result and consequence of the pressures and nature of the anarchic environment?

Offense-defense theory was used throughout this investigation to examine the validity of strategic interpretation to historical events, as they are known. Offense-defense analysis consistently revealed the horizontal nature of *Jihad fi sabil l'Allah* (distinct from *absolute Jihad*) during the *maghazi* period; and that *Jihad fi sabil l'Allah* was strategically directed and not religiously, or by the dictates of the theological imperative. *Jihad fi sabil l'Allah* was clearly a means of limited warfare not holy war. Whilst the initial raids were sanctioned by the Qur'an, the resulting guerrilla campaign was the product of a strictly means-ends calculus.

As the Muslims became increasingly successful in their battle against the Quraysh (post-Hudaybiyya), *Jihad fi sabil l'Allah*, that is, *Jihad* in reality or as a function of warfighting, became an increasingly offensive strategic instrument of political bargaining culminating in an overwhelming preponderance of latent violence that was used to secure a decisive victory in Mecca. In this sense, the term *diplomacy of violence* is the most befitting description of *Jihad fi sabil l'Allah* in its final form during the *maghazi*. Consequently, the mission of the Prophet was undoubtedly 'religious' (that is, vertically inclined) yet the means-ends calculus employed by the Prophet and his advisors was, more often than not, horizontally explored.

The predictions of offense-defense theory were consistent in explaining why an offensive character of diplomacy and bargaining was present throughout the *maghazi*, as well as highlighting the associated behaviours expected with politico-strategic decision-making. It was the nature of the tribal political structures and the anarchic conditions in Arabia that drove strategic interactions and designs over and above religious injunctions as we have elaborated upon during the investigation of sub-investigative questions a. and b.

The administration of Abu Bakr was a continuation of the politico-strategic designs of the Prophet, *by other means*. Once again, the crisis condition of the strategic setting and environment informed strategic action unquestionably, over and above religious ideals. Whilst the weight of personal faith or value-systems undeniably forged firm commitment (sub-investigative question b.), it is those elements of rational calculation and the instrumentalisation of force that were most apparent during this administration; as Schelling explains, '... what one does today in a crisis affects what

one can be expected to do tomorrow.²⁵ The overall calculi of Abu Bakr and his war council determined that the expected utility of violence had supreme efficacy in harmonising ends with military means.

The Pacification of Arabia extended to the northern grasslands bordering the Byzantine and Sassanid empires. Extending regional security meant de-escalating the military instrument to meet the limited nature of the use of the engagement. The recalibration of Jihad to limited warfare simultaneously induced a state of brinkmanship between the Muslims and the regional powers. Brinkmanship is a function of VUCA, and uncertainty about neighbours always exists, thus by extending the regional security Abu Bakr was also raising the manipulation of risks associated to limited war as he had done during the *Ridda Wars*.

Although a risky strategy, it was politically sound. Schelling argues that brinkmanship strategies often seek to advance risky behaviours especially with regards to territory since '[n]ot all the frontiers and thresholds are precisely defined, fully reliable, and known to be so beyond the least temptation to test them out, to explore for loopholes, or to take a chance that they may be disconnected this time.'²⁶ The offense-defense diagnosis supports the strategic interpretation of Abu Bakr's extended security policy. This geostrategic expansion of the military effort was a continuation of strategic projection and design that would have the greatest weight upon the *strategic dynamics* of Jihad and the prime directives for its employment through subsequent administrations as it began a 'domino effect' in the region. Once again, Jihad *fi sabil l'Allah* and not *absolute Jihad* guided the utility and employment of warfighting capabilities as a subordinated instrument of policy.

The majority of variables that influenced the offensive warfighting actions during 'Umar's administration were secondary variables inherited from the previous administration or as a direct consequence of the strategic setting and environment both domestic and systemic. Undoubtedly, the theological imperatives of the Islamic meta-narrative and *absolute Jihad* gave meaning and credibility to the new foreign policy of Da'wa, but only after developments had occurred and not before.

²⁵ Schelling (2008), p.93

²⁶ Ibid.

In other words, the official policy of Da'wa certainly conveyed the tendency to conduct strategic behaviour inclined towards a set of strategic preferences and assumptions as the product of a religious worldview but was practiced horizontally as a result and consequence of the pressures and nature of the anarchic environment. *Absolute Jihad* would have demanded the zero-sum concept of victory that was clearly not adopted. Instead, 'Umar adopted a nonzero-sum concept of victory as an acceptable political baseline calculation. Political goals were primarily a consequence of the domestic strategic setting, and secondarily, a matter of strategic preference managed according to a strict means and ends calculus of expected utility.

The offense-defense diagnostics were clear in demonstrating the increasing predilection of Jihad as an offensive military instrument serving a political programme of security protocols as part of a *strategy of conflict*. And although a teleological consequence of Islam,²⁷ Jihad had been a product of the rise of the *dar al-Islam*, and not a cause for it.²⁸ As the Caliphates of Abu Bakr and 'Umar demonstrated, Jihad as warfighting (*qital*) - *fi sabil l'Allah* - was part of 'a long and deliberate process of political consolidation'²⁹ and not a frenzied force of religious fervour.

The Caliphate of 'Uthman, during its first period, was a continuation of the Da'wa policy on all fronts with little to no amendments. Although the introduction of a standing naval fleet did enrich the Muslim military capabilities and open new avenues of exploitation; there were little to no signs or symptoms that religious preferences played any role in the determination of policy choices or military action. Instead, expected patterns of strategic behaviour anticipated, according to the prime predictions of offense-defense theory, were exhibited.³⁰ The emergence of a new crisis environment within the domestic strategic setting was the catalyst to deflate the escalating offense-dominant approach of the Da'wa policy, as internal insurrections crippled the ability of central administrations to focus upon foreign policy. The outbreak of civil war saw the return of blind forces dominating the strategic setting, as tribal politics overshadowed foreign policy.

²⁷ As established by sub-investigative question b.

²⁸ Donner (1981), pp.295-6, fn.31

²⁹ Ibid., p.118

³⁰ Van Evera (2004), p.244

The socio-political grievances of tribal factions became the primary cause that halted the Jihad on all fronts. This indirectly reinforces the offense-defense diagnostic findings of the case investigation since Jihad had been determined as a result and consequence of the pressures and nature of both the domestic setting and the broader anarchic environment. In other words, religion had not directed Jihad horizontally neither did it bring it to a halt. The interim administration of ‘Ali further ratified this conclusion, since it was clear that appeals to re-ignite Jihad domestically fell on deaf ears since claims to authorise its use had been separate from foreign policy.

It was in our final case study, the administration of Mu‘awiya, that the marriage of the variables proposed in research question 3 took place. The outwardly religious exhortation of the Da’wa policy 2.0. was, in effect, an exercise in political misdirection and a means to increase credibility and personal legitimacy within the domestic strategic setting. At the systemic level, the revival of the Da’wa policy was wholly a reaction to the pressures of the anarchic environment. Mu‘awiya’s effort to champion the *absolute Jihad* and the Manifest Destiny of the *dar al-Islam* through a new imperial agenda was a strategic development, and not religious.

Damping the blind forces of passion by military recruitment, the accumulation of war booty and tax revenues to maintain ongoing military operations, whilst simultaneously managing systemic threats, were the primary reasons for the formulation of the imperial agenda. The *rhetoric of righteousness*, and the invitation for God to judge between the Muslims and their enemies, were part of Mu‘awiya’s strategic design to advance his political objectives. The ‘weaponising’ of *absolute Jihad* by invoking God’s Providence was a skillful political manipulation of the Islamic meta-narrative to serve domestic political interests.

Hence across all six administrations of government the *signs* and *symptoms* of the offense-defense variables were consistently supportive in explaining politico-strategic decision-making and their consequences. The escalating drive of the *dar al-Islam* towards offense dominance in the region was clearly predicted according to expected strategic behaviours of offense-defense theory, and consistent in validating the strategic interpretations advanced during the investigation.

8.2.3. Research Question 4

4. Can the *strategic dynamics* of Jihad explain the offensive military conquests of Islamic history within the remit of policy to facilitate a coherent explanation for the origin and evolution of warfighting?

The investigation, which charted the *strategic dynamics* of Jihad over a 70-year period, has confirmed the prime predictions of offense-defense theory. Jihad was employed in a warfighting capacity to consistently advance the interests of the Islamic movement or the *dar al-Islam* when the strategic initiative was attained. When the strategic initiative was lacking, as during the Meccan phase of the *maghazi*, warfighting was not employed.³¹ As the offense grew stronger for the Muslims, they increasingly escalated in their resort to the military instrument in the name of Jihad, initiating a guerrilla campaign during the *maghazi* and seeking defensive expansionism by means of extended security under conditions of perceived vulnerability during the Caliphate of Abu Bakr. The policy of Da'wa promoted the notion of emancipatory interventionism but was more clearly identified as being a means to maintain and enhance the offensive strategic initiative during the administrations of 'Umar and 'Uthman.

During the Caliphate of Mu'awiya, the new policy of Da'wa was an attempt to regain the perceived loss, or at least the diminishing, strategic initiative.³² During periods of offense dominance, such as during the *Futuh*, the Muslims never relinquished the strategic initiative that reflected a sense of Providence and continued mission to promote the supremacy of God's Will on earth.³³ From these investigative conclusions, it is clear that the early employment of Jihad in its warfighting capacity was distinctly offense-orientated to achieving an offense-dominant status in relation to other actors, and hence sought regional hegemony.

³¹ Prediction 1. - War will be more common in periods when conquest is easy or is believed easy, less common when conquest is difficult or is believed difficult;

³² Prediction 2. - States that have or believe they have large offensive opportunities or defensive vulnerabilities will initiate and fight more wars than other states;

³³ Prediction 3. - A state will initiate and fight more wars in periods when it has, or thinks that it has, larger offensive opportunities and defensive capabilities

Below (Figure 3.) is an overview of the strategic reconstruction of the dynamics involved and those characteristic features that were connected to the application and the development of those policies, which regulated its military function and utility.

Period	Features	Policy	Warfare	Dynamic evolution
1. <i>Maghazi</i> 610-632	<i>Absolute Jihad</i>	<i>da'wa</i> (Diplomacy of Violence)	Guerrilla Warfare	<i>Nisus</i> or <i>Jihad fi sabil l'Allah</i>
2. Abu Bakr 632-634	<i>Ridda Wars</i>	Homeland Security (Art of Commitment)	Counter-Revolt and Border Control	Security threat and Self-Help
3. 'Umar & 'Uthman 634-656	<i>Futuh</i> & <i>Bughat</i>	Da'wa (Strategy of Conflict)	Defensive Expansionism / Counter –Insurgency	Emancipation and Political Stability
4. Mu'awiya 661-680	Holy War	Imperial Da'wa (Dynamics of Mutual Alarm)	Conventional Warfare	'Nationalised Jihad' and Imperial Agenda

Figure 3. - The Strategic Dynamics of Jihad to Policy

The evolving *strategic dynamics* of Jihad consistently reflects the state of the strategic environment, setting, and the interaction between actors, such that direct and indirect outcomes had net consequences for the system as a whole. This meant that each administration of the *dar al-Islam* was never truly acting according to an independent will,³⁴ even when dictating the strategic initiative through Jihad. Instead, we see a continuum of operations and policies both internal and external, which kept administrations always reacting or making decisions in response to events taking place or having had occurred; this being true for all actors within the operational strategic environment, because anarchy is concomitant with interdependence.

³⁴ Villacres & Bassford (1995), p.14

For example, during the *Futuh*, the predilection of invoking variables to achieve offense-dominance in the short-term were extremely high because strategic interactions were intended to be unique, thereby avoiding considerations of cooperative preferences or strategies for decisive victory. Hence, during the later stages of ‘Uthman’s administration and throughout that of Mu‘awiya, the effects of continued battle with Byzantium resulted in mid-to-long term strategies, as opposed to the high-risk short-term offense dominant strategies of the first two Caliphates. Though imperial in its swagger, continued indecisive military campaigns and a series of frontier stalemates created the beginnings of hostile-cooperative diplomatic contacts between the *dar al-Islam* and Byzantium.

The outwardly aggressive re-ignition of Jihad to strike at Byzantium on all fronts was actually a battle between ‘defense dominant’ orientated opponents. Strategically interpreted, Jihad as directed by Da’wa 2.0. was driven to maintain control of the tactical initiative as a prelude to the strategic. The outward description of events as presented by historians might suggest the opposite, however the logic of strategy demands that the overall strategy that directs the tactical efficiency of military operations are examined and judged by their ability to achieve political ends.³⁵ The tactical operations of Jihad directed by Da’wa 2.0. clearly revealed a strategy that did not seek decisive battle, instead force was scattered, rather than concentrated; and defense dominant strategies replaced the offense dominant perception for the first time in Islamic history. Nonetheless the *cult of the offensive* remained, as defense was sought in the mindset of the offensive. Luttwak’s expression ‘Great-State Autism’ is the most illustrative in this context as he explains:

In all great states there is so much internal activity that leaders and opinion-makers cannot focus *seriously* on foreign affairs as well, except in particular times of crisis. ... decisions on foreign affairs are almost always made on the basis of highly simplified, schematic representations of unmanageably complex realities,

³⁵ Smith (1997), p. 102

which are then distorted to fit within internally generated categories, expectations, and perspectives.³⁶

The Da'wa 2.0. 'nationalised' Jihad and became an essential element of Muslim political unity and identity as Mu'awiya appealed to the glory of the *Futuh*, and invoked *absolute Jihad*, *paradoxically* not to conquer, but to create a status quo condition and bolster a deterrent capability against Byzantium.³⁷ Simply put, Jihad was employed offensively as the best way to defend the vulnerabilities of the *dar al-Islam*.

In conclusion, the evolving *strategic dynamics* distinctly reveals that as a means of limited war, Jihad was no different to any other form of warfare (sub-investigative question a.), in that, it demonstrated a consistent failure to impose enduring political results from decisive military victories. Most of the military victories of the *maghazi* period were politically over-turned once the Prophet died. Abu Bakr's military victories during the *Ridda* Wars ended in semi-permanent results on account of tribal extinction or decimation. The political operation of 'Umar to absorb the security policy into the Da'wa policy was predicated upon projecting limited war to the frontiers; an exercise with successful political victories that were short lived. After 'Umar died revolts took place both within the *dar al-Islam* and external to it, diminishing the success that had been accrued before it.

These short-term results are perhaps unsurprising since, as Schelling so writes: 'To engage in limited war is to start rocking the boat, to set in motion a process that is not altogether in one's control.'³⁸ The *strategic dynamics* of Jihad were largely determined by horizontal domestic stability as much as the pressures of systemic anarchy, over and before vertical imperatives, which explains the offensive military conquests of Islamic history within the remit of policies that were designed with a high estimation in the efficacy of warfighting to realise political ends.

³⁶ Luttwak (2012), pp.13-14

³⁷ On mutual dynamics and deterrence as a means of warding off premeditated war or 'accidental war' see Schelling (2008), pp.221, 230-1

³⁸ Schelling (2008), pp.105-6

8.3. Research Question 1

1. Is Jihad *is a continuation of politik by other means*; that is to ask the question therefore, what is the link between *politik* (policy and politics) and the application of force in the name of Jihad?

Finally we arrive to the central research question and prime agenda of this thesis. Clausewitz wrote ‘If we keep in mind that war springs from some political purpose, it is natural that the prime cause of its existence will remain the supreme consideration in conducting it.’³⁹ The political purposes of Jihad have been revealed horizontally on the plane of war in reality, as the *idiom of military action*, in other words, as a *warfighting capability*. Proposition one and two of the strategic paradigm states that war and warfighting are considered core parts of human social relations, and on the basis of strategic observation we have demonstrated that Jihad was a continued political instrument employed to serve the political interests of a social unit, whether an organised political polity, a tribe, or a prophet. ‘Nations, like people, [and tribes]’ Schelling writes, ‘are continually engaged in demonstrations of resolve, tests of nerve, and explorations for understandings and misunderstandings’;⁴⁰ that is, engaged in the bargaining exercise of politics.

This study has investigated six successive administrations of the earliest Islamic political administrations as case studies to explore the relationship between the function of Jihad and *politik*. The results have demonstrated that the application of Jihad *fi sabil l’Allah* was consistently in harmony with the propositions of the strategic paradigm (and thus strategic theory in general), and strategic interactions examined in the context of offense-defense theory; demonstrating congruity with our thesis that the origin and evolution of Jihad was the product of rational calculation and the strategic instrumentalisation of Jihad *fi sabil l’Allah* as a *warfighting capability* to serve the interests of the early Islamic movement. As a warfighting capability, the purposes for which Jihad *fi sabil l’Allah* was employed resonated with existing practices of war according to the *Ayyam al-‘Arab* traditions.

³⁹ Schelling (2008), p.87

⁴⁰ Ibid., p.93

Haykal identifies 30 pre-Islamic applications of warfighting for the interests of policy from the *Ayyam al-‘Arab* traditions. Having condensed the list into 20 applications of pre-Islamic warfighting and tabulating these against applications of Jihad below reveals common patterns of warfighting. The congruence of Arab warfighting practices to Jihad exposes the commonality of practice on account of sharing objectives in service of limited warfare.

Form of Warfighting	Pre-Islamic Period	<i>Maghazi</i> 610-632	Abu Bakr 632-634	‘Umar 634-644	‘Uthman 644-656	‘Ali 656-661	Mu‘awiya 661-680
Acquisition of material wealth	✓			✓	✓		✓
Differences in <i>Assabiyyah</i> or as a missionary means	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
Contests for political authority	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
Geo-strategic contests for land	✓			✓	✓		✓
The suppression of internal insurrection	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓
Interference in the internal affairs of other nations	✓			✓	✓		✓
Regional hegemony	✓		✓	✓	✓		✓
Class warfare	✓	✓		✓		✓	✓
Internal Unification	✓		✓		✓	✓	✓
Wars of liberation	✓	✓		✓	✓		✓
Wars of succession	✓		✓			✓	
Status quo balancing	✓				✓	✓	✓
Protecting foreign interests	✓				✓		
Breaking treaties	✓	✓			✓		✓
Coercion to form alliances	✓	✓		✓	✓		✓
Political entrapment	✓	✓					✓
Pre-emptive strikes	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓		✓
Foreign and separatist interventions	✓		✓		✓		
Internal rectification	✓	✓	✓		✓	✓	✓
War by proxy	✓						
Total Variables	20	9	9	9	16	7	16

The generally shared practice of limited warfare⁴¹ supports the thesis that Jihad was, like war in general, a continuation of policy by other means. Clausewitz states, 'Policy, then will permeate all military operations, and in so far as their violent nature will admit, it will have a continuous influence on them'.⁴² The warfighting orientations of the Muslims differed according to time and place, resulting in Jihad being employed across a variety of policies. It is clear that the instrumental nature of Jihad, like all forms of strategic violence, 'always stands in need of guidance and justification through the end it pursues. And what needs justification by something else cannot be the essence of anything.'⁴³ In this respect, the teleological connection between Jihad as a translation of *absolute Jihad* in service of political ends is most meaningful. In other words, *absolute Jihad* authorised horizontal translation into policy.

The common denominator of limited war between Jihad and the *Ayyam al-'Arab* traditions is rendered separate once the aims of policy are explored. Jihad was authorised and subordinated to policy only if policies were themselves congruent and in harmony with the Islamic meta-narrative or its ideals and injunctions, i.e. the Qur'an, or by precedent of the Prophet, through word or deed.⁴⁴ From the strategic investigation of this study, the following inferences regarding policy can be made based upon the six case studies explored: Policies that are the result of referent objects of Islam, such as in defence of the jurisdiction of God, territorial integrity, or the Muslim body politic at large; are all commensurate threats that can be used to initiate Jihad. Policies that are designed to enhance the security of these objects, or to promote the supremacy of the Shari'a, or are in service of emancipatory interventionism are also justifiable.⁴⁵

Politics, that are *bargaining exercises* for the promotion or security of domestic and trinitarian harmony, are also variables that Jihad may be commissioned to service. This includes, the pacification of internal rebellion, insurgencies or terrorism.⁴⁶ Jihad

⁴¹ The *Ridda Wars* having been the sole exception, alongside the inferred assumption that unlimited war would be waged in the face of an impacting existential threat.

⁴² *OW*, p.87

⁴³ Arendt (1970), p.51

⁴⁴ Research Question 3

⁴⁵ Research Question 4

⁴⁶ Sub-Investigative Question c.

was not commissioned to serve ambitions that fell beyond the concern of the Shari‘a or were in contradistinction to it, its aims, ideals, or the general meta-narrative of Islam.⁴⁷ Warfighting was considered the highest function of Jihad *fi Sabil l’Allah*, although it is clear that as a function of *politik*, the early Muslim movement was ‘total’ in its worldview.

Hence, Jihad *fi Sabil l’Allah* was a part of the ‘total war’ of *absolute Jihad* expounded in the Qur’an and the meta-narrative between Truth and Falsehood, in which all Muslims had a role to play, warfighting being the highest.⁴⁸ Jihad therefore was teleologically linked to Islam via *absolute Jihad*,⁴⁹ but altered in its application given the evolving *strategic dynamics* of the setting and environment and the nature of the anarchic systemic environment.⁵⁰ Jihad was the *idiom of military action* during the first 70 years of Islam, and as such, it was the continuation of *politik* by other means.

8.4. Final Remarks

Clausewitz writes that the ‘primary purpose of any theory is to clarify concepts and ideas that have become confused and entangled.’⁵¹ Concepts and ideas pertaining to the matter of Jihad have become, as discussed in Chapter One, as confused and entangled as they have become academically stagnant. It is customary today that the more benevolent and co-operative expression of diplomacy and conviviality is what most Muslims (and some non-Muslims) would like to believe was the norm between the *dar al-Islam* and their neighbours; but it was the quest for *offense-dominance* and the strategic initiative that most accurately reflects the competitive state of political affairs during the first 70 years of Islamic history.

The early Muslim community was forged in the crucible of war. The history of early Islam is one of Trinitarian successes but more often of consistent failures to balance internal rectification and external power management as the *cult of the offensive* increasingly dominated policy.⁵² Consequently, from guerrilla warfare, to an

⁴⁷ Sub-Investigative Question d.

⁴⁸ Sub-Investigative Question a.

⁴⁹ Sub-Investigative Question b.

⁵⁰ Research Question 2

⁵¹ *OW*, p.132

⁵² Quigley (2013), pp.731-3

instrument of security, and then as an instrument in service of a strategy of systemic conflict, Jihad, *like a chameleon*, reveals itself as a structurally fluid and philosophically instrumentalised mechanism of *realpolitik*. The dynamic application of Jihad was a result of the strategic environment, and in response to the behaviour of the *dar al-Islam*'s adversaries. In other words, the policies which directed Jihad, and its military expression, found *realpolitik* behaviour by adapting to the nature of the anarchic systemic level of international relations and war.

This investigation has clearly demonstrated the following: the Prophet and successive administrations employed Jihad in accordance with their politico-strategic calculus of means and ends within their respective strategic environments and settings. *Absolute Jihad* served as a theo-philosophical foundation that legitimated, calibrated, and justified policy, but never dictated the horizontal application of force. Jihad was subject to the variables of VUCA as any other forms of warfare might be, and consistently served as an instrument of policy between 610-680 in an increasingly offense-dominant *warfighting capability*.

8.5. Areas of Continuing Research

Pre-legal Islam, that is, before the fall of the Umayyad Caliphate (~750), operated without any set 'Islamic' military doctrine, or any specific formulation of warfighting which is identifiably 'Islamic'. There were however, specific challenges to 'Muslim' security and strategic interests. Hence, a broadly articulated form of security thinking and strategic practice developed that would later direct legal developments in the Muslim world. The codification of legal opinions formulated on the conduct of Jihad was an attempt by jurists to reconstruct the warfighting practices during the periods we have examined primarily, but also broadly up until their own time periods.

Politics and law are deeply connected in Islam; yet it was the political discourse that dominated the early strategic development of theory and application of Jihad before the legal.⁵³ In this pre-legal paradigm period, Jihad was not constrained or directed by law but by *politik*. Therefore, the most salient and obvious area of research that this

⁵³ Cook (2005), pp.11, 19-21

study reveals are those areas that relate to the transition between pre-legal, or politico-strategic Jihad, and the legal paradigm of Jihad that is well-known today.

By pre-dating the development of the legal institution in Islam, areas of further study are abundant, and can include but are not restricted to, primarily a systematic study of the Prophet's politico-strategic and military career in the context of revolutionary war; military operations, guerrilla warfare theory; and broader themes of missionary emancipation, theo-political sovereignty and models of theocratic governance. In particular, the politico-strategic response and aggressive military stance of the *Ridda* Wars proved difficult for later Islamic scholarship and jurists to rationalise and justify.⁵⁴ Traditional attempts have never fully satisfied anyone, and modern research in the area feeds off the same insufficient works. Hence, an in-depth analysis of the *Ridda* campaigns, including operational and tactical analysis, as a means to exposing the first form of non-Prophetic warfighting in Islam that laid the foundations for later legal codification and legislation for foreign policy, and military action, such as pre-emptive warfighting and targeted killing, amongst others, is a potential treasure trove of strategic study in the making.

An entire study, or series of studies, can be envisioned to cover the administrative and military reforms during the Caliphate of 'Umar and the socio-political influence of the period on early Islamic politico-strategic thought. Identifying distinctive assumptions of Jihad embedded in the developing spatial narrative⁵⁵ (the *dar al-harb* and *dar al-Islam* dichotomy) during the *Futuh* is an exciting prospect for elaboration; as too would be coverage of institutional developments such as the constituents of the 'Umar Doctrine, the emergence of Islamic naval power, the establishments of the *shurta* (police) and *haras* (close and secret services); the judiciary and their growing influence as scholasticism grew.

Strategic theory has revealed the importance of contextualising an actor's value system into any strategic analysis. Often writers would rather do without the

⁵⁴ Madelung (2001), pp.48-9; and Abou El Fadl (2001)

⁵⁵ See Lefebvre (1991); also de Certeau (1984), pp.115-30; and Pred (1990), p.50.

consideration of the abstract or supernatural, but to accept their existence as variables in the decision-making processes of actors is not to impose beliefs upon oneself, which all too often is the reason for their neglect. Strategic theory, being pragmatic accepts that if an actor believes something to be true then there is great value in accepting this belief in subsequent analysis. Often the temptation is to ignore the belief or to wish it away through scientific explanation or interpretation. Hence, research specifically investigating the *providentialism* associated with Jihad is especially pertinent given the parallels to the rallying calls of Jihad by non-state actors and the associated effects of violence as a result. Indeed, whilst studies have been conducted in the areas of intra-Muslim violence, these are almost always working within the later legal paradigm and thus are post-facto revisions of selective interpretations.

In the midst of sustained interest in areas of Islam and violence (radicalisation, extremism, terrorism, etc.) this study stands alone as being the first to have not only distinguished Jihad from legal interpretation, but in doing so, made Jihad a strategically intelligible concept and an accessible area of research for further study by those in academia, the military, or broader fields of social sciences and politics.

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